


Varieties of Political Regimes (Va-PoReg)



Country Reports Si-Z

Principal investigator: Steffen Kailitz

Contact: steffen.kailitz@mailbox.tu-dresden.de

Hannah Arendt Institute for Totalitarianism Studies, Dresden

Research assistance (at various points in time):

Natalia Bachmann, Maximilian von Boehm-Bezing, Naomi Braun, Tobias Genswein, Andre Günther, Pauline Degirmenci, Dora Gergis, Nicole Husemann, Merle Kaup, Lisa-Marie Lucke, Luisa Meier, Katharina Mette, Ines Meyer, Philipp Nulsch, Jakob Ochsenkühn, Priscilla Pirschle, Leonhard Pitz, Paula Schrank, Johannes Wichert, Malina Witzenrath, Daniel Wünsche

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Overview

The following country reports are part of the Va-PoReg supplementary materials. We provide these materials to transparently trace how we have classified political regimes between 1900 and the present. For details on regime classification, please consult the codebook. The countries and territories covered by the dataset are listed in alphabetical order in the document. In each case, the history of political regimes in the named territory from 1900 to the most recent cut-off date (currently 07/01/2025) is listed. The description begins in each case with an entry starting 01/01/1900. This is followed in each case by the regime type at that time. The time at which this regime began is indicated in square brackets behind it. All following entries indicate the end of a regime and the start of a new regime. The entries conclude with a note indicating which regime was continued at the last cut-off date, specifically 07/01/2025. Please note that regime periods which begin after 07/01 of year x and end before 07/01 of the following year appear in the following regime narratives but not in the country-year dataset. If the regime type is mentioned in brackets after protectorate, this always refers to the country that is a protectorate. If after colony a regime type is mentioned in brackets, this refers to the colonizing country if it is mentioned first.

Acronyms for datasets

AF	Anckar and Fredriksson (2020, Political Regimes of the World Dataset, v.2.0)
BMR	Boix, Miller, and Rosato
BR	Bjørnskov and Rode (2019)
CEI	Clean Elections Index (V-Dem)
CGV	Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland
EF&FI	Elections Free and Fair Index (V-Dem)
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
FH	Freedom House
GWF	Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018)
LIED	Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy, dataset v6.4 (2022)
MCM	Magaloni, Chu, and Min (2013, Autocracies of the world)
PCLI	Political and Civil Liberties Index (V-Dem)
REIGN	Rulers, Elections and Irregular Governance Dataset
RoW	Regimes of the World

Other abbreviations

EU	European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
USA	United States of America

Slovakia

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Hungary, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 08/29/1526]: Since the 10th century, the territory of what is later known as Slovakia, belonged to the Hungarians. In the battle of Mohacs in 1526, Hungary lost parts of its territory against the Ottoman Empire. As a result, present day Slovakia became a part of the Habsburg Empire.¹ Only when the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated in 1918, Slovakia got a new ruler.²

10/28/1918 End Part of Other Country [Hungary, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Part of Other Country [Czechoslovakia, Democratizing regime]: On this date, the Territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were declared independent and some of them formed the Czechoslovak Republic, including todays Slovakia.³ The Czechoslovak Constitution adopted on 02/29/1920 guaranteed universal suffrage.⁴

03/14/1939 End Part of Other Country [Czechoslovakia]/Start Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy [as Protectorate of Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: On this date, Slovakia became the Slovak Republic and declared independence from Czechoslovakia. Instead, it became a client state of Nazi Germany.⁵ The country was ruled by Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, a clerical-fascist party, as a one-party state. Elections were scheduled for 1943, but they did not take place, consolidating the parties power grip.⁶ The government played a central role in regulating and

¹ https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Moh%C3%A1cs

² <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slovakia>

³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Czechoslovak_Republic

⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage; <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22336586/the-1920-constitution-rooted-democracy-and-womens-suffrage-in-czechoslovakia.html>

⁵ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slovak_Republic_\(1939%E2%80%931945\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slovak_Republic_(1939%E2%80%931945))

⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slovak_People%27s_Party

controlling the economy. For example, it established a number of cartels and monopolies, and it also imposed strict controls on wages and prices. The regime was characterized by a strong emphasis on nationalism and antisemitism, Tiso cooperated with Germany in the deportation of Jews, overseeing the transfer of numerous Slovak Jews to extermination and concentration camps in Germany and German-occupied Poland. Additionally, some Jews within Slovakia were directly subjected to acts of violence resulting in their deaths.⁷ However, the party was marked by internal conflicts. Two separate wings had emerged, the radicals wanted to establish a more radical fascist regime, modeled after Nazi Germany, whereas the conservatives pursued a mildly more moderate, but still fascist, way. When it looked like the conservative wing would win, Nazi Germany intervened and appointed a new Prime Minister, Vojtech Tuka. In 1941 the conservatives won the power struggle. Germany accepted the situation, because they needed a successful example of a satellite state.⁸ LIED does not provide any data during the specified period. In this period, V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties were absent. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

04/03/1945 End Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy [as Protectorate of Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [Czechoslovakia, Communist Ideocracy]: For the regime in this period see **Czechoslovakia**. The Prague Spring of 1968, initiated by Slovak leader Alexander Dubček, was partly motivated by a desire for greater Slovak autonomy within Czechoslovakia. Following the suppression of the Prague Spring, the federalization of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a key development for Slovakia, leading to the formation of the Slovak Socialist Republic. This gave Slovakia more self-governance, although the real power still remained with the central communist party in Prague. Slovakia, with its strong Catholic tradition, had a tense relationship with the officially atheist communist regime. The government suppressed religious institutions and tried to limit the influence of the Church, which was a significant cultural and social force in Slovakia. The communist regime in Slovakia, as in the rest of Czechoslovakia, controlled and censored the media, literature, and the arts, promoting Soviet-style socialist realism. Slovak culture and language, however, were promoted in an attempt to build a unified socialist national identity. This was a departure from the pre-war era, where Slovak culture often played a secondary role to Czech culture in the combined state. One of the major shifts was the transformation of Slovakia from a predominantly agrarian society to a more

⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jozef_Tiso

⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slovak_People%27s_Party

industrial one. Before the communist era, the majority of Slovakia's population was engaged in agriculture. However, by the end of the communist period, only a small percentage of all employees continued to work in agriculture. This shift was accompanied by rapid urbanization and the creation of new employment opportunities (Londák/Londáková 2011). LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Slovakia before 1993.

01/01/1993 End Part of Other Country [Czechoslovakia, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, independence was declared (Marshall 2018b). The country has a unicameral parliament (National Council), with delegates elected for four-year terms based on proportional representation. The president, who is the head of state, is elected by direct popular vote for a five-year term.⁹ Slovakia's parliamentary structure involves routine multiparty elections and peaceful transitions of power among competing parties. In 1994, Vladimir Meciar, who was prime minister of a nationalist minority government, lost a vote of no confidence and resigned. However, in the next elections the oppositional parties were not able to form a coalition against the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), thus Meciar of the HZDS again became prime minister, this time in a left-right coalition with the Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS) and the Slovak National Party (SNS). In 1997, the opposition parties (the Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Union, the Democratic Party, the Green Party and the Social Democratic Party) formed the “blue coalition”, which would later be formalized as the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK).¹⁰ According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for the year 1993 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. As per FH's classification for the years 1994 to 1995, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. As classified by FH in the period 1996-1997, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. Per FH, for 1998, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED the elections are classified constantly as competitive since the country's independence. Since 1994 Slovakia's election fully represent overall freedom and fairness by V-Dem's EF&FI. In addition, V-Dem's CEI reports constantly cleanliness for the elections since 1993. Regarding the political liberties LIED views them as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were present. From 1993 to 1997, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third

⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Slovakia

¹⁰ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Slovakia_R: 1, Slovakia_V: 1.

intermediate category. In 1993 and 1998, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Between 1994 and 1997, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. While PRC classifies the regime as a semidemocracy between 1993 and 1998, all other regime datasets (like BMR, CGV, GWF, HTW) classify the regime in this period as a democracy. 09/25[&26]/1998 End Defective Democracy/Start Liberal Democracy: On this date parliamentary elections took place. The HZDS claimed victory and became the largest party in the parliament but were unable to form a coalition. Thus, the newly formed SDK announced their ambition to form a government, leading to the resignation of Meciar as prime minister. The SDK, consisting of five parties, came to power with the support of three other parties, the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), the Hungarian Alliance (SMK) and the Party of Democratic Understanding (SOP), and Mikuláš Dzurinda became prime minister. In preparation for the national elections in 2002, Dzurinda formed a new coalition called the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU), which was composed different to the SDK, and won again. He stayed in office through 2006, when national elections led to the victory of the Direction – Social Democracy (Smer-SD) under Robert Fico, which was founded in 2002.¹¹ Although civil liberties are typically upheld, democratic institutions face challenges due to persistent discrimination against Roma communities and escalating political animosity towards migrants and refugees. Moreover, political corruption continues to pose a significant issue.¹² On 09/30/2023 early parliamentary elections were held, from which the left-wing nationalist party Direction, Social Democracy (Smer-SD) emerged as the party with the most votes, while Progressive Slovakia (PS) came second and Voice, Social Democracy (Hlas-SD) third.¹³ A three-party coalition consisting of Smer-SD, Hlas-SD and the Slovak National Party was formed under prime minister Robert Fico.¹⁴ As per FH's classification for this regime period, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this whole period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For 1998 LIED identifies political liberties as absent. For the rest of the relevant period, LIED identifies political liberties as present, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were present. Since 1998,

¹¹ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Slovakia_R: 1, Slovakia_V: 1-2

¹² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/slovakia/freedom-world/2022>;

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Slovakia_2017?lang=en

¹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Slovak_parliamentary_election

¹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fico%27s_Fourth_Cabinet

based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. FH viewed Slovakia as free in this period.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Mikus 1963, Rybář 2010, Saxonberg 2001)

Slovenia

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Austria, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 05/12/1797]: After the dissolution of the Republic of Venice on 05/12/1797¹⁵, the Venetian Slovenia was passed to the Austrian Empire. The Slovenia was part of the French-administered Illyrian Provinces established by Napoleon, the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary.¹⁶ In the 1890s political parties were formed, including the Progressive (Liberal) Party, the Socialist Party, and the Slovene People's Party. During World War I, Slovenes fighting in the Austrian army suffered huge losses against the Italians in incessant battles of attrition along the Soča front. In 03/1917 deputies in the Austrian Reichsrat forwarded a declaration in favor of Trialism, in that context, it signified the consolidation of all regions of the monarchy populated by South Slavs into a single independent political entity, under the rule of the Habsburg dynasty.¹⁷

12/01/1918 End Part of Other Country [Austria, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Constitutional Monarchy]: On this date the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later Kingdom of Yugoslavia, was established. The idea of Trialism, an ideal of a partnership between South Slavs, Austrians, and Hungarians fell victim to the collapse of Austria-Hungary due to World War I.¹⁸

04/08/1941 End Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy and Italy, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: In April 1941 the Kingdom was occupied and partitioned between Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria and their client regimes.¹⁹ Slovenia was the only present-day European nation that was trisected and completely annexed into both Nazi Germany and Fascist

¹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall_of_the_Republic_of_Venice

¹⁶ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slovenia>

¹⁷ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Slovenia/The-Middle-Ages>

¹⁸ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Slovenia/The-Middle-Ages>

¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Yugoslavia

Italy during World War II. Fascist Italy occupied south-central Slovenia, which was renamed the Province of Ljubljana, while Nazi Germany took over the northern and eastern parts of the country. Resistance started against the two occupational powers. In return Italian violence against the Slovene civilian population escalated. The Italian authorities deported some 25,000 people to concentration camps, which equaled 7.5% of the population of their occupation zone. After the Italian ‘Armistice of Cassibile’ on 09/03/1943, the Germans took over both the Province of Ljubljana and the Slovenian Littoral, incorporating them into what was known as the operation zone of Adriatic coastal region.²⁰ LIED does not provide any data during this specified period.

05/09/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy and Italy, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Communist Ideocracy]: On this day, the German surrender marked the end of the occupation of the Slovenian territories, of which roughly 70% had been occupied by German forces. On 03/07/1945, and during the retreat of the German forces, a government dominated by Tito and the communists was established (Petrovich 1947: 508-9, Van Dyke 1947: 375). On 11/29/1945 Yugoslavia was fully liberated by the partisan resistance and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was officially proclaimed.²¹ On the same day Federal Slovenia, later Socialist Republic of Slovenia and Republic of Slovenia, was proclaimed. It was one of the six federal Republics forming Yugoslavia and the nation state of the Slovenes.²² The first free multi-party elections in Slovenia were held on 04/08/1990 (Ramet 1993). These elections led to the formation of a government by Demos, a coalition of newly established parties, and were an essential step in Slovenia's transition to independence. Slovenia made plans to hold an independence referendum, but the Yugoslav government warned Slovenia that it would use force to maintain the union on 12/18/1990.²³ According to FH, for 1991, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Slovenia prior to 1990.

06/25/1991 End Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Liberal Democracy: On this date Slovenia, as the first republic, gained independence from Yugoslavia. The declaration of independence triggered the Ten-Day-War between Yugoslavia and Slovenia, which was won by Slovenia. Universal suffrage was already in place before independence and

²⁰ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slovenia>

²¹ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slovenia>

²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_Republic_of_Slovenia

²³ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/europerussiacentral-asia-region/yugosloviasslovenia-1990-1992/>

continued thereafter.²⁴ Alojz Peterle of the Slovene Christian Democrats (SKD), who had been elected prime minister in 1990, became prime minister of the newly founded republic, but resigned in April 1992 due to a vote of no confidence. In the subsequent elections Janez Drnovsek of the party of Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) emerged victorious and took over office of prime minister. During the following years, his coalition saw several changes. Ultimately, in April 2000, Drnovsek lost a vote of no confidence and was temporarily replaced, but in the following elections in the same year, he regained power. In 2002, he was elected president and was replaced by his party affiliate Anton Rop. Rop was voted out of office in 2004 and succeeded by Janez Jansa of the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS). Jansa served one term and lost elections to Borut Pahor of the Social Democrats (ZLSD, formerly SDP) in 2008.²⁵ While political freedoms and civil liberties are generally upheld, the present right-wing administration has made efforts to undermine the rule of law and democratic structures, particularly targeting the media and judiciary. This has elicited resistance from civil society. As per FH's classification for 1991, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. According to FH, for the rest of the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED political liberties were absent the first two years after independence and in 2021. Our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI indicates the presence of political liberties for the entire time except in 2021, when the PCLI switched into a range that, in our interpretation, indicates that political liberties were somewhat present. Since 1991, according to Polity5, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive until 2022 and are interpreted by us as robust (JCE) and as comprehensive (LCE) afterwards. Despite ongoing challenges, corruption persists, albeit actively countered by the media. The judiciary has demonstrated a commitment to impartial decision-making.²⁶ Election observer organizations declared that the elections in 2020 were conducted efficiently according to minimum democratic standards but noted some irregularities that affected turnout and results.²⁷ Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which

²⁴ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Slovenia_2016?lang=en

²⁵ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Slovenia_R: 1, Slovenia_V: 1-2

²⁶ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/slovenia/freedom-world/2022>

²⁷ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/slovenia/freedom-world/2022>;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Serbian_parliamentary_election

aligns with the observations of LIED. Since the country's independence LIED affirms the elections as competitive. In addition, the elections are constantly considered as free as free by V-Dem's EF&FI. V-Dem's CEI indicates cleanliness for the whole period. Slovenia has a parliamentary system of government with a multiparty system. The bicameral parliament is composed of the National Assembly and the National Council. On 04/24/2022 parliamentary elections, to elect the members of the National Assembly, took place. The Freedom Movement (GS) won the largest share of votes and since then leads a coalition with the Social Democrats and The Left.²⁸ The election was deemed free and fair by the OSCE.²⁹ Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Gallenkamp/Kassner 2010)

Solomon Islands

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 03/15/1893]: The process of colonial annexation began in 1893 when the British Solomon Islands Protectorate was declared over the southern islands. Over the subsequent decade, additional islands were incorporated, including the northern islands transferred from Germany to Britain in 1899. Arbitrary borders were established, and a centralized colonial administration was implemented, without adequate regard for their compatibility with existing local governance structures (Dinnen 2008). According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. Hence, it seems LIED misclassifies the scores for legislative and multiparty elections as present in this period. Suffrage was not given (LIED). The British takeover of the Solomon Islands in 1893 did not have the goal of safeguarding or advancing the welfare of the indigenous population. The incident in 1927, where an official group was massacred while collecting head taxes from tribesmen on Malaita, underscored the deep-seated local grievances towards the colonial authorities. (Premdas/Steeves 1985). Therefore, the Solomon Islands Protectorate, previously identified as 'belonging to Germany,' was transferred to Great Britain without local consent through a Treaty in 1899 (Crawford 2006). Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which,

²⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Slovenian_parliamentary_election

²⁹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/slovenia/freedom-world/2023>

with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

01/22/1942 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]: The Japanese occupied these islands and began the construction of several naval and air bases with the goals of protecting the flank of the Japanese offensive in New Guinea (Gegeo 1991).³⁰ According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. LIED lists male suffrage as absent during this period. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

09/08/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date the Japanese occupation ended as result of the developments of the Second World War.³¹ A consensus regarding the formal governmental structure had gradually developed since the late 1960s, coinciding with the establishment of parliamentary committees aimed at gathering public input on political and constitutional reforms.³⁷ According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI (until 1959). V-Dem's PCLI for 1960 indicates in our interpretation an ambiguous state regarding political liberties. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

10/18/1960 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this day, a country-wide nominated Legislative Council was established. This was followed in 1964 with the introduction of universal adult suffrage under which a minority segment of the Council was elected by the people. Through a systematic approach by which nominated members were replaced by elected legislators, combined simultaneously by a gradual approach of transferring executive powers to the elected members, over a period of 10 years from

³⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_occupation_of_the_Solomon_Islands#References

³¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_occupation_of_the_Solomon_Islands

1964 to 1974, a fully elective parliament with a cabinet-style executive was put in place as the preferred Solomon Islands form of government. Male suffrage was introduced in 1964 (LIED). Based on our observations, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period, which contradicts the observations of LIED. LIED confirms that multiparty legislative elections were held since 1964. On 05/22 & 06/12/1973 general elections were held in the Solomon Islands. The following year, Solomon Mamaloni of the People's Progressive Party became the first Chief Minister. Female suffrage was also introduced in 1974.³² In the timeframe 1960-1969, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates in our interpretation an ambiguous state regarding political liberties. For 1970 to 1976, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were somewhat present. From 1960 to 1969, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 1970 afterwards, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

02/01/1976 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Defective Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: Internal self-governance, with the Governor retaining authority over defense, foreign affairs, internal security, policing, and public services was introduced (Premdas/Steeves 1985). The British blueprint of a gradual approach of transferring legislative and executive powers to an indigenous leadership was applied to the Solomon Islands in its quest for self-determination. On 06/22/1976 the first general elections were held, three political parties participated, but the largest group in the newly elected parliament consisted of independents.³³ Petir Kenilorea became Chief Minister, led the Solomon Island to independence and became 1978 the first prime minister. According to FH, for 1978, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. From 1976 to 1977, according to LIED, the elections were categorized as non-competitive. The overall election conditions are acknowledged as somewhat free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. During this time V-Dem's CEI classifies the cleanliness of the elections as ambiguous, expressing irregularities in the election process. In the

³²

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_Solomon_Islands_general_electionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

³³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1976_Solomon_Islands_general_election

specified timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties were somewhat present.

07/07/1978 Continuation (Monarchical) Defective Democracy [as independent country]: On this date the Solomon Islands gained independence from Great Britain but stayed part of the commonwealth with the British Crown as ceremonial head of state. Modern state institutions only began to replace colonial structures in the two decades before the Islands' independence and, as a result, had shallow foundations and legitimacy in the local environment (Dinnen 2008).³⁴ According to FH, for the years 1978 to 1983, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Per FH's scoring for 1984 and 1985, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. According to FH, for the years 1986 to 1999, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1978, the elections are classified as competitive by LIED. After independence, V-Dem's CEI continues to indicate an ambiguous level of election integrity, while V-Dem's EF&FI remains at the somewhat labelled level until 1988 and are classified by us as indicating an ambiguous state afterwards. For the specified period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present until 1998 and somewhat present in 1999. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. On 08/08/1980, the first general elections after independence were held. The Solomon Islands United Party led by Peter Kenilorea as first prime minister won the party.³⁵ FH categorized the regime as free (Gastil 1980). Therefore, they cannot be seen as fully free and fair. In 1998 ethnic tensions and violence emerged. Insurgents on Guadalcanal were engaged in a conflict aimed at overthrowing the island's predominant Malaitan minority.³⁶ This period is known as 'the Tensions'.³⁷ Despite ongoing ethnic tensions during this period, civil liberties were upheld. However, The judiciary operated independently, and the media effectively acted as an outlet for oppositional critique (Karatnycky 1999: 420). As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. For the given timeframe, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

³⁴ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Solomon_Islands_2018?lang=en

³⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1980_Solomon_Islands_general_election

³⁶ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Solomon-Islands/History>

³⁷ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Solomon-Islands/History>

06/17/1999 End (Monarchical) Defective Democracy/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, a four-month lasting state of emergency was declared because the violence between armed political groups escalated, and ethnic violence started to arise. During this period, the Ulufa'alu administration restricted press coverage and freedom of association, while also granting expanded authority to the police force.³⁸ Per FH's scoring for 2000, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED. However, our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI indicates political liberties being somewhat present. V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive in 1999 and are interpreted as robust by JCE and as moderate by LCE in 2000. On 06/05/2000 Prime minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu was kidnapped by members of the Malaita Eagle Force, a militia formed in response to the ethnic conflicts in domestic politics. In exchange for his own release, Ulufa'alu resigned from the presidency.³⁹ In this brief period there were no elections. However, multiparty executive and legislative elections still have to be coded as present, which aligns with the observations of LIED. To argue with V-Dem's CEI or EF&FI would be meaningless regarding this short period. Despite the extraordinary nature of the events in June 2000—including the abduction and forced resignation of Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu by the Malaita Eagle Force militia—there was no fundamental transformation of the political regime. Although the executive transition was clearly illegitimate and coercive, the core institutional framework of the regime remained intact. Parliament continued to function, and the subsequent appointment of Manasseh Sogavare as prime minister on 06/30/2000 occurred through formal parliamentary procedures, albeit under contested and highly irregular conditions. Regular multiparty elections remained in place, and the monarchy continued to serve as the constitutional anchor of the system. The political opposition was weakened but not eliminated, and no authoritarian consolidation occurred. While the rule of law significantly deteriorated, and the state's monopoly on violence was partially undermined by militias, these developments did not result in a shift to full-scale electoral autocracy. The system remained a hybrid regime characterized by formal electoral competition combined with severe functional deficits and episodic violence, but without the institutional closure or systematic repression required to justify coding a transition to electoral autocracy. On 06/30/2000 Manasseh Sogavare was elected as prime minister by 23–21 over Leslie Boseto. Sogavare's election was immediately surrounded by controversy due to the absence of six members of parliament (believed to be Boseto supporters) who were unable to attend the crucial

³⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Solomon_Islands_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

³⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bartholomew_Ulufa%27alu

vote.⁴⁰ New elections in December 2001 saw Allan Kemakeza become prime minister. As the conflict evolved, law and order continued to worsen. Violence persisted on the Weathercoast, while militants in Honiara increasingly engaged in criminal activities and extortion. Instances occurred where armed individuals surrounded the Department of Finance during fund disbursements. In December 2002, Finance Minister Laurie Chan resigned after being coerced at gunpoint to sign a cheque payable to certain militants.⁴¹ The Australian government, with support of other Pacific Island nations and under the authorization of the Pacific Island Forum, led a multinational intervention force against ‘the Tensions’ called ‘Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands’ (RAMSI). RAMSI was deployed to restore law and order, disarm the militants, and support the Solomon Island government. As per FH, for 2000 and 2001, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. Per FH, for 2002 to 2015, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. For the years 2016 and 2017 the country receives a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. According to FH, from 2018 to 2021, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. From 2022 on, the country receives a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this entire time the elections were competitive according to LIED. V-Dem's CEI indicates no cleanliness between 2000 and 2001. From 2000 to 2018 the cleanliness for the elections is ambiguous, except in 2007 they were not really clean. Since 2019 the elections are declared as somewhat clean. Regarding V-Dem's EF&FI the overall election conditions are also ambiguous between 2000 and 2006, and are somewhat free and fair ever since 2007. LIED still considers the absence of political liberties until 2017. LIED identifies them as present since 2018. However, our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI still indicates somewhat political liberties until 2003. For the remaining years political liberties were constantly present, according to our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI. Since 2004, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. In 2001, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 2002 to 2004 and from 2010 to 2019, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as

⁴⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bartholomew_Ulufa%27alu

⁴¹ <https://www.ramsi.org/the-tensions/>

indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. On 04/05/2006 general elections were held, which were regarded as peaceful and free by international observers.⁴² As no party won the majority, the new Chamber chose Snyder Rini as prime minister, His naming led to two days of protests, as he was regarded as corrupt. Instead, the parliament elected a new prime minister in May, Manasseh Sogavare.⁴³ Sogavare was removed from office in 2007, when he lost a confidence vote. His successor lost the elections in 2010 to Danny Philip, who also lost the confidence vote shortly after and was replaced. The elections 2010 were overseen by international election observers, who voiced their concern about “serious flaws in voter register”, but otherwise the elections were described as peaceful and orderly.⁴⁴ In the elections 2014, Sogavare came back into power.⁴⁵ Observers generally regarded the 2014 parliamentary election as free and fair, despite occasional reports of vote buying. Following the election, Parliament re-elected Manasseh Sogavare as prime minister, leading to the formation of a coalition government. In November 2017, after a vote of no confidence against Sogavare, parliament elected Ricky Houenipwela as prime minister, and he subsequently formed a new coalition government.⁴⁶ The elections 2019 were regarded as peaceful, however irregularities with the electoral lists were seen.⁴⁷ The next years saw rioting and unrest, the last took place in early 2023.⁴⁸ Solomon Islands are a parliamentary democracy with a prime minister as head of government. A governor general is selected by the National Parliament to represent the British Monarch as head of state. Power often transitions between competing groups and opposition parties have the freedom to campaign unrestrictedly. Civil liberties and political rights are generally upheld. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. However, corruption and discrimination persist as ongoing concerns.⁴ Although FH has consistently rated the Solomon Islands as "Free" since the mid-2000s—assigning scores in the range of 72 to 75 out of 100—this assessment does not correspond to a regime upgrade in our classification scheme. In our typology, the designation electoral hybrid regime is retained. This classification reflects persistent structural features of the political system that are

⁴² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Solomon_Islands_general_election

⁴³ <https://www.refworld.org/docid/487ca25b82.html>

⁴⁴ <https://web.archive.org/web/20101003031217/http://www.thecommonwealth.org/news/228195/060810solomonislandsinterim.htm>

⁴⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomon_Islands

⁴⁶ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/solomon-islands/>

⁴⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Solomon_Islands_general_election

⁴⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomon_Islands

incompatible with the threshold for defective democracy. Specifically, the Solomon Islands have continued to exhibit high levels of executive instability, weak institutionalization of political parties, and fragile horizontal accountability. Frequent no-confidence motions, clientelist coalition dynamics, and the near absence of programmatic competition indicate that electoral processes, while formally competitive, remain embedded in a system lacking effective democratic consolidation. These characteristics are consistent with the logic of hybrid regimes, where elections coexist with serious deficiencies in rule of law, effective governance, and institutional checks and balances. Moreover, episodes such as the violent unrest in Honiara in 2021, the government's increasing reliance on external security forces, and the politically motivated postponement of general elections in 2023 further underscore the fragility of democratic institutions. These developments reinforce our assessment that the Solomon Islands did not cross the threshold into defective democracy by 2018—and have not done so thereafter either—despite relatively high Freedom House scores.⁴⁹

(Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Premdas 1983, Steeves 2001)

Somalia

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Italy, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 08/03/1889]: Egypt occupied parts of the Somali coast since the 1860s. After the Mahdist Movement Uprising in 1885, Egypt had to withdraw its forces from the Somaliland coast (Issa-Salwe 1996). Italy obtained the protectorate over Obbia and Mijertina in 1889 and administered the territory directly until 1898 (Tripodi 1999, Turner 2004). On 03/16/1905 Italian Somaliland became officially a colony of Italy. In 1925, the United Kingdom “gifted” Italy the Jubaland region as a reward for having joined the First World War and in 1926, it became part of Italian Somaliland.⁵⁰ On 06/01/1936 Somalia became part of Italian East Africa (province of Somalia, formed by the merger of the colony and the Ethiopian region of Ogaden). Following conflicts between Ethiopia and Italy, the Ethiopian territory was annexed to Eritrea and Somalia, so that, apart from British Somaliland and French Djibouti, the Horn of Africa was almost completely under Italian control. The Ogaden became part of Somalia (Tripodi 1999). According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were absent during this period. For 1900-1909,

⁴⁹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/solomon-islands/freedom-world/2023>

⁵⁰ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jubaland>

LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. For the period 1910 to 1940, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. For 1941, V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

03/25/1941 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Italy, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: see for the time between 03/25/1941 and 04/01/1950 **Somaliland**. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

04/01/1950 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Italy, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, the United Nations made Italian Somaliland into a Trust Territory under Italian Administration (Tripodi 1999).⁵¹ The “Amministrazione fiduciaria italiana della Somalia” began its rule, accompanied with the deployment of 6,500 troops. Therefore, the country’s internal affairs were administered by the Italian Administration. In 1954, the first local elections were held, which were won by the Somali Youth League (SYL). However, the Italian Administration remained the state authority, only the cooperation between them and SYL grew.⁵² According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held, and political liberties were absent. V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as indicating political liberties are not really present until 1954 and as ambiguous from 1955 onward. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

03/02/1956 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Italy, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of Italy, Liberal Democracy]: Universal suffrage was introduced, and first parliamentary elections were held in February 1956.⁵³ The SYL won the majority of seats in the Territorial Council.⁵⁴ In line with that LIED indicates that multiparty legislative elections were

⁵¹ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somalia>; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_Territory_of_Somaliland

⁵² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_Territory_of_Somaliland

⁵³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

⁵⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1956_Italian_Somaliland_parliamentary_election

present, whereas executive elections remained absent. These elections gave the assembly complete power over domestic affairs. However, the Italian Administration had the right of absolute veto.⁵⁵ For the period under consideration, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI indicates in our interpretation an ambiguous state regarding political liberties. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

07/01/1960 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of Italy, Liberal Democracy]/Start (Male) Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date the independent Somali Republic came into being as a result of the merger of the British Somaliland Protectorate, which first became independent on 06/26/1960, and the Italian Trusteeship Territory of Somaliland (Turner 2004). The first parliament that took office was a merger of the elected officials of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland.⁵⁶ They formed the National Assembly.⁵⁷ Adan Abdullah Osman Daar was named the first president and named Abdi Rashid Ali Shirmarke as prime minister on 07/12/1960. On 06/20/1961, a new constitution was approved in a referendum. The constitution was widely perceived as unjust in former Somaliland, with over 60% of northern voters opposing it in the referendum. Nevertheless, it was ratified into law. This decision fueled widespread discontent among the population in the north.⁵⁸ Until 1963 there was no universal suffrage in the Somali Republic. Only women in the former Italian Trust Territory had been granted the right in 1956. Women in the former British Somaliland were granted the legal right to vote in 1963.⁵⁹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Following LIED's data, the elections were competitive. Between 1960 and 1963 the V-Dem's CEI determined the country's elections with a level of ambiguous cleanliness. Additionally, the overall election conditions are also classified as ambiguous by V-Dem's EF&FI. According to LIED political liberties were absent and V-Dem's PCLI indicates in our interpretation an ambiguous state regarding political liberties. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority.

03/30/1964 Continuation Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date parliamentary elections under universal suffrage took place. These were also the first elections to be conducted after the merger

⁵⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_Territory_of_Somaliland

⁵⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1964_Somali_parliamentary_election

⁵⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Parliament_of_Somalia

⁵⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_Somaliland

⁵⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somali_Republic

of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. The ruling Somali Youth League (SYL) won 69 out of 123 seats.⁶⁰ Therefore, based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED declares the elections as competitive. However, V-Dem's CEI indicate that elections were not really clean from 1964 to 1969, while in contrast to that V-Dem's EF&FI indicates that the elections were somewhat free and fair. We would side, in this case and based on our observations with V-Dem's CEI against LIED and V-Dem's EF&FI. Despite the constitutional framework that ostensibly protected civil and political rights, the elections were influenced by deep-rooted clan dynamics and political manipulations. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates in our interpretation an ambiguous state regarding political liberties. For 1969, the PCLI switched into a range that, in our interpretation, indicates that political liberties were not really present. Until 1968, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. The ruling SYL dominated the political scene, and the lack of political competition and transparency led to questions about the elections' legitimacy. However, there are also voices like Ahmed Ali M. Khayre (2016: 16) who argue that the elections were free and fair, the judiciary operated independent and the civil and political rights of citizens were adequately protected in this period.

10/21/1969 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: After the president was assassinated in an unrelated incident, the military used the opportunity to stage a military coup led by colonels under the leadership of Siad Barre. They established the Supreme Revolutionary Council of 25, including initially four generals, seven lieutenant- colonels, and seven majors to rule the country. The goal of the council was to create socialism (Welch 1974: 137, Samatar 1992, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 94). According to FH's classification since 1972, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. No multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period according to LIED. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making

⁶⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1964_Somali_parliamentary_election

power. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

08/25/1976 End Military Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: A one-party government by the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party was formed.⁶¹ It replaced the Supreme Revolutionary Council. In 1979 a new constitution was instated, under which the first election since 1969 was held. As Somalia was a one-party state, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party won, and the People's Assembly appointed Siad Barre as President.⁶² The regime is classified as a one-party autocracy and not a communist ideocracy because the SRSP encouraged private investment on a limited scale. The ideology was based on a so-called scientific socialism and Islamic tenets and not Marxism-Leninism.⁶³ Although Somalia was a one-party state, it lacked the organizational features of a typical communist party, such as a commitment to democratic centralism or a vanguard role in leading the proletariat. After a failed coup attempt against Siad Barre in 1978, unrest swept Somalia. No multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1978 according to LIED. In 1979 only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty were held. From 1980 to 1990 executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. For the given timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties were absent. From 1976-1978, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. In 1979, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

01/26/1991 End One-Party Autocracy/Start No Central Authority: On this date, Siad Barre was driven from power, after multiple rebellions started across the country. Effective government ceased after in-fighting between groups began (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 94).⁶⁴ A

⁶¹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somalia#Somali_Democratic_Republic_\(1969%E2%80%931991\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somalia#Somali_Democratic_Republic_(1969%E2%80%931991))

⁶² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979_Somali_parliamentary_election

⁶³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somali_Democratic_Republic

⁶⁴ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12285365>

humanitarian crisis started to unfold, leading to the formation of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1992. On 07/21/1991, northern groups of the country proclaimed Somaliland Republic. Following Somaliland's example, the north-east of Somalia declared autonomy in 1998 and established Puntland.⁶⁵ In 2000 the Republic of Somalia, an interim government (the Transitional Federal Government) was formed, consisting of the many warring clans. It had its headquarters in Kenya until 2005 and never got the support of all war parties.⁶⁶ Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. No multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period according to LIED. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties, indicating an intermediate state between present and absent. From 1992 to 2000, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

03/20/2012 End No Central Authority/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: The Transitional Federal Government was disbanded on 03/20/2012, as part of the official "Roadmap for the End of Transition", a political process that provided clear benchmarks leading toward the formation of permanent democratic institutions in Somalia,⁶⁷ and the first constitutional government was formed. The Federal Government of Somalia was the first permanent central government in the country since the start of the civil war.⁶⁸ Under the 2012 provisional constitution the president is elected with a two-third majority of both parliamentary chambers of the Federal Parliament to serve a four-year term. The president shares executive power with a prime minister, who must have the support of the parliament. However, the parliament is not elected by the citizens.⁶⁹ The lower house as legislative institution, is elected under a clan-based power-sharing system in which clan elders choose delegates, who in turn select lawmakers, rather than popular elections. The electoral framework does not provide universal suffrage. Balloting is the result of an ad-hoc process based on lengthy negotiations

⁶⁵ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puntland>

⁶⁶ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somalia>

⁶⁷ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somalia>

⁶⁸ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somalia>

⁶⁹ <https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somalia#Politik>

among the country's main clans.⁷⁰ As neither the president nor the parliament are elected by the population, it cannot be coded as an electoral autocracy. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Other datasets vary in their classification of Somalia, ranging from personalist rule (AF) to non-electoral autocracy (LIED) to closed autocracy (RoW). This variation suggests coding Somalia as a non-electoral transitional regime in this dataset. LIED classifies multiparty executive and legislative elections as absent until 2021 and doesn't provide a classification for the following years. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the state of political liberties. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. From 2013 to 2015 and from 2017 to 2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. In 2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In 2016 and for the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. As of 2016, the government had formed five federal member states, but these semi-autonomous regions frequently clash with the central government. Additionally, the government's authority over territory is challenged by a separatist administration in Somaliland and by the Shabaab, an Islamist militant group. National elections have yet to be conducted, and political dynamics are largely influenced by clan affiliations. Against a backdrop of persistent insecurity, both state and non-state actors frequently perpetrate human rights violations.⁷¹ On 02/08/2017 Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as Farmaajo, was elected as president by Somalia's two-chamber legislators, who were not freely elected, but selected by tribal clans. He took over the office on 02/16/2017. Farmaajo's term concluded in 02/2021, and the presidential election faced multiple delays throughout the year. In April, Parliament decided to prolong Farmaajo's term by two years, ostensibly to provide adequate time for the nation to prepare for direct elections. However, this decision was reversed a month later following international condemnation. After his term ended, struggles within the country prevented new

⁷⁰ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/somalia/freedom-world/2023>

⁷¹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/somalia>

elections, which then led to demonstrations and unrest. On 05/16/2022 former president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was re-elected. The regime since 2012 is hard to classify.

Non-Electoral Transitional Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Kakwenzire 1986, Wegemund 1999, Lewis 1981, Roberts 1986)

Somaliland

[officially known as the Republic of Somaliland]

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 03/15/1893]: Egypt occupied parts of the Somali coast since the 1860s. After the Mahdist Movement Uprising in 1885, Egypt had to withdraw its forces from the Somaliland coast (Issa-Salwe 1996). In 1884, the northern part of Somaliland became a British protectorate while the southern part was ruled by local leaders who accepted Italian protection in 1889. British Somaliland was administered by the British India colony until 1898 and then managed by the Foreign Office upon 10/01/1898.⁷² In 1905, it was transferred to the Colonial Office (Roberts 1986). In November 1909 the British colonial administration in British Somaliland was ordered to stay in three coastal towns on the red sea after a failed peace attempt with the Daraawiish. By 1913, the Daraawiish had control over the entire hinterland, leading the British to form the Camel Corps to police the area (Issa-Salwe 1996). In January 1920, a military expedition against Sayyid was launched, and by the end of February, the Dervish movement was destroyed. The Sayyid is believed to have died in the Ogaden in 1921 (Kakwenzire 1986). In 1925, the United Kingdom gifted Italy the Jubaaland region as a reward for having joined the First World War and in 1926, it became part of Italian Somaliland.⁷³ LIED does not provide any data during this colonial time. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

08/18/1940 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Italy, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: Within the context of the Second World War, Italy invaded British Somaliland. However, the occupation was short lived, as the allied forces seized Mogadishu on

⁷² https://en-m-wikipedia-org.translate.goog/wiki/British_Somaliland?_x_tr_sl=en&_x_tr_tl=de&_x_tr_hl=de&_x_tr_pto=sc

⁷³ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jubaland>

02/25/1941, and in March advanced to win back British Somaliland. LIED does not list Somaliland. Because the occupation started after 01/07/1940 and ended before 01/07/1941 it is not present in the country-year-version of the dataset. In this timeframe, V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not really present. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

03/25/1941 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Italy, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: The British offensive in 1941 was successful and within a few weeks, between February and March, the whole of Somalia was conquered; with Mogadishu falling on 03/25/1941 (Tripodi 1999). In March 1941 all Somali territories (with the exception of French Somaliland which remained under the Vichy rule) were under the British flag (Issa-Salwe 1996). The former Italian Part of Somalia was put under a British Military Administration, while British Somaliland had its own military government. Starting 1946, the British rebuild the territories' administrative system in the former Italian parts (Tripodi 1999) (Issa-Salwe 1996). On 04/01/1950, the United Nations made Italian Somaliland into a Trust Territory under Italian Administration (see 04/01/1950 Somalia) (Tripodi 1999).⁷⁴ LIED does not provide any data during this colonial time. For 1942, V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. For, 1943-1958, V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as an ambiguous status of political liberties. For the year 1959, V-Dem's PCLI suggests that political liberties are somewhat present. V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE indicates no value, as of parliament exists, and thus no legislative constraints on the executive are possible until 1957. From 1958 to 1959, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

06/26/1960 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Party) Regime: On this date, the independence of British Somaliland was reached, and the State of Somaliland was formed. It only existed for five days, before merging with the Trust Territory of Somaliland on 07/01/1960.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somalia>; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_Territory_of_Somaliland

⁷⁵ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_Day_\(State_of_Somaliland\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_Day_(State_of_Somaliland))

07/01/1960 End Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Party) Regime/Start Part of Other Country [Somalia, Electoral Hybrid Regime]: see for the time between 07/01/1960 and 07/21/1991 **Somalia**.

07/21/1991 End Part of Other Country [Somalia, Electoral Hybrid Regime]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, northern groups of Somalia proclaimed Somaliland Republic. On 05/17/1991, the primary insurgent faction in the northern region of the nation, the Somali National Movement, announced the secession of an autonomous entity named the Somaliland Republic (Turner 2004). The Republic is internationally not recognized and therefore officially still part of the Somalian State. It had different types of government, which all crumbled due to fighting in the 1990s. In 1996, peace was established, which is relatively stable up to today.⁷⁶ Tuur assumed the presidency of Somaliland as its inaugural leader, initially championing separatism. However, by 1994, he shifted his stance, advocating instead for reconciliation within a federal governance framework. During his tenure, an armed conflict erupted, reaching resolution in 1992 through the Sheikh conference. Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal succeeded Tuur in 1993, overseeing a period marked by enhanced security measures and territorial consolidation. In 1994, Egal's administration confronted another conflict precipitated by rebel militias occupying Hargeisa airport, which was ultimately quelled by government forces by 1995. Simultaneously, Djibouti-backed Issa forces endeavored, albeit unsuccessfully, to assert control over certain regions of Somaliland. Egal continued his presidency until his demise in 2002, succeeded by Dahir Riyale Kahin, who assumed office as Somaliland's inaugural elected president in 2003.⁷⁷ LIED does not provide any data during this specified time. V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties are somewhat present. From 1991 to 1992, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1993 to 1998, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

04/14/2003 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: In 2001, a new constitution was agreed upon, in which Somaliland Republic regarded itself as a democracy.

⁷⁶ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somaliland>

⁷⁷ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somaliland#State_of_Somaliland_\(Independence\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somaliland#State_of_Somaliland_(Independence))

This constitution was approved by referendum on 05/31/2001.⁷⁸ The first elections that were held were the municipal elections on 12/15/2002.⁷⁹ The following year, presidential elections were held on 04/14/2003 and saw Danir Riyale Kahin victorious. His victory was rejected by the opposition, leading to protests. Nevertheless, the elections were considered democratic.⁸⁰ The first parliamentary elections took place in 2005. The next presidential elections were scheduled for August 2008. However, they were delayed multiple times, due to political instability. This was heavily criticized by the opposition. After multiple pushbacks, the elections were held on 06/26/2010. The elections were internationally described as fair and free, only the violence and fighting in some parts of the country did set a hurdle.⁸¹ The next parliamentary elections took place in 2021, 16 years after the last one took place. They were delayed for numerous reasons, droughts, delayed voter registration and political conflicts. However, the elections on 05/31/2021 were considered free and democratic by international observers.⁸² The general elections of 11/13/2022 were postponed due to the Lac Anod conflict⁸³ and held on 11/13/2024. This election marked a significant political turning point: opposition candidate Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi "Irro" of the Waddani party won the election by a clear margin against the incumbent President Muse Bihi Abdi. This marked Somaliland's first transfer of power from the ruling party to the opposition in 14 years.⁸⁴ Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Between 2003 and 2005, V-Dem's CEI scores the elections of Somaliland with a not really electoral cleanliness. Since 2006, the cleanliness is classified as ambiguous. Regarding the overall election conditions, they are considered as somewhat free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). From 2008 onwards, the territory scores per FH between 8 and 10 as partly free, which we interpret as rather not free. V-Dem's PCLI suggests that political liberties were somewhat present in this period. From 2003 to 2004, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Since 2005, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. However, their LDI remains at a not really score. Based on all information we have, we classify Somaliland as an Electoral

⁷⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_Somaliland_constitutional_referendum

⁷⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Somaliland_municipal_elections

⁸⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Somaliland_presidential_election

⁸¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Somaliland_presidential_election

⁸² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Somaliland_parliamentary_election

⁸³ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Las_Anod_conflict_\(2023%E2%80%93present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Las_Anod_conflict_(2023%E2%80%93present))

⁸⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Somaliland_presidential_election

Hybrid Regime. This classification is also due to the long gaps between elections, which undermine the reliability and frequency of power transitions. A regime that conducts elections irregularly, sometimes with more than a decade between them, cannot be considered a democracy. LIED does not list Somaliland in its dataset.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

South Africa

[for the time between 01/01/1900 until 05/31/1910 see **Cape Colony, Natal, Transvaal and Orange Free State**]

05/31/1910 Start (Monarchical) Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: In 1907, Dominion became the distinguishing label for the colonies with responsible government. Dominion status was a half-way house between colonial and independent status. On 05/31/1910 The Union of South Africa was established through the amalgamation of the formerly distinct Colonies/Dominions, including Cape Colony, Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State, creating a unified Dominion (McIntyre 1999). Similar to Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the Union of South Africa attained self-governing dominion status within the British Empire. This status was solidified by the Balfour Declaration of 1926 and the Statute of Westminster in 1931. Governed as a constitutional monarchy, the Crown was represented by a governor-general.⁸⁵ However, Dominion status did not confer full sovereignty during that period. The concept of Dominion evolved over time, and even New Zealand did not achieve complete independence, meaning absolute autonomy and sovereign authority over its constitutional arrangements and foreign affairs, until 1947.⁸⁶ Thus, it is essential to check how the parliament of Union of South Africa was restricted in terms of legislative powers (e.g., foreign relations and external trade). South Africa became independent under a racially restricted male suffrage.⁸⁷ Hence, elections were competitive but not at all universal. Because non-whites were the huge majority in South Africa the regime cannot be classified at all as a democracy (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 94). Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Following LIED the elections were competitive between 1910 and 1947. Since 1948 the scores decreased, referring to an absence of competitiveness. The systematic exclusion of electoral groups explains why the V-Dem's CEI

⁸⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_of_South_Africa

⁸⁶ https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/research-papers/document/00PLLawRP07041/new-zealand-sovereignty-1857-1907-1947-or-1987#footnote_3

⁸⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

scores South Africa with a not really cleanliness at this period. According to V-Dem's EF&FI the overall election conditions were ambiguous between 1910 and 1947. From 1948 to 1993 they are considered as not really free and fair. In addition, V-Dem's LDI shows a constantly low level between 1910 and 1994 reflecting that the country was an autocracy in that period. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. From 12/11/1931 on the Statute of Westminster granted full sovereignty to the Dominions. Dominion from then on only meant a common allegiance to the British Crown (McIntyre 1999). In 1931 female suffrage for white women was introduced.⁸⁸ The non-white majority, however, remained completely disenfranchised and politically repressed throughout the regime period. Although South Africa was clearly an autocracy due to the systematic exclusion and subjugation of the black population, government power occasionally alternated between competing white parties. This suggests that elections within the dominant racial group retained a certain degree of competitiveness, albeit strictly confined to a racially exclusive political system. For the period 1910-1946, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates in our interpretation an ambiguous state regarding political liberties. For the rest of the period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present. From 1910 to 1946, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. From 1947 to 1949, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1950 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

05/31/1961 Continuation Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy (as a republic): On this date South Africa became fully independent from the British Crown, the Queen no longer acting as the ceremonial head of state. Hendrik Verwoerd, who had been prime minister since 1958, when he became leader of the National Party (NP), is regarded as the "architect of apartheid" for his policy of "good neighborliness", which further institutionalized racial segregation and white supremacy. It was under his government that Nelson Mandela was imprisoned for life. Verwoerd was assassinated on 09/06/1966; his assassin proclaimed he wanted to see a change in government because he thought the government under the NP not to be representative.⁸⁹ Following

⁸⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

⁸⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hendrik_Verwoerd#cite_note-1-56

Verwoerd's death, Balthazar Vorster was named new head of the NP and thus succeeded Verwoerd as prime minister. Vorster remained in office until his retirement in 1978 and was replaced by Pieter Botha who became the new head of the NP and the new prime minister.⁹⁰ The governmental continuity attests to lack of competitiveness in election processes and repression of opposition. In 1984, Pieter Botha promulgated a new constitution, which established additional houses of parliament for "colored" and Asian people respectively. This act cannot be interpreted as equalizing political rights, however, because the "white" cabinet still held ultimate authority, and Black people were excluded from these innovations all together. Additionally, Botha's constitution removed the office of prime minister and merged the position with the office of state president, which Botha proceeded to assume. In 1989, Botha resigned due to health issues and was replaced by Frederik de Klerk.⁹¹ In 1990, the National Party government lifted the ban on the African National Congress and other political organizations. Frederik Willem de Klerk ordered the release of Nelson Mandela from prison and began negotiations for a political transition. The government repealed apartheid legislation and agreed to hold free elections in 1994 with universal suffrage not regarding race or color of skin.⁹² According to FH's classification for 1972, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Per FH's evaluation from 1973 to 1976, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Per FH, for the years 1977 to 1989, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. According to FH, from 1990 to 1993, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. As per FH's classification for 1994, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For the period 1961-1990, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. In the timeframe 1991-1993, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as being ambiguous about the status of political liberties. For 1994, we code the PCLI data as indicating political liberties being present. Until 1983, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative

⁹⁰ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, South Africa_R: 1-2, South Africa_V: 2

⁹¹ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, South Africa_R: 2

⁹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

constraints on the executive were also limited. From 1984 to 1992, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

04/29/1994 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, competitive elections with universal suffrage were held. The oppositional African National Congress (ANC) gained an overwhelming majority and government turnover took place (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 58, Sinai 1996, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 94).⁹³ Nelson Mandela was elected president; these elections may be interpreted as the step towards political representation of the Black majority in South Africa and their political inclusion. In the following elections through 2019, the ANC has won the parliamentary majority, indicating that the ANC has established its voter base among the Black communities.⁹⁴ Reports of corruption among government officials often emerge, and in recent years, the ruling ANC has been accused of undermining state institutions to protect corrupt officials and preserve its power as its support base has begun to wane.⁹⁵ South Africa is a bicameral democracy, with the president being both the head of state and of government. Its constitution, promulgated in 1996, acts as its supreme law, granting and securing civil liberties and political rights. In the elections on 05/08/2019 the parliamentary election was won by the ruling ANC, but with a reduced majority of 57.50%, down from 62.15% in the 2014 election. In the general election on 05/29/2024, the ANC suffered a historic defeat, winning only 40% of the votes. Although the ANC still secured most of the seats in the National Assembly, it lost its parliamentary majority. Consequently, the ANC, the DA and other minor parties formed the first coalition, and incumbent president Cyril Ramaphose was re-elected.⁹⁶ As per FH's classification for 1994, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. According to FH, for the rest of the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1994, LIED's data confirm constant competitive elections. The two years after the end of the electoral oligarchical autocracy the scores by V-Dem's CEI indicate an ambiguous level of electoral cleanliness. Between 1996 and 2004 V-Dem CEI reflects the elections as somewhat clean. From 2005 to 2013 the elections gained full cleanliness. Since 2014 the elections decreased to somewhat cleanliness outcomes. In addition, V-Dem's EF&FI still declares the elections as somewhat free and fair between 1994

⁹³ <http://africanelections.tripod.com/za.html>

⁹⁴ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, South Africa_R: 2, South Africa_V: 2

⁹⁵ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-africa/freedom-world/2023>

⁹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_South_African_general_election

and 1998. Since 1999 the overall elections conditions are considered as free and fair. According to the LDI South Africa is classified until 1999 by an ambiguous score. Since 2000 the LDI increased to a somewhat score, echoes to a democracy. In 2023 the LDI states a backslide to an ambiguous outcome. While the country is internationally considered a proponent of human rights,⁹⁷ corruption issues persist, including all levels of government, up to the presidency. Moreover, gender-based discrimination and violence remain a problem. For the relevant period, LIED identifies political liberties as present, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. Since 1996, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. In 09/2022 the constitutional court continued to advance transparency reforms by ruling that senior officials must disclose the receipt of intraparty campaign funding.⁹⁸ On 07/01/2024, the ruling ANC announced a coalition agreement with the predominantly white Conservative Party, following the ANC's loss of its absolute majority in the 05/2024 election. This significant event marks the first time the ANC has not governed alone and the first instance of a predominantly white party participating in governance since the end of Apartheid.⁹⁹ This would suffice to declare South Africa a full democracy, as our previous reason of ANC-dominance no longer holds true. However, we continue to list the country as a defective democracy as in the meantime, the conditions of democracy have decayed beyond acceptability. Corruption, mismanagement and deterioration of state services have come to a point where social exclusion based on class is commonplace. Rolling blackouts due to infrastructure constraints or cessation of rail traffic are just some examples (Hausmann et al. 2023).

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Lacour-Gayet 1977)

South Korea see **Korea**

Soviet Union: see **Russia 1917 to 1991**

⁹⁷ https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230306424_8

⁹⁸ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-africa/freedom-world/2023>

⁹⁹ <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cw9yx5w9577o>

South Sudan

[Before 2011 South Sudan was a part of Sudan. The Southern Sudan Autonomous Region was an autonomous region that existed in Southern Sudan between 1972 and 1983. It was established on 02/28/1972 by the Addis Ababa Agreement which ended the First Sudanese Civil War. The region was abolished on 06/05/1983 by the administration of Sudanese President Gaafar Nimeiry. Revocation of southern autonomy was one of the causes of the Second Sudanese Civil War which would continue until January 2005, when southern autonomy was restored; the region became the independent Republic of South Sudan in 2011.¹⁰⁰ The Second Sudanese Civil War was a conflict from 1983 to 2005 between the central Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army. It was largely a continuation of the First Sudanese Civil War of 1955 to 1972. Although it originated in southern Sudan, the civil war spread to the Nuba mountains and the Blue Nile. It lasted for 22 years and is one of the longest civil wars on record. The war resulted in the independence of South Sudan six years after the war ended.^{101]}

[For the history of the region before 2011 see **Sudan**.]

07/09/2011 End Part of Other Country [Sudan, Military Autocracy]/Start Personalist Autocracy: On this date, South Sudan gained independence from the Republic of Sudan as the outcome of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed on 01/09/2005 between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the government of Sudan. The CPA granted the region of South Sudan a six-year transitional period of self-rule and allowed for an independence referendum, which took place from 01/09 to 15/2011. The results showed an overwhelming majority for independence from Sudan, granted on 07/09/2011.¹⁰² Salva Kiir Mayardit was elected president of the semiautonomous region of Southern Sudan from 04/11-15/2010 and remained president after South Sudan gained independence.¹⁰³ The president cannot be impeached and has the authority to dismiss state governors and dissolve the legislature and state assemblies. A permanent constitution has not been published.¹⁰⁴ We code this regime change event as a negotiated transition because the independence resulted from the peace agreement. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period. However, the Transitional Constitution of

¹⁰⁰ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Sudan_Autonomous_Region_\(1972%E2%80%931983\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Sudan_Autonomous_Region_(1972%E2%80%931983))

¹⁰¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Sudanese_Civil_War

¹⁰² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_South_Sudanese_independence_referendum

¹⁰³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-sudan/freedom-world/2023>

¹⁰⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-sudan/freedom-world/2022>

South Sudan 2011 (TCSS), enforced on the day of independence, introduced universal suffrage (Diehl/van der Horst 2013).¹⁰⁵ On 12/15/2013 the South Sudanese civil war started. It was a multi-sided civil war in South Sudan between forces of the government and opposition forces. In December 2013, President Kiir accused his former deputy Riek Machar and ten others of attempting a coup d'état. Machar denied trying to start a coup and fled to lead the SPLM – in opposition (SPLM-IO). Fighting broke out between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and SPLM-IO, igniting the civil war. Ugandan troops were deployed to fight alongside the South Sudanese government.¹⁰⁶ On 08/17/2015 the South Sudanese government and Machar's rebels signed a peace agreement on, brokered by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), temporarily stopping the fighting. As part of the peace accord, Machar returned to Juba and was sworn in as vice president on 04/26/2016.¹⁰⁷ On 07/07/2016 the 2015 peace agreement collapsed after clashes between Kiir's and Machar's forces broke out. The fighting spreads across South Sudan and the southern Equatoria region.¹⁰⁸ Consequently, Machar fled the country, and the rebel chief negotiator, Taban Deng Gai, replaced Machar as acting vice president, rejected by Machar as he had fired Deng Gai before.¹⁰⁹ On 09/12/2018, President Kiir and rebel factions signed a second peace deal. However, rebels led by General Thomas Cirillo in Equatoria refused to sign the agreement and continued fighting.¹¹⁰ On 02/22/2020 after months of renewed negotiations, Machar returned to Juba and formed a unity government, the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity, with Kiir on this date. They declared an end to the civil war.¹¹¹ The transitional government has postponed the 2023 general elections to late 2024.¹¹² The SPLM holds significant influence in the political arena, with the majority of competition occurring within the movement itself, following its fragmentation at the onset of the civil war. Kiir's intolerance towards dissent within the SPLM exacerbated the conflict. Both the government and the legislature, lacking electoral credibility, struggle to exert authority over the nation's territory.¹¹³ In summary, the political developments in South Sudan since independence, including the concentration of power in the presidency and the absence of competitive elections align with the attributes of a personalist autocracy. Regarding political liberties, LIED only does consider the country from 2012 onwards and identifies political liberties as absent for the entire

¹⁰⁵ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2013?lang=en

¹⁰⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudanese_Civil_War

¹⁰⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riek_Machar

¹⁰⁸ <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/south-sudan-independence-civil-war>

¹⁰⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riek_Machar

¹¹⁰ <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/south-sudan-independence-civil-war>

¹¹¹ <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/south-sudan-independence-civil-war>

¹¹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_South_Sudanese_general_election

¹¹³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-sudan/freedom-world/2023>

regime period. V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present until 2013 and in 2020 and are absent for the remaining years. In 2012 and 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

Personalist Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Spain

01/01/1900 Constitutional Monarchy [Start: 10/19/1469]: In 1479, the Crown of Castile and the Crown of Aragon were dynastically united by the Catholic Monarchs on 10/19/1469.¹¹⁴ The governments, institutions, and legal traditions of each kingdom remained independent of each other; alien laws (*Leyes de extranjería*) determined that the national of one kingdom was a foreigner in the other Crowns/States). In 1831 the two kingdoms dissolved, and the unified kingdom of Spain emerged. the Constitution of 1812 enfranchised all Spanish men of Iberian or indigenous American descent in both hemispheres irrespective of property, but explicitly excluded Afro descendent men. Extended to all men from 1869 to 1878 (First Spanish Republic and three first years of Bourbon Restoration) and from 1890 to the end of the Second Spanish Republic (1931–36).¹¹⁵ According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. On 02/11/1873 the parliamentary majority proclaimed a republic and forced King Amadeo I to abdicate. Suffrage now applied to men over 21. As early as May 1873, Spaniards elected a parliament under the new electoral law. Around four million Spaniards were eligible to vote.¹¹⁶ However, still in the transition phase to democracy, the restoration of the monarchy of the House of Bourbon took place on 12/29/1874. Brigadier General Arsenio Martínez-Campos, who fought for the Republican government against the Carlist (House of Savoy), sided with the Alfonists (House of Bourbon). In December 1874, Alfonso of Bourbon was proclaimed King of Spain. However, fighting with Carlists continued until March 1876. The king now had sole power to govern again. Census voting again applied to the parliamentary elections. The elections were now systematically manipulated on a massive

¹¹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catholic_Monarchs_of_Spain

¹¹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

¹¹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictatorship_of_Primo_de_Rivera

scale. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. Alfonso XIII was king of Spain from 05/17/1886 until 04/14/1931. However, the regime changed its character with the coup 1923. For almost the entire period under consideration, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. For 1923, our interpretation of PCLI indicates that political liberties were not really present. Until 1922, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In 1922, Spain entered war against Morocco over the Spanish colonies and suffered heavy losses, which led to the government continuously losing popular support.¹¹⁷

09/13/1923 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start (Monarchical) Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy: After a coup against the parliamentary government Miguel Primo de Rivera established himself officially as prime minister and de facto as a dictator. During the Military Directory (1923-1925), the dictatorship created the official party of the regime, the Unión Patriótica (UP). However, Alfonso XIII was still king of Spain and played a considerable political role (Berman 2019: 265-67, Casey et al. 2020: 16).¹¹⁸ In classifying the relatively mild autocracy of this period as fascist compared to the Nazi regime in particular, we follow the assessment of Shlomo Ben-Ami (1983). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. In this period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are robust. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

01/28/1930 End (Monarchical) Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy/Start Autocratic Monarchy: On this date, Primo de Rivera resigned from office of prime minister, acknowledging that he had lost the tolerance and the support from the military and the king. We code the regime change event as a voluntary exit because, although the lack of legitimation forced Primo de Rivera out of office, he resigned on his own accord. The following governments of General Dámaso Berenguer and Admiral Juan Bautista Aznar were weak and could barely keep order (Berman 2019: 267-

¹¹⁷ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Spain_R: 1-2, Spain_V: 1-2

¹¹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miguel_Primo_de_Rivera; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfonso_XIII

68, Casey et al. 2020: 16).¹¹⁹ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. In the specified timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were somewhat present. For the relevant year, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are robust. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. This regime is a borderline case between an autocratic and a constitutional Monarchy, but the absence of political liberties combined with the lack of legislative constraints on the executive leads us to the categorization of an autocratic monarchy.

04/12/1931 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start (Male) Defective Democracy: On this date, local elections were held, which demonstrated that the major cities of Spain had a strong Republican support. Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were absent from 1936 onward, which contradicts the observations of LIED. The elections were classified as competitive per LIED. V-Dem's CEI starting with scores that indicate no cleanliness of elections increased into a range which indicates an ambiguous state regarding the cleanliness of elections since 1932. V-Dem's EF&FI indicates that the elections were overall somewhat free and fair. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. To avoid the risk of civil war and protests in Madrid, Alfonso XIII abdicated and left the country. The general elections in June 1931 were won in a landslide victory by the Republican-Socialist coalition. The government that was formed consisted of seven, later six parties.¹²⁰ On 12/09/1931 a new progressive constitution was formulated, introducing a range of provisions including universal suffrage, freedom of religion, and efforts to diminish the influence of the Roman Catholic Church, among others.¹²¹ In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as present, and V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are present.

11/19/1933 Continuation Defective Democracy: On this date, Spain experienced a significant shift with general elections that were the first to include women voters.¹²² Between 1933 and 1935 the elections were competitive. Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

¹¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfonso_XIII;

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miguel_Primo_de_Rivera#Fall_from_power_and_death

¹²⁰ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, Spain_V: 3

¹²¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_Constitution_of_1931#Liberties_for_religious_minorities

¹²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

Since 1936 no competitiveness was scored by LIED. The elections were characterized by an ambiguous level of cleanliness until 1936, as reflected by the V-Dem's CEI, the political climate was already highly polarized and increasingly violent. From 1936 to 1938, the elections became not really clean. Therefore, regarding the broader focus of V-Dem's EF&FI outcomes underline somewhat free and fair election conditions between 1931 and 1939. The Second Spanish Republic, established with a progressive constitution that enshrined civil liberties, was nonetheless beset by extreme tensions between left-wing and right-wing factions, including the Falangists. These tensions escalated to violence, culminating in the assassination of the anti-fascist Lieutenant José Castillo by Falangists and the subsequent socialist retaliation with the murder of right-wing leader José Calvo Sotelo. This violence set the stage for further unrest, leading to the deeply contested 1936 general election.¹²³ LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicates the presence of political liberties until 1935. Since 1936 LIED indicates no political liberties. V-Dem's PCLI outcomes point to somewhat political liberties in 1936, and an ambiguous state from 1937 to 1938. For 1939, we interpret PCLI as showing that political liberties were not really present. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. Following the election of a leftist coalition government, the political situation deteriorated rapidly. From 1932 to 1936, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. From 1937 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Right-Wing military officers, discontented with the new government, began plotting a coup almost immediately. The coup, initiated on 07/17/1936 in Spanish Morocco, failed to achieve its immediate objective of overthrowing the government but instead triggered the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. The conflict quickly spread across Spain, dividing the nation between the Nationalists, led by Francisco Franco, and the Republicans. Franco, who initially was not the leader of the coup, rose to prominence due to a combination of military successes and the untimely deaths of his rivals. By October 1936, Franco had consolidated his leadership, being named the Caudillo of Spain and the head of the Nationalist government.¹²⁴ His ascent was marked by the unification of right-wing factions, including his takeover of the Falange Española de las JONS and its merger with the Carlist *Comunión Tradicionalista* in 1937, creating the

¹²³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Spanish_Republic#1936_elections

¹²⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francoist_Spain

Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS, which became the sole legal party under his rule.¹²⁵

03/28/1939 End Defective Democracy/Start Right-Wing (Corporatist) Autocracy: The defeat of the Popular Front government's forces in Madrid signaled the ultimate triumph of the nationalist armed forces (Rinehart/Browning 1990, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 94-95).¹²⁶ Initially, the Francoist dictatorship was characterized as a "fascistized dictatorship" or "semi-fascist regime," demonstrating evident influences of fascism in areas such as labor relations, autarkic economic policies, aesthetics, and the establishment of a single-party system.¹²⁷ The only trade union entity, known as the Organización Sindical Española (OSE or Sindicato Vertical), comprised corporatist associations bringing together both employers and workers, in contrast to Marxism's emphasis on class conflict. Additionally, all civil servants and public officials were required to pledge allegiance to the Principles of the National Movement.¹²⁸ Starting in 1945, Franco altered the distribution of power within his supporters, transitioning it from the Falange to Catholics.¹²⁹ Unlike fascist movements in Italy and Germany, Franco did not have a mass, populist movement behind him. Instead, his rise to power was a result of a military coup during the Spanish Civil War. The regime upheld conservative, traditional values, including strong ties to the Catholic Church and a rejection of liberal and left-wing ideologies. State repression of "enemies of the state" was widespread during this time, with liberals, socialists, Protestants, homosexuals, Jews as well as Basque, Catalan, Andalusian, and Galician nationalists being subjected to discrimination and persecution. The civil service was purged extensively, leading to roughly a quarter of all Spanish teachers and professors being removed from their jobs.¹³⁰ Municipal elections were held every three years between 1948 and 1973, with one exception as the 1966 election was followed by an irregular four-year term, with elections resuming in 1970. The elections were subject to heavy manipulation and candidates were often pre-selected and approved by the regime. For example, election regulations at times allowed candidates to be confirmed as victors without any actual voting taking place.¹³¹ Per FH, for 1972 and 1973, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. As classified by FH for 1974 and 1975, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held

¹²⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francoist_Spain

¹²⁶ <https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2011/mar/29/archive-madrid-gives-itself-up-to-franco-1939>

¹²⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francoist_Spain

¹²⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Movimiento_Nacional

¹²⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Movimiento_Nacional

¹³⁰ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Terror_\(Spain\)#Post-war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Terror_(Spain)#Post-war)

¹³¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Municipal_electoral_regime_during_Francoism

during the specified period. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. Regarding the regime data sets there is a great uncertainty in classifying the regime led by Franco. While HTW and MCM classify it as a one-party autocracy, it is a personalist regime according to GWF. Different from that AF and BR categorize it as a military autocracy. In this period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. From 1940 to 1942, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

11/22/1975 End Right-Wing (Corporatist) Autocracy/Start Constitutional Monarchy: Following Franco's death in 1975, King Juan Carlos took over as head of state with the same prime minister chosen by Franco in office. However, with Franco's death Spain became a de facto monarchy under King Juan Carlos I. The king quickly began steering Spain towards democratization. By June 1976, he replaced Arias Navarro with Adolfo Suárez, a former Francoist reformer who introduced the reforms that ultimately ended the Francoist system and a key figure in the transition to democracy (Rinehart/Browning 1988, Powell 1994: 16, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 95). This action which showed real and not only ceremonial power is decisive for our classification as a constitutional monarchy. While a democratically elected parliament is absent in this brief regime period it is more adequately classified as a constitutional monarchy. As classified by FH for 1975, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH's scoring for 1976, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free.

11/18/1976 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start (Monarchical) Non-electoral Transitional: On this date, the Political Reform Law was passed by the Francoist government, which introduced universal suffrage parliamentary elections. Despite being passed under the Francoist corporatist system of representation, these changes marked the end of the Francoist regime. According to FH, for 1976, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. As per FH's classification for 1977, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. LIED identifies political liberties are absent for the regime period, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present (1976) and then somewhat present (1977). For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as

indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

06/15/1977 End Non-electoral Transitional/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy: On this date the first free elections since 1936 were held.¹³² The elections were won by Suárez González, who, although originally being part of the Francoists, was not responsible to the Francoist clique anymore, but rather to the constituents of his party, which is why González' term is considered the major break with the Francoist system.¹³³ Female suffrage was recovered with the new Spanish Constitution in 1977.¹³⁴ The first period saw the beginning of the development of the rule of law and the establishment of regional government, amidst ongoing terrorism, an attempted coup d'état and global economic problems.¹³⁵ Concerning the quality of democracy in Spain, it has experienced ups and downs. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections score a constant competitiveness according to LIED. Since 1978, following the end of Franco's dictatorship, Spain has held democratic elections that have been consistently scored as clean by the V-Dem's CEI, reflecting a strong commitment to electoral integrity in the post-Franco era. In addition, since 1978 the overall election conditions are considered as free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. The political landscape is characterized by free and competing parties. The political landscape in Spain since the transition has been both simple and complex. From 1977 until 1982, Spain was governed by the Union of the Democratic Centre (Unión de Centro Democrático; UCD), with the major opposition party being the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español; PSOE). Other significant parties included the right-wing Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular; AP) and the Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista de España; PCE). In 1982, PSOE came to power and governed until 1996. The UCD subsequently split into smaller parties, and the Popular Party (Partido Popular; PP), successor to the AP, became the leading opposition force. The PP won a plurality in the elections of 1996 and formed a government.¹³⁶ Spain is best described as a mid-performing democracy and has faced challenges such as secessionism, terrorism, corruption scandals, and economic crises. Despite these challenges, it has maintained stable democratic performance and seen improvements in the absence of corruption. As per FH's classification for 1977, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. As per FH's classification from 1978 onwards, the

¹³² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1977_Spanish_general_election

¹³³ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, Spain_V: 6-7

¹³⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

¹³⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_transition_to_democracy

¹³⁶ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Spain/National-parties>

country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Regarding the political liberties they are present since 1980 according to LIED, whereas our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI indicates their presence already since 1978. Since 1978, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. Since 1979, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive except between 2012 and 2015 and in 2020 V-Dem's JCE is interpreted as comprehensive and LCE as robust. The transition to democracy, while successful in establishing a democratic system, did not fully address demands for justice and reconciliation from those oppressed during the dictatorship.¹³⁷ Spain has a parliamentary system of government with a bicameral parliament consisting of the Congress of Deputies and the Senate.¹³⁸ In 2022, the EIU Unit downgraded Spain from a full democracy to a flawed democracy due to concerns about its judicial independence, particularly over the appointment of new magistrates to the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ).¹³⁹ However, Spain is still a liberal democracy according to our criteria.

(Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Blinkhorn 1986, Carr 1982, Hermet 1976, Linz 1964, Nohlen/Vallès 2010, Payne 1993, Payne 1999, Robinson 1970)

Sri Lanka

[formerly known as Ceylon]

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 03/25/1802]: Ceylon became a British crown colony signing of the Treaty of Amiens on 03/25/1802 (Schrikker 2007). It was administered by British governors with advisory councils that had limited influence. The indigenous population had minimal political representation. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 1910. From 1911 onward, only multiparty legislative elections were held. No executive elections were present. The Legislative Council elections in Ceylon were undemocratic due to its restrictive structure and limited voter representation. Only four unofficial members were elected, with the

¹³⁷ <https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/spain>

¹³⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Spain

¹³⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Spain

majority of the council appointed by the Governor. Two of the elected seats for Europeans were uncontested, leaving no actual voting process. The electorate was highly restricted, with seats divided along racial lines (Europeans, Burghers, and "educated" Ceylonese), severely limiting political participation and excluding the majority of the population. This arrangement lacked the foundational principles of equal suffrage, broad representation, and competitive elections, hallmarks of a democratic process.¹⁴⁰ Political liberties were absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI indicates political liberties as somewhat present until 1919 and again in 1930. For the rest of the years, we interpret the PCLI as indicating the presence of political liberties. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

04/25/1931 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: In 1931 the Donoughmore Constitution introduced universal adult suffrage for all irrespective of race, ethnicity, language, and established the State Council.¹⁴¹ The parliament had significant influence over domestic affairs, though the British governor retained control over defense and foreign policy. The parliament was effective in advancing the interests of the indigenous population, leading to independence on 02/04/1948. LIED confirms the presence of legislative and multiparty elections and the presence of female and male suffrage. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and present according to V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

08/23/1947[-09/20/1947] End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Defective Democracy [as (de facto) Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: Between these dates the first national Ceylonese parliamentary elections took place, which were won by the United National Party (UNP) and Ceylon became a self-governing nation as a British Dominion.¹⁴² The Ceylon Independence Act came into effect on 12/10/1947.¹⁴³ For the specified period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present.

¹⁴⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1911_Ceylonese_Legislative_Council_election

¹⁴¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donoughmore_Constitution

¹⁴² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1947_Ceylonese_parliamentary_election

¹⁴³ <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/11-12/7/enacted>

02/04/1948 Continuation Defective Democracy [as independent country]: On 02/04/1948 Ceylon gained its independence within the Commonwealth (Ratnapalan 2016). On 05/22/1972 the name of the country was changed to Republic of Sri Lanka. The constitution of 05/22/1972 created a weak president appointed by the prime minister (Warnapala 1973). Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Up to 1976 the elections remained competitive according to LIED. V-Dem's CEI reflects clean election from 1948 to 1951. Between 1951 and 1978 the elections decrease to a somewhat cleanliness level. According to V-Dem's EF&FI, the overall conditions are free and fair until 1976. The following year, they fall to somewhat free and fair. According to FH, for the years 1972 to 1974, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. As classified by FH for 1975, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. As per FH's classification for 1976, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. According to FH, for 1977, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. As per FH's classification for 1978, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. Besides, the political liberties were present until 1969 according to LIED. The remaining years no political liberties were achieved according to LIED. Our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI confirms the presence of political liberties until 1970. Since 1971 somewhat political liberties were achieved. The LDI shows a constantly ambiguous score, thus referring to a defective democracy in this time interval. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. From 1948 to 1971, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 1972 onwards, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating that robust constraints on the executive. While in doubt we follow the classification of BMR, CGV, GWF and PRC as democratic for this period.

09/07/1978 End Defective Democracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: The regime change in Sri Lanka is classified as an incremental self-coup, marked by the adoption of a new constitution on 09/07/1978. This constitutional reform fundamentally transformed the institutional structure of the regime by replacing the previous parliamentary system with a powerful executive presidency. In contrast to the earlier framework, the new constitution granted the president sweeping powers, including the authority to override, amend, or suspend laws passed by parliament, dissolve the

legislature, and expel members of parliament (Edrisinha 2000: 106).¹⁴⁴ Although formal multiparty elections continued to be held, the introduction of such far-reaching executive dominance effectively dismantled horizontal accountability and shifted the regime away from democratic standards. The accumulation of power in the presidency—deemed by some observers to amount to quasi-dictatorial rule.¹⁴⁵ Accordingly, this moment marks the transition to an electoral hybrid regime, characterized by competitive elections under conditions of severely weakened checks and balances. The government used UNP militants to harass and beat supporters of opposition parties with collusion from the police (DeVotta 2004: 143-46, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 95). According to GWF the Jayawardene government crossed the line to dictatorship (DeVotta 2002: 91, DeVotta 2004: 143-46, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 95). This is disputed by MCM. We agree with MCM that there was a gradual shift from democracy to autocracy between 1978 and 1983 (Magaloni/Chu/Min 2013: 28). In 10/1980 the political rights of the main opposition leader were cancelled (Blood 1988, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 95). On 12/22/1982 a rigged referendum extended the UNP's 2/3 majority in Parliament instead of holding the required election (DeVotta 2001: 91, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 95). Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For the entire time the elections were not competitive following LIED's data. The elections remained somewhat clean until 1982. Since 1983 V-Dem's CEI switched to ambiguous cleanliness. V-Dem's EF&FI outcomes show somewhat free and fair election conditions. The LDI reflects a not really score which points more into the direction of an electoral autocracy. A pogrom against Tamil civilians in 1983 escalated the low-level violence into a full-blown civil war (until 2009) with Tamil separatists in the northeastern regions fighting for independence.¹⁴⁶ Because of the progressive autocratization, we classify the regime as an electoral hybrid regime despite the fact that the UNP under Jayewardene came to power in democratic elections. The new constitution was not an illegitimate act per se either. It did not change the guarantee of fundamental rights and an independent judiciary.¹⁴⁷ However, the developments described above constitute severe restrictions on political and civil liberties as well as deficits in the institutional restrictions on the executive. While according to LIED political liberties were not present for this entire period, V-Dem's PCLI finds somewhat political liberties until 1982, from 1994 to 1999, from 2002 to 2004, in 2015 and since 2019. V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous from 1983 to 1993, from 2000 to 2001 and from

¹⁴⁴ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Sri_Lanka_2015?lang=en

¹⁴⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sri_Lankan_Civil_War

¹⁴⁶ https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sri_Lanka; <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/LKA>

¹⁴⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Sri_Lanka

2005 to 2014 regarding the state of political liberties. For the period 2016 to 2018, V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are present. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. On 05/18/1983 President Jayawardene declared a state of emergency and exploited his parliamentary supermajority to extend the life of the sitting parliament without elections (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 59-60, Samarasinghe 1984). Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Following LIED the elections were not competitive during this period. V-Dem's CEI reflects an ambiguous cleanliness for the elections retains between 1983 and 1988. The LDI indicates a not really score. Whereas V-Dem's EF&FI indicates somewhat free and fair conditions between 1983 and 1988. Per FH's scoring for 1978 to 1982, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. As classified by FH for the rest of this regime period, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. From 1978 to 2004, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Between 2005 and 2014 V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Since 2015 JCE and LCE fluctuate. From 2015 to 2016, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate and JCE is interpreted as comprehensive and LCE as robust from 2017 to 2019 and in 2021. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. We classify the country in this period still as an electoral hybrid regime. For instance, the incumbent party successfully banned the leader of the opposition from politics (Gastil 1984: 25). FH observed a decline from a free to a partly free regime in 1983. On 12/19/1988 presidential elections were won by Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa of the governing United National Party. However, the victory was narrow. On 02/15/1989 parliamentary elections took place (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 59-60). On 11/09/1994 presidential elections were won by opposition (DeVotta 2002: 92, Samarsinghe/Samarsinghe 1998: 112). According to GWF this returned the country to democracy (Geddes/Wright/Frantz

2014: 95). Between 2010 and 2015 according to HTW and LIED Sri Lanka turned into a democracy. For example, the 2015 presidential elections were still characterized by deficits, violation of electoral laws and violent incidents.¹⁴⁸ In contrast, the 2019 presidential elections were classified by the EU as peaceful and upholding democratic institutions.¹⁴⁹ However, Nandasena Gotabaya Rajapaksa, winner of the 2019 presidential election, expanded presidential power and began to appoint family members to positions of power. In combination with an economic crisis, popular upheaval forced him out of office in 2022.¹⁵⁰ Throughout the period, however, there have been severe limitations on democracy. According to our observations Sri Lanka is a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime. Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Between 1989 and 2009 the elections were classified as competitive by LIED, for the following five years as not competitive. Since 2015 LIED scores elections as competitive. Since 1988 V-Dem's CEI declares multiple changes between an ambiguous and a somewhat cleanliness. Between 1988 and 1994 the elections score an ambiguous cleanliness before entering five years of a somewhat cleanliness. From 2000 to 2001 the elections switched back to ambiguity. For the following three years the elections are somewhat clean again. 2005 and 2014 marks a change to an ambiguous cleanliness. Since 2015, the country's elections are classified as somewhat clean. In addition, V-Dem's EF&FI also indicates multiple changes regarding the freedom and fairness of the elections. Until 1993 the scores remain at a somewhat free and fair level. For the following five years, the outcome is acknowledging overall free and fair conditions. Between 1999 and 2018 the electoral standards decrease to a somewhat level. Since 2019, freedom and fairness for the elections were given. Per FH, for 1988, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. As classified by FH for 1989-1995, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH's scoring for 1996, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for 1997-2005 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Per FH's scoring for 2006 to 2009, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH for 2010 to 2014, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH's scoring for 2015, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize

¹⁴⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Sri_Lankan_presidential_election#Conduct

¹⁴⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Sri_Lankan_presidential_election#International_reactions

¹⁵⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gotabaya_Rajapaksa#

as rather not free. Per FH, for the years 2016 to 2018, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. According to FH, in the period 2019-2023, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. Until 2000, according to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. In 2001 and 2002, based on Polity5's evaluation, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. Between 2003 and 2009, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. From 2010 to 2014, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. Since 2015, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. Overall, given the persistent pattern of fluctuating democratic quality, recurring violations of electoral standards, and substantial constraints on political liberties at various points, the category of an “electoral hybrid regime” appears more fitting. While there were certain periods that suggested movement toward a defective democracy, these phases did not solidify into a sustained, stable democratic order. Instead, long stretches of restricted freedoms, uncertain electoral fairness, and concentration of power point toward a regime type that is neither fully democratic nor completely authoritarian—one that is best described as an electoral hybrid.

09/21/2024 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Defective Democracy: The presidential election on 09/21/2024 marked the first time in Sri Lankan history that a long-dominant political establishment was peacefully ousted through the ballot box. The victory of Anura Kumara Dissanayake, a candidate from a party previously considered a fringe player, was a clear signal that the electoral system could produce genuine change and accountability. This proved the elections were not merely a facade for an entrenched power elite. Following this, Dissanayake's party, the National People's Power (NPP), secured a supermajority in the parliamentary elections on 11/14/2024. This cemented the public's rejection of the political status quo and gave the new government a strong mandate for reform. These events were a culmination of widespread public protests against corruption and economic mismanagement that had plagued the country for years. The new administration immediately began to fulfill its campaign promises by focusing on anti-corruption measures and strengthening the rule of law.¹⁵¹ This revitalization of the electoral process and the subsequent steps towards institutional reform elevate Sri Lanka from a hybrid regime, where democratic elements are weak or co-opted, to a defective democracy. While the

¹⁵¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Sri_Lanka

country still faces significant challenges, such as deep-seated corruption and ethnic tensions, the recent events have established a crucial foundation for a more transparent and accountable system of governance. As classified by FH the country is scored with 7 as partly free, which corresponds to our interpretation of rather free.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Sudan

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 06/19/1899]: In 1899 the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium was declared, providing for the Sudan to be administered jointly by Egypt and Great Britain, with a governor-general appointed by the khedive of Egypt but nominated by the British government. In reality, however, there was no equal partnership between Britain and Egypt in the Sudan, as the British dominated the condominium from the beginning.¹⁵² The Sudan was divided into 15 Provinces. The governors of the provinces were British Officers of the Egyptian Army. Administration was carried out through British inspectors in charge of one or more districts into which the provinces are subdivided (Willoughby/Fenwick 1974). The effective head of the government was Lord Cromer, the agent of British overrule in Egypt. Cromer treated the governor-general (from 1899 to 1916 Reginald Wingate) as a mere executive subordinate (Roberts 1986). During this time, however, two political parties emerged by 1945. There were two main parties involved: the National Unionist Party, headed by al-Azhari, advocated for the unification of Sudan and Egypt, receiving endorsement from Sayed Sir Ali al-Mirghani, a prominent religious leader. On the other side was the Umma Party, supported by Sayed Sir Abdur-Rahman al-Mahdi, which strongly pushed for complete independence without any ties to Egypt.¹⁵³ There was no parliament or electoral system in Sudan under the colonial regime of the United Kingdom. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 1948. Thereafter, multiparty legislative elections were conducted. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present. Until 1947, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. From 1948 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is

¹⁵² <https://www.britannica.com/place/South-Sudan/The-arts>

¹⁵³ https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Sudan#Foreign_control:_Egyptian_and_British

interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

04/01/1952 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date Sudan was granted self-government as well as full Sudanisation of the administration within three years. In January 1953, Egypt and Britain arrived at a formal agreement of independence for the Sudan (Crowder 1984).¹⁵⁴ In the same year male suffrage was introduced (LIED). Under continued pressure, the United Kingdom conceded to Egypt's demands in 1953, with the governments of both Egypt and the United Kingdom agreeing to terminate the condominium, and grant Sudan independence in 1956.¹⁵⁵ In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as being ambiguous about the status of political liberties. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

11/25/1953 End (Monarchical) Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start (Male) (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, parliamentary elections were held, in which the National Unionist Party (NUP) won. The election, in which only males had the right to vote, was by observers regarded as free and fair.¹⁵⁶ On 08/18/1955 the first Sudanese Civil War started. This was a conflict between the northern part of Sudan and the southern Sudan region that demanded representation and more regional autonomy. Half a million people died over the coming 17 years and the war was divided into four major stages: initial guerrilla warfare, the creation of the Anyanya insurgency, political strife within the government and establishment of the South Sudan Liberation Movement. For the period under consideration, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

01/01/1956 Continuation Electoral Hybrid Regime (as a republic): Independence became effective and the Sudan became the Republic of Sudan (Barbour 1980). Additional internal conflicts within the NUP concerning religious policies resulted in a division in February 1956, leading to the formation of the independent People's Democratic Party (PDP).¹⁵⁷ The PDP got together with the Umma party, to bring down al-Azhari and then formed a coalition government.

¹⁵⁴ <https://www.eisa.org/wep/sudoverview3.htm>

¹⁵⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Egyptian_Sudan

¹⁵⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Sudanese_parliamentary_election

¹⁵⁷ <https://www.eisa.org/wep/sud1965bg.htm>

They governed for the rest of the parliament's tenure, however their reign was marked by internal conflict. Nevertheless, they were determined to keep working together.¹⁵⁸ The coalition comprising the Umma Party (securing 36% of seats) and the PDP (gaining 16% of seats) won the February 1958 elections after entering into an electoral agreement.¹⁵⁹ The new parliament was divided on many issues and faced factionalism and corruption, making it hard for the government to exercise its leadership.¹⁶⁰ Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. From 1953 and 1955 the elections were not competitive. The following two years the elections were categorized as competitive by LIED. Furthermore, between 1953 and 1958 a somewhat freedom and fairness is given (V-Dem EF&FI). V-Dem's CEI reflects a not really cleanliness of elections from 1954 to 1958. The LDI indicates a none scores corresponding to an autocracy and according to LIED political liberties were absent. However, V-Dem's PCLI indicates ambiguous political liberties from 1953 to 1955. The remaining years even somewhat political liberties were given. In 1956 and 1957, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. From 1953 to 1955, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. In the years 1956 and 1957, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties are somewhat present. For 1958, our interpretation of the PCLI indicates an ambiguous state of political liberties.

11/17/1958 End (Male) Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: A military coup led by General Ibrahim Abboud in a context of widespread anti-government demonstrations happened. The coup was orchestrated by Prime Minister Abdallah Khalil, a retired army general (Marshall 2018a).¹⁶¹ Abboud established the Supreme Council of the armed Forces made up of twelve senior officers as a military junta (Haddad 1973: 183-85, Ofcansky 1991, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 95) and declared a state-of-emergency.¹⁶² The interim constitution

¹⁵⁸ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Sudan_\(1956%E2%80%931969\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Sudan_(1956%E2%80%931969))

¹⁵⁹ <https://www.eisa.org/wep/sud1965bg.htm>;

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1958_Sudanese_parliamentary_election

¹⁶⁰ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Sudan_\(1956%E2%80%931969\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Sudan_(1956%E2%80%931969))

¹⁶¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1958_Sudanese_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

¹⁶² <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/70-republic-of-sudan-1956-present/>

was put on hold, and all political organizations were disbanded.¹⁶³ Parliament was dissolved and the government ruled by decree.¹⁶⁴ "Although this event could be classified as a ruptural self-coup by the prime minister, we categorize it as a military coup due to the decisive role of the armed forces and the subsequent establishment of a junta. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. For 1959, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. In the period 1960-1963, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. For 1964, our interpretation of the PCLI indicates that political liberties were not really present. According to Polity5, from 1958 to 1962, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. In 1963, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. Polity5 does not provide a categorization for 1964. In 1959, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, and V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Since there was no parliament in this period V-Dem's values for LCE are clearly wrong, while the values for the JCE seem doubtful to say the least.

10/29/1964 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, Abboud was forced out due to a popular uprising to appoint a transitional civilian cabinet and resign (Haddad 1973: 195, Ofcansky 1991, Shepherd 1964: 12, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 95). Al-Khalifa became acting president of the new civilian regime. According to LIED, only executive elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No legislative elections were present. In 1964 female suffrage was introduced in Sudan.¹⁶⁵ The UNF government was dominated by the Communist Party of the Sudan (CPS), the People's Democratic Party and their allies in the trade union movement. National elections were scheduled for March 1965 despite the ongoing conflict in the south, which prevented elections from being carried out in this region. Political parties were split on the question of whether the elections

¹⁶³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibrahim_Abboud

¹⁶⁴ <https://fanack.com/sudan/history-of-sudan/democracy-and-military-coup/#:~:text=The%20coup%20was%20led%20by%20General%20Ibrahim%20Aboud,constitution%2C%20instead%20of%20actually%20drafting%20a%20new%20constitution.>

¹⁶⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

should be carried out only in the north or whether they should be postponed.¹⁶⁶ In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's indicates in our interpretation an ambiguous state regarding political liberties. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Again, V-Dem's LCE seems misleading since there was no parliament in this period.

04/21/1965 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: Elections were held in the North from 04/21 to 05/08/1965, and the Umma Party (UP) won 90 out of 207 seats in the Constituent Assembly. Finally, the election for the constituent assembly was held in the South on 04/18/1967.¹⁶⁷ GWF classifies the country from 1966 to 1968 as democratic, MCM, BR, AF and LIED from 1965 to 1969. We code this period as an electoral hybrid regime, because it was characterized by internal party conflicts as well as conflicts between parliament and head of parties. Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. From 1965 to 1968 the elections were classified as competitive by LIED. V-Dem's CEI indicates no cleanliness for the elections. In 1966 and 1967 no elections were held. In 1968 the overall election conditions are considered as ambiguous (V-Dem EF&FI). V-Dem's LDI declares the absence of liberal democratic indicators, referring to an autocracy. Furthermore, regarding the political liberties, LIED scores absence at this time (LIED) and V-Dem's PCLI is coded as ambiguous until 1969, when our classification of PCLI changes to not really present. However, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. This situation resulted in two simultaneous governments in Khartoum - one convening inside the parliament building and the other on its lawn - both asserting to represent the legislature's will.¹⁶⁸ The different governments in this period were incapable of ensuring the stability and guarantee of institutions, as well as the guarantee of political and civil liberties, such as religious freedom.¹⁶⁹

05/25/1969 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: A military coup led by General Gaafar Nimeiry seized power from the civilian government on the basis that it had not solved the economic or social problems. He established a new junta with a leftist pan-Arab

¹⁶⁶ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Sudan_\(1956%E2%80%931969\)#Post-October_1964](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Sudan_(1956%E2%80%931969)#Post-October_1964)

¹⁶⁷ <https://www.eisa.org/wep/sud1969bg.htm>

¹⁶⁸ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Sudan_\(1956%E2%80%931969\)#Post-October_1964](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Sudan_(1956%E2%80%931969)#Post-October_1964)

¹⁶⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Sudan#Independence_and_the_First_Civil_War;
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Sudan_\(1956%E2%80%931969\)#Post-October_1964](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Sudan_(1956%E2%80%931969)#Post-October_1964)

orientation, the Revolutionary Command Council (Haddad 1973: 209-13, Ofcansky 1991, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 95). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. For the given timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. As observed for many regime periods for Sudan the LCE is misleading since there was no functioning parliament in this period. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) assumed both executive and legislative powers, effectively replacing parliamentary structures.

07/19/1971 End Military Autocracy/Start Communist Ideocracy: Communists backed by Major Hashem al Atta overthrew Nimeiry and established an extremely short-lived communist government.

07/22/1971 End Communist Ideocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Nimeiry and loyalist forces launched a counter coup against the communist regime headed by Atta. Nimeiry resumed his chairmanship of his previous junta and began to suppress communists in his country. According to LIED, only executive elections were held until 1973, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No legislative elections were present. From 1974 onward, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. As per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. As classified by FH for the period 1972-1977, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Per FH's evaluation for 1978 to 1983, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH's classification for the years 1984 and 1985, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED indicates the absence of political liberties through the entire regime period. V-Dem's PCLI does change over the regime period. From 1972 to 1978, PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. The PCLI for the years 1979 to 1984 are classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present. For 1985 we code the PCLI data to indicate an ambiguous state of political liberties. Until 1973, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were

limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. As observed above the LCE is misleading since there was no parliament in this period.

04/06/1985 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: A conservative officer-led coup was carried out as a response to riots. This resulted in the removal of Nimeiry from power and the instalment of a Transitional Military Council, which joined forces with previously marginalized civilians that had been excluded under the Nimeiry administration (Anderson 1999: 14-26, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 96).¹⁷⁰ Following the coup the junta appointed a largely non-partisan civilian cabinet, promulgated a revised constitution and oversaw elections for a Constituent Assembly, which were held as scheduled in April 1986 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 60). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. As classified by FH for 1985, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Per FH's evaluation for 1986, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In the specified timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties are somewhat present. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Again, the LCE is misleading since there was no parliament in this period and the indications of the JCE seem doubtful to say the least. Regarding Sudan neither V-Dem's JCE nor LCE seems reliable.

04/12/1986 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: Between 04/01 and 04/12/1986 the first multi-party elections in the country since 1968 were held. Power was returned to civilians (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 96).¹⁷¹ Although these elections had been relatively free and fair, they could not be conducted throughout the entire national territory. The Umma Party emerged as winner but had to form a coalition government.¹⁷² Although Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma party and elected prime minister, promised to restore judicial independence, religious freedom and end the civil war those goals could not be achieved.¹⁷³ Therefore, this regime period is marked by deficits in the electoral process, as well as in the

¹⁷⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1985_Sudanese_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

¹⁷¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1986_Sudanese_parliamentary_election;
<https://africanelections.tripod.com/cf.html>

¹⁷² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1986_Sudanese_parliamentary_election

¹⁷³ <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a607f.html>

guarantee of political and civil rights and the independence of the judiciary. Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED scores the elections as competitive in this period. While V-Dem's CEI acknowledges that the elections were not really clean, V-Dem's EF&FI scores the elections as somewhat free and fair. According to FH, for the period between 1986 and 1988, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. V-Dem's low LDI indicates that Sudan was an autocracy in that period and the absence of political liberties is stated by LIED. However, according to V-Dem's PCLI somewhat political liberties were achieved. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was even subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. Based on the mixed information we classify the regime as an electoral hybrid regime. For most of the relevant period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are somewhat present. In 1989, PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

06/30/1989 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: A military coup led by General Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir and an Islamist faction against Sadiq al-Mahdi's elected all-party coalition government, imposed a state of emergency, dissolved all parties and unions, took possession of their assets, banned demonstrations, and established the 15 members, all military Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (R.C.C.) to rule. The new rulers dismissed much of the officer corps (Hoogland 1991, Burr/Collins 2003: 2, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 96, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 88). On 12/12/1999 al-Bashir ordered tanks and troops to oust Hassan al-Turabir, a political rival, who was speaker of the parliament. This move concentrated absolute power in al-Bashir's hands. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held between 1989 and 1995. Subsequently, both executive and legislative elections were held until 1998, though they were not categorized as multiparty. In 1999, only executive elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No legislative elections were present. Both executive and legislative elections were held again between 2000 and 2004, but they were not categorized as multiparty. Since 2005, multiparty executive and legislative elections have been held. According to Polity5, from 1989 to 2004, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 2005 to 2009, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-

making power imposed by other institutions. From 2010 onward, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED indicates that political liberties were absent for the entire regime period. V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent until the year 2004. We code the PCLI data for 2005-2018 as showing that political liberties are not truly present. For 2019 PCLI we interpret PCLI's assessment as indicating an ambiguous state of political liberties. Between 1992 and 2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

04/11/2019 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was overthrown by the Sudanese army after popular protests demanded his departure. At that time the army, led by Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf, toppled the government and National Legislature and declared a state of emergency in the country for a period of three months. He proclaimed himself the de facto Head of State, declared the suspension of Sudan's constitution, enforced a curfew, effectively quelling the ongoing protests. Additionally, he dissolved the National Legislature, national government, state governments, and legislative councils across Sudan. On 04/12/2019 the military regime in power agreed to potentially shorten its tenure and hand over governance to a civilian administration pending successful negotiations for its formation. Later that evening, Auf resigned from his position as head of the military council, appointing Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan, the general inspector of the armed forces, as his successor. Subsequently, on 04/13/2019 discussions between the protestors and the military commenced officially to facilitate the transition to a civilian-led government. By 04/27/2019 a consensus was reached to establish a transitional council comprising both civilians and military personnel. However, the specifics of the power-sharing agreement had not been finalized, as both factions sought to secure a majority representation.¹⁷⁴ The Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), the political coalition consisting of civilian and rebel coalitions, negotiated the power-sharing plan with the Transitional Military Council (TMC) in July 2019. The agreement was reached on 07/17/2019.¹⁷⁵ It included a 39-month transitional period aimed at restoring democracy as well as the establishment of executive, legislative and

¹⁷⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Sudanese_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

¹⁷⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forces_of_Freedom_and_Change

judicial institutions along with their respective procedures..¹⁷⁶ This constitutional declaration was signed by the TMC and FFC in August 2019. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free.

08/20/2019 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date the Transitional Sovereignty Council took over as the collective head of state of Sudan. It consisted of five civilians chosen by the FFC and five military officers chosen by the TMC as well as one civilian chosen through consensus between the FFC and TMC. For the initial 21 months, the chair was designated to be a military representative, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, while for the subsequent 18 months, a civilian member was to assume the role..¹⁷⁷ Abdalla Hamdok was appointed prime minister by the council on 08/20/2019 and sworn in on 08/21/2019..¹⁷⁸ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. In the timeframe 2019-2020, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as being ambiguous about the status of political liberties. For 2021, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

10/15/2021 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup led by Lieutenant General Abdelfattah El Burhan ousted prime minister Abdalla Hamdok and the military seized power followed by the declaration of a state of emergency. Hamdok was reinstated later, however the military retained control over the government. He resigned on 01/02/2022 amid continuing protests – leaving the government in the hands of the military leaders..¹⁷⁹ The military declared not to hold elections until 2023. This power shift was encountered with violent protest by the people..¹⁸⁰ By 2023 the military had consolidated power of all governmental institutions. In April 2023, tensions between the Sudanese Armed Forces

¹⁷⁶ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudanese_transition_to_democracy_\(2019%E2%80%932021\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudanese_transition_to_democracy_(2019%E2%80%932021))

¹⁷⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transitional_Sovereignty_Council

¹⁷⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdalla_Hamdok

¹⁷⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/October%E2%80%93November_2021_Sudanese_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat; <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-military-seizes-power-arrests-pm-and-civilian-ministers-in-dawn-coup>

¹⁸⁰ <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule>; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Sudan_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

(SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) spiked and brought negotiations over the formation of a new government to a standstill. Violence erupted as the groups became increasingly hostile. International Organizations in 2023 report that the conflict has led to over 12,000 deaths and 6 million displaced persons. The RSF has reportedly committed mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region, killing or forcibly removing non-Arab parts of the population.¹⁸¹ In December 2023, Sudan's military and civilian leaders agreed to a new framework aimed at restoring civilian rule. The transition efforts are however stalled because of the ongoing civil war between the SAF and RSF as well as several militias and armed groups. For now, no side seems able to break the stalemate which raises the question of the existence of a central authority.¹⁸² For now, we classify Sudan as a military autocracy referring to the internationally recognized government of Sudan. The reasoning behind this choice is, that the RSF do not aim to secede or abolish the government's authority, but to usurp it. Defending governmental authority against a usurper is, in this case, a reason not to speak of a case of no central authority. It remains to be seen how the military situation on the ground plays out. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE indicates no values, as no parliament exists, and thus no legislative constraints on the executive are possible.

Military Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Metz 1991)

Suriname

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Netherlands, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 07/31/1667]: In 1667, Suriname became a Dutch colony after being under British rule from 1650 to 1657. The Dutch fleet from Zealand commanded by Abraham Crynssen conquered Suriname and it passed into Dutch ownership under the Peace Treaty of Breda, signed on 07/31/1667.¹⁸³ In 1814, Suriname fell under the King's sovereignty and became the responsibility of the Minister

¹⁸¹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/sudan/freedom-world/2024#PR>

¹⁸² <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan>

¹⁸³ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Breda_\(1667\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Breda_(1667))

of Colonies, who was responsible to the States General (Society of Surinam) (Van Lier 1971). Following the 1922 constitutional revision in the Netherlands, which replaced the term "colony" with "overseas territory," the government regulation of 1865 was replaced by the Basic Law of Suriname on 04/01/1937. This Basic Law changed the name of the Colonial Council to the Estates of Suriname and increased its membership from 13 to 15 (Muhlenfeld 1944).¹⁸⁴ After the signing of the 1941 Atlantic Charter by the Netherlands on 01/01/1942, Queen Wilhelmina proposed a federal system within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, but this was later deemed too heavy for the economies of Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles.¹⁸⁵ According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. Universal suffrage was introduced in 1949 (LIED). Political liberties were absent according to LIED and somewhat present according to our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

03/14/1951 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Netherlands, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of Netherlands, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this day the first free and fair general elections with male and female suffrage were held.¹⁸⁶ LIED confirms that legislative multiparty elections were held. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and somewhat present according to our classification of V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

12/15/1954 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of Netherlands, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Defective Democracy [as Protectorate of Netherlands, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: Suriname gained internal autonomy (as part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands). In 1954, Suriname became an autonomous coequal member of the Kingdom of the Netherlands under the terms of the Statute of the Realm, with the exception of foreign affairs and defence Suriname.¹⁸⁷ The Charter enacted in 1954 allowed Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles to have a Minister Plenipotentiary and participate in Dutch cabinet meetings, and to alter their "Basic Laws." Delegates from both countries could participate in the States-General, and an overseas member could be added to the Council of State. The Charter did not allow for the

¹⁸⁴ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surinam_\(Dutch_colony\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surinam_(Dutch_colony))

¹⁸⁵ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suriname_\(Kingdom_of_the_Netherlands\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suriname_(Kingdom_of_the_Netherlands)). See also LIED.

¹⁸⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1951_Surinamese_general_election

¹⁸⁷ https://1997-2001.state.gov/background_notes/suriname_0398_bgn.html

unilateral exit of Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles from the Kingdom, but it could be dissolved through mutual consultation.¹⁸⁸ From this point on we code Suriname as a semisovereign entity (Protectorate status). Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED considers the elections as competitive during this time. Additionally, V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI indicate free, fair and clean elections in this regime period. As per FH's classification for 1975, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. For the relevant period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are somewhat present. This changes in 1975, for which our interpretation of the PCLI data indicates that political liberties were present. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

11/25/1975 Continuation Defective Democracy [as independent country]: On this date, Suriname gained its independence and the former governor Johan Ferrier was sworn in as president on the same day (Gallé 1993, Marshall 2018d).¹⁸⁹ During this period regular elections were held with occasional changes in government.¹⁹⁰ On 10/31/1977, Suriname held its first general elections after gaining independence. The result was a victory for the National Party Combination (an alliance of the National Party of Suriname, the Renewed Progressive Party, the Party for National Unity and Solidarity and the Suriname Progressive People's Party).¹⁹¹ According to Freedom House elections during this period were fair and free, civil liberties were upheld and the judiciary acted independently (Gastil 1980: 297). According to FH, for the assessed period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. The elections score competitiveness according to LIED's data. V-Dem's CEI also affirms cleanliness for the election process. In addition, the overall election conditions are classified as fully free and fair, by V-Dem's EF&FI. Since 1975, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. In the timeframe 1975-1979, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are present. In 1980 PCLI indicates a change to an ambiguous state of political liberties. From 1976 onwards, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive were robust.

¹⁸⁸ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suriname_\(Kingdom_of_the_Netherlands\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suriname_(Kingdom_of_the_Netherlands))

¹⁸⁹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suriname_\(Kingdom_of_the_Netherlands\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suriname_(Kingdom_of_the_Netherlands))

¹⁹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1969_Surinamese_general_election

¹⁹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1977_Surinamese_general_election

02/25/1980 End Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: Dési Bouterse, a military officer, and his group of sergeants overthrew the government of Prime Minister Henck Arron from the National Party of Suriname.¹⁹² Bouterse established himself as the head of a military junta, the National Military Council of Suriname.¹⁹³ The civilian president resigned sometime later in protest. Bouterse moved to consolidate power over the country by removing members of his junta and the civilian president. He also dissolved the legislature and declared a state of emergency in an apparent self-coup. The regime ruthlessly quashed civic and political opposition, inaugurating a decade of military intervention in politics.¹⁹⁴ On 07/22/1986 the Surinamese Interior War began in Stolkertsijver when twelve soldiers manning a checkpoint were captured. The conflict initially stemmed from a personal dispute between Bouterse and Brunswijk, who had previously served as Bouterse's bodyguard. However, it eventually took on political significance, as Brunswijk pushed for democratic reforms, civil rights, and economic development for Suriname's Maroon minority.¹⁹⁵ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, in 1980 and 1981, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1982 onward, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. As classified by FH for this regime period until 1986, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Per FH's scoring for 1987, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. For the period under consideration, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

11/25/1987 End Military Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: On this date a general election took place. The result was a victory for the Front for Democracy and Development (an alliance of the National Party of Suriname, the Progressive Reform Party and the Party for National Unity and Solidarity).¹⁹⁶ The National Democratic Party (NDP), organized by the military, won just three out of 51 seats.¹⁹⁷ Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections

¹⁹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henck_Arron

¹⁹³ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Military_Council_\(Suriname\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Military_Council_(Suriname))

¹⁹⁴ <https://www.refworld.org/docid/473c55fb53.html>

¹⁹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surinamese_Interior_War

¹⁹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1987_Surinamese_general_election;
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Surinam_1992?lang=en

¹⁹⁷ <https://www.refworld.org/docid/473c55fb53.html>

were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Between 1988 and 1989 LIED indicates competitiveness for the country's elections. Furthermore, since 1988 Suriname's elections were clean the following three years according to V-Dem's CEI and fully free and fair according to V-Dem's EF&FI. Throughout this period, the judiciary maintained a strong sense of independence, and civil liberties were generally upheld. Per FH's scoring for 1987, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. As per FH's classification for 1988, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. As classified by FH for 1989, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. According to FH, for 1990 a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. Our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI confirms the presence of somewhat political liberties in 1988 and full liberties in 1989, however, LIED still indicates their absence. In 1988 and 1989, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. In 1990, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. However, anti-guerrilla operations in rural areas resulted in civilian casualties, and the government struggled to maintain control over the military (Gastil 1989: 461). In 1987 and 1989, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. In 1988, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

12/24/1990 End Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: Bouterse disapproved of the new civilian president's policies, especially those concerning the jungle tribes. He threatened a coup by telephone, forcing Ramsewak Shankar to flee and Iwan Granooget to take over as acting president (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 61). However, Bouterse was the de facto ruler of the country.¹⁹⁸ Per FH's scoring for 1991, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. For the specified period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

¹⁹⁸ <https://www.refworld.org/docid/473c55fb53.html>

05/25/1991 End Military Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: The military junta agreed to hold new elections in May 1991 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 61). The elections also score a constant presence of competitiveness ever since the democratic transition (LIED). Since 1990 the elections are classified constantly as clean by V-Dem's CEI. Furthermore, V-Dem's EF&FI confirms fully free and fair conditions since 1990. The president acts as both the head of state and head of government. As per the 1987 constitution, the National Assembly is a unicameral body with 51 seats. Representatives are elected through proportional representation, serving five-year terms.¹⁹⁹ Generally, the judicial system is mostly independent from other branches of government, however clientelism and corruption remain issues that threaten democratic integrity. In 2022 major protests against corruption and nepotism erupted in July. In July, a Surinamese court commenced the hearing of an appeal filed by former president Désiré "Dési" Bouterse. In 2019, he was found guilty of the abduction and murder of political adversaries in 1982, during his tenure as Suriname's military leader.²⁰⁰ In December 2023 he was sentenced to 20 years in prison for the murder of 15 political opponents during his reign.²⁰¹ In the general election on 05/25/2025, the National Democratic Party (NDP) won the most seats (18), narrowly surpassing the incumbent Progressive Reform Party (VHP), which won 17 seats. Since no party won a majority, NDP leader Jennifer Geerlings-Simons successfully negotiated a coalition with five smaller parties, securing the required two-thirds majority in Parliament. This led to her election as the country's first female president in July.²⁰² Per FH's scoring for 1991, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for the period 1992-1999 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. As per FH's classification for 2000-2014, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. According to FH, for 2015 and 2016, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. As per FH's classification for 2017, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Per FH's scoring for 2018 and 2019, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. According to FH, for the rest of the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Anyhow, since 1991 both LIED and our interpretation

¹⁹⁹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/suriname/freedom-world/2023>

²⁰⁰ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/suriname/freedom-world/2023>

²⁰¹ <https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-12-20/surinames-ex-dictator-sentenced-to-20-years-in-prison-for-the-1982-killings-of-political-opponents.html#>

²⁰² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Surinamese_general_election

of V-Dem's PCLI confirm that political liberties are present. Since 1991, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. Multiparty general elections were last held in 2020, which were generally considered fair and free. V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. Except from 2018 to 2019 and in 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. In 2021, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Stöver 2005)

Swaziland see **Eswatini**

Sweden

01/01/1900 Constitutional Monarchy [Start: 06/06/1809]: On 06/06/1523 Sweden seceded from the Kalmar Union, which existed from 1397 to 1523.²⁰³ The '1809 Instrument of Government' transitioned Sweden's absolute monarchy into a stable constitutional monarchy adhering to the rule of law and significant civil liberties. It was adopted on 06/06/1809.²⁰⁴ According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. Full male suffrage was introduced in 1909 for those aged 25 and above, but only to one of two equally weighed houses of parliament. Data from Polity5 identifies the time between 1907 to 1917 as a transitional from a constitutional monarchy to a democratic parliamentary monarchy. 10/19/1917 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Oligarchy: The transition to a regime where the king no longer held sway was initiated in 1917 when Gustaf V, compelled by circumstances, endorsed the concept of a parliamentary system. We code this regime change event as an elite concession under mass pressure, since the king did not voluntarily initiate the move toward a parliamentary system but did so only after the 1917 national elections brought liberals and social democrats to power, compelling the transition. Gustaf V pledged to

²⁰³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalmar_Union

²⁰⁴ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrument_of_Government_\(1809\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrument_of_Government_(1809))

Prime Minister Nils Edén that he would cease seeking counsel from clandestine advisors outside the official cabinet and refrain from further political meddling.²⁰⁵ From then on, the political influence of the King was considerably reduced, and an unwritten constitutional precedent was set that would remain in effect until in 1975 a new constitution formalized the only ceremonial role of the monarch. Restricted male suffrage was already introduced in 1909, in 1911 it was extended, but requirements regarding completed military service and income remained. Universal suffrage for men and women aged 23 was enacted in 1919. But still requirements regarding military service and income remained.²⁰⁶ Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED declares the constant presence of competitive elections. Although Sweden is classified as an electoral oligarchy, the elections already exhibit cleanliness according to V-Dem's CEI. Additionally, V-Dem's EF&FI affirms free and fair election conditions. In addition to that, no political liberties were present (LIED), whereas our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI already indicates full political liberties. However, based on the LDI, the country is rated with an ambiguous score for liberal democratic indicators. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

09/26/1921 End (Monarchical) Electoral Oligarchy/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy: On this date, the second round of the parliamentary elections, almost universal suffrage was applied for the first time. The share of the population which participated in the elections rose from 11.2 per cent in 1920 to 29.3 in 1921 (Widfeldt 2010: 1859). However, until 1922 men who refused to do military service were excepted from universal suffrage. Until 1945 people living on benefits, declared legally incompetent or declared bankruptcy were excepted from universal suffrage. Voting age changed to 21 in 1945, to 20 in 1965, to 19 in 1969 and to 18 in 1975. The elimination of voting restriction for men due to refused or non-fulfilment military service was a consequence of women's suffrage. Maintaining these restrictions would only have affected one gender and therefore would have been inconsistent. The largest group to be disenfranchised in the 1921 elections, was the group living on benefits numbering around 42,000. A total of 2.2% of voters were disenfranchised in these elections (Sundevall/Berg/Sandin 2024: 4-8).²⁰⁷ Due to the small number of people affected, we classify Sweden as a full democracy even before 1945.

²⁰⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monarchy_of_Sweden

²⁰⁶ <https://www.riksdagen.se/en/how-the-riksdag-works/the-history-of-the-riksdag/the-development-of-democracy-in-sweden/#1901-1950-40>

²⁰⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

However, it must be pointed out that this restriction of the suffrage makes Sweden a borderline case between a defective democracy and a liberal democracy. Between 1932 and 1976 the Social Democratic Party held government, and Sweden became a welfare state.²⁰⁸ After a committee was appointed to review the constitution of 1809 in 1955, the Riksdag consisting of two chambers was changed to a one-chamber Riksdag in 1971. On 01/01/1975 the amended constitution came into force, which limited the powers and responsibilities of the king to merely ceremonial purposes, lowered the voting age to 18 and guaranteed the people the right to demonstrate.²⁰⁹ In 1976 Thorbjörn Fälldin of the Center Party, ended the dominance Social Democratic Party. The elections of 1982 put the Social Democrats back on top with Olof Palme becoming prime minister. Palme was assassinated in 1986 and succeeded by his deputy prime minister Ingvar Gösta Carlsson. Since then, governmental power alternates between different parties and election outcomes tend to lean more to the political right.²¹⁰ Sweden has a parliamentary system of government with a unicameral system, the Riksdag. The head of state is the monarch who has almost only ceremonial functions. Safeguarding civil liberties and political rights is a high priority in Sweden. As per FH's classification for this regime period, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Therefore, LIED indicates the presence of political liberties since 1922 with one exception between 1933 and 1945. Constant political liberties were given according to our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI. Equal rights for all members of society are ensured by the Swedish state. Political parties operate freely in a competitive environment. In addition, freedom of religion, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly are constitutionally guaranteed and upheld in practice, the judiciary operates independently.²¹¹ On 09/11/2022, general elections took place, leading to the formation of a right-wing government holding a narrow three-seat majority. In October, a ruling coalition was established comprising the Moderate Party, the Christian Democrats, and the Liberal Party, with backing from the far-right Swedish Democrats.²¹² The election was deemed free and fair.²¹³ LIED affirms the elections were constantly competitive for the entire time. Since 1921 the elections have consistently scored high in cleanliness according to V-Dem's CEI and the overall election

²⁰⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Sweden#20th_century

²⁰⁹ <https://www.nytimes.com/1973/06/07/archives/sweden-approves-new-constitution.html>;
<https://www.britannica.com/place/Sweden/The-welfare-state>

²¹⁰ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, Sweden_R: 2, Sweden_V: 2

²¹¹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/sweden/freedom-world/2022>

²¹² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/sweden/freedom-world/2023>

²¹³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/sweden/freedom-world/2023>

conditions are considered as free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

(Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Jahn 2009, Redslob 1918)

Switzerland

01/01/1900 (Male) Defective Democracy [Start: 10/27/1848]: The traditional founding of Switzerland is dated back to 1291. In the short-lived Helvetic Republic (1798-1803) men above the age of 20 had the right to vote. On 08/07/1815 a restoration of the Ancien Régime occurred, reverting the changes imposed by Napoleon Bonaparte. The emergence of Switzerland as a federal state commenced on 09/12/1848, following the adoption of a federal constitution in the aftermath of a 27-day civil conflict known as the Sonderbundskrieg.²¹⁴ At the formation of today's federal state in 1848, Switzerland reintroduced universal male suffrage. However, Jews did not have the same political rights as Christian citizens until 1866. Switzerland held federal elections from 10/01 to 10/27/1848. The Radical Left emerged as the dominant force, securing 79 out of 111 seats in the National Council.²¹⁵ In 1874 a revision of the constitution introduced the people's right to referendums and in 1881 the right to petition for a referendum was introduced. During the First World War, Switzerland maintained its neutrality. A general strike in 1918 failed to realize their goal of establishing a 48-hour workweek. In the following year, a proportional voting system was introduced, allowing for better representation of the working class within parliament. In 1920, Switzerland joined the League of Nations, after having obtained guarantees that it would be allowed to maintain its neutrality and would not have to participate in any military action.²¹⁶ Foreign Minister Giuseppe Motta subsequently withdrew Switzerland from the League of Nations amidst pre-War tensions in 1938, to ensure Switzerland's complete neutrality once again. During the Second World War, Switzerland was fully mobilized only three days after the outbreak. A mix of military deterrence, such as the National Redoubt, economic concessions and lucky circumstances lead to Switzerland never being invaded by the Germans.

²¹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Switzerland_as_a_federal_state

²¹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1848_Swiss_federal_election

²¹⁶ https://www.bk.admin.ch/dam/bk/de/dokumente/komm-ue/Buku2009/der_bund_kurz_erklaert2009.pdf.download.pdf/der_bund_kurz_erklaert2009.pdf

Switzerland remained neutral and independent, often mediating communications between Axis and Allied powers.²¹⁷ Between 1946 and 1951, multiple cantons reject women's suffrage, in 1951 the Bundesrat (Federal Council) declares it is "too early" for a plebiscite on women's voting rights. A plebiscite in 1957 made the civil defense service mandatory for all women, during this plebiscite 33 women of the town Unterbäch in the canton of Valais cast their votes, which were later annulled. On 02/01/1959, the first people's vote on national women's suffrage failed decisively.

Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The LIED scores the elections as competitive during this time. The V-Dem's CEI already declares the absence of irregularities with cleanliness outcomes. Moreover, the elections were free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). The LDI shows an ambiguous level. In addition, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI already scored a full presence of political liberties. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant period, LIED identifies political liberties as present, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

02/07/1971 End (Male) Defective Democracy/Start Liberal Democracy: On this date women's suffrage was introduced at a national level in federal elections after a nationwide (male) referendum in 1971, but the referendum did not give women the right to vote at the local Cantonal level and still allowed women to be barred from the ability to vote on the basis of their gender. All, save one, of the cantons independently voted to grant women the right to vote at different times during the second half of the 20th century. Before the referendum in 1971, women gained the right to vote for local cantonal elections in Vaud, & Neuchâtel in 1959; Genève in 1960; Basel-Stadt in 1966; Basel-Land in 1968; Ticino in 1969; and Valais, Luzern, & Zürich in 1970. The same year as the referendum in 1971: Aargau, Fribourg, Schaffhausen, Zug, Glarus, Solothurn, Bern, & Thurgau extended the right to vote in local elections.²¹⁸ St. Gallen, Uri, Schwyz, Graubünden, Nidwalden, & Obwalden soon followed in 1972, with Appenzell Ausserrhoden allowing women to vote in local cantonal elections in 1989. Those of canton Appenzell Innerrhoden had to wait until 1990 and a ruling of the Federal Court that forced the

²¹⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Switzerland_during_the_world_wars

²¹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1971_Swiss_referendums

canton to grant women the right to vote.²¹⁹ Switzerland federal government is led by a Federal Council which is traditionally comprised of representatives from the major parties that head different ministries. The federal council acts as the government but is usually not subject to much change over the years. This is due to the so called ‘Zauberformel’ which is an unwritten rule that decides who makes up the federal council. It was agreed upon by the major parties in 1959.²²⁰ According to this rule today, the three largest parties nominate two councilors each with the fourth strongest party nominating one. The result is that, as power is always shared, there are seldom changes of power. This form of government is described as consensus democracy.²²¹ Parties, who represent substantial parts of the electorate but do not manage to be amongst the four strongest parties, are principally excluded from power.²²² In the 2023 election, the four strongest parties were the right-wing SVP, the centre-left SP, the centrist Centre and the liberal FDP. The FDP nominated one councilor, the other parties two councilors each. The left-wing Greens, who managed to secure about ten percent of the popular vote, do not nominate any councilor.²²³ Proponents of this system point to it being conducive to internal peace and cooperation, which is necessary for a state as diverse as Switzerland.²²⁴ It is, however, to be asked, if this system allows for the transfer of power necessary to reflect changing wishes of the electorate. As it makes de facto, no difference, if a party is strongest or third strongest, no party can truly ‘win’ or ‘lose’ an election if it stays amongst the three strongest. Still, the necessary qualities of a democracy are fulfilled. Since 1971 there has been universal suffrage, elections and free and fair with no hurdles in place to block certain groups from participation in politics. Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections were constantly competitive for the entire time (LIED). After 1971 Swiss elections continued to have a high level of cleanliness according to V-Dem’s CEI. Moreover, since the transition to a democracy the election conditions have been constantly free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Additionally, LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI maintain their scores concerning political liberties. These rights are protected by constitutional law. The bicameral legislative branch (National Assembly) is divided into the National Council, representing the public and the

²¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage_in_Switzerland;

²²⁰ <https://www.swissinfo.ch/ger/demokratie/die-zauberformel-der-schweizer-direkten-demokratie/48693224>

²²¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consensus_democracy

²²² <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/schweiz-bundesrat-regierung-zauberformel-1.6317687>

²²³ <https://wahlen.admin.ch/en/ch/>

²²⁴ <https://blog.nationalmuseum.ch/2021/09/mit-der-zauberformel-zur-konkordanz/>

Council of States, which represents the cantons. The Supreme Court judges act independently and are elected by the National Assembly.²²⁵ As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Altman 2008, Linder 2009)

Syria

[officially known as the Syrian Arab Republic]

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 08/24/1516]: Syria was part of the Ottoman Empire from the 'Battle of Marj Dābiq' on 08/24/1516.²²⁶ to 1918, with the exception of the period from 1831 to 1841, when it was occupied by Egyptian forces. The Ottoman Empire, governed by an absolute and autocratic monarchy, granted the sultan unrestricted power. For administrative purposes, Syria was divided into several districts under Ottoman rule. Following the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, the British promised the Arabs an independent state, and, in return, the leaders of the Arab revolt joined the Allies in the First World War to capture Great Syria from the Ottoman Turks from 1917 to 1918 (Zeine 1977, Thompson 2020). However, from 05/09-16/1916, the United Kingdom and France, with an assent from the Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Italy, secretly adopted the so-called Sykes-Picot Agreement to establish their respective spheres of influence and territorial divisions in the event of the Ottoman Empire's defeat (Douwes 2000, Pipes 1990). LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Syria before 1917.

10/23/1917 End Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Autocratic Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy and France, Defective Democracy, later only France]: On this date, the British military declared the "Occupied Enemy Territory Administration" (OETA), a joined British, French, and Arab military administration. When Syria and Lebanon were occupied by the Allied armies, they were not independent countries, but part of the Ottoman Empire, therefore, they were technically "occupied enemy territory" pending the signing of the peace agreement with Turkey (Zeine 1977:40). As the

²²⁵ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Switzerland/Government-and-society>

²²⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Marj_Dabiq

struggle for independence intensified, Governor Ali Rida al-Rikabi called for an election based on Ottoman electoral law but skipped the first stage of the election process to save time. While electors in the East Zone publicly cast their votes, France, and Britain blocked elections in the Western (Lebanon) and Southern (Palestine) zones and claimed that the Congress was not legitimately elected. Nevertheless, secret meetings were held in the French and British zones to choose representatives for the Congress. The conservative faction won fourteen out of sixteen seats allocated for Damascus. The General Syrian Congress convened on 06/07/1919, serving as a temporary advisory body rather than a formal parliament (Thompson 2020). The administrations were gradually dissolved between 1919 and 1920, following the withdrawal of British forces. Turkish rule ended in Syria on 09/30/1918 (Zeine 1977, Pipes 1990).

11/26/1919 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy and France, Defective Democracy]/Start Autocratic Monarchy: On this date, Britain withdrew its forces from Syria and was replaced by French forces (Pipes 1990). Widespread protests across Syria followed, and the Syrian Congress declared unilateral independence as Kingdom of Syria without Allied consent based on the League of Nations' principle of self-determination (Thompson 2020). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held in 1918. In contrast, multiparty legislative elections were held in 1919. No executive elections were present. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates according to our interpretation an ambiguous state of political liberties. In 1918, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. In 1919, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

03/08/1920 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Constitutional Monarchy: On this date, the Syrian Arab Kingdom declared independence and the Congress elected Faisal king, who appointed al-Rikabi prime minister. For our classification of regime change events we adopt the Syrian perspective and code this case as a strategic liberal restructuring, taking into account the efforts to build a sovereign state. On 07/05/1920, the Congress presented a draft constitution outlining a civil, parliamentary form of government. The committee designated Faisal as king with limited constitutional authority and established a decentralized federal government structure, including provincial assemblies with local governance. The draft constitution also guaranteed equal rights and citizenship for all residents of Syria but did not grant women the right to vote. Within a week, Congress formally ratified the first six articles, establishing a civil, representative monarchy and delineating the king's powers bound by the constitution and divine laws (not Islamic laws as in

the Ottoman constitution) (Thompson 2020). Syria's declaration of independence was denounced as a coup d'état by France.²²⁷ LIED and V-Dem do not provide any data for this specified period. 07/25/1920 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy]: On 07/18/1920, French General Henri Gouraud issued an ultimatum to Faisal, threatening an invasion, unless Faisal accepted the French mandate. While Faisal accepted the conditions, the minister of war, Yusuf al-Azma rejected the ultimatum, leading to the France-Syrian war, won after one day by French forces. The French installed a pro-French civil administration in Syria on 07/25/1920, bringing an end to the short-lived kingdom and dissolving its institutions.²²⁸ We code this a colonization in our regime change events system. However, it is a borderline case, considering the framing as a League of Nations mandate. We focus on the French military conquest and the dissolving of the national institutions. After the San Remo Conference held from 05/19-26/1920, the northern half of the Ottoman province of Syria (Syria and Lebanon) was mandated to France, and the Southern half (Palestine) to the United Kingdom (Pipes 1990). On 06/28/1922, France established the Syrian Federation (Fédération syrienne), comprising the states of Damascus, Aleppo, and the Alawite state. Subhi Bey Barakat, supported by France, was elected president on 12/17/1923 by the Federal Council. The Syrian Federation was dissolved on 12/05/1924, merging the states of Aleppo and Damascus into the state of Syria with Barakat as president.²²⁹

09/29/1923 Continuation as Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy as International Mandate]: On this date, France was assigned the League of Nations mandate of Syria, including present-day Lebanon and Alexandretta in addition to modern Syria.²³⁰ Under the French mandate (from 09/29/1923), Syrien was governed through a direct colonial administrative structure in which all real power was concentrated in the hands of the French High Commissioner. Although the mandate framework nominally envisioned gradual self-rule, the political system was designed to maintain French control. The High Commissioner, appointed by Frankreich, held overriding executive and legislative authority, including the power to issue decrees, dissolve local assemblies, and veto laws. Local representative councils existed but were weak consultative bodies with no sovereign powers. France deliberately fragmented the territory into multiple statelets (Damascus, Aleppo, Alawite State, Jabal Druze, etc.) to limit nationalist coordination. Suffrage was narrow and legislative elections were tightly controlled; there were no executive elections, and political liberties were severely restricted. Judicial and legislative

²²⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandate_for_Syria_and_the_Lebanon

²²⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Kingdom_of_Syria

²²⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_Federation

²³⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandate_for_Syria_and_the_Lebanon

checks on the High Commissioner were minimal. In practice, the mandate functioned as a centralized colonial regime, with Paris making key decisions and local institutions serving a subordinate, administrative role. According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present and there was no universal male suffrage. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI. Since 1922 V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. On 04/01/1928 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy as International Mandate]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy as International Mandate]: After the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925-1927, elections were held in April 1928 for a constituent assembly. In 1928, male suffrage was introduced (LIED). The assembly convened for the first time in July 1928 and formulated a draft constitution. However, France rejected the draft, stating that it undermined their special status as the mandatory power in Syria. France eventually ratified the constitution with alterations in 1930 (Schumann 2008). On 05/22/1930, the French High Commissioner promulgated the new Syrian Constitution, including universal male suffrage, and declared the Republic of Syria.²³¹ However, no regime change is coded because the constitutional reforms did not entail a real transfer of power. Although a parliament and universal male suffrage were introduced, the French High Commissioner retained overriding executive and legislative authority, could dissolve parliament, and veto or replace any law by decree. Core areas such as security, foreign affairs, finance, and justice remained fully under French control. Local institutions lacked meaningful autonomy, making this an instance of continued direct colonial rule with only symbolic institutional reforms. LIED confirms the presence of multiparty and legislative elections during this time. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

06/25/1940 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy as International Mandate]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Vichy, Right-Wing (Corporatist) Regime]: Following Germany's conquest of France in June 1940, the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon came under the control of Vichy France. During the period of Vichy France's control

²³¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Syrian_Republic

over the French Mandate for Syria, there was no functioning Syrian parliament, and local participation in governance was severely limited. Although Vichy authorities allowed the existence of nominal local administrations, these were fully subordinated to the French High Commissioner, who held ultimate authority. The Syrian parliament had already been dissolved in 1939 after France ceded the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey. Under Vichy rule, it was not reconstituted, and nationalist leaders were marginalized, surveilled, or exiled. The regime suppressed political activity and maintained authoritarian control through French officials, particularly under High Commissioner Henri Dentz. With the shift of authority after the June 1940 armistice, control in Syria tightened significantly as Vichy France imposed the authoritarian structures of the motherland on the mandate. Opposition and anti-colonial movements were repressed more harshly, with contacts to Allied or nationalist circles increasingly criminalized. Censorship and propaganda were intensified, as Vichy installed stricter controls over the press, radio, and public communication. Military oversight also increased, given Syria's strategic position in the Mediterranean–Iraq–Palestine triangle, leading to heightened surveillance and occasional arbitrary arrests. The transition from the Third Republic to Vichy thus brought no liberalization but rather a marked intensification of repression. The room for maneuver of local elites narrowed, political opposition was suppressed more severely, and the administration was bound more tightly to authoritarian loyalty.

06/21/1941 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Vichy, Right-Wing (Corporatist) Regime]/Start Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy and France, Direct Rule Occupation Regime]: On 06/08/1941, British and Free French forces invaded Vichy France-held Syria and captured Damascus on 06/21/1941. A ceasefire went into effect on 07/12/1941, leading to the signing of the armistice between Vichy and Allied representatives on 07/14/1941 (Sutton 2022).²³² General Catroux assumed the position of Free French governor and commander-in-chief of the Levant.²³³ On 09/27/1941, Catroux issued a declaration of Syrian independence, but it stated that France would retain control of the armed force and police, public services, and the economy. As the constitution was still suspended, he appointed a compliant non-nationalist as president. On 03/25/1942, Catroux restored the constitution of the Republic of Syria and a newly elected chamber of deputies convened and elected Shukri al-Quwatli as president on 08/17/1943 (McHugo 2015). On 12/27/1943, an agreement was signed between representatives of the French National Committee of Liberation and of Syria, by which most of the powers and capacities exercised hitherto by

²³² <https://www.anzacmemorial.nsw.gov.au/our-stories/our-stories/syria-lebanon-campaign-june-july-1941>

²³³ <https://www.britishmilitaryhistory.co.uk/docs-middle-east-1930-1947-syria-1941-1945/>

France under mandate were transferred as from 01/01/1944 to the Syrian government. However, from 05/29-31/1945, in a final attempt to maintain their control, France shelled the Syrian parliament and attempted to arrest Syrian government leaders. As a result, British garrisons assumed control and the French started withdrawing their forces from Syria (McHugo 2015). On 08/01/1945, the French government agreed to transfer the command of the Syrian military to the Republic of Syria.²³⁴ LIED lists elections and male suffrage as present during this period. According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held until 1943 and no executive elections were present. In 1944 and 1945, multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For the years 1941 to 1945, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. V-Dem's PCLI for 1946 is classified by us as an indication of an ambiguous status of political liberties. Until 1944, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. From 1945 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

04/17/1946 End Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy and France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy [as independent country]: On this date, the remaining French and British forces withdrew, and Syria gained complete independence under the leadership of President Shukri al-Quwatli of the National Party (McHugo 2015). We code this as a negotiated transition in our regime change events classification system, because the occupation forces only withdrew after long negotiations in the UN Security Council.²³⁵ The Republic of Syria maintained a unicameral parliamentary system with a strong prime minister and a president elected by the parliament. However, the electoral system favored the stronghold of the traditional oligarchy instead of promoting the formation of political parties. Two rival party blocs represented the influential families: the National Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) and the People's Party (Hizb al-Sa'b). In 1948, the constitution was amended to allow President al-Quwatli's re-election, but in 1950, a new constitution reinstated the original provision banning consecutive terms. In 1949, women gained the right to vote if they possessed a certificate of

²³⁴ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/middle-eastnorth-africapersian-gulf-region/french-syria-1919-1946/>

²³⁵ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Syria/The-French-mandate>

graduation from elementary school, and the voting age was lowered to 18 years. Separate polling stations were established for female voters. Since the first post-independence election in 1947, voting rights were denied to officers, soldiers, police members, gendarmerie personnel, and other military organizations (Zisser 2001). In response to anti-government riots, the government declared a state of emergency on 12/02/1948. The regime was autocratic and it was not fully electoral due to the indirect character of the elections (Torrey 1964: 65). According to our classification, it is a borderline case between an electoral autocracy and the specific type of an electoral oligarchical autocracy. On 07/17/1947 the first direct, competitive parliamentary election took place. (Torrey 1964: 88-101, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 97).²³⁶ According to GWF Syria was a democracy in the period following the election. However, this is not in line with our data. We agree with HTW and LIED that the regime was a(n) electoral/multiparty autocracy. BMR also classified the period as non-democratic. Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED confirms that elections were not competitive in this period. In addition, V-Dem's CEI declares the elections as not clean from 1946 to 1947 and as not really clean between 1948 and 1949. However, the elections were somewhat free and fair since 1947 according to V-Dem's EF&FI. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as an indication of an ambiguous status of political liberties. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. Since 1948, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

03/30/1949 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: The civilian government in Syria was held responsible for the Arab military's defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which shattered the oligarchy's "precarious legitimacy" (Chin/Wright/Carter 2021:197). In response to anti-government riots, the government declared a state of emergency on 12/02/1948. Then, on 03/30/1949, Colonel Za'im ousted President al-Quwatli in a coup and promised to establish a civilian-military government and to hold elections (Be'eri 1970). However, on 04/01/1949, Za'im dissolved the government after it refused to legitimize the new regime, and proclaimed himself head of state and selected individuals to fill cabinet positions (Carleton 1950). By 05/29/1949, Za'im had dissolved all political parties. On 05/30/1949, a new

²³⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1947_Syrian_parliamentary_election

government led by Husni al-Barazi, consisting of six civilians and a military officer as minister of defense, assumed office but did not hold real political power. On 06/25/1949, Za'im ran uncontested for the presidency and was elected with nearly unanimous support, receiving 85 percent of the electoral votes (Chin/Wright/Carter 2021).²³⁷ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as an indication of an ambiguous status of political liberties.

08/14/1949 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date, Za'im was arrested in a military coup led by Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi, subsequently tried by court martial, and executed (Carleton 1950). Al-Hinnawi assumed the Chief of General Staff role and led a ten-member "Supreme War Council". Following the coup, al-Hinnawi legalized political parties and transferred power to a civilian cabinet headed by President al-Atassi, with only the Minister of Defense being a military officer (Be'eri 1970). On 11/15/1949, the People's Party won the most seats in the constituent assembly election. Although the new government emerged from a more democratic election overseen by the coup leaders, the Supreme War Council "remained in the background as the supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority" Chin/Wright/Carter (2021: 201), (Faksh 1985:10) code here a successful regime change because the coup leaders empowered civilians, reinstated the previously elected leaders, and promptly arranged for democratic elections. On 12/14/1949, a third coup led by civilian al-Hawarni and General al-Shishakli prevented democratically elected president al-Atassi from taking office. General al-Hinnawi and his supporters, both military and civilian, were arrested (Be'eri 1970). Khaled Azm, who had been ousted as premier on 03/30/1949, agreed to form a new provisional cabinet under provisional president al-Atassi. Military rule was not immediately imposed as the coup leaders attempted to maintain the appearance of civilian rule. On 12/24/1949, the deputy leader of the People's Party, Nazim al-Qudsi, formed a cabinet with a majority of People's Party members, but it quickly dissolved due to an army veto. On 12/27/1949, al-Atassi agreed to remain in office after a unanimous request from the constituent assembly (Chin/Wright/Carter 2021). On the subregime level the regime is also coded as a new military (Personalist) autocracy, while on the main level of the military autocracy no regime change is coded. We concur with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), that the coup established an indirect military control over a civilian government elected by the people. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. The events of

²³⁷ <https://www.nytimes.com/1949/06/26/archives/syrian-president-chosen-unopposed-zayim-elected-on-complicated.html>

the March 1949 coup are not regarded as the onset of this regime, as the military faction that seized power in March was ousted in June 1949 through a subsequent military intervention. This later coup ensured fair elections and the restoration of democratic governance in November 1949. Post-December 1949, elected civilians governed most policy areas, although the military retained the authority to veto foreign policy decisions and the appointment of officials (Be'eri 1970: 57-64, Haddad 1971: 202-205, McGowan 1988, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 97). For 1950, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating an ambiguous status of political liberties. For 1951, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

11/29/1951 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: On 11/13/1951, Premier Hassan al-Hakim resigned, and Maarouf al-Dawalibi, the People's Party leader, became prime minister. This appointment aimed to counter the populist efforts to end army interference. However, after being sworn in, the members of the newly formed coalition cabinet were imprisoned. Army chief of staff, al-Shishakli, had warned al-Dawalibi that his cabinet was unacceptable and would lead to the dissolution of parliament. On 11/29/1951, al-Shishakli ordered the arrest of the prime minister, government members, the People's Party secretary general, and Hashemite sympathizers and declared the army in control over the country's security. Al-Dawalibi resigned on 12/01/1951, followed by President Atassi on 12/02/1951. The parliament was dissolved, and Colonel Fawzi Selu assumed full legislative and executive powers as president, prime minister, and defense minister. Al-Shishakli remained in control behind the scenes, while Selu acted as a figurehead (Seale 1965, Be'eri 1970). Consistent with MCM and GWF, we code this as a new military (personalist) autocracy as the coup removed the civilian government, ushering in direct military rule by decree. The era post-November 1951 is recognized as a distinct regime, as military leaders purged civilian allies who once held prominent positions and influenced policies. This restructuring narrowed the ruling group to a faction within the military (Torrey 1964: 207-12, Haddad 1971: 211, Finer 1975: 168-169, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 97). On 07/4/1953, all parties opposing al-Shishakli - including the Ba'th Party, People's Party, National Party, Communist Party, and others – signed a National Pact, “which was, in effect, a pledge to bring the dictator down” (Seale 1965:134). Consequently, revolts broke out nationwide, leading al-Shishakli to declare a state of emergency on 01/27-28/1954. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during

the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For almost the whole period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. We interpret the PCLI data for 1954 as political liberties being in an ambiguous state. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

02/26/1954 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Non-Party) Regime: On this date a military coup ousted Shishakli. Ma'mun al-Kuzbari, the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, assumed the role of acting president. This avoided, as a compromise, a military confrontation among the supporters and opponents of Shishakli within the Syrian army. The 1950 constitution and parliamentary rule were reinstated as the military withdrew to the barracks. Given the reinstitution of the constitution and parliamentary rule, we code the direction of this military coup as liberalizing. Although military interventions are typically associated with autocratization, this case represents an exception due to its outcome: a transition toward greater institutional openness and political competition. On 03/01/1954, Hashim al-Atas, who had been deposed as president in the previous coup on 11/29/1951, was reinstated as president (Be'eri 1970). According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as an indication of an ambiguous status of political liberties.

09/24[-25]/1954 End Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Non-Party) Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On these dates, competitive multi-party elections were held without interference from the military (Be'eri 1982: 80, Torrey 1964: 244-64, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 97). On 02/26/1957 "a number of important opposition leaders, including several MPs, were found guilty of trumped-up treason charges despite formal parliamentary immunity, marking the point at which the government crossed the line from democracy to autocracy. "Authoritarianization" occurred incrementally during 1956-57, as Colonel Sarraj gradually undermined the elected civilian government. We identify this guilty verdict as the point at which there ceases to be doubt about who exercised power. In May 1957, the government rigged by-elections, further reducing opposition representation (Torrey 1964: 329-31, 352-53). During 1957-58, Syria was ruled by an alliance of the Ba'th, a radical faction of the Nationalist party, Communists, and independents, supported by Ba'thist and Communist factions of the military. The president and prime minister were civilian Nationalists, and no party dominated the civilian coalition, though the Ba'th was

gaining power throughout the period. The military was too factionalized to fully determine events. No single person seems to have been calling the shots during this period, but Colonel Sarraj has been identified as the "power behind the throne" (Haddad 1971: 224) and appeared to wield greater influence than any other individual leader (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 97-98). Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED confirms that the elections score no competitiveness during this period. In addition, V-Dem's CEI confirms that the elections were not really clean. V-Dem's EF&FI indicates ambiguous overall election conditions. Furthermore, LIED outcomes concerning the political liberties remained absent, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates ambiguous scores. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. We would argue that in this case the classification of Polity5 is a miscoding that we take not into account. For the years 1954 to 1957, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as political liberties not really being present. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

02/22/1958 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Part of Other Country [United Arab Republic, Electoral Autocracy]: On 02/21/1958, Syrian politicians, under pressure of the army, decided to unite with Egypt and form the United Arab Republic (UAR) with Abdel Nasser as president. Consequently, Syria ceased to be an independent state and became the Northern Region of the UAR. The actual political power resided with Nasser, who abolished the Communist Party and all other political parties (Zisser 2001, McHugo 2015, Turner 1998, Torrey 1964: 379-80, McGowan 1988, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 98). In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties were not really present. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

09/28/1961 End Part of Other Country [United Arab Republic, Electoral Autocracy]/Start Military (Transitional) Autocracy [as independent country]: On this date, a military coup by Syrian officers ended the UAR and returned Syria to independence (Syrian Arab Republic) after Nasser of Egypt centralized power in Egypt at the expense of the Syrian partners of the UAR. On 09/29/1961 the Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command of the Armed Forces (SARCAF)

appointed Mahmoud Kuzbari as the head of the provisional government and tasked him to form a new government consisting of politicians from the old National Party and People's Party (Zisser 2001).²³⁸ The main objective of the government was to re-establish a democratic government through democratic elections.²³⁹ Therefore, we classify this regime change as liberalizing. On 12/01/1961, the military oversaw a constitutional referendum (Be'eri 1970: 145-148, Haddad 1971: 265-273, McGowan 1988). In addition, a new National Security Council was formed, comprising army commanders, the president, and five ministers to supervise the government (Zisser 2001). However, tensions increased between the civilian government, composed of conservative elite politicians, and the military, which sought to implement UAR socialist reforms to maintain military control over the government. The UAR restrictions on political and individual freedoms remained, and political parties continued to be banned.²⁴⁰ In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties were not really present. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

03/28/1962 End Military (Transitional) Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, the same officers who led the secessionist coup against the UAR on 09/28/1961 carried out a military coup that overthrew the emerging electoral regime (Be'eri 1970). Al-Qudsi publicly resigned, and the parliament was dissolved with the "General Command of the Army and Armed Forces" taking over executive and legislative functions (McGowan 1988: 32). On 03/31/1962, Ba'athists and Nasserites attempted a countercoup, calling for the restoration of the UAR. However, the March 1962 coup encountered public resistance, sparking internal divisions within the military. This discord eventually led to conflicts within the military ranks, resulting in the establishment of a partly civilian government just one month after the coup. Despite the reinstatement of the civilian president removed in March 1962, the military maintained influence over the cabinet's makeup and dissolved the parliament. As a result, this era is coded as indirect military rule and authoritarian (Be'eri 1970: 145-148, Haddad 1971: 265-73, McGowan 1988, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 98). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not

²³⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961_Syrian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat;
<https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/middle-eastnorth-africapersian-gulf-region/syria-1946-present/>

²³⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maamun_al-Kuzbari

²⁴⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961_Syrian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

really present. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

03/08/1963 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: The military committee of the Ba'th party led a military coup that ousted General Zahr al-Din's government and its civilian allies (Be'eri 1970: 150-53). The National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC) set up immediately after the coup contained a minority of Ba'th members, and the first cabinet they chose was half Ba'th. Lu'ay al-Atassi was released from prison and appointed as president on 03/23/1963. However, his presidential powers were limited, and he was more of a figurehead leader, while the junta controlled the regime.²⁴¹ The central figure was Amin al-Hafiz, general, and member of the Ba'ath party. Over the next few months of factional struggle within the new government and within the military, however, most non-Ba'th officers were excluded from leadership and many non-Ba'thist officers and NCOs were purged from the army, leaving the regime dominated by the Ba'thist faction of the military (Be'eri 1970: 156-65, Rabinovich 1972: 49-59, McGowan 1988, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 98). Amin al-Hafiz clashed with Atassi in the aftermath of the violent Nasserite coup attempt. He overthrew Atassi on 07/27/1963, consolidated the regime and army command positions around him. We concur with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) and Chin/Wright/Carter (2021) that this event constitutes a regime change as it brought Ba'athists and Nasserists to power and installed the NCRC under the leadership of General al-Hafiz, which effectively ended parliamentary rule in Syria. On 02/23/1966, al-Hafiz was overthrown by the nationalist faction of the Baath party with aid from the ethnic minorities, including the Druze. Salah al-Jadid took power behind a civilian puppet regime.

11/13/1970 End Military Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: Crises within the Ba'ath Party precipitated by philosophical differences culminated in the Corrective Movement, a coup led by Defense Minister Lieutenant General Hafez al-Assad on 11/13/1970. Assad led a far-left and Alawite faction of the Baath party against al-Jadid after the defeat of the Syrian military in Jordan. The party and military were purged and Assad took power as president, party leader and military leader. On 11/13/1970 Assad became president and was subsequently elected secretary general of the party. The regime established a parliament, and in 1973, held the first national elections. The National Progressive Front (NPF), consisting of the Ba'ath Party and its allies, won an overwhelming majority of seats in the People's Assembly. By 1981, all the seats were

²⁴¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lu%27ay_al-Atassi

distributed among NPF members” (Lansford 2021: 1613). Hafez al-Assad would rule Syria until his death in 2000, after which he was succeeded by his son Bashar Assad.²⁴² An emergency law, enacted when the Ba’ath Party came to power in 1963, retained a ban on political opposition (Lansford 2021: 1614). Consistent with Chin/Wright/Carter (2021: 232) we do not code a regime change, but rather a shift in leadership within the existing regime. Assad orchestrated the ousting of Jadid by employing active members of the military who had not been dismissed. In this context, Assad is seen as a regime insider and a rival of Jadid. Until 11/13/1970, Syria had functioned as a military autocracy in which collective officer factions within the Ba’ath Party exercised real authority and presidents served largely as figureheads. The Corrective Movement transformed this pattern. Assad not only mobilized loyal units to seize control but subsequently purged the army, the party, and the security apparatus to eliminate rival factions. By uniting the offices of president, commander-in-chief, and general secretary of the Ba’ath Party, he concentrated effective power in his own hands. The regime was thereby reshaped from a collegial military autocracy into a personalist autocracy. Assad’s dominance rested not on the corporate weight of the military institution but on his personal networks, and the dynastic succession to his son in 2000 confirmed the personalist nature of the regime. On 03/15/2011 The Syrian civil war emerged as a component of the broader 2011 Arab Spring protests, stemming from dissatisfaction with the Syrian government.²⁴³ In 02/2012, constitutional amendments removed the provision securing the Ba'ath party's political dominance. Despite this, in the 05/2012 parliamentary elections, the Ba'ath party and its affiliates in the National Progressive Front (NPF) maintained control over the government. In 03/2014, the assembly approved legislation allowing multiple candidates for the presidency. However, this law, stipulating ten consecutive years of residency in the country before the election, excluded numerous potential candidates, such as expatriates and members of the opposition-in-exile. Once again, in the 2020 parliamentary elections, there were no competing parties aside from the NPF. (Lansford 2021: 1615). Between 03/15/2011 and 03/31/2020 Syria is a borderline case between having no central authority and the regime we classified it in, since Assad did not hold power over part of the territory. The Syrian Armed Forces controlled 63.57% of Syrian territories as of March 31, 2020. The SDF held 25.57%, while rebel groups (including HTS) and Turkey controlled 9.72%. The Islamic State held 1.14%.²⁴⁴ Reestablishment of the Assad regime. On 05/26/2021 President Assad won a fourth term in highly repressive and uncompetitive elections that only took place in government-

²⁴² [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corrective_Movement_\(Syria\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corrective_Movement_(Syria))

²⁴³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_civil_war

²⁴⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_civil_war

controlled areas. Syrians living abroad largely refrained from voting.²⁴⁵ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held from 1963 until 1970. Thereafter, only executive elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. From 1973 onward, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were once again not categorized as multiparty. According to Polity5, until 1999, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 2000 to 2011, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. From 2012 onward, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. Since 1964, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. Except from 1967 and 1970 and in 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. In this period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent.

12/08/2024 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: Between 12/08/2024 and 03/29/2025, Syria underwent a regime change from a personalist autocracy under Bashar al-Assad to a non-electoral transitional regime led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. On 12/08/2024 the Assad regime collapsed during a major offensive by opposition forces as the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The Syrian capital Damaskus was captured and Assad departed to Moscow, Russia. Assad's departure ended decades of personalist rule. The HTS appointed Mohammed al-Bashir as the new Prime Minister of the Syrian caretaker government. On 03/13/2025, the Interim Constitution was promulgated, and on 03/29/2025, al-Sharaa appointed a transitional cabinet, formally institutionalizing the new autocratic transitional framework.²⁴⁶ According to FH's classification, a score of 13 makes the territory not free, which we also place in the not free category.

Non-Electoral Transitional Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Dam 1979, Dam 1996, Hinnebusch 1990, Hinnebusch 2002, Khalili 2009, Perlmutter 1969, Wedeen 1999, Ottaway/Choucair-Vizoso 2008, Bank 2004)

²⁴⁵ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/syria/freedom-world/2023>

²⁴⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall_of_the_Assad_regime

Taiwan

[officially known as the Republic of China]

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Japan, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 02/26/1898]: In 1898, China ceded Taiwan to Japan after being defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War, as confirmed by the Treaty of Shimonoseky signed on 04/17/1895. Subsequently, Japanese forces arrived on the island on 05/29/1895 (Davison 2003, Lamley 2007). In 1898, General Kodama Gentarō assumed authority as governor-general of Taiwan, shifting control from Tokyo. He reduced military influence, placing domestic affairs under Gotō Shinpei, his civil administration chief. The governor-general could issue decrees following Tokyo's policy guidelines. The Japanese colonial regime in Taiwan exercised tight administrative control through the hoko system, a household surveillance system, and local police. It also allowed for limited self-government through the participation of Taiwanese in lower-level government councils and an island-wide consultative council. In 1915, Japanese forces ended Taiwanese armed resistance through a brutal “subjugation” campaign. Afterward, colonial governors became more open to Taiwanese involvement in higher government and educational institutions (Davison 2003, Lamley 2007). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Both LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI classify political liberties as absent. For the relevant period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

10/25/1945 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Part of Other Country [China, One-party Autocracy]: During the Cairo Conference from 11/22-26/1943, the Allies agreed that Taiwan would be ceded to the Kuomintang (KMT) government following Japan’s surrender in the Asia-Pacific War. Japan’s emperor ceased war efforts on 08/05/1945, and formally surrendered on 09/02/1945 (Davison 2003, Lamley 2007). On 10/25/1945, Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan formally ended and Taiwan was returned to the Republic of China (ROC). Subsequently, on 10/26/1945, the ROC government officially proclaimed Taiwan a province of China.²⁴⁷ The Nationalists aimed to exert control over both the island’s economy and political matters. To fulfill these responsibilities, the central government of Mainland China

²⁴⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan_under_Japanese_rule

appointed a provincial administration primarily composed of mainlanders (Lansford 2015). The ROC's 1946 constitution established key political structures, including a president (indirectly elected) and a national assembly. Moreover, it established three bodies with parliamentary functions: the Legislative Yuan, the National Assembly, and the Control Yuan. Both the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly were popularly elected. Finally, the constitution also introduced universal, secret, equal, and direct suffrage for citizens over the age of 20 (Rinza 2001).²⁴⁸ On 02/28/1947, an uprising occurred in Taiwan, briefly overthrowing the provincial administration. While not leading the uprising, the elite demanded increased control over governance and resources. However, military forces brutally suppressed the rebellion on 03/08/1947, with martial law imposed by Chen Yi. Following the incident, a provincial government was established on 04/22/1947 to provide advice on island administration, yet its influence remained limited. Positions in the provincial administration were mainly held by mainlanders, with only a few posts allocated to Taiwanese (Phillips 2007). From 11/21-23/1947, direct elections for the national assembly were held, covering both Taiwan and Mainland China, electing 2,961 delegates from across the country. This was the first election in which women and farmers were allowed to vote. However, fraud was widely reported, and votes could not be casted in provinces controlled by Communist troops or Soviet forces (Rinza 2001).²⁴⁹ The politically active Taiwanese were divided into three groups: half-mountain, Taichung, and Ah Hai. While the half-mountain faction collaborated with the Nationalists, the Taichung, comprising Japan-era elites, and the Ah Hai, representing the young elite, harshly criticized Chen Yi's rule (Phillips 2007). In this period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

12/07/1949 End Part of Other Country [China, Communist Ideocracy]/Start One-Party Autocracy [as (de facto) independent country]: In 1949, the Government of the Republic of China (ROC) lost the Chinese Civil War and retreated to Taiwan, declaring Taipei as the provisional capital of the ROC on 12/07/1949.²⁵⁰ Taiwan did not achieve national independence in the traditional sense. Instead, the Nationalist Party (KMT) regarded Taiwan as the only remaining free part of the ROC, while Mainland China became the People's Republic of China (PRC)

²⁴⁸ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Taiwan_2005?lang=en

²⁴⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1947_Chinese_National_Assembly_election

²⁵⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

(Rinza 2001). It was intended as a temporary refuge while nationalist forces regrouped to take the mainland but quickly became a de facto independent state (Wang 1951).²⁵¹ During the subsequent era of authoritarian one-party rule, the parliament's constitutional powers were eroded, and the president announced Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion. These provisions mandated that all members of parliament of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan would serve until Mainland China was recovered (Rinza 2001). On 03/01/1950, Chian Kai-shek resumed the ROC presidency. On 12/11/1951, the Taiwan Provisional Provincial Assembly was established, succeeded in 1959 by the Taiwan Provincial Assembly. This assembly paralleled the functions of the Legislative Yuan but was perceived as more democratic due to direct elections. Nonetheless, the KMT effectively controlled debates and votes. Under Chiang Kai-shek's successor, Ching Chin-kuo, from 1975 on the political regime began to liberalize. On 12/06/1980, elections for the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan were held, considered a milestone in competitive elections (Copper 2007). Before these elections, President Chiang Chin-kuo had agreed with Tangwai leaders and other independent candidates to allow their participation alongside KMT candidates. On 09/28/1986, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the first official opposition party, gained legal status (Copper 2007, Rinza 2001). According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. According to Polity5, until 1974, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1975 onward, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Per FH, for 1972 to 1975, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. As classified by FH from 1976 to 1986, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. For the years 1949 to 1981, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent. For the remainder of this regime period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present. From 1950 to 1974, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. From 1975 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

²⁵¹ <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/>

12/01/1986 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the first multi-party election, with the KMT competing against the DPP were held. The KMT won most seats in the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan (Rinza 2001).²⁵² On 07/15/1987, President Chiang Ching-kuo announced the end of martial law in Taiwan.²⁵³ In the national elections on 12/02/1989, the DPP won sufficient seats in the Legislative Yuan to propose legislation and control district and city executive offices, encompassing forty percent of the nation's population (Copper 2007). Based on our observations, both executive and legislative elections were held during this period, but they were not categorized as multiparty, which contradicts the observations of LIED. LIED confirms the absence of competitive elections at this time. By V-Dem's CEI the elections are scored as not really clean from 1986 to 1989. The following two years the elections were classified with an ambiguous cleanliness. Concerning the overall conditions for the elections they were not really free and fair between 1986 and 1988. Afterwards the conditions became ambiguous (V-Dem EF&FI). Per FH's evaluation for 1986 and 1987, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. For 1988, according to FH, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. As classified by FH for 1989 to 1991, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. LIED identifies political liberties as absent. We classify political liberties according to V-Dem's PCLI for 1986 as not really being present. V-Dem's PCLI indicates an ambiguous state of political liberties from 1987 to 1988 and somewhat political liberties from 1989 to 1991. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. In 1987, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. In 1988, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1989 onwards, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

12/22/1991 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: On this date the National Assembly voted to repeal the so-called Temporary Provisions, authoritarian measures that dated to the time of the KMT's reversion to Taiwan (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 62). The 1991 constitutional amendment provided for elections to be held for the whole national assembly in December 1991, the first non-supplementary elections. In the corresponding elections on

²⁵² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1986_Taiwanese_legislative_election

²⁵³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martial_law_in_Taiwan

12/22/1991, the KMT won a majority of the seats (69.11 percent) (Rinza 2001). On 12/19/1992, the first non-supplementary Legislative Yuan election was held, resulting in the victory of the opposition party DPP, increasing its representation from 14.4 percent to 31.1 percent (Copper 2007). Voter turnout averaged at 72% (Copper 1992: 74). The 1992 elections were the most free and fair elections thus far, with no candidates being excluded for political reasons, no serious accusations of interference and only a single charge of vote-rigging in the Hualien County. Nonetheless, certain constraints remained: the president was not popularly elected, the media remained state-controlled, giving the KMT a competitive advantage, and local election commissions were largely occupied by ruling party members (Nathan 1993). Based on our observations, both executive and legislative elections were held during this period, but they were not categorized as multiparty, which contradicts the observations of LIED. LIED still indicates no competitiveness for the elections during this period. Since 1992 elections are classified as somewhat clean by V-Dem's CEI and somewhat free and fair since 1991 by V-Dem EF&FI. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for 1992 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Per FH's scoring for 1993, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH for 1994 and 1995, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. For 1996, the country is classified by FH as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. Besides, according to LIED no political liberties were present for this time whereas our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI underlines somewhat political liberties. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. V-Dem's LDI shows a not really score, which points into the direction of an electoral autocracy.

03/23/1996 End Defective Democracy/Start Liberal Democracy: On this date, the first direct presidential elections which were considered the first free and fair elections in Taiwan took place (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 62-63). On 03/18/2000, competitive elections were won by the opposition party, DPP, ending more than fifty years of Nationalist Party rule (Niou/Paolino 2003: 721-40, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 98-99). President Tasi Ing-wen was reelected in presidential elections on 01/11/2020 with 57.1 percent of the vote. During the election campaign, online disinformation, linked to the Chinese government, targeted Tsai, the DPP, and the

democratic process. However, these efforts had only a limited impact on the election results.²⁵⁴ Taiwan is a unicameral representative democracy that holds regular fair and free elections with peaceful transfers of power. The president is the head of state while the prime minister acts as the head of government. The judiciary is independent from other branches of government. Civil liberties and political rights are granted by the constitution and generally respected and enforced. As per FH's classification for this regime period, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Moreover, LIED affirms that political liberties are present since 2000. However, our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI confirms full political liberties since 1997. Concerns regarding China's influence in election results through disinformation campaigns etc. remain yet, seem to have shown limited effect thus far. Most recent general elections were held on 01/13/24. Incumbent Tsai Ing-wen was ineligible to run again, and the DPP elected Lai Ching-te as their presidential candidate, who managed to secure the presidency with 40% of the vote. Voter turnout was high at approx. 71% amid pressure from China. Lai Ching-te seems likely to continue his predecessors' China policy and is openly disliked by CPP leaders.²⁵⁵ Despite political and military tensions with China looming over the elections and manipulation attempts, the election is considered fair and free.²⁵⁶ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED affirms that the elections are competitive ever since the democratic transition. In addition, since 1996 V-Dem's CEI confirms a constantly clean electoral process. The elections are also classified as fully free and fair since 1998 (V-Dem EF&FI). According to the Polity5 indicator, from 1996 to 2003, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. From 2004 onward, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. Until 1999, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 2000 to 2008, from 2016 to 2018 and since 2020, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

²⁵⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/taiwan/freedom-world/2023>

²⁵⁵ <https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/13/asia/taiwan-presidential-election-results-intl-hnk/index.html>

²⁵⁶ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/taiwan/about-project-election-watch/2024>

Additional sources (Rigger 1999, Schubert 2003)

Tajikistan

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Russia, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 07/23/1867]: From 1864 to 1885, the Russian Empire gradually gained control over the entire area of Russian Turkestan, which included the Tajikistan region previously held by the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Kokand. Russian Turkestan was officially established on 07/23/1867.²⁵⁷ By 1885, Tajikistan's land was under the rule of either the Russian Empire or its dependent state, the Emirate of Bukhara.²⁵⁸

11/07/1917 Continuation as Part of Other Country [Russia, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was proclaimed.²⁵⁹ On 04/10/1918 the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (initially, the Turkestan Socialist Federative Republic) was officially proclaimed. The Turkistan ASSR was an autonomous republic of the RSFSR, which included territories of present-day Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Fedorenko 2015: 3).²⁶⁰ We code this regime change event as a strategic autocratic restructuring, as the regime change in the dominant political authority (Russia) resulted in the formation of the Soviet republics and the incorporation of Tajikistan into the new federal structure. In the immediate aftermath of October 1917, pockets of resistance did emerge—most notably the Kokand Autonomy in the Ferghana Valley, which was suppressed by Red forces in mid-1918—but these efforts did not coalesce into a Tajik national civil war. Rather, these uprisings formed part of what is often called the “Central Asian Front” of the broader Russian Civil War. During 1918–1920, Muslim guerrilla bands collectively known as the Basmachi waged sporadic campaigns to expel Bolshevik influence. However, they were not fighting a “Tajik state” per se; they represented various local and tribal interests across Central Asia, including areas that later fell within Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen borders as well as those that would become Tajikistan.²⁶¹ The Bukharan People’s Soviet Republic was proclaimed on 10/08/1920, the territory of which was mostly in Uzbekistan with parts in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.²⁶²

²⁵⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Turkestan

²⁵⁸ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tajikistan>

²⁵⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Soviet_Federative_Socialist_Republic

²⁶⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkestan_Autonomous_Soviet_Socialist_Republic

²⁶¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Asian_Front_of_the_Russian_Civil_War

²⁶² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bukharan_People%27s_Soviet_Republic

12/28/1922 Continuation as Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]: With the establishment of the USSR, Tajikistan became a part of the Soviet Union.²⁶³ In October of 1924, the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Tajik ASSR) was established as part of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic.²⁶⁴ In October 1929, the Tajik ASSR was upgraded to the status of a Soviet Socialist Republic (Tajik SSR). Additionally, the Khujand region (now Sughd Province) was incorporated into the Tajik SSR from the Uzbek SSR.²⁶⁵ The implementation of communist rule, occurring roughly from 1927 to 1934, included land redistribution, forced collectivization of agriculture, a rapid development of cotton monoculture, and the introduction of Tajik-language education as part of Moscow-led “nationalization” policies. The Soviet ideology in Tajikistan had to confront strong Islamic and clan-based traditions. Attempts to replace Islamic institutions with secular, communist alternatives met with limited success, as traditional authority persisted in private and local affairs. Soviet authorities created Tajik national symbols and a Tajik-language print culture, but Russification and domination by non-Tajik officials remained prominent, especially in urban and administrative life. The Communist Party of Tajikistan (CPT) was the nucleus of power, but significant decisions were made by Moscow and the regional Soviet administration. Two Moscow-directed rounds of purges, the first between 1927 and 1934 and the second from 1937 to 1938, led to mass expulsions from the Communist Party of Tajikistan. The freed positions were subsequently filled by Russians. The Tajik SSR remained one of the Soviet Union’s most rural and underdeveloped republics, with the lowest living standards in the Union. Russians and other Slavs composed a substantial portion of the party elite, more so than in the neighboring Uzbek or Kyrgyz SSRs. Tajik national identity was shaped by Moscow’s border and language policies and mountainous isolation meant Sovietization penetrated only superficially in many areas, contrasting with Kazakh or Turkmen republics, which saw more rapid cultural Russification.²⁶⁶

LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI consider Tajikistan since 1990. For the rest of that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

09/09/1991 End Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Party) Regime: On this date, Tajikistan became independent. The government was still formally controlled by communist leaders in the Supreme Soviet that had

²⁶³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union#Treaty_on_the_Creation_of_the_USSR

²⁶⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tajik_Autonomous_Soviet_Socialist_Republic

²⁶⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tajik_Autonomous_Soviet_Socialist_Republic

²⁶⁶ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tajikistan#Soviet_Rule_\(1920%E2%80%931991\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tajikistan#Soviet_Rule_(1920%E2%80%931991)),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tajik_Soviet_Socialist_Republic

been elected in February 1990 (Hiro 2009: 321, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 99).²⁶⁷ However, when Qadriiddin Aslonov took over the presidency on 08/31/1991, he signed an edict calling for the cessation of all activities of the Communist Party on the territory of Tajikistan. On 09/20/1991, Aslonov resigned from the Tajik Communist Party as well as from its Politburo. On 09/23/1991 conservative deputies in his government overthrew Aslonov. The parliament installed Rahmon as president who reversed Aslonov's actions. According to FH, for the regime period under consideration, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

11/24/1991 End Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Party) Regime/Start Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: For the first-time presidential elections were held in Tajikistan. The result was a victory for Rahmon Nabiyev of the Communist Party of Tajikistan with 60% of the vote.²⁶⁸ In 1992 Tajikistan was engulfed in civil war. In August 1992, demonstrators in Dushanbe seized Nabiyev and forced him at gunpoint to resign. The speaker of the Supreme Soviet, Akbarsho Iskandarov-a close associate of Nabiyev - became acting president. Hence, the regime did not change. On 11/06/1994 Emomali Rahmonov, who had held the position of de facto president since 1992, campaigned for the reinstated position of president with the backing of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, although he was not formally nominated by the party. He secured 59.5% of the votes and emerged as the winner. According to a 1995 report by the US State Department, the election process was deemed unfair as it favored the incumbent ruler and there were reports of intimidation, ballot-box stuffing, and suspected vote rigging.²⁶⁹ Rahmonov has held the presidency since 1994, and has secured reelection victories in 1999, 2006, 2013, and 2020.²⁷⁰ However, these elections have been criticized as unfair and lacking in freedom.²⁷¹ parliamentary election on 03/02/2025 took place without any independent international observers present, and the results were as expected: an overwhelming victory for the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP). Led by President Emomali Rahmon, the PDP secured 49 of the 63 seats, further solidifying the regime's long-standing dominance. The election process was widely

²⁶⁷ <http://tinyurl.com/8fmesb3>

²⁶⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Tajik_presidential_election

²⁶⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1994_Tajik_presidential_election

²⁷⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Tajikistan

²⁷¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Tajik_presidential_election

criticized by international bodies due to the lack of formal guarantees for observer access and limited media accreditation.²⁷² In Tajikistan, general presidential and parliamentary elections are regularly held at the national level, allowing for unhindered, universal suffrage with secret ballots. However, these elections, along with the multiparty system, are largely seen as a façade intended to portray democratic processes and institutions to an international audience. Both local and international observers have consistently labelled all previous elections as fraudulent, lacking even the most basic political competition. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Throughout the entire period, according to the LIED indicator, no competitive elections were held. V-Dem's CEI suggests that from 1992 to 1993, the cleanliness of elections was ambiguous. In 1994, the indicator reflects a shift towards elections that were not genuinely clean, and from 1995 onwards, the CEI indicates a complete lack of electoral cleanliness in the country. V-Dem's EF&FI indicator suggests that elections from 1991 to 1993 had some degree of freedom and fairness. However, from 1994 to 2014, the indicator shows a steady decline, with elections becoming increasingly devoid of real freedom and fairness. Between 2015 and 2019, the EF&FI reflects a total absence of electoral freedom and fairness. Since 2019, the indicator suggests a slight improvement, although the elections are still not truly free and fair. Presidential leadership has remained unchanged since 1994, with the president-led People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) controlling the parliament since 2000. The PDPT has served as a mechanism for consolidating regional elites and the president's allies under a single political entity. Consequently, public trust in the election process is minimal.²⁷³ Per FH's evaluation for 1991, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH for the rest of the regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Regarding the political liberties they were not present according to LIED. Our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI states multiple changes during the time. Not really political liberties were present in 1992, from 1998 to 2001, and from 2004 to 2014. Between 2001 and 2003 political liberties were in an ambiguous state. In the remaining years no political liberties were present. According to Polity5, from 1991 to 1997, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1998 to 2002, the executive's constraints were categorized as Intermediate Category 2, between slight and substantial limitations. From 2003 onward, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. Since 1992, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as

²⁷² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Tajik_parliamentary_election

²⁷³ <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/TJK>

indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Atkin 1997, Grotz 2001a)

Tanganyika

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 02/27/1885]: The former British-ruled territories of Tanganyika and Zanzibar developed along separate lines until their union in 1964. Tanganyika was occupied by Germany in 1884 and then incorporated into the Protectorate German East Africa (GEA) on 02/27/1885 (Lansford 2021: 1631).²⁷⁴ LIED's and V-Dem's data start from the year 1914. The scores indicates that no legislative elections were held. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI. Since 1914, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

11/11/1918 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]: After WWI, German East Africa was divided among several powers under the Treaty of Versailles. Apart from Ruanda-Urundi (assigned to Belgium) and the small Kionga Triangle (assigned to Portuguese Mozambique), the territory was transferred to British control. "Tanganyika" was adopted by the British as the name for its part of the former German East Africa.²⁷⁵ No elections were held during this period (LIED). For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present. For the given timeframe, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

07/20/1922 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as International mandate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy under League of Nations]: Tanganyika became a British-

²⁷⁴ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tanzania#Colonial>

²⁷⁵ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tanzania#Colonial>

administered mandate under the League of Nations and continued under British administration as a United Nations trust territory after World War II on 12/13/1946 (Lansford 2021: 1631). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI until 1957. For 1958 we interpret the PCLI data as political liberties being in an ambiguous state. Until 1925, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1926 to 1956, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1957 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

09/08[&09/12]/1958 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy under League of Nations]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy under League of Nations]: General elections took place in Tanganyika in September 1958 and February 1959.²⁷⁶ Universal suffrage was introduced in 1959.²⁷⁷ LIED outcomes confirm the presence of multiparty legislative election and the presence of universal suffrage. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI. For the given timeframe, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

12/09/1961 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy under League of Nations]/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime: Tanganyika became independent under the leadership of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which won the August 1960 pre-independence elections. Although TANU won every seat in pre-independence elections, opposition was unfettered, and observers considered the election free and fair (Lansford 2021: 1631). We code this regime change as a voluntary exit, since the move toward independence would not have been possible without the consent of the United Kingdom, and there was no significant pressure on the colonizers. Queen Elizabeth was the head of state for one year until 12/09/1962. As per Polity5's classification, the

²⁷⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1958%E2%80%939359_Tanganyikan_general_election

²⁷⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1995_Tanzanian_general_election

executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

12/09/1962 Continuation Electoral Hybrid Regime (as a republic): On this date the monarchy ended in Tanganyika, and it became a republic. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to the LIED indicator, elections during this regime period are not competitive. V-Dem's CEI classifies the electoral cleanliness as ambiguous. However, V-Dem's EF&FI indicator suggests that the election conditions were free and fair. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. In this time frame, LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as an indication for an ambiguous state of political liberties. Since 1962, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

04/26/1964 End Tanganyika [Electoral Hybrid Regime].

For the time after 04/26/1964, see **Tanzania**.

Tanzania

[officially known as the United Republic of Tanzania]

04/26/1964 Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: Zanzibar merged with Tanganyika on this date (for the time before 04/26/1964 see the country reports on **Tanganyika** and **Zanzibar**). The new country was named the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.²⁷⁸ This significant event was spearheaded by Julius Nyerere, the first President of Tanganyika, and Abeid Amani Karume, the first President of Zanzibar. Nyerere, a leading figure in the country's journey to independence from British colonial rule, became the first President of the united country, while Karume became the Vice President. The government of the newly united Tanzania was legitimized through a combination of legal, political, and symbolic measures. The union was formalized by the Articles of Union, a set of documents that outlined the terms and conditions of the merger between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. This legal framework was crucial in establishing the legitimacy of the united government, setting the foundation for a single sovereign state. While there were some independent newspapers and magazines, and some freedom of speech and assembly, the government was quick to crack down on any dissent that it perceived as a threat to its authority.

²⁷⁸ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tanzania#Modern>

Therefore, LIED identifies no political liberties being present and our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as ambiguous. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED declares the elections as not competitive, V-Dem's CEI as ambiguously clean, but the EF&FI as free and fair. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. According to our interpretation V-Dem's LDI reflects a not really scores. We classify the regime in this period as an electoral hybrid regime. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

07/10/1965 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start One-Party Autocracy: On 07/10/1965, Tanzania's new constitution established a formal one-party system, designating the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) as the sole legal party on the mainland and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) as the sole party in Zanzibar. Although elections continued, competition was restricted to candidates within the ruling parties. This regime change was initiated by the governing elite through a constitutional reorganization, ending multiparty electoral competition. A multiparty system was legalized on 06/17/1992 (Lansford 2021: 1630). In 1977 TANU in the mainland and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) in Zanzibar were the dominant parties that merged to form the Revolutionary State Party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi, CCM) in 1977, which continued to govern Tanzania for several decades. This political arrangement was justified on the grounds of promoting national unity and avoiding the ethnic and regional divisions that plagued many newly independent African states. The legitimacy of the government was thus a complex interplay of legal formalization, political consolidation, and the strategic management of public discourse. While the government faced criticisms for its limitations on political freedoms, it also garnered support for its efforts to foster national unity and development in the post-colonial era. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also robust. According to FH's classification for 1972-1994, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Per FH's evaluation for 1995, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. For 1965 and 1966, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. For 1967-1981, LIED identifies political

liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. In the timeframe 1982-1991, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as being ambiguous about the status of political liberties. For the rest of the regime period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were somewhat present.

10[&11]/29/1995 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On these days, multiparty elections were held in Tanzania. Multipartyism was enabled by the Eighth constitutional Amendment (Act No. 4 of 1992) which came into force on 07/01/1992 (Fimbo 1995: 18). Despite the multiparty elections, the CCM retained its control of the country, with its candidate Benjamin Mkapa winning the presidential election, and the party winning 186 of the 232 constituencies.²⁷⁹ Many credited the outcome to the majority electoral system, while others pointed to extensive electoral fraud, especially in the Zanzibari voting process (Lansford 2021: 1632). During the 2000 general elections, President Mkapa clinched a second five-year term with 71.7 percent of the vote, facing a fragmented opposition. The CCM retained its firm grip on the assembly, securing a comfortable majority in the House of Representatives (Lansford 2021: 1632). Widespread uprising against alleged irregularities emerged after the elections in October 2000. Government security forces subsequently repressed the demonstrations in Zanzibar by opening fire and assaulting thousands of unarmed demonstrators and others according to a report by Human Rights Watch.²⁸⁰ Subsequent elections such as the 2020 general elections, were also marred in controversy.²⁸¹ Since 1995 V-Dem's CEI indicates multiple changes in terms of the election process. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED scores the elections as not competitive for the entire time. Moreover, until 2000 the cleanliness is ambiguous. Between 2001 and 2005 not real cleanliness has been pointed out. Since 2006 there is a return to ambiguous cleanliness for the country's elections. Since 2021 the elections scored not real cleanliness again. Furthermore, V-Dem's EF&FI indicates the country's election are somewhat free and fair until 2019. Since 2020 the overall condition are classified as ambiguous. As classified by FH for 1995-1998, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH's scoring for 1999 to 2001, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH for 2002 to 2016, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather

²⁷⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1995_Tanzanian_general_election

²⁸⁰ <https://www.hrw.org/report/2002/04/10/bullets-were-raining/january-2001-attack-peaceful-demonstrators-zanzibar>

²⁸¹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tanzania/freedom-world/2022>

free category. Per FH's scoring for 2017, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH, from 2018 to 2023, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. In 2024 the score worsened to 11 which is considered as not free by both FH and our framework. The LDI displays steadily moderate score. From 2017 to 2021 and from 2024 onwards the Tanzania was classified as not free by FH, from 1995 to 2016 and from 2018 onwards as partly free. According to Polity5, from 1995 to 2014, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 2015 onward, the executive's constraints were categorized as Intermediate Category 2, between slight and substantial limitations. Tanzania is in this regime period classified by us as an electoral hybrid regime. From 1995 to 2015 and in 2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. For the relevant period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are somewhat present.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Fengler 1999, Hopkins 1971, Pinkney 1997, Skinlo 2007)

Thailand

[formerly known as Siam]

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [Start: 06/21/1782]: The current Chakri Dynasty was created with the coronation of King Rattanakosin on 06/21/1782. In 1897 Thailand gave all men and women the right to vote in local village elections in the "Local Administrative Act of May 1897" but not nationally.²⁸² One of King Chulalongkorn's reforms included the implementation of a Western-style law of royal succession. Consequently, in 1910, he was peacefully succeeded by his son Vajiravudh, who ruled as Rama VI.²⁸³ In contrast to other Southeast Asian states, Thailand was never formally colonized by foreign powers, although substantial territories were relinquished under pressure to Britain and France.²⁸⁴ King Prajadhipok (Rama VII) was the last

²⁸² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

²⁸³ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rattanakosin_Kingdom_\(1782%E2%80%931932\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rattanakosin_Kingdom_(1782%E2%80%931932))

²⁸⁴ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rattanakosin_Kingdom_\(1782%E2%80%931932\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rattanakosin_Kingdom_(1782%E2%80%931932))

absolute monarch of Siam.²⁸⁵ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this regime period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. Until 1920, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1921 onwards, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. In this period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties were absent.

06/24/1932 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start (Monarchical) (Non-Electoral) One-Party Autocracy: A coup by the People's Party (Khana Ratsadon) ended the rule of King Prajadhipok and the regime of an autocratic monarchy.²⁸⁶ The bloodless transition brought the introduction of the first constitution and the creation of a parliament.²⁸⁷ King Prajadhipok remained on the throne and compromised with the People's Party. The inaugural People's Assembly of Siam, comprised solely of appointed representatives, convened for the first time on June 28th. The system operated as a Non-Electoral single-party autocracy. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. In 1933, Pridi Panomyong, then serving as a Minister of State, presented his Draft Economic Plan, also known as the Yellow Cover Dossier, to King Prajadhipok. This dossier outlined socialist approaches to address the nation's myriad financial and economic challenges.²⁸⁸ Phraya Manopakorn rallied those who opposed the plan and dissolved his own cabinet to oust Pridi, who had great support within the People's Party. For the given timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

04/01/1933 End (Monarchical) (Non-Electoral) One-Party Autocracy/Start (Monarchical) Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date prime minister Phraya Manopakorn called for the dissolution of the People's Assembly with the support of King Prajadhipok. Under the emergency decree, some parts of the constitution, including the legislature and the judiciary, were

²⁸⁵ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rattanakosin_Kingdom_\(1782%E2%80%931932\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rattanakosin_Kingdom_(1782%E2%80%931932))

²⁸⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monarchy_of_Thailand

²⁸⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siamese_revolution_of_1932

²⁸⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phraya_Manopakorn_Nitithada

suspended.²⁸⁹ The leadership of the People's Party fled into exile in May 1933. Even though Phraya Manopakorn subsequently began to implement more restrictive measures against political opposition, he was unable to consolidate almost unlimited authority. The fact that resistance arose from the political opposition and the military during this brief period suggests that. Members of the People's Party and the military joined forces to have Phraya Manopakorn deposed. This culminated in the coup on 06/20/1933.²⁹⁰ Furthermore, King Prajadhipok still maintained a certain amount of influence and continued to exist as institution.²⁹¹ The regime therefore represents a borderline case between a personalist autocracy and a non-electoral transitional regime, since on the one hand parliament was dissolved and the constitution suspended, and on the other hand Phraya Manopakorn was unable to consolidate his unlimited claim to authority. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties were absent.

06/20/1933 End (Monarchical) Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start (Monarchical) Military Autocracy: On this date, young military officers led by Colonel Phraya Phahon Pholphayuhasena launched a coup against the conservative premiership of Phraya Manopakorn. Pholphayuhasena became the second prime minister of Siam.²⁹² After royalist forces launched a failed counter coup in October, the army was purged and jailed several members of the royal family. The first general elections were held on 11/15/1933 to elect 78 of the 156 members of the House of Representatives, with the other 78 appointed by the King.²⁹³ Universal suffrage for national elections was granted during the first general election in 1933.²⁹⁴ After the end of the reign of Prime Minister Pholphayuhasena on 12/16/1938, the regime leadership was initially split between Pridi Banomyong (a civilian) and Plaek Phibunsongkhram, a military leader usually referred to as Phibun. The military came to dominate and Phibun became prime minister on 12/16/1938. The new regime engaged in press censorship and repression of political opposition (Reynolds 2005: 1, Baker/Phongpaichit 2014: 104, 115-17, 119-20, 123-24, Casey et al. 2020: 16-17). According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified

²⁸⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/April_1933_Siamese_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

²⁹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phraya_Manopakorn_Nitithada

²⁹¹ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prajadhipok>

²⁹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phraya_Phahonphonphayuhasena

²⁹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1933_Siamese_general_election

²⁹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. In this period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties were absent.

07/26/1944 End (Monarchical) Military Autocracy/Start (Monarchical) Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: After the regime leader, Supreme Commander Phibun resigned, Phibun and what had been the military faction of The People's Party gave way to an unelected pro-Allies, predominantly civilian faction led by Pridi Banomyong, who garnered support from a civilian pro-royalist faction and navy officers. The shift in leadership selection moved from high-level army officers before July 1944 to a coalition of civilians and leaders of the Seri Thai, the anti-Japanese partisans. Within this group, Khuang Abhaiwongse emerged as the chosen prime minister on 08/01/1944. His selection was based on his adeptness in dealing with the Japanese, allowing him to shield the growing Seri Thai movement while maintaining a facade of cooperation with the Japanese occupiers.²⁹⁵ Despite the introduction of some democratic reforms in the 1946 constitution, such as allowing the election of both legislative houses, prohibiting officers from serving in the legislature and government, and legalizing parties, the period from 1944-47 is still considered authoritarian. This is because there was no change in government control following the 1946 election, some opposition leaders faced arrest and harassment, and the constitution imposed suffrage limitations based on education.(Vella 1955: 388-89, Cady 1974: 114, Chaloeontiarana 2007: 16-17, Suwannathat-Pian 1995: 188, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 99-100, Baker/Phongpaichit 2014: 136, 139-41, Casey et al. 2020: 17). According to LIED, only legislative elections were held in 1945, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No executive elections were present. In 1946 multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1944 and 1945, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. For 1946 and 1947, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties were not really present.

11/08/1947 End (Monarchical) Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start (Monarchical) Military Autocracy: The military overthrew rear Admiral and Prime Minister Thamrong in response to

²⁹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pridi_Banomyong

series of damaging scandals, high consumer prices, and ongoing corruption in the regime. Khuang ascended to the prime minister position. The coup was led by a group of officers forced into retirement by the previous government ousted the civilian government and returned Phibun to office (Chaloemtiarana 2007: 20-31, Suwannathat-Pian 1995: 164-65, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 100). The parliament was dissolved. A new constitution formally gave the king the right to make laws when parliament was out of session, dismiss cabinet members, and appoint senators, who functioned as the legislature until new elections; these functions were really exercised by the Privy Council controlled by the army (Suwannathat-Pian 1995: 164-65, Chaloemtiarana 2007: 20-32). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held in 1947. Thereafter, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. In November 1951, military governance was reinforced with additional restrictions. The 1932 constitution was reinstated, the recently elected legislature (inaugurated in January 1948) was disbanded once again, political gatherings were prohibited, and parties were barred from engaging in political activities. A national executive council, composed of nine officers - three from each branch of the military, was established. In accordance with the provisions of the 1932 Constitution, a Senate was appointed, serving as the legislative body until new elections were held for half of the assembly in 1952, with the remaining members being appointed. Notably, 106 out of 123 Senate members were military or police officers (Chaloemtiarana 2007: 51-54, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 100). Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. Until 1949, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1950 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present.

11/29/1951 End (Monarchical) Military Autocracy/Start (Monarchical) Military Autocracy: The Coup Group who made up an informal military junta carried out a coup to reduce the influence of civilians in the government. The generals shuttered the legislature and started a provisional government in the absence of the king. They convinced Plaek to act as the head of the provisional government. In the end, the generals gained most of the political power in the country. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held in 1951. From 1952 onward, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. For the given

period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the period up to 1954, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent. For the remaining years of the regime period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present.

09/16/1957 End (Monarchical) Military Autocracy/Start (Monarchical) Military Autocracy: In response to public and royal outrage over allegedly rigging of the 1957 elections and continued corruption of the Phibun regime, the armed forces led by Sarit launched a coup to oust Phibun. The coup was successful and Sarit took control over the government through his informal junta (Chaloemtiarana 2007: 79-80, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 100-101). In October 1958, Sarit and his allies further narrowed the regime: parties and political gatherings were banned, the constitution abrogated; they created the Revolutionary Council (Khana Pattiwat) to rule. The Revolutionary Council proclaimed an Interim Constitution in January 1959 and also appointed a Constituent Assembly to write a new one and act as interim legislature. Of 220 members, 102 were army officers, 26 navy, 24 air force, 18 police, and 50 were bureaucrats (Chaloemtiarana 2007: 79-80, 96, 186-87, Bienen/Morell 1974: 11, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 100-101). By 10/20/1958 Sarit believed democracy had failed to restrain politicians and solve the country's economic problems. He launched a second coup to bring back traditional Thai benevolent despotism. On 12/09/1963 prime minister Sarit Thanarat was succeeded by Thanom Kittikachorn.²⁹⁶ On 06/20/1968 a new constitution was promulgated, despite resistance from Thanom. Although democratic on the surface, the 1968 constitution legitimized Thanom's military-dominated regime. Against the principles of parliamentary democracy, members of the house were prohibited from serving in the cabinet. Furthermore, the senate wielded the authority to postpone any legislation for up to a year, with the senate president also serving as the president of parliament. King Bhumibol endorsed Thanom's predominantly military slate of senate nominees. The new constitution legitimized all legislation previously enacted by the regime, including the repressive Anticommunist Act used to suppress dissent.²⁹⁷ In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the given timeframe, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while

²⁹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thanom_Kittikachorn

²⁹⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Thailand

V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties were not really present.

02/10/1969 End (Monarchical) Military Autocracy/Start (Monarchical) Electoral (Military) Autocracy: On this date, elections were held and resulted in Thanom and his aligned parties receiving a majority of votes and thus the majority in the House of Representatives.²⁹⁸ While the military kept the dominant role in the political process, this period is coded as an electoral autocracy because there were elections. Based on our observations, only executive elections which were not classified as multiparty were held during this period, which contradicts the observations of LIED. The elections are classified as not competitive by LIED. Moreover, these elections are labeled with no cleanliness by V-Dem's CEI. The overall conditions score not really free and fair elections (V-Dem EF&FI). According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. According to Polity5, in 1969 and 1970, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. In 1971, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties were not really present.

11/17/1971 End (Monarchical) Electoral (Military) Autocracy/Start (Monarchical) Military Autocracy: Thanom and the military dissolved the constitution and legislature in a self-coup, consolidating all powers under the National Executive Council. The coup was initiated to counter the perceived threat of communist infiltration, yet opposition to the regime persisted (Nohlen/Grotz/Hartmann 2001: 262, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 100-101). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. As classified by FH for 1972, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. According to FH, for 1973, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present. In

²⁹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1969_Thai_general_election

1972, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

10/14/1973 End (Monarchical) Military Autocracy/Start (Monarchical) Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Non-Party) Regime: Military rule under Thanom collapsed after student protests and widespread calls for democracy and a new constitution (Croissant/Lorenz 2018: 294). Army Commander-in-Chief General Kris refused more violent action against the demonstrators and the king supported a transition to democracy. The king appointed Sanya Dharmasakti, the rector of Thammasat University as prime minister of a transitional government (Lansford 2015). Transitory provisions were applied such as the creation of a National Forum consisting of 2,347 people and a new constitution was promulgated in 1975 (Nohlen/Grotz/Hartmann 2001: 269).²⁹⁹ In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1974 to 1975, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Per FH's evaluation for 1973, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH, for 1974, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. For 1973, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. For the rest of the assessed regime period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates in our interpretation an ambiguous status of political liberties.

01/26/1975 End (Monarchical) Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Non-Party) Regime/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date general elections under universal suffrage were held.³⁰⁰ Several sources indicate that they were free and fair (Bienen/Morell 1974: 11, Elliott 1978: 135, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 101).³⁰¹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For this year the elections score competitiveness (LIED). However, these elections receive a not really score for cleanliness according to V-Dem's CEI. The overall election conditions are classified as somewhat free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. According to

²⁹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_Thai_popular_uprising

³⁰⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#Dates_by_country

³⁰¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1975_Thai_general_election

FH, for 1975, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. Moreover, political liberties were absent according to LIED. According to our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI, political liberties were not really present in this period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. Additionally, the LDI scores are classified with not really, not indicating a hybrid regime. Based on our very mixed information, we classify the regime during this period as an electoral hybrid regime. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints in 1975. In 1976, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time.

10/06/1976 End (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start (Monarchical) Military Autocracy: Far-right paramilitary groups and security forces launched a massacre among left-wing students at Bangkok's Thammasat University. The military intervened to end the bloodshed and restore control. The National Policy Council was established, which was made up of officers. The council suspended the constitution, dissolved the assembly, banned parties, and declared martial law. It appointed a new legislature and civilian cabinet (Elliott 1978: 136, Chaloeontiarana 2007: 234). The council was led by Admiral Sangad Chaloryu. He was succeeded by General Kriangsak Chamanan in 1977 (Croissant/Lorenz 2018: 294, Lansford 2015). After a period of State of Emergency, a new constitution was promulgated in 1978 (Nohlen/Grotz/Hartmann 2001: 263, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 101). On 10/20/1977 Admiral Sangad overthrew the prime minister whom he accused of dividing the country and failing to address the economic situation. Sangad's junta remained in power for only a month. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. As classified by FH for 1976 and 1977, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Per FH's evaluation for 1978, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH, for 1979, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

04/22/1979 End (Monarchical) Military Autocracy/Start (Monarchical) Electoral (Military) Autocracy: The 1979 elections led to an unstable government primarily controlled by bureaucrats, sidelining elected politicians. Following Prime Minister General Kriangsak

Chomanan's loss of military support, he resigned in 02/1980, paving the way for Defense Minister and army Commander-in-Chief Prem Tinsulanonda (Nohlen/Grotz/Hartmann 2001: 263). Under General Prem's governance, Thailand received another chance for liberalization in 1980.³⁰² He appointed parliamentarians from major political parties to serve in his cabinet. Prem's administration was endorsed through elections in 1983 and 1986, although he had to navigate through two coup attempts in 1981 and 1985 instigated by a faction known as the "young Turk officers." Furthermore, following the 1986 election, there arose public debate regarding the suitability of a non-elected individual assuming the position of prime minister. Despite this, Prem successfully retained his position at that time. However, after the 1988 elections, he stepped down, allowing Chatichai Choonhavan, leader of the Chart Thai Party, to lead a fully elected government (Nohlen/Grotz/Hartmann 2001: 263). The coding of the regime is disputed. GWF, HTW, MCM and AF coded the regime as military, while CGV coded it as civilian. In addition in the qualitative literature, for instance, Croissant classified it as an electoral-authoritarian regime (Croissant 2016: 488). This dataset disagrees with most of the datasets on this regime. According to the coding rules this regime is clearly identified as an electoral autocracy. The regime after 1979 did not come to power by a military coup and Prem was elected as prime minister in semi-competitive elections. Between 1979 and 1982 the elections scored an absence of competitiveness. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1983, the elections increased to competitive conditions (LIED). Moreover, V-Dem's CEI underlines no cleanliness from 1979 to 1982. Since 1983 the elections score a not really cleanliness. In addition, the overall conditions are considered as not really free and fair from 1979 to 1982, before they reach out to an ambiguous level until 1987 (V-Dem EF&FI). According to FH, for 1979, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. As classified by FH for the rest of the assessed regime period, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. For the years 1979 and 1980, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. For the rest of the period under consideration, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating an ambiguous status of political liberties. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the

³⁰² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prem_Tinsulanonda

executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Nevertheless, the classification of the regime is complicated since “a new system of government in which the military shared power with parliament through the mediation of the monarchy”³⁰³ was established. Hence, in addition to the military the monarch played a more than a ceremonial role in politics. Since the military obviously had a dominant rule in the regime, the regime is classified as the subtype on an electoral (military) autocracy.

07/24/1988 End (Monarchical) Electoral (Military) Autocracy/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime: In response to political unrest in 1988, Prime Minister Prem dissolved the parliament and announced a general election. The outcome was a triumph for the Thai Nation Party, securing 87 out of the 357 seats.³⁰⁴ This signaled the commencement of a phase characterized by a fully elected and civilian-led government under Chatichai Choonhavan, who had previously resigned his military commission to lead the party (Lansford 2015, Croissant/Lorenz 2018: 294, Nohlen/Grotz/Hartmann 2001: 263). The opposition party secured victory (Lansford 2015, Croissant/Lorenz 2018: 294, Nohlen/Grotz/Hartmann 2001: 263). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this period the elections were classified as competitive by LIED. In a comparative perspective this seems to be a misclassification by LIED. V-Dem's CEI indicates a not really level of electoral cleanliness, however, V-Dem's EF&FI declares the election as somewhat free and fair. V-Dem's LDI has a score which we label as not really. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for 1988 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. As per FH's classification for the years 1989 and 1990, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. According to qualitative sources civil liberties and political freedoms were generally respected, although there were limitations on media criticism of the royal family, which did not extend to critique of the government (McColm 1991: 356). According to LIED no political liberties were present for this time. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI points out their ambiguous presence. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Based on the mixed information we classify the regime in this period as an electoral hybrid regime. However,

³⁰³ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Thailand/The-1973-revolution-and-its-aftermath#ref509841>

³⁰⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1988_Thai_general_election

the regime was a borderline case between an electoral hybrid regime and a – highly – defective democracy.

02/23/1991 End (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start (Monarchical) Military Autocracy: On this date, the military overthrew Choonhavan in a bloodless coup led by Commander General Suchinda Kraprayoon among growing military suspicion of civilian interference in its sphere (Croissant/Lorenz 2018: 294, Bhuchongkul 1992: 313, 319, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 101). Parliament was dissolved, the constitution suspended, and martial law declared. A six-man National Peacekeeping Council (NPKC) made up of all top military commanders was established to rule. Sunthorn seated himself at the head of the National Peacekeeping Council. General Suchinda Kraprayoon ordered the arrest of prime minister and Chatchai on charges of corruption and incompetence and assumes the position himself (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 90). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. In 1991, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates an ambiguous status of political liberties.

05/20/1992 End (Monarchical) Military Autocracy/Start (Monarchical) Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: The military sought to draft a new constitution with “provisional clauses” guaranteeing military influence over parliament for another four years. This sparked heavy protests. After the military's repressive stance towards the protesters, that led to a high number of casualties, the king himself intervened and removed General Suchinda from office (Croissant/Lorenz 2018: 294) and replaced him with a civilian interim prime minister until new elections in September 1992 (King/LoGerfo 1996: 104). Parliament rescinded the provisional clauses that came from the military and in June 1992, the constitution was amended to require the prime minister to be an elected member of parliament (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 101). As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI indicates an ambiguous status of political liberties.

09/13/1992 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start (Monarchical) Defective Democracy: The interim government oversaw elections in September 1992 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 63). These elections were won by the Democrat Party, completing the transition to democracy.

After the elections in September 1992, a coalition government was formed under Chuan Leekpai, who became Prime Minister. A new constitution was promulgated in 1997 that saw a “democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the State” (Croissant/Lorenz 2018: 295) for Thailand. The 1997 constitution explicitly protected a wide range of human rights and civil liberties and strengthened the system of checks and balances.³⁰⁵ Per FH, for 1992, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. Per FH’s scoring for 1993 and 1994, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH for 1995-1997, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. According to FH, for the rest of the regime period under analysis, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. According to LIED political liberties were absent, while according to our interpretation of V-Dem’s PCLI somewhat political liberties were achieved in the years 1993-2005. For 2006, PCLI indicates an ambiguous status of political liberties. In 02/2006, an assorted extra-parliamentary movement known as the "People's Alliance for Democracy" (PAD, or "Yellow Shirts") surfaced, calling for Thaksin's resignation. (Croissant/Lorenz 2018: 295). The judiciary was mostly independent, allegations of corruption persisted, however. While freedom of speech was mostly upheld, there were infringements of the freedom of press (Piano/Puddington/Rosenberg 2006: 718). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. From 1992 to 2005 the elections are classified as competitive by LIED. V-Dem’s CEI shows multiple changes in this period. Between 1993 and 1996 the elections are classified as not really clean. The four following years mark a change towards an ambiguous score. In the years 2001 and 2002 the scores increase towards a classification as somewhat clean, but with a quick backslide towards ambiguous levels for the years 2004 and 2005. In addition, V-Dem’s EF&FI indicates the overall conditions as somewhat free and fair for the entire period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. Until 1997, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1998 onwards, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. Considering the LDI for this time the scores indicate the so called not real until 2000. Since 2001, ambiguous outcomes are given.

³⁰⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997_constitution_of_Thailand#Key_features

09/19/2006 End (Monarchical) Defective Democracy/Start (Monarchical) Military Autocracy: On this date, the military seized the moment for a coup d'état while Thaksin was traveling abroad (Croissant/Lorenz 2018: 295). The coup, orchestrated by the Army Commander-in-Chief, involved the military annulling the 1996 constitution, apprehending the cabinet, disbanding parliament, prohibiting political activities, and establishing the Council for Democratic Reform as the governing body.³⁰⁶ (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 101).³⁰⁷ An interim government was installed thereafter by the military junta. The LIED information that multiparty executive and legislative elections were present on 12/31 is in this case false. According to FH's classification for 2006, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Per FH's evaluation for 2007, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. For the period under consideration, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI indicates in our interpretation an ambiguous state regarding political liberties.

12/23/2007 End (Monarchical) Military Autocracy/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, more or less "[c]ompetitive elections returned the government to civilian rule"³⁰⁸ (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 101). However, a tribunal appointed by the military outlawed the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party of Thaksin Shinawatra and banned TRT executives from contesting in elections for five years.³⁰⁹ On 06/08/2008 The interim government, appointed by the military, dissolved the TRT, imposed bans on Thaksin and several high-ranking officials, and crafted a new constitution. Subsequently, general elections were orchestrated in late 2007. Despite facing an uneven political landscape that disadvantaged the TRT's successor, the People's Power Party (PPP), it managed to secure 48% of the seats. This outcome highlighted Thaksin's sustained popularity among provincial and lower-class voters, enabling the pro-Thaksin faction to establish a coalition government (Croissant/Lorenz 2018: 295-96). Between 2007 and 2010, the country's election scored an absence of competitiveness. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 2011, the elections were considered as competitive by LIED. Since 2008, the elections are labeled with an ambiguous cleanliness (V-Dem CEI). Moreover, the overall conditions remain somewhat free and fair up to 2013 (V-Dem EF&FI). According to FH, for the years 2007 to 2010, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. As per FH, for 2011-2013, the country receives a score

³⁰⁶ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2814.htm>; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5361512.stm>

³⁰⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Thai_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

³⁰⁸ <http://tinyurl.com/9gsx277>

³⁰⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Thai_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. LIED maintained its absent outcomes regarding the political liberties. V-Dem's PCLI indicates in our interpretation an ambiguous state regarding political liberties from 2007 to 2010. For 2011-2013 PCLI indicates that political liberties were somewhat present. Our interpretation of the PCLI data for 2014 is that political liberties were absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. In 2007, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. In 2008 and from 2012 to 2013, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. In addition, the LDI shows a so labeled not really score from 2007 to 2011, and in 2013, referring to an autocracy, increasing to an ambiguous level in 2012 which states to a hybrid regime.

05/22/2014 End (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start (Monarchical) Military Autocracy: On this date, the Royal Thai Armed Forces led by General Prayut Chan-o-cha overthrew the Yingluck cabinet. Six months of political crisis followed.³¹⁰ The establishment of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) by the military marked the resolution of the persistent political conflict between the military-led regime and democratic forces. This conflict had originated from the 2006 Thai coup d'état, often referred to as the “unfinished coup”.³¹¹ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. LIED identifies political liberties as absent for the whole period. For 2014 and 2015, V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. For 2016, V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present. V-Dem's PCLI for 2017 is again classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. For 2018, V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. For 2019, V-Dem's PCLI indicates in our interpretation an ambiguous state regarding political liberties. Between 2015 and 2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is

³¹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_coups_and_coup_attempts_by_country#Thailand

³¹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Thai_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Just before the elections on 03/24/2019, the Constitutional Court, banned one of the major opposition parties. Irregularities in vote counting and the allocation of mandates further compounded the issues. Consequently, the military government solidified its grip on power.³¹² Five days later, Prayuth declared an official end to military rule.³¹³

03/24/2019 End (Monarchical) Military Autocracy/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the elections, long-awaited but deemed neither free nor fair, took place. The existence of an unelected chamber in parliament was not the sole concern. The elections were widely perceived as an unbalanced contest in which Prayut enjoyed an unfair advantage, given that the 250 members of the appointed Senate were to be chosen by the junta.³¹⁴ The ban on the Future Forward Party (FFP) by the Constitutional Court in February 2020 marked the next disappointment.³¹⁵ In the summer and fall of 2020, demonstrations calling for Chan-o-cha's resignation erupted, leading him to declare a state of emergency, enforce gathering bans, and censor the press. The protests, led by student Panusaya Sithijirawattanakul, targeted both the monarchy under Maha Vajiralongkorn and the government. A week later, the Chan-o-cha administration announced the lifting of these measures.³¹⁶ In August 2022, the opposition initiated legal proceedings in Thailand's Constitutional Court, asserting that Prayut had exceeded the maximum eight-year term in office. The determination of the applicable timeframe for this calculation remains a point of contention—whether it should be measured from his initial appointment in 2014, the enactment of the current constitution in 2017, or the 2019 election. While awaiting the court's verdict, Prayut was suspended of his official responsibilities. During this interim period, his former deputy, Prawit Wongsuwan, is overseeing governmental affairs.³¹⁷ The general elections on 05/14/2023 marked the end of final Prayut's term as prime minister. The elections held were comparatively competitive since the ascent of the military. The oppositional Move Forward Party (MFP) managed to secure a surprising 151 seats, becoming the largest party in the House of Representatives.³¹⁸ However, the military-appointed senate with 250 members blocked the leading party from forming a government coalition with other opposition parties. Subsequently, the constitutional court suspended the MFP leader and prime ministerial candidate

³¹² <https://www.rosalux.de/news/id/45343>

³¹³ https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prayut_Chao-cha;
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26867618#metadata_info_tab_contents

³¹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Thai_general_election

³¹⁵ <https://www.rosalux.de/news/id/45343>

³¹⁶ https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prayut_Chao-cha

³¹⁷ https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prayut_Chao-cha

³¹⁸ <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/14/world/asia/thailand-election-results.html>

Pita Limjaroenrat from his role in parliament and the pretext of an investigation into if his media holdings violated election rules. On 07/01/2025, Thailand did not experience a regime change. The Constitutional Court suspended Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, and Deputy Prime Minister Suriya Juangroongruangkit took over as acting head of government.³¹⁹ While this amounted to a government change under crisis conditions, the constitutional framework, the multiparty system, and electoral legitimacy remained in place. The caretaker cabinet operated within the existing democratic institutions, which continued to define the regime as a defective democracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In addition, LIED classifies the elections as not competitive ever since. V-Dem's CEI affirms no cleanliness levels for Thailand's elections and the overall election conditions are considered as not really free and fair according to V-Dem's EF&FI. In August, the more established oppositional party Pheu Thai Party (PTP), which trailed the MFP by ten seats, managed to form a coalition government backed by military-backed parties. PTP candidate Srettha Thavisin was confirmed as prime minister in August. The military retains a firm grip over political proceedings and the senate remains comprised of military-elected members, most still holding office since their first appointment in 2019.³²⁰ Per FH's evaluations for 2019 and 2023, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In 2024 the score worsened to 11 which is considered as not free by both FH and our framework. According to FH's classification for the rest of the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. In addition, regarding the political liberties, they were absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI indicates in our interpretation an ambiguous state regarding political liberties in 2019 and 2023. For the other years political liberties were not really present according to our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI. In 2019, and from 2021 to 2022, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. In 2020, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. In 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive.

(Monarchical) Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

³¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_Minister_of_Thailand

³²⁰ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/thailand/freedom-world/2024>

Additional sources (LePoer 1987, Croissant 2002, Nelson 2004, Nguyen 2011)

Tibet

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of China, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 09/24/1720]: In 1720, the Qing Dynasty had started a military expedition to occupy Tibet and to expel the invading forces of the Dzungar Khanate. The Qing installed a new Dalai Lama.³²¹ During the 18th and 19th centuries, Tibet was regarded a “fanshu” which translates to “vassal state”. During the Qing occupation, Tibet held differing amounts of autonomy. At the end of the 19th century, the Qing held practically no sovereignty over Tibet. Tibet could rather be seen as a self-governing protectorate. The inner state regime was headed by the 13th Dalai Lama, Thubten Gyatsu, in Lhasa.³²² Tibet was ruled according to the Tibetan Dual System of Government. This traditional system was a diarchal government initially consisting of the co-rule of the spiritual leader (Dalai Lama) and the worldly “temporal” ruler (Desi). However, the Desi was abolished by the seventh Dalai Lama in 1751. Worldly and religious rule were merged onto the Dalai Lama who became the sole ruler of Tibet.³²³ Instead, the Kashag, the governing council of Tibet. The Kashag presented opinions to the office of the first minister. The first minister then presented these opinions to the Dalai Lama. Its responsibilities were laid out in the 1751 13-Article Ordonance for the More Effective Governing of Tibet.³²⁴ While the classification of the inner state regime in Tibet during Qing rule is ambivalent, we code it as an autocratic monarchy considering the absolute power vested in the Dalai Lama who is not elected by the people. Undeniably, power is not passed on through monarchic descentance but rather through a process of searching for his reincarnation (phowa).³²⁵ LIED does not provide data for Tibet.

12/11/1903 End Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of China, Autocratic Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]: On this date, Great Britain invaded Tibet.³²⁶ The British had become increasingly aware of the Russian Empire’s ambitions in the East. The so-called Younghusband expedition was aimed at countering this. When the British reached Lhasa, the Dalai Lama had already fled first to Mongolia and then to

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_expedition_to_Tibet_\(1720\)#::~:~:text=Expel%20the%20Dzungars%20to%20preserve,the%20Qing%20dynasty%20in%201912.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_expedition_to_Tibet_(1720)#::~:~:text=Expel%20the%20Dzungars%20to%20preserve,the%20Qing%20dynasty%20in%201912.)

³²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tibet_under_Qing_rule#Political_status

³²³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tibetan_dual_system_of_government

³²⁴ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashag>

³²⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dalai_Lama#Searching_for_the_reincarnation

³²⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_expedition_to_Tibet

China. The British troops easily beat the Tibetans and forced the remaining officials to sign the Convention of Lhasa.³²⁷

09/07/1904 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by China, Autocratic Monarchy]: On this date, the Convention of Lhasa was signed.³²⁸ With certainty that China would not allow any third country (namely Russia) to interfere with the Tibetan administration, the British retreated to Sikkim.³²⁹ On 04/27/1906, the Sino-British Treaty was signed. It was a follow up to the Convention of Lhasa and reaffirmed China's possession of Tibet.³³⁰ With this Treaty, the Chinese government started to take control over the Tibet's policy on foreigners, continuing the yearlong exclusion of any foreign entry into the country. The directive dispatched to Tibetan officials served solely to showcase Chinese sovereignty in Tibet. The Chinese government aimed to convey its position as the supreme authority in Tibetan affairs, both within Tibet and on the international stage (Schweiger 2015: 339). At the end of 1908, the Dalai Lama returned to Tibet, in order to structure his government. However, the Chinese government sent a military expedition under Zhao Erfeng in 1910 to reintegrate Tibet into China.³³¹ With this expedition began the forced Sinicization of Tibet which, beforehand, had been tolerated in remaining Tibetan traditional ways of living. In order to safeguard its interests, it executed a strategy of integrating Tibet into the broader framework of China politically, economically, and culturally between 1905 and 1911.³³² After the Chinese Invasion of 1910, the Dalai Lama was forced to flee to India.³³³

10/10/1911 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by China, Autocratic Monarchy]/Start No Central Authority: On this date, the 1911 revolution erupted in China.³³⁴ Zhao's soldiers of the punitive expedition to Tibet mutinied and beheaded him.³³⁵ A series of mutinies, the collective of which is referred to as the Xinhai Lhasa Turmoil, followed.³³⁶ We code this event as a voluntary exit in our regime change events typology, since the collapse of direct Chinese rule

³²⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_expedition_to_Tibet

³²⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_of_Lhasa

³²⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_expedition_to_Tibet

³³⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_Between_Great_Britain_and_China_Respecting_Tibet

³³¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/13th_Dalai_Lama#Military_expeditions_in_Tibet

³³² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tibet_under_Qing_rule#Qing_in_Kham,_1904-1911

³³³

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tibet#Qing_conquest_and_administrative_rule_\(1720%E2%80%931912\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tibet#Qing_conquest_and_administrative_rule_(1720%E2%80%931912))

³³⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1911_Revolution

³³⁵

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tibet#Qing_conquest_and_administrative_rule_\(1720%E2%80%931912\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tibet#Qing_conquest_and_administrative_rule_(1720%E2%80%931912))

³³⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xinhai_Lhasa_turmoil

resulted from mutiny and the subsequent withdrawal of occupation forces rather than from an executive takeover or a popular uprising.

02/12/1912 End No Central Authority/Start Autocratic Monarchy: This date marked the end of the 1911 revolution. The Qing Dynasty had fallen.³³⁷ The Dalai Lama returned to Tibet in July 1912. He expelled the Amban (Qing representatives) and all Chinese forces.³³⁸ In 1913, the Dalai Lama declared that Tibet was an independent nation. The claim to independence was not officially recognized by all countries. Nevertheless, it is agreed upon that Tibet enjoyed de facto independence during this period.³³⁹ In 1949, after the protests of the Kuomintang and the communists in China, the Dalai Lama expelled all Chinese nationals connected with the Chinese government for fear of communist control.³⁴⁰

10/07/1950 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by China, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date, Chinese forces invaded the Tibetan Chamdo province. By 10/19/1950, 5000 Tibetan soldiers had surrendered to the People's Republic of China (PRC).³⁴¹

10/24/1951 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by China, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [China, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date, the 14th Dalai Lama ratified the Seventeen Point Agreement via telegraph from exile. The agreement declared the annexation of Tibet by the PRC and made it part of Chinese territory.³⁴² He later repudiated his ratification on grounds of having been coerced into it. Other members of the government later also questioned the validity of the agreement as they had not signed it at all.³⁴³ In 1956, clashes between the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and guerilla resistance fighters in Kham and Amdo regions took place. These regions had been subjected to socialist reform.³⁴⁴ Between 04/17/1958 and 04/25/1958, the so-called Xunhua Incident took place. In Xunhua, socialist reforms were underway and within this framework, religious leaders were sent away for "re-education". Over 4000 people revolted and killed the leader of the Chinese task force. In order to suppress the rebellion, the PLA massacred over 400 people on 04/25/1958.³⁴⁵ The incident is believed by

³³⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1911_Revolution

³³⁸ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tibet#De_facto_independence_\(1912%E2%80%931951\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tibet#De_facto_independence_(1912%E2%80%931951))

³³⁹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tibet_\(1912%E2%80%931951\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tibet_(1912%E2%80%931951))

³⁴⁰ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tibet_\(1950%E2%80%93present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tibet_(1950%E2%80%93present))

³⁴¹

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tibet_\(1950%E2%80%93present\)#1950%E2%80%931955:_Traditional_systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tibet_(1950%E2%80%93present)#1950%E2%80%931955:_Traditional_systems)

³⁴² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seventeen_Point_Agreement#Legacy

³⁴³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_Tibet_by_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China

³⁴⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1959_Tibetan_uprising

³⁴⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xunhua_Incident

some to be the precursor for the 1959 Tibetan Uprising.³⁴⁶ Beginning in 1957, the CIA trained Tibetan rebels in the United States to organize rebellions back in Tibet.³⁴⁷

03/10/1959 End Part of Other Country [China, Communist Ideocracy]/Start No Central Authority: On this date, the Tibetan Uprising broke out in Lhasa. In 1957, the Defenders of the Faith Volunteer Army had begun to assemble around Gompo Tashi Andrugtsang. This was a rebel army forming against the Chinese. By 1958, Gompos army had taken control of a portion of central Tibet.³⁴⁸ On 03/10/1959, the Dalai Lama intended to attend a dance performance at the PRC headquarters. Rumors from an unknown source were spread that the Chinese intended to abduct the Dalai Lama during this performance. Thousands of Tibetans surrounded the palace of the Dalai Lama to prevent him from leaving. Violence first targeted senior Tibetan officials accused of conspiring with the Chinese and then later the Chinese officials. Protestors used anti-Chinese slogans in expression of their wish for China to leave Tibet for good. The Dalai Lama consulted the state oracle and decided to flee Lhasa. After a shell hit the palace on 03/17/1959, the Dalai Lama fled to India³⁴⁹ with the help of the CIA.³⁵⁰

03/23/1959 End No Central Authority/Start Part of Other Country [China, Communist Ideocracy]: This date marked the end of the 1959 Tibetan Uprising.³⁵¹ However, the Tibetan guerilla movement, Cushi Gagdruk, continued until 1974, when the United States stopped supporting their cause.³⁵² During the next years, Tibet was hit by famine, leading to the death of thousands of Tibetans. The cause of the famine was contested. Whereas the Tenth Panchen Lama made the Chinese policies, such as the Great Leap Forward, responsible, officials in China claimed natural disasters as the cause. Furthermore, this period saw the destruction of the majority of Tibet's monasteries. In 1960, the ICJ published a report about Tibet, which accused China of violating the 1951 Seventeen Point Agreement, as well the suppression of Tibetan culture, genocide and severe Human Rights violations. On 09/01/1965, the region formerly governed by the Dalai Lama's administration from 1951 to 1959 (Ü-Tsang and western Kham) was rebranded as the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).³⁵³ On 09/01/1965, Tibet became the

³⁴⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1959_Tibetan_uprising

³⁴⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1959_Tibetan_uprising#Aftermath

³⁴⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protests_and_uprisings_in_Tibet_since_1950#Early_resistance_1950-1958

³⁴⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1959_Tibetan_uprising

³⁵⁰

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tibet_\(1950%E2%80%93present\)#1956%E2%80%931958:_Trials_and_incremental_reform](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tibet_(1950%E2%80%93present)#1956%E2%80%931958:_Trials_and_incremental_reform)

³⁵¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1959_Tibetan_uprising

³⁵² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chushi_Gangdruk

³⁵³ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tibet_\(1950%E2%80%93present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tibet_(1950%E2%80%93present))

Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), a provincial division of China.³⁵⁴ The governance of Tibet by the Chinese government is carried out through the administration of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and 12 Tibetan autonomous prefectures or counties situated in the neighboring provinces of Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan. According to the Chinese constitution, autonomous regions possess the prerogative to develop their own regulations and enforce national laws in line with local circumstances. Nevertheless, in reality, decision-making power is centralized in the hands of appointed ethnic (Han) Chinese officials of the CCP, which maintains a monopoly over political authority.³⁵⁵ The Tibet Autonomous Region's regional people's congress, officially elected by lower-level people's congresses, nominates representatives to China's 3,000-member National People's Congress (NPC) on a five-year cycle. However, in reality, all candidates undergo scrutiny by the CCP.³⁵⁶ Engaging in any form of organized political activity beyond the CCP is deemed unlawful and met with severe penalties, as is any indication of allegiance to or contact with the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA)—a representative entity headquartered in Dharamsala, India, commonly acknowledged as a government-in-exile.³⁵⁷ Political prospects for ethnic Tibetans within Tibet are notably restricted. Top-tier and critical positions within the CCP and government are predominantly held by ethnic Chinese officials, leaving ethnic Tibetans relegated to lower-tier and token roles. The authorities vehemently suppress and severely penalize any autonomous political or civic involvement by ethnic Tibetans, even regarding local community matters that were previously regarded as less politically contentious in past decades.³⁵⁸ According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the territory not free, which we also place in the not free category. V-Dem does not provide data for Tibet.

Part of Other Country [China, Communist Ideocracy] continued as of 07/01/2025.

For Time after 03/23/1959 see **China**.

Togo

01/01/1900 (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 07/05/1884]: Togo became a German protectorate on 07/05/1884. While a

³⁵⁴ https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomes_Gebiet_Tibet

³⁵⁵ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tibet/freedom-world/2023>

³⁵⁶ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tibet/freedom-world/2023>

³⁵⁷ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tibet/freedom-world/2023>

³⁵⁸ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tibet/freedom-world/2023>

protectorate in name it was de facto a colony.³⁵⁹ LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Togo for this period.

08/26/1914 End (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy and France, Defective Democracy]: After the start of the First World War, both France and the United Kingdom invaded the country, forcing the colony to surrender on 08/26/1914. The two invading countries divided Togoland into two administrative zones.³⁶⁰ Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI consider Togo since 1916. For the given timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent. According to LIED, no elections were held during this period. Since 1916, V-Dem's JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

07/20/1922 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy and France, Defective Democracy]/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of France, Defective Democracy and United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy]: The country became a protectorate as an International Mandate of the League of Nations. It remained separated in two parts, one being under the French the other under British rule.³⁶¹ The British part of Togo voted to become part of Ghana in 1957. In French Togoland, Territorial Assembly elections were held in 1955. They were boycotted by one main party, the Committee of Togolese Unity (CUT).³⁶² LIED considers that multiparty executive and legislative elections were absent until 1945. Thereafter, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. For 1922-1955, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. We interpret PCLI's score for 1956 as political liberties not really being present. Until 1945, V-Dem's JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1946 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while

³⁵⁹ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Togoland>

³⁶⁰ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Togoland>

³⁶¹ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Togoland>

³⁶² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1955_French_Togoland_Territorial_Assembly_election

V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

08/30/1956 End (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, French Togoland joined the French Union and was granted self-governance.³⁶³ In the same year, the French Togoland autonomy referendum was held, which approved Togo as an autonomous region within the French Union.³⁶⁴ On 09/12/1956 Nicolas Grunitzky was named prime minister, he was supported by France.³⁶⁵ In 1957 universal suffrage was introduced (LIED).³⁶⁶ Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI. Until 1959, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Because the colonial hierarchy persisted intact—the French High Commissioner retained decree powers and veto over all local laws—and no sovereign authority truly shifted to Togolese hands, this transition represents an elite-driven redesign of colonial institutions. The change was managed unilaterally by Paris and its appointed premier, not negotiated with domestic opposition nor imposed by external force. Therefore it is coded as a voluntary exit, with a net **liberalizing** direction, reflecting the expansion of electoral inclusion through universal suffrage.

04/27/1960 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy [as independent country]: On this date, the country achieved complete independence in an agreement with France and the United Nations (Lansford 2021: 1660, Marshall 2018e). Nevertheless, the new government under Sylvanus Olympio began to suppress the opposition directly after elections had been held. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED the elections were not competitive. Systematic irregularities in the elections are confirmed by not really cleanliness outcomes until 1962 (V-Dem CEI). In addition, the elections are somewhat free and fair up to 1960, before they are scored as ambiguous (V-Dem EF&FI). Pre-independence political leaders were arrested or decided to flee the country (Decalo 1976: 96, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 101). Since the country's independence no political liberties were given (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI affirms that they were not really present during this period. Polity5 doesn't contain data on Togo until 1960. From 1960 to

³⁶³ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Togo/History>

³⁶⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1956_French_Togoland_autonomy_referendum

³⁶⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolas_Grunitzky

³⁶⁶ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Togo/History>

1963, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Since 1960, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

01/13/1963 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Tensions with Ghana prompted the military to urgently request increased funding from Olympio. When these requests were rejected, the military ousted his government and assassinated Olympio. The military coup was led by ex-Sergeant Gnassingbé Eyadema and other former French colonial army veterans who had not integrated into the new Togolese military. Although they initially appointed a civilian opposition leader, Nicolas Grunitzky, as president, ultimate political control remained in the hands of Eyadema and two other ex-sergeants (Decalo 1976: 97-99, Lansford 2012b: 1435, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 102).³⁶⁷ According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty.. For the timeframe 1963-1966, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. According to V-Dem's PCLI, political liberties were absent in 1967. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

04/14/1967 End Military Autocracy/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: On 01/13/1967 Eyadema and the military overthrew Grunitzky. Coup co-leader Kléber Dadjo, also a military officer, became chairman of the junta. On 04/14/1967 Gnassingbé Eyadema unilaterally dismissed Dadjo from his position of junta chairman and declared himself president. During his government, he banned in 1969 all parties except for his Rally of the Togolese People Party, which he had only founded in the same year. He held one-party and one-candidate elections. On 09/27/1992 a multiparty constitution was adopted by popular referendum (Lansford 2021: 1659).³⁶⁸ GWF and REIGN classify the whole period from 1967 to 1993 as a personalist autocracy, BR, AF, HTW, and MCM between 1972 and 1990 as a military autocracy. Because the regime started with a military coup we classify the regime as a military autocracy. However, there are also very strong indicators in favor of placing this regime in the personalist category. The military represented almost no actual restriction on Eyadema's exercise of power. The regime

³⁶⁷ <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/togo.htm>

³⁶⁸ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Togo_2007?lang=en

was characterized by his personal authority and a lack of strong, organized political institutions. His personally founded party is an example of this. Another point in favor of this view is that the party was dissolved in 2012 after Eyadema's son took it over after his death in 2005.³⁶⁹ The Rally of the Togolese People Party then emerged into the newly founded party Union for the Republic by his son 2012.³⁷⁰ Furthermore, Eyadema's rule rested on repression, patronage, and a bizarre leadership cult. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 1971. Thereafter, only executive elections, which were not categorized as multiparty, were recorded. From 1979 onwards, both executive and legislative elections were included in the LIED database, but they were not categorized as multiparty. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. For the period 1967-1990, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent. For 1991-1993, V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as being ambiguous about the status of political liberties. indicates in our interpretation an ambiguous state regarding political liberties. According to Polity5, until 1990, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1992 onward, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. Until 1979, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1980 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

08/25/1993 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: The first presidential elections with more than one candidate were held on this date, but the opposition parties boycotted them, leaving only two minor candidates to run. They accumulated less than 4% of the votes, leaving Gnassingbé Eyadéma to stay president.³⁷¹ His reelections in 1993, 1998 and 2003 were considered highly undemocratic and a seizure of power by the EU. Leading to the discontinuation of any talks between the two stakeholders.³⁷² In the multiparty poll held on 02/06 and 20/1994, violence tainted the process, including attacks by RPT militants on opposition candidates. Despite this, international observers endorsed the results, which initially favored the opposition Patriotic Front (FP) with 43 seats and the RPT with 35 seats. However, following

³⁶⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rally_of_the_Togolese_People

³⁷⁰ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_for_the_Republic_\(Togo\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_for_the_Republic_(Togo))

³⁷¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Togolese_presidential_election

³⁷² <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Togo>

petitions from the RPT, the Supreme Court invalidated 3 opposition seats, putting the FP's lead at risk pending by-elections scheduled for May but later postponed. In the presidential election on 06/21/1998, President Eyadéma secured 52% of the vote, Gilchrist Olympio of the Union of Forces of Change (UFC) received 34%, and other candidates shared the remaining votes. Criticisms of the election process emerged from domestic and international observers (Lansford 2021: 1661). On 02/05/2005, Eyadema's death during medical evacuation led to the military's declaration of his son Faure as president, disregarding the constitutional line of succession. This was internationally condemned as a coup. After pressure, Faure resigned as speaker and acting president on 02/25/2005, succeeded by Abbas Bonfoh. In the controversial 04/24/2005 elections, Faure Gnassingbé was credited with 60% of the vote, but international observers deemed the elections fraudulent. In the legislative elections of 10/14/2007, the ruling RPT won 50 seats, followed by the UFC with 27 seats and the CAR with 4 seats. While foreign observers deemed the elections fair, the opposition contested the results (Lansford 2021: 1662). Ahead of the 2013 parliamentary elections, opposition groups protested an expanded Assembly and demonstrated for constitutional changes to prevent President Gnassingbé's third term. Despite this, Gnassingbé was re-elected for a third term on 04/25/2015, and a new government under Sélom Komi Klassou was formed. Gnassingbé won a fourth term on 02/22/2020, with 70.8% of the vote (Lansford 2021: 1663). On 04/29/24 Togo held parliamentary elections, in which the ruling Union for the Republic (UNIR) party won an extensive majority. Early in April a constitutional amendment shortened presidential terms to four instead of five years, with a two-term limit. Time in office was however not considered, allowing Gnassingbé to stay in office until 2033, provided a successful re-election in 2025.³⁷³ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1993, the country's elections are not competitive according to LIED. In addition, from 1994 to 1997 the elections scored not really clean levels. Between 1998 and 2007 it switched to no cleanliness at all. Since 2008, except for the year of 2014 with an ambiguous cleanliness, the scores maintained at the not really clean levels (V-Dem CEI). The overall election conditions remained ambiguous until 1997. Between 1998 and 2006 the elections are considered as not really free and fair. In the following three years the elections are somewhat free and fair. Since 2010 they are classified as ambiguous (V-Dem EF&FI). As classified by FH for 1993-1998, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Per FH's evaluation for 1999-2001, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as

³⁷³ <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/togo-ruling-party-wins-sweeping-majority-legislative-poll-final-provisional-2024-05-04/>

rather not free. Per FH's evaluation of the years 2002-2006, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. As classified by FH for 2007-2012, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH's scoring for 2013 to 2017, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH, for the rest of the regime period under consideration, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. For the period under consideration, LIED identifies political liberties as absent. For 1994 and 1995, V-Dem's PCLI indicates in our interpretation an ambiguous state regarding political liberties. For 1996-1998, V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing somewhat political liberties. Our interpretation of the PCLI-data changes back to ambiguous in 1998, before returning again to somewhat political liberties for the years 2000 to 2010. According to our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI, political liberties were present in 2011 and 2016. For the remaining years of this regime, we interpret the data of V-Dem's PCLI as political liberties being somewhat present. According to Polity5, from 1993 to 2009, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. From 2010 onward, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. Until 2004, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 2006 to 2017 and since 2020, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In 2005 and 2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

05/03/2025 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: On 05/03/2025, Togo shifted from an electoral autocracy under Faure Gnassingbé to a personalist autocracy. Constitutional reforms adopted on 05/06/2024 and entering into force on 05/03/2025 abolished presidential elections and established the new office of President of the Council of Ministers. Gnassingbé assumed this position without term limits, effectively removing even the façade of electoral legitimation. The reform dismantled the limited but still existing electoral framework and concentrated power indefinitely in the hands of a single ruler.³⁷⁴ The president is now indirectly elected by parliament rather than by direct popular vote. Moreover, while the presidency has

³⁷⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Togo#2024_constitutional_reform

become more ceremonial and less powerful, it retains the authority to appoint both the prime minister (President of the Council of Ministers) and the government.³⁷⁵ This transformation constitutes a clear regime change to a personalist autocracy. As per FH, Togo is considered partly free with a score of 9, which aligns with our rather not free category.

Personalist Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Decalo 1990, Hounnikpo 2001)

Tonga

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 12/04/1845]: The first king of Tonga, George Tupou I, reigned from 12/04/1845 until his death on 02/18/1893. He was succeeded by George Tupou II.³⁷⁶ On 11/04/1875 a constitution was established, creating a modern framework for government.³⁷⁷ Starting with a declaration of rights, it affirmed the supremacy of law. The constitution established a Legislative Assembly, a Cabinet and defined the role of the king. Additionally, an aristocracy of 20 nobles was created to replace the traditional chieftainship. The established legislature was unicameral and included hereditary, nominated, and elected members. Elections were held every five years, and parliament was required to meet at least once every two years. Government functions were carried out by Privy Council, which consisted of four ministers, one of whom was the king (Campbell 2004: 810). The Tonga Islands became a British protectorate on 11/14/1899 by the Anglo-German Agreement (also known as Treaty of Amity) (Turner 2014). The Treaty was signed by the King and the British representative in Tonga. It transferred authority over the islands' financial and foreign affairs to the British Consul, who acted as the representative of Britain (Ratuva 2019, Lansford 2021: 1670). The Agent was instructed not to meddle in internal matters unless the welfare of British subjects or foreigners was at stake, although he could offer counsel if requested by the King and his government. These agreements were ended by mutual consent in 1970 (Crawford 2006). Tonga was not what was understood as colonial protectorate, however, since in 1958 and 1968 certain levels of authority in internal and external matters were attained by Tonga, therefore it is coded as a protectorate. Revised agreements with the United Kingdom in 1958 and 1968 granted Tonga complete internal self-governance alongside restricted authority over its external affairs (Lansford 2021: 1670). Under the guardianship of Britain,

³⁷⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_Togolese_Republic

³⁷⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_monarchs_of_Tonga

³⁷⁷ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tonga_2013

Tonga safeguarded its sovereignty, retaining its monarchical government as the sole Pacific nation. The Tongan monarchy upholds an unbroken lineage of hereditary rulers from a single family.³⁷⁸ In 1915, due to the inefficiency of a large parliament, the government implemented a significant amendment. The number of representatives for both the nobles and the people was reduced to seven each, and all Privy Councilors, except for the King, were included as members of the assembly. From then on, elections were scheduled every three years, with the parliament meeting annually (Campbell 2004: 810-811). In this regime period, Tonga represents a borderline case between a constitutional monarchy and an autocratic monarchy. The lack of data from datasets such as V-Dem further complicate the distinction. However, due to the fact the legislature could not formally initiate bills in this period, one of the many signs that power was concentrated in the hands of the king and his appointed ministers, we interpret Tonga as an autocratic monarchy here. In 1951, general elections were held and the right to vote was extended to women aged 21 and older, though this change did not come into effect until 1960 (Campbell 2004: 814). However, still only half of the legislature was directly elected, while the other half was appointed by nobles.³⁷⁹ Political liberties were absent according to LIED. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period.

06/04/1970 Continuation Autocratic Monarchy [as independent country]: Tonga attained full independence within the Commonwealth as a ruling monarchy on 06/04/1970 and was the only country that had its own monarch, rather than having the United Kingdom's monarch, along with Malaysia, Lesotho, and Eswatini. While exposed to colonial pressures, Tonga has always governed itself, which makes it unique in the Pacific.³⁸⁰ At this stage, the elections have no influence on the composition of the government, as the king appoints the prime minister and the cabinet outside parliament and the term of office is not fixed (Campbell 2004: 812).

01/01/1984 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Constitutional Monarchy: The formal codification of legislative initiative by Tonga's parliament in 1984 constitutes the first legally defined redistribution of political authority within the regime. Although the monarch retained full control over the executive, including the appointment of the prime minister and cabinet, and while no democratic elections were yet in place, the 1984 reform marked a clear institutional shift: for the first time, the Legislative Assembly was endowed with a constitutionally recognized right to initiate bills (Campbell 1992: 79). This development introduced a formal, if limited, legislative function that had previously been entirely absent or undefined. As such, the change represents a

³⁷⁸ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tonga>

³⁷⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1951_Tongan_general_election

³⁸⁰ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tonga>; https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tonga_2013?lang=en

decisive step away from a purely autocratic monarchy, in which all political initiative resided exclusively with the crown. The date 01/01/1984 is used to mark this transition because it reflects the formal enactment of this new legislative competence. While not accompanied by broader democratization, the reform altered the structure of the regime by establishing a rudimentary separation of powers. Hence, beginning on this date, the regime is no longer classified as an autocratic monarchy but as a constitutional monarchy. In 1988 a court of appeal was established. Before that event, the privy council functioned both as the executive and the court of appeals. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 2000. Thereafter, only multiparty legislative elections were conducted during this period. No executive elections were held. Since 2011, multiparty executive and legislative elections have been held. The constitution does not clearly define who holds the greatest influence. Constitutional amendments in 1915 were made to increase the king's power relative to the nobles. The arrangement in the latter part of the twentieth century is more balanced, allowing personal abilities, and other intangibles to significantly affect power dynamics. These factors have certainly shifted power towards the monarch instead of the nobles (Campbell 2004: 811). On 11/25/2010 early general elections under a new electoral law were held. The early elections were announced by the new King George Tupou V in July 2008 shortly before being crowned on 08/01/2008 and were preceded by a program of constitutional reform. For the first time, a majority of the seats (17 out of 26) in the Tongan parliament were elected by universal suffrage, with the remaining nine seats being reserved for members of Tonga's nobility. This marked a major progression away from the 165-year rule of the monarchy towards a fully representative democracy. The Taimi Media Network described it as 'Tonga's first democratically elected Parliament'.³⁸¹ The constitutional reforms of 2010 strengthened democratic change in the political regime. They included increasing the role of parliament and reducing the influence of the monarch.³⁸² Despite these reforms and the introduction of partially competitive elections, Tonga is still classified by Va-PoReg as a constitutional monarchy with a ruling monarch. The king continues to serve as the effective executive leader, retaining core powers such as appointing and dismissing the prime minister, dissolving parliament, vetoing legislation, and appointing senior judges. These functions go beyond symbolic representation and establish the monarch as the central authority in the political system. Therefore, the regime remains a hereditary monarchy in which democratic procedures exist but executive power is not derived from electoral legitimacy. Former prime Minister 'Akilisi Pōhiva died in 2019 and was temporarily succeeded

³⁸¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Tongan_general_election

³⁸² https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tonga_2013

by finance minister Pōhiva Tu‘i‘onetoa whose government survived a vote of no confidence in January 2021. In November 2021 general elections were held, following which parliament elected Siaosi Sovaleni as the new acting prime minister. While elections were held competently and effectively, criteria such as universal suffrage are not met, due to the continued reservation of nine parliamentary seats for nobility. Moreover, the King retains significant political powers including the right to veto legislation, dissolve parliament and appoint judicial officials.³⁸³ According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for 1972 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Per FH’s scoring for the period 1973 to 1988, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. Per FH, for the years 1989-1992, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. According to FH, for the years 1993 to 2009, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. As per FH’s classification for 2005, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. As classified by FH for 2010 and 2011, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. Per FH, for the rest of the assessed regime period, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. Political liberties were absent until 2017 and present from 2018 onward according to LIED. V-Dem does not provide data for Tonga.

Constitutional Monarchy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic

For the time before 11/28/1917 see **Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia**.

03/22/1917 Start Part of Other Country [Russia, Democratizing Regime]: Following the February Revolution and the collapse of the Russian Empire, the Russian Provisional Government established the Special Transcaucasian Committee (Ozakom) on this date to administer the Transcaucasian region. This committee replaced the imperial viceroyalty and was intended to act as the highest organ of civil administration.³⁸⁴

11/11/1917 End Part of Other Country [Russia, Democratizing Regime]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime [as Transcaucasian Commissariat]: In the wake of the October Revolution and the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd, the leading political forces in Transcaucasia,

³⁸³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tonga/freedom-world/2022>

³⁸⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Transcaucasian_Committee

including the Georgian Mensheviks, Azerbaijani Musavatists, and Armenian Dashnaks, refused to recognize the new Soviet government. They dissolved the Ozakom and established the Transcaucasian Commissariat in Tbilisi, which declared itself the legitimate government of the region until an All-Russian Constituent Assembly could be convened.³⁸⁵ Headed by the Georgian Menshevik Evgeni Gegechkori, this body acted as an independent government, effectively severing ties with Bolshevik Russia.³⁸⁶

04/22/1918 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime [as TDFR]: The Transcaucasian Seim (parliament), which had been formed in February 1918 from the region's elected delegates to the now-dissolved All-Russian Constituent Assembly, formally declared the independence of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR).³⁸⁷ This act was a direct response to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, under which Soviet Russia had ceded Transcaucasian territories to the Ottoman Empire. Refusing to recognize the treaty, the Seim established a new, sovereign, and federal state.³⁸⁸

05/26/1918 End Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic [Non-Electoral Transitional Regime]: The TDFR existed for only a month. Facing an ongoing invasion by the Ottoman army and irreconcilable internal divisions among its Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani factions, the federation collapsed. On this date, the Democratic Republic of Georgia declared its independence, effectively dissolving the TDFR.³⁸⁹ Armenia and Azerbaijan declared their own independence two days later, on 05/28, marking the final end of the short-lived republic.³⁹⁰

For the time after 05/28/1918, see **Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia**.

Transvaal

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 04/12/1877]: In 1852 the British Government recognized the independence of the Boer Republics of the Transvaal based on the 'Thirty-Three Articles' passed in 1849 and the 'Grondwet' or Fundamental Law of 02/13/1858 (Keltie 1894, Oliver/Anthony 2005). The Boers drafted a constitution in 1855. Transvaal was governed with a Volksraad of 24 elected members. Despite

³⁸⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcaucasian_Commissariat

³⁸⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/October_Revolution

³⁸⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcaucasian_Seim

³⁸⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcaucasian_Democratic_Federative_Republic

³⁸⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian_Declaration_of_Independence,_1918

³⁹⁰ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declaration_of_Independence_of_Armenia_\(1918\);](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declaration_of_Independence_of_Armenia_(1918);)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declaration_of_Independence_of_Azerbaijan

claiming a larger territory, the Boers authority was limited to southwestern Transvaal. The discovery of diamonds and gold deposits heightened British interest in gaining control of the region, while the Republic's economy remained stagnant.³⁹¹ Subsequently on 04/12/1877³⁹² the Transvaal was occupied by the British, Sir Theophilus Shepstone annexed the financially bankrupt republic to Britain.³⁹³ This first annexation attempt, and the failed promise of internal self-governing by the United Kingdom led to a Boer uprising (Oliver/Anthony 2005). On 08/08/1881 the Transvaal territory was granted self-government by the Pretoria Convention, however, Britain remained the suzerain of the Transvaal Territory as it had the right to move troops through the Transvaal in time of war to control the external relations of the Transvaal including the conclusion of treaties and the conduct of diplomatic intercourse with foreign powers (De Villiers 1896). The Transvaal received greater autonomy after the British amended their suzerainty by the London Convention in 1884 (Evans et al. 2003).³⁹⁴ In 1899 a conflict broke out between the British and the Boer Republic (Transvaal and Orange Free State known as the Second Boer War) and by June 1900 the British had defeated the Boer armies, which surrendered to the United Kingdom.³⁹⁵ Political liberties were absent according to LIED. It is defined as occupation due to the British military presence, governance and control exercised over the region. The British interventions, annexation attempts and the establishment of colonial administration, indicates occupation rather than a protectorate with intern autonomy. According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. However, according to LIED, male suffrage was absent during this period. During the Second Boer War (1899–1902), British control was purely military. The Transvaal was governed through martial law, with large parts of the territory under Boer guerrilla control and no civilian institutions in place. The occupation was transitional by design, aimed at subduing the Boer Republic rather than establishing a lasting colonial administration.

05/31/1902 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]: On this date, the Treaty of Vereeniging, a peace treaty, ended the Second Boer War. In the aftermath the Transvaal (along with the Orange Free State) was annexed by Britain and became a British Crown colony (Kesner 1978: 28-53). The Responsible Government Association was formed in late 1904 and made up of a loose gathering of ex-colonial and ZAR officials. They called for the allowance of the colony

³⁹¹ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Transvaal>

³⁹² <https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/sir-theophilus-shepstone>

³⁹³ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Transvaal>

³⁹⁴ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Convention_\(1884\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Convention_(1884))

³⁹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transvaal_Colony

to create its own policy and strive for self-government.³⁹⁶ LIED affirms that during this time no legislative or multiparty elections were held. Universal suffrage was not given. Political liberties were absent according to LIED.

12/12/1906 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]/Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [under self-rule]: The pro-Boer Liberal Party in Britain came to power in 1906 with a new self-rule policy for the Boer colonies.³⁹⁷ The Transvaal Colony was granted responsible government in terms of self-rule on 12/12/1906. White people in the colony had the right to decide whether to grant franchise to Africans. However, when Britain granted self-government to the two territories in 1906 and 1907 political power passed once again into Boer hands, and non-whites were permanently excluded from the vote (Oliver/Anthony 2005). Elections were held in the colony in 1907. Following the results of the elections Louis Botha became Prime Minister of the Transvaal Colony on 03/04/1907 leading the Het Volk Party winning 37 out of 69 seats (including three affiliated independents) to the Legislative Assembly ahead of the Progressive Party (21 seats), the National Association (16), Labour (3 seats) and two independents.³⁹⁸ The elections are considered as not competitive according to LIED. No political liberties were present (LIED). This period of self-governance clearly is to be distinguished from other periods of self-governance in other cases. In this case, only white people in the colony had the right to participate in the election of a government. V-Dem does not list Transvaal in its dataset. LIED considers Transvaal only until 1907.

05/31/1910 End Transvaal [Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy]: On this date the Transvaal Colony joined with three other provinces (Natal, the Orange Free State and Cape Colony) under a single administration as the Union of South Africa with the status as a self-governing colony (Leacock 1910).

For the time after 05/31/1910, see **South Africa**.

Trinidad and Tobago

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 01/01/1889]: The formalization of British control over Trinidad occurred on 03/25/1802, through the Treaty of Amiens between France and Great Britain. On 01/01/1889, Trinidad and Tobago

³⁹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transvaal_Colony

³⁹⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transvaal_Colony

³⁹⁸ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cabinet_of_Louis_Botha_\(Transvaal_Colony\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cabinet_of_Louis_Botha_(Transvaal_Colony))

were amalgamated as Crown Colonies of the United Kingdom. Until 1925 LIED underlines the absence of executive and legislative multiparty elections. For 1900-1916, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. For the rest of the assessed regime period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates in our interpretation an ambiguous state regarding political liberties. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are comprehensive. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

02/07/1925 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) (Male) Defective Democracy]: On this date the first general election for the Legislative Council was held. Suffrage was initially granted in 1925, allowing both men over 21 and women over 30 to vote, aligning with the United Kingdom full suffrage for women was achieved in 1945.³⁹⁹ From 1946 to 1961, self-government was progressively granted.⁴⁰⁰ Between 01/03/1958 and 05/31/1962 Trinidad and Tobago were part of the Federation of the West Indies (with Antigua, Barbados, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Turks and Caicos Islands) (Lansford 2021: 1674). According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present.. For the period until 1947, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. Since 1948, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were somewhat present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

08/31/1962 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Defective Democracy: Trinidad and Tobago gained independence from the United Kingdom, however the Queen remained ceremonial head of state until 1976. General Elections were already free and fair before independence. The government of the People's National Movement leading Trinidad and Tobago into independence was elected

³⁹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage;

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1925_Trinidad_and_Tobago_general_election

⁴⁰⁰ <http://countrystudies.us/caribbean-islands/40.htm>

indirectly through the parliamentary elections taking place on 12/04/1961.⁴⁰¹ The position of governor-general was replaced with that of president. Rival parties consistently transferred power peacefully, with multiple changes in government through elections since the 1980s.⁴⁰² Trinidad and Tobago operate as a parliamentary democracy with active media and civil society sectors. Nevertheless, organized crime fuels elevated levels of violence, and addressing corruption within public offices remains an ongoing challenge. Despite strides, discrimination against the LGBT+ community persists, alongside instances of violence against women, while human trafficking remains a significant issue of concern.⁴⁰³ Per FH's scoring for 1972, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. As per FH's classification for the rest of this regime period, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. However, according to LIED political liberties were present. V-Dem's PCLI also indicates somewhat political liberties until 1970. Ever since 1971 full political liberties are achieved. LIED scores the elections as competitive. For five years since 1962 the elections were classified with an ambiguous cleanliness. Since 1967 the country is reaching constantly a somewhat cleanliness (V-Dem CEI). Furthermore, the elections are acknowledged as somewhat free and fair following V-Dem's EF&FI. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power.

08/01/1976 Continuation Defective Democracy (as a republic): On this date a new constitution was promulgated, and Trinidad and Tobago became a republic with a president as head of state. They remained a cooperative member of the commonwealth.⁴⁰⁴ According to LIED, the country scores electoral competitiveness during this period. During this period the elections score a somewhat cleanliness level by V-Dem's CEI. According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. For the relevant period, LIED identifies political liberties as present, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were present. According to the Polity5 indicator, from 1976 to 1980, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. From 1981 to 1985, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category.

⁴⁰¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961_Trinidad_and_Tobago_general_election

⁴⁰² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/trinidad-and-tobago/freedom-world/2022>

⁴⁰³

<https://freedomhouse.org/country/trinidad-and-tobago/freedom-world/2023>

⁴⁰⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Queen_of_Trinidad_and_Tobago#Abolition

During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

12/15/1986 End Defective Democracy/Start Liberal Democracy: The 1986 general elections resulted in the first peaceful and competitive transfer of power since independence, with the opposition National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) defeating the long-ruling People's National Movement (PNM) in free and fair elections. This marked a transition from defective democracy to liberal democracy through improved electoral quality and genuine political competition. The institutional structure remained the same as in the regime period before. This election outcome was significant as it marked the first peaceful transfer of power through the electoral process in the postcolonial era of Trinidad and Tobago. The victory of the NAR is often seen as the beginning of an era where democratic norms, such as free and fair elections, became more firmly established. It also reflected the growing political maturity of the electorate, which opted for change after more than two decades of PNM dominance. In the 2015 general election, the PNM led by Keith Rowley, returned to power, winning 23 of the 41 seats. In August 2020, the governing PNM under Prime Minister Keith Rowley won the general election again.⁴⁰⁵ The general election on April 28, 2025, resulted in a decisive victory for the opposition United National Congress (UNC), ending the People's National Movement (PNM)'s 10-year tenure. Led by Kamla Persad-Bissessar, the UNC won 26 of the 41 seats, forming a majority government. Persad-Bissessar was sworn in as prime minister for the second time.⁴⁰⁶ According to LIED, the country scores electoral competitiveness for the entire time. In addition, from 1997 to 2000 the elections score cleanliness. For the following two years the elections decreased to a somewhat cleanliness level. Since 2003 the country gained back cleanliness for its elections (V-Dem CEI). Moreover, the overall conditions are free and fair until 2000. Between 2001 and 2006 the elections fall back to somewhat free and fair. Since 2007, the conditions are free and fair again following V-Dem's EF&FI. From 1987 onwards V-Dem's LDI has a so-called somewhat level. Most recent fair and free elections were held in 2020.⁴⁰⁷ According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. For the relevant period, LIED identifies political liberties as present, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were present. From 1986, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting

⁴⁰⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Trinidad_and_Tobago#Cabinet_until_2025

⁴⁰⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Trinidad_and_Tobago_general_election#

⁴⁰⁷ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/trinidad-and-tobago/freedom-world/2021>

executive parity or subordination. Until 2002, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Catón 2005)

Tunisia

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 05/12/1881]: Tunisia became a French protectorate when the Treaty of Bardo was signed on 05/12/1881 (Crawford 2006). Nonetheless, the Convention of La Marsa, finalized on August 6th, 1883, granted France authority over Tunisia's internal matters through the office of the Resident-General. The official wielded considerable powers, including the formulation of detailed strategies—whose overarching framework was determined in Paris—and the discretion to determine negotiation approaches with local representatives (Ikeda 2015, Lewis 2013, Roberts 1986, Willoughby/Fenwick 1974). For the whole time LIED classified legislative and multiparty elections as absent as well as universal suffrage. For the given timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. This period is therefore coded as a direct colonial rule regime.

06/03/1955 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]: While France officially granted internal autonomy on that date through the *Conventions de l'autonomie interne*, this move fell far short of genuine sovereignty or effective self-rule. The designation of the regime as - autocratic monarchy under - indirect rule colonial regime is more accurate for this transitional phase. Despite some administrative concessions to the Neo-Destour leadership under Habib Bourguiba, France retained control over key sovereign domains, including foreign affairs, defense, currency policy (through a monetary union), and overarching legal authority. The internal administration operated under heavy French supervision, and the Resident-General continued to wield decisive

influence (Houssi 2017). These characteristics align with the classic model of indirect rule colonialism, where local elites are granted limited administrative powers under overarching foreign dominance. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held in 1955.

03/20/1956 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy [as independent country]: The Tunisian Kingdom was inaugurated as an independent realm.⁴⁰⁸ Although the government was formally a constitutional monarchy, Habib Bourguiba (appointed as prime minister by king Muhammad VIII al-Amin) and Neo-Destour had full control of decision making from the beginning (Anderson 1986: 235, Moore 1965a: 71-75, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 102).⁴⁰⁹ The monarch was purely ceremonial figurehead. A single-party system was effectively in place from the moment Tunisia achieved independence—no other party or institutional check constrained Bourguiba's rule. According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Because of the absence of political liberties and the lack of legislative constraints, we code this regime period as an autocratic monarchy. On 03/25/1956 a Constituent Assembly, was elected (Paxton 1986) with universal male suffrage. The Néo-Dustūr party list, headed by Habib Bourguiba received some 82% of the vote (Houssi 2017).

07/25/1957 Continuation One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy: The Constituent Assembly voted to abolish the monarchy and proclaimed a republic on this date (Paxton 1986). Bourguiba became the provisional head of state. In 1959 with the approval of a new constitution universal suffrage was introduced.⁴¹⁰ In 1960 the people elected Bourguiba president of the Tunisian Republic (Houssi 2017). In 1964 the sole party Neo-Destour was renamed Socialist Destourian Party.⁴¹¹ As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI. Since 1958, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were

⁴⁰⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Tunisia

⁴⁰⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neo_Destour

⁴¹⁰ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2008

⁴¹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_Destourian_Party

absent. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty.

03/01/1975 End One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: From the start the regime had a strong personalist note and in March 1975 Habib Bourguiba was declared President-for-life by the Chamber of Deputies. For this reason, there were no more presidential elections until 1989.⁴¹² According to our classification rules, the appointment of a president for life means that there has been a regime change towards a personalist autocracy, although the ruling elite has not changed. Furthermore, even the one-candidate presidential elections no longer took place, which means that there were no direct or indirect popular multi-party/multi-candidate executive (s)elections. The cult of personality around Habib Bourguiba is an additional feature.⁴¹³ Legislative elections in November 1979 were neither free nor fair, the PSD running unopposed. On 11/01/1981, following changes to the constitution that allowed for multiple parties the regime de facto was still dominated by Habib Bourguiba and the PSD. The PSD now contested the elections as the lead party of the National Front in alliance with the Tunisian General Labour Union and other minor parties, and according to official results, won all seats.⁴¹⁴ Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI. Until 1979, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1980 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. Per FH, for 1975 to 1980, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. The FH-score for 1981 is missing. As classified by FH for 1982 to 1985, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. As classified by FH for 1986 and 1987, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free.

11/07/1987 End Personalist Autocracy/Start One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date, doctors declared Habib unfit for duty and prime Minister Zine el Abidine Ben Ali declared himself president in conformity with the constitution. The ruling party was again renamed in Democratic Constitutional Rally, but the ruling elite stayed the same.⁴¹⁵ Per FH's evaluation for

⁴¹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1974_Tunisian_general_election

⁴¹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cults_of_personality#Tunisia

⁴¹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Tunisian_parliamentary_election

⁴¹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zine_El_Abidine_Ben_Ali

1988, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Per FH's scoring for 1989, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH for 1990 and 1991, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. According to FH's classification for the years 1992 to 1999, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. On 04/02/1989 for the first time since 1974 presidential elections have been held and for the first time in the parliamentary elections on this date oppositional parties were allowed. However, based on the official results they did not receive any seats in the parliament.⁴¹⁶ For the first time the Ennahda Movement fielded independent candidates, because Ben Ali had banned the party from participating.⁴¹⁷ Also, only Ben Ali was standing for election as president.⁴¹⁸ Therefore, based on the observations Tunisia under Ben Ali is coded as one-party autocracy, even for the period following 1989 because there were still no (direct or indirect) popular multi-party/multi-candidate executive (s)elections and political parties like the Ennahda Movement were banned and persecuted. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty.

10/24/1999 End One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, general elections took place to elect a president and parliament. The presidential election witnessed an unprecedented occurrence: the presence of multiple candidates for the first time in history.⁴¹⁹ However, Ben Ali received 99 per cent of the vote. In the parliamentary elections the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally received more than 91 per cent of the votes. The country is in this period a borderline case between an electoral autocracy and a one-party autocracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Following LIED the elections are not competitive for the entire time. V-Dem's CEI declares irregularities in the election process by no cleanliness scores. Moreover, the overall election conditions are not free and fair according to V-Dem's EF&FI. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Additionally,

⁴¹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Tunisian_general_election

⁴¹⁷ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ennahda>

⁴¹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Tunisian_general_election

⁴¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_Tunisian_general_election

political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present following V-Dem's PCLI. This changed in 2011, when the PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties were present. According to Polity5, from 1999 to 2001, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 2002 to 2010, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

01/14/2011 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Democratizing Regime: On this date, Ben Ali was ousted. In the course of the Tunisian Revolution, also called the Jasmine Revolution, all members of the cabinet associated with Democratic Constitutional Rally as the ruling party resigned on 02/27/2011 (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 102). In response to the ongoing protests and the demands of the Tunisian people, Mohamed Ghannouchi, who was rooted in the old regime, resigned from his position as prime minister on 02/27/2011. He was replaced by Béji Caïd Essebsi, who served as the interim prime minister.⁴²⁰ No data was provided by LIED for this specified period. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present.

10/23/2011 End Democratizing Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, the first free and fair elections in Tunisia's history took place. The new constitution adopted in 2014 was "regarded as a milestone in North Africa's political history and the region's most progressive and democratic constitution".⁴²¹ Following the 2011 revolution, Tunisia witnessed sluggish progress in judicial reform despite constitutional mandates for a robust and independent judiciary. Many judges from the Ben Ali era persisted in their roles, and successive governments frequently attempted to influence court proceedings. The constitution affirmed the right to assemble and demonstrate peacefully, and public protests addressing political, social, and economic concerns were a common feature of political life. However, the enactment of a contentious counterterrorism law in 2015 and the recurrent imposition of states of emergency placed significant limitations on public demonstrations. Exclusive eligibility for the presidency was restricted to Muslims, and societal biases alongside laws criminalizing homosexuality hindered the active political engagement of many LGBT+ individuals, with political parties largely neglecting their concerns. Nevertheless, elections during this period have been

⁴²⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beji_Caid_Essebsi

⁴²¹ <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019C13/>

competitive and free and civil liberties have been mostly upheld.⁴²² Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 2011 the elections score competitiveness (LIED). Between 2012 and 2019 V-Dem's CEI affirms electoral standards in Tunisia as clean. In 2020 the scores decreased to a somewhat cleanliness. Nevertheless, the elections were free and fair for the entire period, according to V-Dem's EF&FI. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for the years 2011 to 2013 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Per FH, for 2014-2016, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. According to FH, for 2017 to 2020, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. Per FH, for 2021, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. LIED indicates that political liberties were absent. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI affirms full political liberties for the entire time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. President Kais Saied announced the dismissal of the government due to continuing protests caused by an increasing number of coronavirus cases and declining economic growth. He disbanded the Parliament in order to rule by decree expanding his executive authority and ignoring certain constitutional norms.⁴²³ The nation's preeminent parliamentary faction, Ennahda, decried the president's maneuvers as constituting a coup d'état. This characterization was echoed by certain political commentators and legal scholars. Saied defended his choice to implement the measures by citing Article 80 of the Tunisian constitution, which grants the president the authority to enact exceptional measures when the country's institutions, security, or sovereignty are jeopardized.

07/25/2021 End Defective Democracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, President Kais Saied suspended the government, dissolved the lower house of the parliament and issued a month-long curfew. This self-coup was preceded by political deadlock and protests against the government. In October, the President directed Najla Bouden to establish a new government. In July 2022, a revised constitution, granting the president greater authority, was ratified following a referendum that was abstained from by more than two-thirds of voters.⁴²⁴ Parliamentary elections were planned for 12/17/2022. Nearly all opposition parties boycotted the elections. Therefore, the voter turnout in the first round was only about 11 percent.⁴²⁵ Saied's authoritarian

⁴²² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tunisia/freedom-world/2020>

⁴²³ <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule>

⁴²⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022%E2%80%9323_Tunisian_parliamentary_election;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Tunisian_self-coup

⁴²⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022%E2%80%9323_Tunisian_parliamentary_election

tactics concerning his opponents raise alarm. In the initial days of September 2021, Human Rights Watch condemned his "repressive policies." Delivering a speech on 09/20/2021, from Sidi Bouzid, the birthplace of the uprising against Ben Ali, the president issued a vaguely worded encouragement to violence, mentioning "traitors" and calling on citizens to "cleanse the country." By 11/2021, Amnesty International reported a surge in military court trials in Tunisia, surpassing the number witnessed in the entire previous decade.⁴²⁶ The 2021 self-coup may give the appearance of a personalist autocracy; however, the president's actions were not entirely unconstitutional, and institutional structures were subsequently reinstated—albeit in a weakened form. The polity did not collapse into a state of near-total institutional absence or unconstrained personal rule. Nevertheless, the self-coup constituted a clear violation of the constitutional separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. Accordingly, the regime is classified as an electoral autocracy due to the erosion of horizontal accountability and the undermining of constitutional constraints. In March 2022 President Saïed formally dissolved the parliament after it attempted to vote against his emergency measures by convening online. In June the President drafted a new constitution which shifted power away from the legislative to the executive branch of government, which was approved in a referendum which FH marks as flawed, with low turnout of 31%. Elections for a new parliament were held in December with a second round in January 2024, featuring extremely low turnout at 11%, a lack of candidates and a boycott by opposition parties. Government critics continue to be persecuted.⁴²⁷ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In 2021 the elections were not competitive (LIED). The election slides back to an ambiguous cleanliness in 2021, no cleanliness in 2022 and an ambiguous outcome in 2023 (V-Dem CEI). V-Dem's EF&FI indicates ambiguous election conditions for the following two years. According to FH, a score of 6 to 8 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free and rather not free. LIED identifies political liberties as absent (for 2021), while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are somewhat present. In 2021, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. In 2022, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. In 2023, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by

⁴²⁶ <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/coup-in-tunisia-is-democracy-lost/>

⁴²⁷ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tunisia/freedom-world/2024>

us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. Additionally, the LDI showed an ambiguous score for 2021, referring to an electoral hybrid regime, while the scores for 2022/23 indicated that the country moved into the direction of an electoral autocracy.

10/06/2024 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: The Presidential election was held in October, marking the first since the 2022 constitutional reform. Incumbent President Kais Saied secured a second term with 90.7% of the vote. However, the election process was marred by significant controversy. The Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) disqualified several opposition candidates, including prominent figures like Mondher Zenaïdi and Imed Daïmi, despite court orders for their reinstatement. Additionally, the parliament amended the electoral law shortly before the election, transferring oversight from the Administrative Court to the Court of Appeal of Tunis, a move critics argued undermined judicial independence and electoral integrity. Ayachi Zammel, a leading opposition candidate, was imprisoned and sentenced to over thirteen years in prison on charges of false sponsorship, a decision widely viewed as politically motivated to eliminate competition.⁴²⁸ According to V-Dem's EF&FI CEI neither free nor fair and not really clean. V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores a 10 as partly free, which we interpret as rather not free. Regarding political liberties, they were in an ambiguous state according to V-Dem's PCLI. Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Axtmann 2007, Entelis/Tessler 2013, Erdle 2010, Moore 1965b, Breivik Andersen 2011, Moore 1970)

Turkey

[For the time before 10/29/1923 see **Ottoman Empire**. In 05/26/2022, the Republic of Turkey officially changed its name to Republic of Türkiye.]

10/29/1923 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date, the establishment of the Republic of Turkey formally concluded the Ottoman constitutional monarchy. This pivotal change was led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), who became the first President of Turkey. The regime change resulted from the military success of the Turkish

⁴²⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Tunisian_presidential_election

National Movement led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), which defeated both the occupying Allied forces and the Ottoman monarchy during the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1922). The establishment of the Republic of Turkey on 10/29/1923 formally concluded the constitutional monarchy. The transition to a one-party (personalist) autocracy was thus driven by a successful rebellion rather than negotiation or voluntary abdication. The Republican People's Party (until 1924 People's Party) was the only party that could be voted for in elections. Hence, there was no competition (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 102). From the first election on male suffrage was universal and in 1934 female suffrage was introduced.⁴²⁹ Under Atatürk's leadership, Turkey embarked on a comprehensive program of political, economic, and cultural reforms aimed at transforming the former Ottoman Empire into a modern, secular, and nation-state. This transition signified the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, an entity that had spanned over six centuries, and the beginning of a new era in Turkish history. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI until the end of 1945. For 1946 PCLI changed into a range which we interpret in the way that political liberties were not really present. Since 1925, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty.

07/21/1946 End One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, Atatürk's successor, İsmet İnönü, allowed the first multi-party elections in the country's history at the national level. However, in these elections, the Republican People's Party still won 395 of the 465 seats. This is an example of how the change from a one-party autocracy to an electoral autocracy is often initially a gradual rather than a fundamental regime change. Nevertheless, the RPR lost the elections on 05/14/1950 and accepted the alternation in power. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this time the country's election were not competitive according to LIED. From 1946 to 1949 V-Dem's CEI declares a not really cleanliness. Additionally, the overall election conditions are scored as ambiguous by V-Dem's EF&FI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. The LDI classifies Turkey from 1946 to 1950 still as an autocracy presenting what we classify as none scores. On 05/14/1950 elections remained not competitive (LIED). Between 1950 and 1957, the

⁴²⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

country's elections according to V-Dem's CEI had a somewhat level of cleanliness. Furthermore, the election conditions are somewhat free and fair following V-Dem's EF&FI. As per Polity5's categorization, from 1950 to 1953, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. From 1954 onward, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. Since 1950 the LDI indicates in our interpretation a level of not really. However, we classify the regime in this period as an electoral hybrid regime. Initially, the ruling Democratic Party (DP) secured its position through legitimately won elections in 1950 and relatively fair elections in 1954. Regarding political liberties, they were absent according to LIED. According to V-Dem's PCLI, they were not really present until 1950. For 1951-1955 PCLI indicates an ambiguous status. For the remainder of the time, they were considered not really present. From 1946 to 1950 and from 1955 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

10/27/1957 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: The manipulated election of 10/27/1957 marks the pivotal moment when the incumbent government transitioned from an electoral hybrid regime to an electoral autocracy. Facing waning popularity, the DP engaged in electoral manipulation. In the lead-up to the 10/1957 election, the government engaged in district gerrymandering, restricted opposition media access, prohibited public gatherings, banned political coalitions, and targeted opposition leaders with harassment. Post-election, numerous allegations emerged regarding voter registration and vote count discrepancies. Subsequently, as ballot boxes were relocated for a recount, the facility destined for this recount suffered a fire incident before the process could begin, resulting in all disputed seats being allocated to the DP. This sequence of events substantiated the allegations of electoral fraud (Glazer 1996, Tursan 2004: 70-71, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 102-103). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Regarding the country's election, they are classified as not competitive by LIED. According to V-Dem's CEI the elections reached somewhat clean scores. The elections are acknowledged as somewhat free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. Moreover, political liberties were absent (LIED) and not really present, according to V-Dem's PCLI. V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

Furthermore, following the not really LDI scores, Turkey can therefore be classified as an electoral autocracy. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time.

05/27/1960 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup led by Chief of the General Staff Gürsel ousted the prime minister Adnan Menderes (DP), dissolved the assembly and established the Committee of National Unity of 38 officers to rule. Gürsel ruled as a military head of government. Menderes was tried and hanged under the military junta. They purged the rest of the government of Menderes supporters. However, the junta allowed for new elections in 1961 (Haddad 1965: 115-18, Brooker 1995: 253, Glazer 1996). Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicates an ambiguous status. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. For this period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

10/15/1961 End Military Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: The parliamentary elections are considered to be free and fair and the following regime as democratic (Haddad 1965: 119-20, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 103).⁴³⁰ The constitution ratified in 1961 promulgated human rights as one of the pillars of the Turkish republic and established an robust and independent judiciary.⁴³¹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1961 the elections are scored as competitive by LIED. In addition, since 1962 the elections score somewhat cleanliness levels (V-Dem CEI). Moreover, the overall election conditions are classified as somewhat free and fair according to V-Dem's EF&FI. For 1961-1962, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. In the period 1963-1969, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties are somewhat present. For the rest of the period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. According to Polity5, from 1961 to 1964, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. From 1965 to 1970, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust,

⁴³⁰ <https://www.org/military/world/europe/tu-military-coup-1961.htm>

⁴³¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Constitution_of_1961#VII._Judicial_Power

while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also robust. Except in 1965, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. In this period the regime is a clear case of a defective democracy.

03/12/1971 End Defective Democracy/Start Non-electoral Transitional Regime: Violence and strikes committed by left-wing students, neo-fascist paramilitaries, and Islamic fundamentalists brought the country to the brink of collapse. It was at this moment that the military demanded by letter that the prime minister should leave office and appoint a stronger, less political leader who could restore order. Suleyman resigned immediately after reading the letter and Nihat Erim was appointed as a non-party prime minister.⁴³² According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present.

03/13/1973 End Non-electoral Transitional Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, the Turkish presidential elections were held and Fahri Korutürk was elected president.⁴³³ When the military-backed candidate for the presidency was defeated, the army retreated to the barracks, relinquishing governance back to the politicians.⁴³⁴ On 10/14/1973 general elections were held, which saw the Republican People's Party victorious.⁴³⁵ In the following year the country was governed mainly by weak coalitions and was shaken by a surge of violence.⁴³⁶ While elections appeared to be free and fair and the judiciary effectively monitored the government, the state of democracy was marred by significant discrimination against the Turkish Kurds and a rise in anti-communist terror (Gastil 1979: 297). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. From 1973 to 1979 the elections are competitive following LIED. In addition, V-Dem's CEI indicates somewhat clean and V-Dem's EF&FI somewhat free and fair elections. As classified by FH for 1973, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. As per FH's classification for the rest of this regime period, the country

⁴³² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nihat_Erim

⁴³³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_Turkish_presidential_election

⁴³⁴ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Turkey/Political-developments-1970s-to-90s>

⁴³⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_Turkish_general_election

⁴³⁶ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Turkey/Political-developments-1970s-to-90s>

receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. Moreover, LIED still indicates that political liberties were absent, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates that they were somewhat present from 1974 to 1979. V-Dem's LDI indicates that the regime was not really a liberal democracy. The terror of the 1970s resulted in an estimated death toll of 5.000, primarily attributed to right-wing and terrorist activities. According to data from British Searchlight magazine in 1978, there were 3.319 fascist attacks, resulting in 831 fatalities and 3.121 injuries.⁴³⁷ Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

09/12/1980 End Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: The elected government of Suleiman Demirel was overthrown by a military coup led by General Kenan Evren. He and the rest of the military high command established a five-member National Security Council composed of the service chiefs. They appointed a civilian cabinet and extended martial law to the entire country (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 90, Brooker 1995: 253, Glazer 1996, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 103).⁴³⁸ Upon the occurrence of the coup in 1980, the military asserted that its involvement would be temporary. Following this, in 1981, the junta designated a Consultative Assembly tasked with formulating a fresh constitution. By 1982, this constitution underwent a referendum. Additionally, the Consultative Assembly drafted electoral legislation, paving the way for the formation of new political entities. In October 1983, despite the setback of their preferred candidate, the military relinquished authority to the incoming government (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 63-64). As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as absent in 1981 and 1982 and as not really present in 1983. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period.

11/06/1983 End Military Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: On this date free and fair parliamentary elections were held. The National Security Council was dissolved on 12/13/1983.

⁴³⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi-party_period_of_the_Republic_of_Turkey#1961%E2%80%931980:_The_Second_Republic

⁴³⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1980_Turkish_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

The 1983 elections were won by a party not allied with the military (Ahmad 1984: 3, Glazer 1996). In 1984, a conflict broke out between the Turkish government and Kurdish insurgent groups, primarily the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), who demanded an independent Kurdistan. In 1985 paramilitary militias were established in the Southeast of the country to oppose Kurdish separatists. Starting in 07/1987 the South-East of Turkey, a state of emergency was declared, which lasted until 11/2002.⁴³⁹ On 12/24/1995, general elections were held. Following these elections, a coalition was formed between the True Path Party (DYP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP), with Mesut Yilmaz of the ANAP serving as Prime Minister. This government failed only four months later following a censure motion by the Welfare Party (RP). The RP was then asked to form a government.⁴⁴⁰ On 02/28/1997 military leadership of the Turkish armed forces sent a briefing note to Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan of the RP. On 06/30/1997 the military forced the prime minister to sign several policies restoring secularism. Shortly after the prime minister resigned. In the aftermath, a new government coalition was formed between the ANAP, the Democratic Left Party (DSP), and the Party for a Democratic Turkey (DTP). The Constitutional Court of Turkey banned the RP in 1998, for violating the constitutional separation of church and state.⁴⁴¹ While this post-modern coup is clearly a breakdown of democracy, the military did not take power and democracy continued with a new coalition government. On 04/18/1999 general elections were held, with the DSP becoming the largest parliamentary party, following which they formed a coalition with the second placed Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the fourth-placed ANAP. This coalition proved very stable, remaining in power until 2002.⁴⁴² Elections were held again on 11/03/2002, with none of the previous governing parties returning to parliament. The newly formed Justice and Development Party (AK) secured 34% of the votes and Republican People's Party (CHP) secured 19%. The AK's founder, [Recep Tayyip Erdoğan](#) was not permitted to hold a seat in parliament, due to a previous conviction for inciting racial intolerance. In 2003, this ban was overturned by the AK and the CHP, allowing him to become Prime Minister in 03/2003.⁴⁴³ On 07/22/2007, general elections that had been scheduled for November were held early, after the parliament had failed to elect a new president. The AK secured 46.6% of the votes and Erdoğan was reelected as Prime Minister.⁴⁴⁴ A constitutional referendum on 10/27/2007 passed with roughly 69% approval, reducing the presidential term

⁴³⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Republic_of_Turkey

⁴⁴⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1995_Turkish_general_election#Coalition_of_Ordered_government

⁴⁴¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997_Turkish_military_memorandum

⁴⁴² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_Turkish_general_election

⁴⁴³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Turkish_general_election

⁴⁴⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Turkish_general_election

from seven to five years, introducing the election of the president by the popular vote instead of parliament, allowing for reelection of the president into a second term, reducing the parliamentary term from five to four years, and reducing the quorum needed for parliamentary decisions from 67 to 34%.⁴⁴⁵ On 06/12/2011 general elections were held, following which Erdoğan was confirmed for a third term as prime minister.⁴⁴⁶ In May and June 2013 there had been violent clashes in İstanbul and several other cities between environmental demonstrators and riot police, prompting accusations of heavy-handedness by Erdoğan's government and criticism from the EU. In December that year a political crisis was triggered by a corruption scandal allegedly involving senior political and business figures and an apparent government attempt to suppress police investigations (Macmillan 2022a). Presidential elections were held on 08/10/2014, with Erdoğan winning the popular vote in the first round and assuming the presidential office on 08/28/2014. On 08/29/2014, he was succeeded as Prime Minister by Ahmet [Davutoğlu](#).⁴⁴⁷ General elections on 06/07/2015 resulted in no clear majority, and despite [Davutoğlu](#) being tasked with the formation of a new government by President Erdoğan, coalition negotiations failed and new elections were called for 11/01/2015.⁴⁴⁸ [Davutoğlu](#) became Prime Minister once more and held the office until 05/22/2016, when he resigned and was succeeded by Binali Yıldırım.⁴⁴⁹ A constitutional referendum held on 04/16/2017 increased the seats in the Grand National Assembly from 550 to 600.⁴⁵⁰ The entire period was marred by a variety of issues. The military still held a significant amount of power and torture in the prison system persisted (Gastil 1987: 360). Kurdish organizations were faced with harassment and discrimination and Kurdish parties were targeted by repression for alleged ties to the Kurdish PKK. Furthermore, the judiciary and freedom of press came repeatedly under pressure from the government, which lead to self-censorship and a partial justice system (Puddington 2014: 709-714, Piano/Puddington 2004: 703-705). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For the whole regime period the elections are scored as competitive by LIED. Between 1984 and 1987 Turkey's election are pointed out with somewhat cleanliness levels. From 1988 to 2007 the elections enhanced to cleanliness. In 2008 they sided back to somewhat cleanliness levels (V-Dem CEI). Until 1990 the elections are somewhat free and fair. Since 1991 the overall freedom

⁴⁴⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Turkish_constitutional_referendum

⁴⁴⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Turkish_general_election

⁴⁴⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Turkish_presidential_election

⁴⁴⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/June_2015_Turkish_general_election

⁴⁴⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmet_Davuto%C4%9Fflu

⁴⁵⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Turkish_constitutional_referendum

and fairness is scored (V-Dem's EF&FI). Per FH's scoring for 1984 and 1985, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH for the years 1986 to 1992, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. According to FH, for 1993, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH's evaluation for 1994-2001, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for the rest of the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. However, LIED still considers that political liberties were absent. V-Dem's PCLI indicates an ambiguous state regarding political liberties from 1983 to 1999 and from 2013 to 2014, indicates somewhat present political liberties in between these periods. According to Polity5, from 1983 to 1988, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. From 1989 to 2013, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. Until 1984, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1986 to 1996, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. Between 1997 to 2009, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. The other years the outcomes increased to somewhat political rights. Despite this fact, the LDI declares not really outcomes from 1983 to 1999 and from 2010 to 2014. Turkey in this period is an absolute borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

07/01/2014 End Defective Democracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: Erdogan was named the AKP's candidate in Turkey's first direct presidential elections. Election at local level took place in March 2014 and turned out highly controversial with regards to vote-rigging. Despite these accusations, the AKP was the obvious winner. Erdogan won the elections on 08/10/2014 with 51.8% of the vote and became president, followed by a wave of mass arrests of journalists and further repression against the opposition. The 2014 elections showed anomalies in terms of freedom and fairness. Furthermore, democratic competition was nearly not possible because oppositional parties lacked funding and media attention paving the way towards authoritarianism.

Erdogan was sworn in on 08/08/2014 with Ahmet Davutoğlu, also of the AKP, replacing him as prime minister. The questionable landslide voter turnout of the 2018 elections was not reflected on a local level (Lansford 2021, Macmillan 2022a).⁴⁵¹ In December 2014 a wave of arrests of journalists on charges of establishing a terrorist group was described by the opposition CHP as a coup against democracy, which further undermined EU confidence in the Turkish government's respect for the rule of law and fueled concerns over a concentration of political power in Erdoğan's hands (Macmillan 2022a). Parliamentary elections in June 2015 deprived the AKP of a majority but, after governing as an interim administration until November that year, the party won an unexpected and decisive victory in further polling marred by violence and media restrictions (Macmillan 2022a). The Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for a number of fatal attacks on Turkish soil in 2015 and 2016. For 2015, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. For 2016, PCLI indicates that political liberties were not really present. V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

07/15/2016 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On 07/15/2016-07/16/2016, a faction of the Turkish military comprising approximately 1.5% of the armed forces attempted to overthrow President Erdoğan's government, deploying tanks to Istanbul and Ankara, bombing the parliament with F-16 jets, and kidnapping Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar. The coup plotters, primarily mid-ranking officers acting outside the chain of command and attributed to the Gülenist movement, controlled two Istanbul bridges and Akıncı Air Base but never secured the presidency, parliament, police forces, or majority of the military. Massive civilian counter-mobilization, loyalist police and military resistance, and Erdoğan's social media appeals led to the coup's collapse within 21 hours, resulting in 251-290 deaths and 2,200+ injuries. The failed coup did not constitute a regime change because the putschists never exercised effective state control, but Erdoğan's response did: a state of emergency declared on 07/22/2016 enabled mass arrests of over 100,000 individuals, closure of 15 universities and dozens of media outlets, and sweeping institutional reforms subordinating the military to civilian control. This crackdown transformed Turkey from an electoral hybrid regime to an electoral autocracy, a shift formalized by the 04/16/2017 constitutional referendum establishing a presidential system with expanded executive powers (Macmillan 2022a). According to Polity5, from 2014 to 2015, the executive's

⁴⁵¹ <http://www.sirjournal.org/research/2020/12/28/turkeys-electoral-authoritarianism>

constraints were categorized as Intermediate Category 2, between slight and substantial limitations. From 2016 to 2017, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. As classified by FH for 2014 and 2015, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. Per FH's evaluation for 2016, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not really present.

04/16/2017 Continuation Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: On 04/16/2017, voters approved a referendum that dramatically expanded the powers of the president. 51.4 % of the voters voted yes and 48.6 % voted no. The position of prime minister was abolished, and a presidential system was established (see Constitution and government, below) (Lansford 2021). Hence, the subtype of the electoral autocracy changed. Erdoğan's purge extended from summer of 2016 through 2018 and included penalties ranging from lengthy prison terms to simple dismissals across government and military institutions as well as universities and the media (Lansford 2021). In June 2018 Turkey held what proved to be one of the most significant elections in its history. Called 18 months in advance of the originally scheduled date and attracting voter turnout of a remarkable 87 %, those elections decided both the presidency and composition of the parliament. In each case, the ruling AKP and its leader, Erdoğan, prevailed, further entrenching the Islamist authoritarian regime already in place. The success that Erdogan's AKP enjoyed in the 2018 parliamentary and presidential elections was not replicated in the municipal elections conducted in March 2019 (Lansford 2021). While the AKP-MHP coalition won 51 % of the vote in local balloting across Turkey overall in March 2010, it lost to CHP candidates in the country's two largest cities, Ankara and Istanbul. In the latter in particular, the CHP's Ekrem Imamoglu edged former AKP prime minister Yildirim by 48.8 to Yildirim's 48.5 percent in the mayoral race. Claiming irregularities at polling stations across the city, the AKP forced an annulment of the results and a new election. In that rerun on June 23, however, Imamoglu won decisively, finishing 10 percentage points ahead of Yildirim. It was a very disappointing outcome for Erdogan, whose AKP controlled nine fewer mayoralities than beforehand, despite the fact that the president held a collective 202 rallies in 59 cities over the 50 days preceding the elections (Lansford 2021). Erdoğan's purge extended from summer of 2016 through 2018 and included penalties ranging from lengthy prison terms to simple dismissals across government and military institutions as well as universities and the media (Lansford 2021). In June 2018, Turkey experienced one of its most pivotal elections in history. The elections were held 18 months ahead of the originally planned date and saw an impressive voter turnout of 87%. These elections were crucial as they

determined both the presidency and the composition of the parliament. In both instances, the incumbent AKP and its leader, Erdoğan, emerged victorious, further consolidating the already established Islamist authoritarian regime. In the presidential elections in May 2023, neither of the leading candidates managed to secure a majority, leading to a second-round election between Erdoğan and the opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu on the 28th of May. Erdoğan managed to secure the presidency once again with a 52,2% majority. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the IEOM claimed in a final observation report that while the elections were generally free and competitive, they were not fair. Voters were given a genuine choice on the ballot, yet biased media coverage favored Erdoğan, and restrictions on freedom of assembly and expression impeded participation. In country, voter-turnout was high at 88.92% (OSCE 2023). After the earthquake in February 2023 the government restricted access to social media platform X, issuing arrests and imposed fines for government critical media posts or commentary.⁴⁵² Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 2018 the election a no longer competitive according to LIED. From 2015 to 2021 V-Dem's CEI reflects ambiguous levels of electoral cleanliness. In 2022 no real cleanliness was scored, while 2023 marks ambiguous cleanliness outcomes. From 2014 to 2017 the elections score somewhat freedom and fairness. Since 2019 the election conditions changed to ambiguous (V-Dem EF&FI). Per FH's evaluation for 2016, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH's classification for the rest of the assessed regime period, a score of 11 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. In addition to that, political liberties were absent (LIED). According to V-Dem's PCLI they were not really present since 2016. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. From 2017 to 2018 and in 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

⁴⁵² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2024>

Additional sources (Arjomand 2008, Birand 1987, Cook 2007, Alcock et al. 2001, Karpat 1959, Karpat 2000, Özbudun 1995, Weiker 1980, Yavuz 2006, Yavuz 2009, Kim 1984)

Turkmenistan

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Russia, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 05/06/1881]: After the suppression of the Emirate of Bukhara (1868) and the Khanate of Khiva (1873), the Turkmen area remained independent.⁴⁵³ Turkmenistan was annexed by the Russian Empire and was incorporated into the Empire as the Transcaspian Oblast on 05/06/1881.⁴⁵⁴

11/07/1917 Continuation as Part of Other Country [Russia, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was proclaimed.⁴⁵⁵ On 04/10/1918 the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (initially, the Turkestan Socialist Federative Republic) was officially proclaimed. The Turkistan ASSR was an autonomous republic of the Russian Federative Socialist Republic, which included territories of present-day Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Fedorenko 2015: 3).⁴⁵⁶ On 08/07/1921 Turkmenistan was established as the Turkmen Oblast under the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR).⁴⁵⁷ Universal suffrage was introduced in 1924.⁴⁵⁸

12/28/1922 Continuation Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date, the RSFSR voluntarily entered into the Union treaty forming the USSR, subsuming Turkmenistan as part of the Soviet Union.⁴⁵⁹ On 05/13/1925 Turkmenistan was declared a republic within the Soviet Union and given the name Turkmen SSR.⁴⁶⁰ During the Soviet era, Turkmenistan followed a unique path within the USSR, influenced by its distinct geographic, cultural, and economic contexts. Incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1922 and established as the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic (Turkmen SSR) in 1925, Turkmenistan saw the consolidation of Soviet power and the imposition of a centralized authoritarian regime that tightly controlled political life and suppressed dissent. The early Soviet period focused on dismantling traditional tribal structures and integrating Turkmenistan into the Soviet system. The Communist Party of Turkmenistan became the sole political authority, with leaders often appointed from Moscow to

⁴⁵³ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkmenistan>; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Turkmenistan

⁴⁵⁴ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkmenistan>; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Turkmenistan

⁴⁵⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Soviet_Federative_Socialist_Republic

⁴⁵⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkestan_Autonomous_Soviet_Socialist_Republic

⁴⁵⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkestan_Autonomous_Soviet_Socialist_Republic

⁴⁵⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

⁴⁵⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union#Treaty_on_the_Creation_of_the_USSR

⁴⁶⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkestan_Autonomous_Soviet_Socialist_Republic

ensure loyalty to the central government. Local autonomy was minimal, and decision-making was dominated by directives from the Kremlin, eliminating political competition and opposition. Economically, Turkmenistan was heavily oriented towards cotton production, becoming the republic's economic backbone. Large-scale collectivization forced individual and communal farms into state-controlled collective farms (kolkhozes) and state farms (sovkhozes), disrupting traditional agriculture and causing social upheaval and famines due to mismanagement and forced quotas. This cotton monoculture made Turkmenistan dependent on a single crop, neglecting food production and environmental sustainability. Industrialization efforts focused on supporting the Soviet military-industrial complex and extracting resources like natural gas and oil. Infrastructure projects, including railways and factories, were prioritized to facilitate resource extraction, reinforcing central control as the local economy became tightly integrated into the Soviet system. Culturally, Soviet policies aimed to create a homogeneous socialist identity, promoting the Turkmen language and national culture within Soviet ideology through educational institutions, theaters, and cultural centers. However, traditional practices and Islamic institutions were suppressed to eliminate potential opposition. Religious leaders and cultural figures resisting Soviet policies were often persecuted, imprisoned, or exiled. Political repression was pervasive, with the secret police (NKVD and later KGB) monitoring the population for dissent. Intellectuals, activists, and ordinary citizens suspected of anti-Soviet sentiments faced harsh punishments, including imprisonment in labor camps or forced relocations. Elections were merely formalities to legitimize predetermined outcomes, ensuring the Communist Party remained unchallenged and eliminating any possibility of genuine political competition. Despite political repression, Soviet rule brought certain advancements to Turkmenistan, such as improved education, healthcare, and infrastructure. Literacy rates increased, and modern medical facilities expanded, though these benefits were unevenly distributed and often overshadowed by repression and economic hardships. In the late 1980s, as the Soviet Union weakened, Turkmenistan experienced rising nationalist sentiments and calls for greater autonomy. Gorbachev's policies of Glasnost and Perestroika introduced some political openness, but significant change remained limited. The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 ended Soviet rule in Turkmenistan, leading to its independence and the establishment of a new national government. LIED and V-Dem do not treat Turkmenistan before 1990.

10/27/1991 End Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Personalist (One-Party) Autocracy: Niyazov held control over independence, with the Supreme Soviet elected in January 1990 being under communist dominance {Clark, 1996 #35197; Geddes, 2014 #38583: 103}. The Communist Party of Turkmenistan (CPT) was renamed the Democratic Party of

Turkmenistan (DPT), and former internal party structures were preserved, including party cadres and elites. However, the DPT possessed zero political decision-making capacity from the outset. Classification as personalist autocracy rather than one-party autocracy is warranted because Niyazov's rule immediately satisfied all three essential personalist criteria: (1) concentration of executive power in one person without institutional mediation, (2) absence of effective institutional checks on the ruler's core decisions, and (3) non-institutionalized succession mechanisms. From 1991 onward, the narrative of nation-building already revolved around the emerging cult of personality, with authority personalized through coercive and patronage networks ensuring direct dependence on Niyazov rather than flowing through party organs.⁴⁶¹ According to Polity5, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. V-Dem indicators confirm that judicial constraints on the executive (JCE) and legislative constraints on the executive (LCE) were absent throughout the period. The DPT served purely as an administrative instrument, while Soviet-era bureaucratic structures retained some administrative capacity for policy implementation, they exercised no political constraints on Niyazov's decisions, distinguishing this regime from party-based autocracies where party organs retain institutional authority. The diagnostic tests for distinguishing one-party from personalist autocracy confirm personalist classification from 1991: Could party organs theoretically constrain or remove the leader? No—all decisions flowed from Niyazov personally. Did elite advancement require party endorsement beyond personal loyalty? No—the assembly consisted of hand-picked loyalists.[3] Could the party survive the leader's removal? No—as demonstrated by the chaotic transition following Niyazov's death in 2006, revealing complete absence of institutional succession mechanisms. Up until 2010 the DPT remained the only legal party, but this legal monopoly served personal rule rather than constituting party-based authority.[4] This represents a semi-institutionalized variant of personalist autocracy where personalist patterns coexisted with partially retained Soviet-era administrative structures. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. FH classified the country as not free (scores 11-14), and political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. On 12/28/1999, the assembly declared Niyazov President for Life {Macmillan, 2022 #35433}. This formalized already-existing reality of unconstrained personal rule rather than marking a regime type transition. By 2003, Niyazov wielded exclusive control over both executive and legislative branches. The cult

⁴⁶¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Party_of_Turkmenistan;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Turkmenistan#;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saparmurat_Niyazov#

of personality took on ever greater proportions, extending to Niyazov's parents, with the title Turkmenbashi (Head of all Turkmen) exemplifying the intensifying personalization.⁴⁶²⁴⁶³ The 1999 declaration represents deepening of personalist features (from borderline semi-institutionalized toward paradigmatic personalism within the same regime type rather than a qualitative regime change).

12/21/2006 End Personalist (One-Party) Autocracy/Start One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date Niyazov died (Lansford 2021). On 02/11/2007 Berdymukhammedov was elected president with nearly 90% of the vote (Macmillan 2022b). After constitutional reforms increased the size of the Assembly (Mejlis), fresh elections were conducted on 12/14 and 12/28/2008, a year ahead of the constitutional requirement.⁴⁶⁴ All 125 members elected to the Assembly were members of the DPT or pro-presidential independents. The balloting marked the first time that foreign monitors were present as observers, although international groups criticized the elections for irregularities and because no opposition parties contested the elections (Lansford 2021). It was only in 2010 that parties other than the DPT were legalized. But even after formal legalization, opposition parties are prevented from emerging.⁴⁶⁵ On 12/15/2013 elections were held. The governing Democratic Party of Turkmenistan won 47 seats, the recently created Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs won 14, trade unions won 33, women's groups 16, youth organizations 8, and citizens' groups 7. An observer mission from the Commonwealth of Independent States concluded that the elections were free, orderly, and competitive, but human rights campaigners dismissed them as a token gesture, noting that genuine opposition leaders are all in jail or in exile. Observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe said that some improvements were made in the legal framework for elections, but that choice was limited. The Turkmen government noted that, apart from Turkmen, there are also ethnic Russians, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks represented in the parliament (Lansford 2021). On 02/12/2017 Berdimuhammedov was reelected president with 97.7 % of the vote in balloting (Lansford 2021). In balloting for parliament on 03/25/2018 the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan and pro-presidential independents won 103 seats, followed by the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs with 11 and the Agrarian Party of Turkmenistan (APT) with 11 (Lansford 2021). Until today elections are held but those are only open to pro-presidential and DPT-candidates.

⁴⁶² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Turkmenistan#History;

⁴⁶³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Turkmenistan#

⁴⁶⁴ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkmenistan_2016?lang=en

⁴⁶⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Party_of_Turkmenistan#

And even this pro-presidential parliament is seen by observers as a rubber-stamp parliament.⁴⁶⁶ Further, there have been substantial changes by current office holder Berdymukhammedov to further entrench presidential powers in the constitution, such as lifelong presidency. According to FH, the country is consistently considered not free during this regime period, with a score of 14, which we also interpret as not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. In the parliamentary elections in March 2023 all seats were won by regime-friendly parties. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty.

One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Heinritz 2007)

Turks and Caicos Islands

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy (as Part of Colony of Jamaica)] [Start: 09/03/1783]: Commencing in the mid-1600s, individuals from Bermuda engaged in seasonal visits to the islands for salt collection, eventually establishing more permanent settlements with the presence of African slaves. Amidst the Anglo-French War (1778–1783), the French seized control of the archipelago in 1783. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Paris (1783) subsequently affirmed its status as a British colony. In 1799, Britain incorporated both the Turks and Caicos Island groups into its territory as components of the Bahamas. In 1848, Britain established the Turks and Caicos as an independent colony with a council president. From 1873 to 1874, the islands were integrated into the Jamaica colony and in 1894, the title of the chief colonial official was changed to commissioner.⁴⁶⁷ No data was provided by LIED for Turks and Caicos Islands.

07/04/1959 Continuation Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date, the islands were once again established as an independent colony, with the final commissioner assuming the title of administrator. The governor of Jamaica

⁴⁶⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Turkmenistan#Political_parties_and_elections

⁴⁶⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turks_and_Caicos_Islands#History

concurrently served as the governor of the islands. Following Jamaica's attainment of independence from Britain in August 1962, the Turks and Caicos Islands became a Crown colony. Starting in 1965, the governor of the Bahamas assumed the additional role of overseeing affairs for the Turks and Caicos Islands. When the Bahamas achieved independence in 1973, the Turks and Caicos Islands were appointed their own governor.⁴⁶⁸

08/30/1973 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Defective Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date, the Turks and Caicos Islands adopted their first constitution, marking the establishment of a self-governing system led by a chief minister. Following the People's Democratic Movement's (PDM) victory in the 1976 general election under "Jags" McCartney's leadership, there was an initial push for eventual independence. However, McCartney's untimely death eroded confidence in the pursuit of full independence. In 1980, the pro-independence PDM reached an agreement with the British government, proposing independence by 1982 if the PDM was re-elected that year. The subsequent election in 1980, essentially a referendum on independence, saw the PDM losing to the Progressive National Party (PNP), which favored continued British rule. Norman Saunders of the PNP became chief minister, securing victory again in the 1984 elections. Consequently, the push for independence receded from the political forefront.⁴⁶⁹ From 1986 to 1988, local government in the Turks and Caicos Islands was suspended due to allegations of government involvement in drug trafficking, leading to the arrest of Chief Minister Norman Saunders. In 2002, the islands were reclassified as a British Overseas Territory, granting full British citizenship to the residents. A new constitution was established in 2006.

02/15/2009 End Defective Democracy/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [UK Oversight]: Following corruption allegations Premier Michael Misick of the Progressive National Party (PNP) resigned, the UK suspended the constitution and restored direct rule under a governor appointed by London. During the period of direct British rule, discussions between the leaders of The Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos Islands in 2010 explored the potential formation of a federation.

11/09/2012 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [UK Oversight]/Start Defective Democracy [as British Overseas Territory, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date, a new constitution came into force and local elections were held on 11/09/2012, restoring an elected House of

⁴⁶⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turks_and_Caicos_Islands#20th_and_21st_centuries

⁴⁶⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Turks_and_Caicos_Islands#Autonomy

Assembly and Chief Minister while retaining UK sovereignty.⁴⁷⁰ In 2016, the People's Democratic Movement (PDM) defeated the ruling Progressive National Party (PNP).⁴⁷¹ In the 2021 general election, the PNP returned to office.⁴⁷² The general election on 02/07/2025 marked the first election held under significant constitutional changes, including the introduction of elected at-large members and electronic voting. The ruling Progressive National Party (PNP), led by Premier Washington Misick, won a decisive victory in the reelection, securing 16 of the 19 available seats. This result solidified the PNP's mandate and maintained its strong dominance over the opposition.⁴⁷³ The judiciary is regarded as independent, and elections generally take place under universal suffrage.⁴⁷⁴ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED, FH and V-Dem do not list the country in their datasets. Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Tuvalu

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 10/09/1892]: Between 10/09/1892 and 10/16/1892, a British protectorate was declared over all parts of the Ellice Islands.⁴⁷⁵ Tuvalu was part of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands since 1892 (see **Kiribati**). In 1967 universal suffrage was introduced.⁴⁷⁶ On 10/01/1975 Ellice Islands separated as Tuvalu from the Gilbert and Ellice Islands.⁴⁷⁷ On 08/27/1977 the first separate parliamentary elections for Tuvalu were held. Since there were no political factions, every candidate stood for election as an independent, and Toaripi Lauti retained his position as Chief Minister.⁴⁷⁸ LIED considers Tuvalu in its data only since 1975. LIED considers political liberties to be present since 1975.

05/01/1978 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime/Start (Monarchical) Defective Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: From this date on, there was a phase of internal autonomy and self-governance (former colonial authority retained responsibility for external affairs). On 10/01/1978 Tuvalu became an independent state

⁴⁷⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turks_and_Caicos_Islands#20th_and_21st_centuries

⁴⁷¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Turks_and_Caicos_Islands_general_election

⁴⁷² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Turks_and_Caicos_Islands_general_election

⁴⁷³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Turks_and_Caicos_Islands_general_election

⁴⁷⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_the_Turks_and_Caicos_Islands#Political_parties_and_elections

⁴⁷⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tuvalu

⁴⁷⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

⁴⁷⁷ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tuvalu_2010?lang=en

⁴⁷⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1977_Tuvaluan_general_election

(McIntyre 2012: 135-46). Since 1977, elections have been regularly held. Tuvalu is a parliamentary democracy with a unicameral parliament. While a governor represents the British monarch as head of state, the prime minister serves as the head of government.⁴⁷⁹ Only non-partisans are elected as there are no political parties. Tuvalu's legal system ensures democratic elections, with laws applied fairly and without bias. A government-appointed secretary oversees elections and manages voter registration. District polling officers have the authority to resolve election disputes, and there's a process for appeals. The September 2019 elections appear to have garnered acceptance from all pertinent stakeholders and constituencies.⁴⁸⁰ On 09/19/2019 Kausea Natano was elected prime minister through free and fair elections (Macmillan 2022c, Lansford 2021).⁴⁸¹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1978, the elections are classified as competitive according to LIED. As part of a constitutional review expected to finalize by July 2019, the government proposed reserving two out of the legislature's 15 seats for women. During the balloting on 09/09/2019, nine incumbents retained their seats out of the 16 contested. Kausea NATANO then secured victory over Sopoaga in the latter's attempt for reelection as prime minister on 09/10, with a vote count of 10–6. Natano assumed office on the same day, forming a new cabinet (Lansford 2021). According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Political rights and civil liberties are generally upheld. LIED confirms that political liberties were present. All Tuvaluans aged 18 and older who are present in the country on election day are qualified to vote. Although woman have equal political rights formally, political affairs are predominantly influenced by older men because of pervasive discriminatory biases. The judiciary operates independently.⁴⁸² V-Dem does not list Tuvalu in its dataset. (Monarchical) Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Somoza 2001)

Uganda

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 06/18/1894]: In the mid-1880s, Uganda underwent a period of political turmoil as four distinct

⁴⁷⁹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tuvalu/freedom-world/2023>

⁴⁸⁰ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tuvalu/freedom-world/2020>

⁴⁸¹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tuvalu/freedom-world/2020>

⁴⁸² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tuvalu/freedom-world/2023>

religious factions competed for political dominance. In 1888, a coup orchestrated by the Muslim faction ousted King Mwanga II, replacing him with Kalema. The following year, Protestants and Catholics formed a coalition to unseat Kalema and reinstate Mwanga II. Collaborating with the Imperial British East Africa Company, they successfully removed Kalema, restoring Mwanga II to power in 1890. On 06/18/1894 Uganda was declared a British protectorate.⁴⁸³ Uganda maintained a level of self-governance distinct from complete colonial administration. However, according to our coding rules the regime is a borderline case between a protectorate with internal sovereignty and a colony with no internal sovereignty.⁴⁸⁴ According to LIED political liberties were absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as not really present until 1955 and as ambiguous from 1956 onward. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 1957. Thereafter, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. Until 1920, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

03/01/1961 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime [as independent country]: On this date, internal self-government was granted to Uganda in 1961, and the first elections were held. Benedicto Kiwanuka of the Democratic Party became the first prime minister. In April 1962 a new National Assembly was elected.⁴⁸⁵ On 04/25/1962 Milton Obote, leader of the majority coalition in the National Assembly, became prime minister and led Uganda to formal independence on 10/09/1962.⁴⁸⁶ In 1962 universal suffrage was introduced.⁴⁸⁷ However, elections were not held in all parts of the country, with the Parliament of Buganda nominating 21 members (all of whom belonged to the Kabaka Yekka party) to the national parliament instead.⁴⁸⁸ The constitutional

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protectorate_of_Uganda#:~:text=The%20Protectorate%20of%20Uganda%20was,Buganda%20to%20the%20British%20government

⁴⁸⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protectorate_of_Uganda

⁴⁸⁵ [https://2009-](https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/uganda/55917.htm#:~:text=In%201894%2C%20the%20Kingdom%20of,Uganda%20maintained%20its%20Commonwealth%20membership)

[2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/uganda/55917.htm#:~:text=In%201894%2C%20the%20Kingdom%20of,Uganda%20maintained%20its%20Commonwealth%20membership](https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/uganda/55917.htm#:~:text=In%201894%2C%20the%20Kingdom%20of,Uganda%20maintained%20its%20Commonwealth%20membership)

⁴⁸⁶ [https://2009-](https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/uganda/55917.htm#:~:text=In%201894%2C%20the%20Kingdom%20of,Uganda%20maintained%20its%20Commonwealth%20membership)

[2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/uganda/55917.htm#:~:text=In%201894%2C%20the%20Kingdom%20of,Uganda%20maintained%20its%20Commonwealth%20membership](https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/uganda/55917.htm#:~:text=In%201894%2C%20the%20Kingdom%20of,Uganda%20maintained%20its%20Commonwealth%20membership)

⁴⁸⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

⁴⁸⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1962_Ugandan_general_election

position of Buganda (and the degree to which it would be able to exercise self-government) was a major issue in Uganda.⁴⁸⁹ Obote ruled in a coalition with the Kabaka Yekka movement/party, whose leader King (Kabaka) Mutesa II was named president.⁴⁹⁰ Under the Independence Constitution of 1962, the First Parliament of Uganda, the National Assembly, was partly elected and partly nominated. The Buganda representatives were to continue to be indirectly elected by the Lukiiko.⁴⁹¹ Although universal suffrage was introduced in 1962, elections were not held throughout the entire country. In Buganda, representatives were indirectly elected by the Lukiiko, rather than directly by the people. This indirect method of election reduced the accountability of representatives to the general populace, a key feature of full democratic systems. Queen Elizabeth II briefly became the ceremonial monarch of Uganda from the 10/09/1962-10/09/1963. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Between 1962 and 1965 the country's election scored competitiveness by LIED. Following V-Dem's CEI the election process marks ambiguous cleanliness scores. Additionally, the overall conditions are classified as somewhat free and fair according to V-Dem's EF&FI. Although one could also argue that the appointment of a quarter of the parliament marks the crossing of the threshold towards an autocracy, there is a qualitative difference between the period 1961-1966 and 1966-1971 that must be taken into account. Not only was there an intact constitution, but with reference to the Civil Liberty Index and the Liberal Component Index of V-Dem it can also be observed that both political and civil liberties as well as judicial and legislative restrictions on the executive increased during this period. However, LIED classifies political liberties as absent. But V-Dem's PCLI indicates ambiguous political liberties for the entire time, except the year 1963 for which it shows that political liberties were somewhat present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. The regime was a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

02/22/1966 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Personalist Autocracy: Due to a rift with Mutesa over the 1964 Ugandan lost counties referendum and later getting implicated in a gold smuggling scandal, Obote launched a self-coup with the support of the military. Obote suspended the

⁴⁸⁹ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buganda#Government>

⁴⁹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milton_Obote

⁴⁹¹ <https://www.parliament.go.ug/page/history-parliament>

constitution, arrested five ministers, and transferred all executive powers to himself after a no-confidence vote by members of his own UPC party. In March 1966, Obote relieved the president (the Kabaka, traditional leader of a different ethnic group) of his position. The imprisoned ministers, which were arrested according to the colonial law of Deportation Ordinance filed a lawsuit against Obote's government yet failed, the Supreme Court Chief Justice ruling that Obote's actions and ascent to power were legal. In a further case, the East African Court of Appeal found the ordinance unconstitutional. The government moved quickly to pass the Deportation Act, after the Ministers had immediately been rearrested after the court's ruling.⁴⁹² On 04/15/1966, a new constitution was promulgated that was intended to serve as a preliminary document until a Constituent Assembly had convened. It gave Obote extensive powers, renamed his previous position president, and abolished the post of the prime minister.⁴⁹³ On 09/08/1967 a new constitution proclaimed Uganda a republic, gave the president even greater powers, declared that incumbent (Obote) would serve a five-year term without a new election and abolished Uganda's traditional kingdoms.⁴⁹⁴ An election had been anticipated around 1969, but it never materialized. On 12/19/1969, President Obote survived an assassination attempt at a UPC party congress. The next day, 12/20/1969, Obote declared a state of emergency and banned all opposition political parties, turning Uganda into a de jure one-party state under the UPC.⁴⁹⁵ Political liberties were absent according to LIED and according to our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI were in an ambiguous range in 1966, before switching into a range, which we would interpret as that political liberties were not really present. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held between 1966 and 1970. However, this seems to be a miscoding. According to our observations in this period no multiparty executive and legislative elections took place.

01/25/1971 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: Major General Amin removed Obote from power. On 02/02/1971, Amin proclaimed himself as the president of Uganda, assuming the roles of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Army Chief of Staff, and Chief of Air Staff. Subsequently, hundreds of troops from Obote's region were killed in their barracks (Welch 1974: 133, Kapuscinski 2002: 141, Lansford 2012d: 1480,

⁴⁹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mengo_Crisis

⁴⁹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Uganda

⁴⁹⁴ <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/insight/the-first-coup-in-uganda-1534158>; <https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/uganda/55917.htm#:~:text=In%201894%2C%20the%20Kingdom%20of,Uganda%20maintained%20its%20Commonwealth%20membership>

⁴⁹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Uganda; <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/uganda-1962-present/>

Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 103).⁴⁹⁶ On 06/25/1976 Amin was declared president for life.⁴⁹⁷ The regime is coded as a personalist autocracy and not as a military autocracy because there was no observable selection process by members of the military, but Amin just declared himself president. Furthermore, the military became increasingly disorganized under Idi Amin. Formal command structures became less important, while loyalty to Idi Amin became crucial. Consequently, advancement in the system depended on the personal relationship with Idi Amin.⁴⁹⁸ Because of the partial suspension of the constitution, the legislature was likewise no counterweight to the power of the executive under Amin.⁴⁹⁹ According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held since 1971. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. Since 1967, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. The coding rule that there are no (direct or indirect) popular multi-party/multi-candidate executive (s)elections is fulfilled. Furthermore, the lifelong term of office is a sufficient condition for coding it as a personalist autocracy.

04/11/1979 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: A combined army of Tanzanian soldiers and Ugandan exiles successfully removed Amin from power. Following this, a coalition government led by former exiles assumed control, with Yusuf Lule assuming the role of provisional president (Mutibwa 1992: 135, Ingham 1994: 7, Lansford 2012a: 1480, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 103-104). Yusuf Lule was removed from his position as interim president by vote. The NCC (National Consultative Commission) of the Uganda National Liberation Front, which was to be an interim governing body with full legislative powers,⁵⁰⁰ voted on the motion via secret ballot. He was succeeded by Godfrey Binaisa who was appointed by the NCC as 5th President of Uganda.⁵⁰¹ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. As classified by FH for 1979, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free.

⁴⁹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Republic_of_Uganda

⁴⁹⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idi_Amin https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idi_Amin

⁴⁹⁸ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uganda_Amy_\(1971%E2%80%931980\)#Organization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uganda_Amy_(1971%E2%80%931980)#Organization)

⁴⁹⁹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Uganda#Third_constitution_\(1967%E2%80%931995\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Uganda#Third_constitution_(1967%E2%80%931995))

⁵⁰⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Uganda

⁵⁰¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yusuf_Lule

As per FH, for 1980, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. For the given timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

05/12/1980 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: President Godfrey attempted to relieve the army chief of staff and this decision in turn, resulted in his immediate removal by the Military Commission led by Paulo Muwanga, a civilian. Muwanga ruled the country with a military junta for a few days. LIED does not provide any data during the specified period. As per FH, for 1980, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. From 05/22/1980, Muwanga chaired the civilian Presidential Commission of Uganda until 12/15/1980, assuming the powers of the president during this transitional phase.⁵⁰² According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which is a misclassification according to our knowledge. Per FH's scoring for 1980, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present. The decision to treat the period from 04/11/1979 to 12/11/1980 as a single non-electoral transitional regime, rather than dividing it into three separate regime phases, is grounded in both empirical continuity and conceptual coherence. The brief episode from 05/12/1980 to 05/22/1980, when Muwanga assumed power after ousting President Godfrey Binaisa, does not justify the classification of a distinct military autocracy. Although Muwanga initially acted as head of a Military Commission the nature and function of this body fall short of constituting a fully-fledged military autocracy. The Muwanga-led junta was extremely short-lived, lasting just ten days—and primarily functioned as a transitional instrument aimed at facilitating the reorganization of a provisional civilian authority, namely the Presidential Commission that was installed shortly thereafter. There was no institutionalization of military dominance during this episode.

12/11/1980 End Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Non-Party) Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, a parliamentary election tainted by fraud, violence, and intimidation resulted in a victory for the UPC, propelling Obote back to power as prime minister. The previous head of the interim government, aligned with the UPC, removed district commissioners who

⁵⁰² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paulo_Muwanga

opposed the UPC and hindered opposition candidates from running. The widespread use of violence and intimidation during the election led us to categorize the 1980 election as undemocratic (Mutibwa 1992: 141, Lansford 2012c: 1480, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 104). Following a period of internecine conflict within the Uganda military forces that participated in the conflict, a transitional structure oversaw bitterly contested elections in December 1980 that were won by Milton Obote's Uganda People's Congress (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 64-65). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this period elections were not competitive according to LIED. No cleanliness scores affirm the absence of a regular election process (V-Dem CEI). V-Dem's EF&FI also indicates that the elections were not really free and fair. While there is no data from FH for the year 1981, for the rest of the assessed regime period the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. The transition occurred in the wake of the Tanzania-Uganda war and the deposing of Idi Amin by victorious Tanzanian and Ugandan forces.

07/27/1985 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date a military coup led by general Tito Okello and Brigadier (after the coup promoted to lieutenant general) Bazilio Olara-Okello ousted President Obotes government (Rowe 1990). Between 07/27 and 07/29/1985, Olara-Okello was Chairman of the Military Council, and de facto head of state, then General Tito Okello replaced him as chairman of the military council. Olara-Okello became chief of the armed forces. However, in this period no group controlled all the territory of Uganda and it is borderline case to No Central Authority (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 104, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 9164-65).⁵⁰³ Per FH's evaluation for this regime period, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

⁵⁰³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bazilio_Olara-Okello

01/27[-29]/1986 End Military Autocracy/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: Tito Okello's ceasefire with the rebels broke down and Okello was forced to flee the country. Yoweri Museveni, the rebel commander and leader, became head of state and eventually president. The National Resistance Army, under the leadership of Museveni, seized control of Kampala. Subsequently, the National Resistance Council was formed, comprising the 38 prominent members of the NRA and NRM, tasked with governance. In April 1987, the National Resistance Council broadened its composition to include cabinet members and their deputies, many of whom were not affiliated with the NRM. Further expansion occurred in April 1989, with the inclusion of elected members into the NRC (Mudoola 1989: 2, Kasfir 1990, Rowe 1990, Lansford 2012c: 1480-81, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 104). As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. However, the period from 1990 to 1993 is an exception, as the country scored between 11 and 14, which we also interpret as not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. The regime is a non-electoral regime. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. It is a borderline case between a military and a personalist autocracy.

05/09/1996 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: In this period general elections were held in Uganda to elect members to the National Resistance Council. These were the first elections since 1980. The transition noted on marks a shift from a Military (Personalist) Autocracy to an Electoral Autocracy, but it remains within the broader framework of Museveni's rule. On 05/09/1996 elections were held in which Museveni's government was elected.⁵⁰⁴ In elections on 02/18/2011 Museveni received 68% of the vote. After allegations of vote rigging, protests emerged that were harshly repressed with violence by security forces. In February 2016, Museveni won again despite international concerns over polling transparency. The opposition claimed widespread fraud, voting irregularities, the repeated arrest of opposition politicians and a climate of voter intimidation during the elections (Macmillan 2022d). Observers from the EU and USA also emphasized on the lack of transparency and criticized the detentions of opposition candidates while critics also claimed the misuse of state powers in favor

⁵⁰⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yoweri_Museveni#Rise_to_power:_1986%E2%80%931996

of the incumbent.⁵⁰⁵ In 2018 a constitutional amendment removed the presidential age limit of 75, allowing the president to seek re-election in 2021 and possibly to retain office for life (Macmillan 2022d).⁵⁰⁶ On 01/16 Museveni secured another term in the 2021 general election with 58% of the vote. Electoral violence was high. After oppositional candidate Bobi Wine, disputed the results, he was subsequently placed under house arrest by the military (Macmillan 2022d). State violence and intimidation by security forces especially of the opposition continues. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1989, LIED classifies elections as not competitive. Until 2000, systematic irregularities in the country's elections are reflected in V-Dem's CEI, which classifies them as not really clean. Since 2001, the indicator suggests a complete absence of electoral cleanliness. Regarding the overall election conditions, they were somewhat free and fair between 1989 and 1995. Over the next five years, the conditions shifted to ambiguous levels. Since 2001, the elections have been classified as not really free and fair according to V-Dem's EF&FI. Per FH's scoring for the years 1996 to 1998, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH, for 1999, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. As classified by FH for 2000 and 2001, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Per FH's evaluation for 2002-2013, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH for 2014 to 2016, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. According to FH, for the year 2017, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. According to FH's classification for the rest of the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. According to LIED the country did not guarantee political liberties for the entire time, while according to our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI, political liberties were not really present from 1989 to 1990, ambiguous until 2005, somewhat present in the period 2006-2011 and again in an ambiguous state since 2012. According to Polity5, until 1992, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1993 onward, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. From 1990 to 1994 and between 2000 and 2004, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints

⁵⁰⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Ugandan_general_election

⁵⁰⁶ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/uganda/freedom-world/2022>

on the executive were robust. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. While the country has been a borderline case between an electoral hybrid regime and an electoral autocracy between 1989 and 2001 it is a clear case of an electoral autocracy ever since.

Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Decalo 1998, Eriksen 2005, Flanary/Watt 1999, Ravenhill 1974, Rwengabo 2013)

Ukraine

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Russia, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 04/19/1783]: On 02/09/1667 following the Truce of Andrusovo the historical region of left-bank Ukraine was incorporated by the Tsardom of Russia.⁵⁰⁷ On 04/19/1783 the Russian Empire annexed the Crimean Khanate.⁵⁰⁸ The historical region of right-bank Ukraine was annexed by the Russian Empire in the Second Partition of Poland in 1793.⁵⁰⁹ A treaty between Prussia and the Russian Empire was signed on 01/23/1793.⁵¹⁰

06/23/1917 End Part of Other Country [Russia, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: The Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR), declared on this date, following the February Revolution in Russia, independence. Initially, it was a socialist-leaning entity under the Central Council of Ukraine, which sought autonomy within the Russian Provisional Government. The Central Council of Ukraine, or the Ukrainian Central Rada, declared Ukrainian autonomy and later proclaimed the UPR's independence on 01/22/1918, in response to the Bolshevik Revolution. During its brief existence, the UPR underwent several political changes. After the Bolshevik October Revolution, the UPR denounced the Bolshevik seizure of power. In December 1917, a competing government, the Ukrainian People's Republic of Soviets, was declared in Kharkiv by local Bolsheviks. This Soviet Republic, supported by Soviet Russia, aimed to establish a communist regime in Ukraine.⁵¹¹ However, this did not represent the

⁵⁰⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Left-bank_Ukraine

⁵⁰⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_the_Crimean_Khanate_by_the_Russian_Empire

⁵⁰⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right-bank_Ukraine#:~:text=In%201793%20right%2Dbank%20Ukraine,Polish%20or%20Polonized%20Ukrainian%20nobility.

⁵¹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Partition_of_Poland

⁵¹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_People%27s_Republic

mainstream UPR government based in Kyiv, which continued to oppose Bolshevik control and sought to establish a democratic socialist republic. The political landscape in Ukraine at the time was highly fragmented, with various factions including the UPR, the Bolsheviks, and other nationalist and anarchist groups vying for control. The UPR government led by the Directorate, particularly under Symon Petliura, maintained a socialist orientation but was distinct from the Bolshevik communists.⁵¹² LIED does not provide any data for this period.

01/09/1918 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: Universal suffrage was introduced, and the Ukrainian People's republic (Ukrainian SSR) held multiparty legislative elections on this date [O.S. 12/27].⁵¹³ The elections could only be held in part of the territory and the elections had to be paused due to the invasion of Russia and the chaos that was spread as the result of it. LIED does not provide any data during this specified period.

04/01/1918 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, the socialist authority of the republic was suspended when it was overthrown by the pro-German Ukrainian State of Pavlo Skoropadskyi, who was elected as a Hetman by a congress of peasants.⁵¹⁴ LIED does still not provide any data during this specified period.

11/14/1918 End Military Autocracy/Start Communist Ideocracy: On this date, the Ukrainian socialists announced a new revolutionary government, the Directorate.⁵¹⁵ The Directorate fought against troops loyal to Skoropadskyi and remaining German troops in Ukraine.⁵¹⁶ On 12/14/1918, after German troops abandoned Kyiv, Skoropadskyi abdicated and fled to Germany, and the remaining government surrendered power to the Directory.⁵¹⁷ No data was provided by LIED during the specified period.

12/30/1922 End Communist Ideocracy/Start Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, proclaimed on 03/10/1919, was admitted to the USSR. Initially, a policy of Ukrainization was pursued, which involved promoting the Ukrainian language and the inclusion of ethnic Ukrainians in leadership positions.⁵¹⁸ Since 1928, a policy of Russification, collectivization and purges were imposed. Repressions against kulaks were imposed, including escalating taxes, dispossession and deportation to Siberia and Kazakhstan. From 1932 to 1933, Stalin's agricultural policies resulted

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<https://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CU%5CK%5CUkrainian6SovietWar1917hD721.htm> ; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_People%27s_Republic

⁵¹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

⁵¹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_People%27s_Republic

⁵¹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_People%27s_Republic

⁵¹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Hetman_Uprising

⁵¹⁷ <https://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CH%5CE%5CHetmangovernment.htm>

⁵¹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic

in the famine known as Holodomor. After the famine, Russian settlers were relocated to repopulate the countryside. During the Great Purge, from 08/19/1936 to 11/17/1939, about half of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) members were expelled and 99 of 102 members of the Central Committee were shot.⁵¹⁹

06/22/1941 End Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: On this date, the invasion of Ukraine by Nazi Germany began as part of Operation Barbarossa. German forces quickly advanced into Ukrainian territory, and many major cities, including Kyiv, were occupied by the German Army. At first, some of the Ukrainian population welcomed the Germans as liberators.⁵²⁰ However, this changed quickly. Following the initial occupation, Ukraine was divided into several administrative regions. The Reichskommissariat Ukraine was established, and it included both the territory of modern-day Ukraine and parts of Belarus and Russia. Erich Koch served as the Reichskommissar. The German occupation was brutal and marked by the Holocaust, mass killings, and widespread destruction. In mid-1943 the Germans began their slow retreat from Ukraine, leaving wholesale destruction in their wake. In November the Soviets reentered Kyiv. With the approach of the front, guerrilla activity in western Ukraine intensified, and bloody clashes that claimed large numbers of civilian victims occurred between Ukrainians and Poles.⁵²¹ No data was provided by LIED for this period.

10/31/1944 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]: By the end of October 1944 all of Ukraine was again under Soviet control.⁵²² The Soviet victory, the Red Army's presence in Eastern Europe, and diplomatic negotiations among the Allies led to a lasting reconfiguration of Ukraine's western boundaries. In exchange for obtaining German territories in the west, Poland agreed to relinquish control of Volhynia and Galicia. A mutual population exchange ensued, during which the remaining Ukrainian population was deported by Poland to its newly acquired western territories. This event marked a significant historical development, establishing a distinct ethnic and political Polish-Ukrainian border, for the first time in centuries.⁵²³ Ukraine, as the USSR's second-most populous republic and a crucial agricultural and industrial hub, was constantly subjected to direct oversight and strict controls from Moscow. The depth of Russification and the magnitude of the Holodomor set Ukraine apart from other

⁵¹⁹ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Ukraine-in-the-interwar-period>

⁵²⁰ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Nazi-occupation-of-Soviet-Ukraine>

⁵²¹ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Nazi-occupation-of-Soviet-Ukraine>

⁵²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic

⁵²³ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Nazi-occupation-of-Soviet-Ukraine>

republics, as did the scale of both Ukrainian cultural resilience and repression. Armed resistance in Western Ukraine was among the most persistent against Soviet authority.⁵²⁴ Between 1944 and 1960, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) waged a guerrilla war against the Soviet Union, at times collaborating with retreating German forces.⁵²⁵ LIED does not include Ukraine in its data before 1992, and V-Dem does not include it before 1990. For the end of this regime period, V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous (1990 and 1991) regarding the status of political liberties.

08/24/1991 End Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Democratizing Regime: On this date the independence of the former Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic from the Soviet Union was declared. The Ukraine's declaration of independence came in direct response to the coup attempt on 08/19/1991 when conservative Communist leaders sought to restore central Communist party control over the USSR. "The proclamation was succeeded by a proposition for a national referendum, jointly announced by majority leader Oleksandr Moroz and opposition leader Ihor Yukhnovsky. The referendum garnered widespread support, achieving an overwhelming victory with 90% of the votes cast (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 65). Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

12/01/1991 End Democratizing Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date Leonid Kravchuk was elected in direct presidential elections (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 66).⁵²⁶ The 1994 election led to a victory for former minister Leonid Kuchma over President Leonid Kravchuk (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016:66). Presidential elections in 2004 were won by Kuchma's chosen successor, Viktor Yanukovich. He defeated Viktor Yanushchenko in the second-round run-off. But observers claimed the election failed to meet democratic standards and in Kyiv widespread protests came to be known as the 'Orange Revolution'. After the poll was declared invalid, Yushchenko was elected president in a repeat of the run-off. In February 2010 Yanukovich was elected president, defeating Yuliya Tymoshenko, a figurehead of the 2004 protests. Tymoshenko alleged fraud and initially refused to resign the premiership as requested by Yanukovich in order for him to install a new government. However, international observers characterized the poll as generally fair (Lansford 2021). Tymoshenko was imprisoned in October 2011 for alleged abuse of power in relation to a 2009 gas deal with Russia.⁵²⁷ In April 2013 the

⁵²⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic

⁵²⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Soviet_resistance_by_the_Ukrainian_Insurgent_Army

⁵²⁶ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ukraine_2019?lang=en

⁵²⁷ <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/UKR>

European Court of Human Rights declared her arrest and detention unlawful (Macmillan 2022e). Unsuccessful attempts to implement judicial reforms and intensified assaults on anti-corruption bodies from 2019 to 2020 reached a climax with a constitutional crisis in late 2020. While there were alternations in power, the quality of democracy was overall low. FH classifies Ukraine as partly free and the V-Dem as an electoral autocracy. However, most other data sets classify Ukraine as being a democracy in this period. According to this dataset Ukraine constitutes an electoral hybrid regime. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Ukraine has faced significant challenges that have impacted its political landscape. The conflict has led to a state of war, dramatically altering the daily lives of Ukrainians and placing immense pressure on the country's institutions and governance. Despite these challenges, Ukraine has continued its efforts to maintain democratic processes and resist authoritarian influences. The resilience of Ukraine's democratic institutions during this period is notable, as the country has held more or less onto its democratic status despite the ongoing war and external pressures. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. From 1991 to 1993 the elections were not competitive according to LIED. Since 1994 constant competitiveness is scored. Regarding the V-Dem's CEI scores for the election process since the country's independence in 1991, multiple changes are observed. From 1991 to 1997 the elections score with a somewhat cleanliness. 1998 marks the change to an ambiguous cleanliness. The following seven years the elections are classified by not really cleanliness levels and irregularities. From 2006 to 2013 there is a return towards ambiguous cleanliness outcomes. In 2014 the scores changed to not really electoral cleanliness until 2016. For the following three years the scores indicate ambiguous cleanliness again. Since 2020 the elections are considered as somewhat clean. Furthermore, according to V-Dem's EF&FI the elections were free and fair from 1991 to 1993, before they were classified as somewhat free and fair up to 1997. In 1998 the overall conditions scored ambiguous levels until 2003. For the next two years the election were not really free and fair. In 2006 there was a return towards somewhat free and fair conditions until 2013. Again, a change to ambiguous levels is given for five years. Since 2019 the election score freedom and fairness levels. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. As classified by FH for 1992, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. In 1992 and 1995, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. From 1993 to 1994, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were

robust. From 1996 to 2002, in 2013, in 2018, from 2021 to 2021 and in 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 2003 to 2009, in 2019 and in 2022, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Per FH's scoring for 1993, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for the years 1994 to 1999 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. As per FH, for the years 2000 to 2003, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. As classified by FH for 2004, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. As per FH's classification for 2005-2009, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for 2010-2021 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Per FH's scoring since 2022, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. Besides, according to LIED no political liberties were present for the entire time. However, V-Dem's PCLI indicates somewhat political liberties are present from 1991 to 1994, 1996 to 2004 and 2010 to 2021. In 1995 and between 2005 and 2009 full political liberties were achieved. Since 2022, the outcomes are ambiguous. In addition, the LDI indicates that the regime was not really a liberal democracy since 1991. Throughout the entire regime period, the country fluctuates between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime based on our criteria. Due to the persistent regime instability, which is a significant issue in itself, the regime is ultimately classified as an electoral hybrid regime.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Åslund/McFaul 2006, Beichelt 2004, Gilka-Bötzow 2007, Kubicek 1994, Prizel 1997, Way 2005)

United Arab Emirates

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 01/08/1820]: Today's territory of the United Arab Emirates became a British Protectorate in 1820 with the signing of the General Maritime Treaty on 01/08/1820.⁵²⁸ Prior to 1971, the Trucial Sheikdoms of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharja, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Fujairah, and Ras al-Khaimah were separately under a British protectorate.⁵²⁹ Neither LIED nor PCLI (V-Dem) does provide any data for this period.

12/02/1971 Continuation Autocratic Monarchy [as independent country]: On this date the protectorate of the United Kingdom ended. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) came into existence through the unification of multiple sheikdoms along the Gulf. The Supreme Council of the Union, comprising the hereditary rulers of the original six emirates (now expanded to seven), selects the president and vice president from among its members. It is the highest legislative authority in the country and receives guidance from the 40-member Federal National Council, which has the authority to assess proposed laws and interrogate government ministers. In the individual emirates, there are no elected legislative bodies.⁵³⁰ The chosen president assumes the roles of head of state, chair of the Supreme Council of the Union, and commander of the military (Hoogland/Toth 1993, Smythe 1993, Lansford 2012d, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 104).⁵³¹ The president appoints a prime minister and a cabinet. The UAE is a federation consisting of seven emirates, with Abu Dhabi leading in practice due to its size and wealth from natural resources. Since 1971 the emirate of Abu Dhabi has maintained control over the presidency of the federation. Similarly, the emirate of Dubai holds authority over the position of prime minister. Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum has been the ruler of Dubai and concurrently served as the prime minister and vice president of the UAE since 2006.⁵³² The allocation of positions in the federal government reflects the varying levels of prestige and financial influence of each emirate.⁵³³ While there are limited elections for a federal advisory body, political parties are prohibited, and ultimate authority in executive, legislative, and judicial matters resides with the hereditary rulers of the seven emirates. Both citizens and noncitizens, who constitute the majority of the population, face significant restrictions on their civil liberties. In 2023 around 90 percent of the UAE's population are noncitizens who do not have political rights or chances to vote, including many stateless individuals. Even though women make up about 50 percent of the

⁵²⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Arab_Emirates#History

⁵²⁹ <https://history.state.gov/countries/united-arab-emirates>

⁵³⁰ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-arab-emirates/freedom-world/2023>

⁵³¹ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United_Arab_Emirates_2009?lang=en

⁵³² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-arab-emirates/freedom-world/2023>

⁵³³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_the_United_Arab_Emirates

electoral body of the Federal National Council and the authorities appointed 13 women in 2019 in accordance with a commitment to guarantee equal representation in the 40-member body, ordinary women have few chances to independently organize and promote their interests within the political system. Non-governmental organizations face numerous restrictions and are required to register with the Ministry of Social Affairs. International human rights organizations have been refused entry to the UAE and local human rights activists face significant threats of arrest and mistreatment while in custody. The judiciary lacks independence, as court decisions are subject to review by the political leadership.⁵³⁴ The UAE extensively uses advanced surveillance technologies to monitor public spaces, internet activities, and more, violating individual rights to privacy and freedom of expression.⁵³⁵ In 2006 a limited suffrage was introduced for both men and women. A hand-picked 12% of Emirati citizens have the right to vote for half the members of the Federal National Council, an advisory quasi-parliamentary body. The UAE is an authoritarian state.⁵³⁶ The Federal National Council comprised 40 members, with 20 elected and 20 appointed by the rulers of each Emirate. Since the size of the electorate is very small, half of the members of the Federal National Council are appointed, and the parliament is no real counterweight to the ruling monarchs the United Arab Emirates are still classified as an autocratic monarchy. The political regime ensures that the hereditary rulers of the emirates hold a monopoly on power, effectively ruling out the possibility of a change in government through elections.⁵³⁷ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period. Per FH, for 1972-1975, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. As classified by FH for 1976-1988, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. According to FH's classification for the rest of the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Political liberties have been absent since 1971 according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. Except between 2018 and 2020, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

Autocratic Monarchy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

⁵³⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-arab-emirates/freedom-world/2023>

⁵³⁵ <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-arab-emirates>

⁵³⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

⁵³⁷ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-arab-emirates/freedom-world/2023>

Additional sources (Herb 1999, Herb 2003, Herb 2004)

United Kingdom

[In this case we use the name the country is commonly referred to. This is so because the official title and hence the historical name of the country changed over time. Until 1918 it was officially the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and from then on the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.⁵³⁸]

01/01/1900 (Monarchical) Electoral Oligarchy [Start: 01/01/1801]: The United Kingdom, as known today, was created in 1707 with the Acts of Union that united the Kingdom of England (including Wales) and the Kingdom of Scotland. This unification resulted in forming of a single legislative body, the Parliament of Great Britain.⁵³⁹ Nonetheless, certain elements remained separate, such as Scottish and English law and the education systems of both countries.⁵⁴⁰ The removal of voting rights based on religion occurred with the Roman Catholic Relief Act 1791 in the Kingdom of Great Britain and the Kingdom of Ireland. Since then the right to vote has never been based on race or religion.⁵⁴¹ On 01/01/1801, Great Britain and Ireland united to form the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and created a legislative Union, the Parliament of the United Kingdom, through the Act of Union 1800.⁵⁴² Until the late eighteenth century, ministers served as advisors to the sovereign, whose decision they were obliged to follow. However, the enactment of the Catholic Emancipation in 1829 marked the decline of the sovereign's independent political power. The Reform Act of 1832 significantly impacted constitutional monarchy, expanding the franchise, giving rise to the modern party system, and effectively reducing the sovereign's influence in general elections. In 1868, prime minister Disraeli resigned without seeking parliament's audience, recognizing that public opinion, rather than the House of Commons, held the power to form and dissolve governments. This resolved the long-standing conflict between the sovereign and parliament: It became evident that a government, even with the backing of the House of Commons, needed to gain the support of the voters. The sovereign could no longer sway voters to elect their preferred choice as prime minister (Bogdanor 1996: 27). After Queen Victoria's passing in 1901, no sovereign was able

⁵³⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom

⁵³⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acts_of_Union_1707

⁵⁴⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_United_Kingdom

⁵⁴¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Catholic_Relief_Act_1791

⁵⁴² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_United_Kingdom

to veto a minister's appointment. As a result, the monarchy assumed the role of a politically neutral mediator between parties, as demonstrated by George V in 1914 regarding Irish Home Rule and in 1915 regarding conscription (Bogdanor 1996). Up until 1918 there was no universal male suffrage. Voting rights were linked to property.⁵⁴³ We code the regime in this period as an electoral oligarchy rather than a constitutional monarchy since the sovereign lacked significant political power and was not in a position to appoint the prime minister to rule on their behalf. Instead, the prime minister was chosen through parliamentary elections, albeit with limited suffrage, and ceremonially accepted by the monarch. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Elections were already competitive according to LIED. V-Dem's CEI indicates somewhat cleanliness scores. The overall election conditions were already free and fair following V-Dem's EF&FI. LDI scores are moderate. The decisive reason for the classification is the very exclusive suffrage. Nevertheless, according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI the country already guaranteed full political liberties until 1914. For the remaining years of this regime period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

12/14/1918 End (Monarchical) Electoral Oligarchy/Start (Monarchical) Defective Democracy: All adult men in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland were enfranchised by the Representation of the People Act 1918.⁵⁴⁴ This Act granted women over 30 the right to vote in national elections, but about 60% of women (those under 30 or not meeting property qualifications) were excluded until the Equal Franchise Act 1928, when all women were granted the vote on the same terms as men in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. For our regime change events we code the commencement of the Representation of the People Act 1918 as a strategic restructuring. After the general elections on 12/14/1918, the Irish party Sinn Féin won most Irish seats in the parliament but refused to take them. Instead, they formed the First Dáil parliament in Dublin and ratified a declaration of independence on 01/21/1919. Subsequently, the Anglo-Irish war was fought between the Crown forces and the Irish Republic Army. The conflict concluded with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty on 12/06/1921,

⁵⁴³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representation_of_the_People_Act_1918

⁵⁴⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representation_of_the_People_Act_1918

establishing the Irish Free State. Consequently, six counties in the north formed Northern Ireland and remained part of the United Kingdom. In 1927, Britain officially adopted the name “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland” through the Royal and Parliamentary Titles Act 1927.⁵⁴⁵ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as competitive. In addition, the election process maintained its somewhat cleanliness scores (V-Dem CEI). However, freedom and fairness were given per V-Dem’s EF&FI. In the specified timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as present, while V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are present. As per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. Until 1922, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 1923 onwards, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. Since 1920 the LIED lists the United Kingdom with a somewhat score, classifying it as a democracy. Though in the time since 01/01/1900 democratic equal participation was severely constrained, which is taken into account by our classification, governmental power alternated between the Conservative Party and the Labour Party, underscoring the competitive character of the national elections.⁵⁴⁶

05/30/1929 End (Monarchical) Defective Democracy/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy: In the parliamentary election on this date (referred to as the "Flapper Election"), for the first time, women aged 21 to 29 had the right to vote, owing to the Representation of the People Act 1928, adopted on 07/02/1928.⁵⁴⁷ However, only the Representation of the People Act 1948 removed plural voting rights held by about 7% of the electorate. Hence, between 1929 and 1948 there were still severe deficits regarding equal participation in the United Kingdom. When the 1929 national elections did not lead to one party gaining the majority in parliament, the Labour Party formed a minority government with support from the Liberal Party, indicating that parliamentary work is still possible without an absolute majority. During the Second World War under the Churchill Government (05/10/1940 to 05/23/1945), even though the Conservative Party had a majority in parliament, it was considered more efficient to create “National Government” including the oppositional Labour Party and Liberal Party which indicates that in times of crises

⁵⁴⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_United_Kingdom

⁵⁴⁶ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, United Kingdom_R: 1

⁵⁴⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1929_United_Kingdom_general_election

compromise-oriented politics were favored against party politics.⁵⁴⁸ The Representation of the People Act 1969 reduced the voting age from 21 to 18. In the 1960s, Northern Ireland's unionist prime minister, Terence O'Neill, attempted reforms to grant Catholics a greater political voice. On 10/05/1968, a march organized by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) in Derry sparked the onset of the Northern Ireland Conflict, also known as "The Troubles". This period saw escalating violence between nationalists (predominantly Catholic republicans) seeking Irish reunification and unionist (mostly Protestant loyalists) desiring to remain part of the United Kingdom. Consequently, British authorities suspended Northern Ireland's parliament and implemented direct rule. In the 1990s, the Irish Republican Army's failure to gain widespread public support or achieve their goal of British withdrawal led to negotiations that resulted in the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (Belfast Agreement) on 04/10/1998, establishing a power-sharing arrangement within the Northern Ireland Assembly.⁵⁴⁹ The holding of referendums in Scotland and Wales on 09/11/1997 and 09/18/1997, respectively, resulted in the passage of the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 1998, establishing the devolved Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales in 1999.⁵⁵⁰ Within the UK's system of devolution, Parliament has delegated varying levels of legislative authority to the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Welsh Assembly, and the Scottish Parliament, thereby enhancing the political representation of regional populations.⁵⁵¹ As of 2019, 529,902 British nationals (257,646 people in Crown Dependencies and 272,256 people in British Overseas Territories) are represented in local legislatures in their territories but not in the House of Commons unless they are residents in the United Kingdom.⁵⁵² The political system of the United Kingdom is a multi-party system in which elections are held regularly. The parliament is bicameral, consisting of the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The members of the House of Commons are directly elected to serve five-year terms. The ceremonial head of state is the monarch. Although the government upholds strong safeguards for political rights and civil liberties, there have been growing concerns regarding government surveillance of residents, as well as an increase in Islamophobia.⁵⁵³ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which

⁵⁴⁸ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, United Kingdom_V: 1

⁵⁴⁹ <https://www.britannica.com/event/The-Troubles-Northern-Ireland-history>

⁵⁵⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997_Welsh_devolution_referendum

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scottish_devolution

⁵⁵¹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2022>

⁵⁵² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

⁵⁵³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2023>

corresponds to our interpretation of free. Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI confirm that political liberties were present. However, in the time of World War II LIED scores their absence. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. Between 1931 and 1963, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Since 1964, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive. On 07/04/2024, general elections were held, marking the Labour Party's first victory in a general election since 2005 and ending the Conservative Party's fourteen-year tenure as the main governing party.⁵⁵⁴ Ever since the country's democratic transition the elections score constant competitiveness according to LIED. Since 1932 the elections reach a continuous cleanliness (V-Dem CEI). Moreover, freedom and fairness for the elections maintain (V-Dem EF&FI).

(Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Bagehot 1867, Fröhlich 1997, Garrard 2000, Jennings 1966, Kaiser 2002, McKibbin 2007, Rose/Munro 2010, Sturm 2009)

United States of America

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchy [Start: 07/04/1776]: On 07/04/1776 independence from Great Britain was declared and on 09/03/1783 Great Britain recognized the independence (Marshall 2021).⁵⁵⁵ Initially, most states allowed only white male adult property owners to vote, representing about 6% of the population. This period, therefore, cannot be considered fully democratic. The perception that the democratic regime started on 04/07/1776, as posited by MCM, is contentious, especially considering the minimal criteria for a democracy. The introduction of male suffrage at the national level in 1856 was a significant step, but it occurred in the shadow of prevalent slavery. The passage of the 13th Amendment by Congress on 01/31/1865, and its ratification on 12/06/1865, abolishing slavery, was a pivotal moment in American history. However, the reality of social and political equality was far from being

⁵⁵⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_Kingdom_general_election

⁵⁵⁵ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United_States_of_America_1992?lang=en

achieved. The 15th Amendment, ratified in 1870, granted suffrage to males regardless of skin color or ethnicity, including former slaves.⁵⁵⁶ The constitutional amendment provided explicit protection for the voting rights of Black Americans in both the North and the South. However, more robust versions of the amendment, advocated by Radical Republicans and Black Americans, which aimed to prohibit states from imposing nativity, property, or literacy tests, and grant the federal government complete control over rights, were rejected due to concerns about their ratification (Davidson 1992). Therefore, Black Americans faced systemic barriers to voting, particularly in the Southern states, through mechanisms like poll taxes, literacy tests, and other discriminatory practices.⁵⁵⁷ As a result in 1906, only two percent of Alabama's black population were registered, whereas 83 percent of white Alabamians were registered. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), founded in 1910, took the lead role in legal actions against discriminatory procedures (Davidson 1992). Overall, in the period 1900-1920 between 18.4 and 15.8 percentage of the overall population participated in the elections (Vanhanen 2019). Therefore, we classify the regime in this period as an electoral oligarchy. While the percentage is slightly above our criteria of 15 percent for a defective democracy the systemic character of discrimination of black people in the South resembling regulations of the Apartheid-regime in South Africa justifies in our view the classification as an electoral oligarchy. However, in a strict sense in this period the Northern States would be classified as defective democracy, the Southern States were electoral oligarchical autocracies. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1900 the country's elections are considered as competitive by LIED. V-Dem's CEI scores ambiguous cleanliness outcomes. V-Dem's EF&FI indicates the overall conditions as already free and fair between 1900 and 1916. The following two years they decreased to somewhat free and fair outcomes. Moreover, LIED considers that political liberties were absent for this time, whereas V-Dem's PCLI already indicates full political liberties, except between 1917 and 1918 when it indicated that political liberties were somewhat achieved. According to the LDI the United States are classified with a what we call not really outcomes. The decisive reason for the classification is the exclusivity of suffrage. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were

⁵⁵⁶ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_United_States_\(1865%E2%80%931917\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_United_States_(1865%E2%80%931917))

⁵⁵⁷ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_United_States_\(1865%E2%80%931917\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_United_States_(1865%E2%80%931917))

comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive.

11/02/1920 End Electoral Oligarchy/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, with the first presidential elections allowing female suffrage, the USA transitioned from an electoral oligarchy to a defective democracy.⁵⁵⁸ This change followed the ratification of the 19th Amendment on 08/18/1920, which granted women the right to vote, a significant step towards gender equality in voting rights. Despite this progress, full voting rights for Black Americans were not effectively established until the Voting Rights Act of 1965, signed into law on 08/06/1965 (Yang/Gaines 2008).⁵⁵⁹ Throughout the 20th century, segregation and racial discrimination, particularly in the Southern states, continued to pose significant challenges to American democracy. The enforcement of Jim Crow laws institutionalized racial segregation, undermining democratic ideals.⁵⁶⁰ In Texas for example Black Americans were kept from party membership. Therefore, being white was necessary to take part in the Democratic primary. This was only overturned by the Supreme Court in *Smith v. Allwright* in 1944. In 1940 black voters in the South stood at only three percent of voting-age Black Americans. In 1957 the percentage had increased to 25 of voting-age blacks. Among whites, however, it was 60%. Besides poll tax, the most effective barrier to keep blacks from voting was literacy tests. In 1944 literacy tests were operative in all Southern States except from Arkansas and Texas (Davidson 1992).⁵⁶¹ Even if it had been administered fairly, the system would have still marginalized many black individuals due to disparities in education. However, white registrars often exercised arbitrary judgment in administering the test, allowing illiterate whites to vote while excluding literate blacks.(Davidson 1992). Although the number of registered Black Americans had doubled between 1952 and 1964 (up to 43.3 percentage), in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and South Carolina the average registration was only at 22.5 percent of voting-age Black Americans. In Mississippi it stood only at 6.7 percentage (Davidson 1992). Robert A. Dahl notes that the United States of America was less inclusive than all other polyarchies, with the exception of Switzerland, despite the introduction of universal male and female suffrage. For in no other polyarchy was a group of comparable size excluded. “It would not be entirely unreasonable to define polyarchy as requiring a degree of inclusiveness greater than that met by the United States, in which case this country would have to be classified as near polyarchy” (Dahl 1971: 29). Therefore, the United States of America still do not fulfill the requirements to be classified as full democracy even

⁵⁵⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1920_United_States_presidential_election

⁵⁵⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

⁵⁶⁰ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_United_States_\(1865%E2%80%931917\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_United_States_(1865%E2%80%931917))

⁵⁶¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smith_v._Allwright

though de jure universal male and female suffrage had been granted. Like in the previous period, in a strict sense the Northern States and the Southern states would have to be classified differently. The former as defective democratic and the latter as an electoral hybrid regime. However, it must also be noted that the repressive system of the Southern states was also supported by an agreement with the most important political class in the North not to interfere in the affairs of the Southern states (Dahl 1971: 93-94). Overall, the de facto restrictions on the black population were so severe until 1965 that we classify the period as a clear case of a defective democracy. However, constitutional succession was upheld, even during major political crisis like the Second-World-War-era or extraordinary events like presidential death, for example the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1945 who was succeeded by his Vice President Harry Truman, or the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963, who was succeeded by his Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson. The presidential power alternated between the two major political parties, underscoring the competitive character of the national elections. In the thirties, the Democratic Party found major support in the southern states; from the thirties onward, the support base shifted to northeastern and midwestern regions, specifically in lower and working class communities, organized labor, Catholics and Jewish and Black Americans in urban areas.⁵⁶² Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED considers that political liberties were absent until 1964. Nevertheless, according to V-Dem's PCLI the country guaranteed political rights except in 1945 somewhat political liberties were achieved. During this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive. Relating to the election process, the scores remain on moderate cleanliness until 1939. For the entire time the elections held, were competitive per LIED. Between 1920 and 1939 the elections score ambiguous cleanliness (V-Dem CEI). From 1940 to 1965 somewhat cleanliness is scored. However, the overall election conditions maintained freedom and fairness during this period, following V-Dem's EF&FI. Nevertheless, the LDI confirms the state of a deeply defective democracy.

08/06/1965 End Defective Democracy/Start Liberal Democracy: On this date the Voting Rights Act of 1965, was signed into law.⁵⁶³ This act was designed to overcome legal barriers at state and local levels that prevented African Americans from exercising their right to vote as guaranteed

⁵⁶² <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, United States of America_R: 1, United States of America_V: 1

⁵⁶³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

under the 15th Amendment and therefore marks the transition from a defective to a liberal democracy.⁵⁶⁴ Following the 1972 Watergate scandal, Richard Nixon was the first president in U.S. history to resign from office on 08/09/1974.⁵⁶⁵ His successor Gerald Ford then granted an unconditional pardon to Nixon on 09/08/1974, for any crimes he may have committed against the United States.⁵⁶⁶ On 12/08/1987, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, banning nuclear and conventional intermediate- and short-range missiles for the U.S. and USSR. The treaty was ratified on 06/01/1988.⁵⁶⁷ Entering the 21st century, the American democratic system faced new challenges. The 2000 presidential election raised concerns about election integrity and judicial involvement in electoral processes. These issues highlighted the complexities and vulnerabilities in the U.S. electoral system.⁵⁶⁸ The terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001 prompted the subsequent War on Terror and the expansion of domestic surveillance, through measures such as the PATRIOT Act.⁵⁶⁹ In 2008, Barack Obama became the first Black president of the U.S.⁵⁷⁰ The presidency of Donald Trump from 2017 to 2021 brought additional challenges to democratic norms in the U.S., including claims of foreign interference in the 2016 election and unprecedented challenges to the electoral process. On 01/06/2021, supporters of then-U.S. President Donald Trump stormed the United States Capitol in an attempt to prevent the certification of President-elect Joe Biden's victory. Despite their efforts, the attack did not succeed in overturning the election results. An investigation by a bipartisan House select committee determined that the incident was part of a larger plan by Trump to overturn the election.⁵⁷¹ These events underscored vulnerabilities in the American democratic system, igniting debates about electoral integrity, media influence, and the role of political institutions. While there are strong safeguards for civil liberties and a robust system of checks and balances in the U.S., there is a growing concern with regards to political extremism and the erosion of democratic institutions.⁵⁷² However, the presidential power in this regime period continued to alternate, underscoring the competitive character of the national elections.⁵⁷³ The 2024 American general election on 11/05/2024 resulted in a Republican trifecta, with Donald

⁵⁶⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_the_United_States

⁵⁶⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Nixon%27s_resignation_speech

⁵⁶⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pardon_of_Richard_Nixon

⁵⁶⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intermediate-Range_Nuclear_Forces_Treaty

⁵⁶⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_the_United_States

⁵⁶⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11_attacks

⁵⁷⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_Barack_Obama

⁵⁷¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/January_6_United_States_Capitol_attack

⁵⁷² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024>

⁵⁷³ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, United States of America_R: 1, United States of America_V: 1

Trump defeating Kamala Harris for the presidency and the party securing control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The election followed a tumultuous cycle marked by the unprecedented withdrawal of an incumbent president, Joe Biden, and a high-profile assassination attempt on Trump. Key issues driving the vote included the state of the economy, border security/immigration, and deep divisions over abortion rights and the future of American democracy.⁵⁷⁴ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. As per FH's classification for this regime period, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. However, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI score a constant presence of political liberties since 1965. Since its classification as a democracy, the country has consistently scored high on electoral competitiveness (LIED) and election cleanliness (V-Dem's CEI). Elections were free and fair according to V-Dem's EF&FI from 1965 to 1971, with a slight decline in 1972-1973. From 1974 to 1999, and from 2002 to 2015, elections again scored well on freedom and fairness, with brief dips in 2000-2001 and 2016-2017. Since 2018, the indicators show that elections have remained free and fair. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

01/20/2025 End Liberal Democracy/Start Defective Democracy: On his first day in office, President Trump pardoned all individuals who had been involved in the storming of the Capitol on 01/06/2024 and were either awaiting trial or had already been convicted. Nearly 1,600 people were pardoned, including 170 individuals who had already been convicted for the use of deadly weapons.⁵⁷⁵ Furthermore, on the same day, he also signed 26 Executive Orders. These include executive Orders 14149 and 14151, both of which aim to dismantle key elements of liberal democratic governance. Executive Order 14149, titled "Restoring Freedom of Speech and Ending Federal Censorship," prohibits federal agencies from cooperating with social media platforms or other organizations to moderate or restrict lawful speech, effectively undermining government efforts to counter disinformation.⁵⁷⁶ Executive Order 14151, meanwhile, eliminates all Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility (DEIA) initiatives within federal institutions, removes related positions, and bans funding or references to DEIA programs in public institutions and cultural agencies.⁵⁷⁷ President Donald Trump's immigration policies have been

⁵⁷⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_elections

⁵⁷⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pardon_of_January_6_United_States_Capitol_attack_defendants

⁵⁷⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_14149

⁵⁷⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_14151

characterized by aggressive enforcement measures and a significant expansion of executive authority. Notably, on 01/20/2025, he signed Executive Order 14159, titled “Protecting The American People Against Invasion”, which authorized the expanded use of expedited removal procedures, effectively allowing for the deportation of individuals without a court hearing. The order also mandated the denial of federal funds to sanctuary jurisdictions and imposed civil and criminal penalties on immigrants who fail to register their status.⁵⁷⁸ These strict immigration measures sparked widespread unrest, particularly in Los Angeles, where protests erupted in response to mass deportations and aggressive enforcement raids. In reaction to the demonstrations, the Trump administration deployed the California National Guard alongside federal law enforcement personnel to quell the unrest, even though the state government opposed such a federalized intervention.⁵⁷⁹ Critics argue that this militarized response to civilian protests demonstrates an erosion of democratic norms, blurring the line between civil law enforcement and military action, and raising concerns about the centralization of executive power at the expense of local authority. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the findings of LIED. According to FH’s classification for this regime period, the country is considered free, with a score of 4, which we also interpret as free within our framework. However, V-Dem’s EFFI and CEI are both interpreted by us as indicators that a climate of high political coercion and sustained delegitimization of the electoral process has been institutionalized since the transfer of power. V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted as robust.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Lindner/Schultze 2005, Rodgers/Harrington 1985, Woll/Binstock 1984)

Uruguay

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [Start: 07/18/1830]: Uruguay’s Independence from the Empire of Brazil was declared on 08/05/1825 and Uruguay joined a union with the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata (current Argentina). The Treaty of Montevideo was signed on 08/27/1828, recognizing Uruguay's independence by Brazil. On 07/18/1830 the Constitution of

⁵⁷⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_14159

⁵⁷⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_deployment_of_federal_forces_in_the_United_States

1830 was approved.⁵⁸⁰ On 07/19/1870, Uruguay's independence was recognized by Spain. On 11/26/1901, parliamentary elections were held. Suffrage was limited to literate men. Voting was not secret, as voters had to sign their ballot paper.⁵⁸¹ In 1903 Batlle y Ordóñez won the presidency by a slim margin, sparking tensions with the opposing Blanco Party and triggering a civil war in 1904. Following the conflict, Batlle y Ordóñez and his supporters emerged triumphant in 1905, securing the Colorado Party's uncontested authority. In 1905, he conducted fair presidential and legislative elections, which he and his party secured. Upon completing his term in 1907, he willingly relinquished the presidency, although he remained involved in selecting his party's next presidential nominee.⁵⁸² The parliamentary elections on 11/09/1910 were the first after introducing the "double simultaneous vote" or "Lema Law", whereby all representative organs (president, chamber of deputies, senate) were elected with one single ballot and vote. This electoral system made it difficult for new parties to attain lema (or party) status and promoted the vote for the Colorados and Blancos, the two traditional parties in Uruguay (Nohlen 2005). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Elections are acknowledged as competitive since 1903 (LIED). V-Dem's CEI indicates an ambiguous cleanliness of elections from 1900 to 1904 and indicates that between 1905 and 1915 the elections were not really clean. In 1916 they scored ambiguous cleanliness. From 1917 to 1919 somewhat cleanliness is attained. V-Dem's EF&FI indicates the overall election conditions as somewhat free and fair until 1906. The following two years the elections conditions were ambiguous. In 1910 the elections returned to being somewhat free and fair for three years. Between 1913 and 1915 the outcomes were ambiguous again. Since 1916, the elections are considered as free and fair. However, according to LIED, political liberties were absent for the entire period. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI already scores full political liberties. According to Polity5, from 1900 to 1903, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1904 to 1909, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1910 to 1918, the executive's constraints were categorized as Intermediate Category 2, between slight and substantial limitations. In 1919, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

⁵⁸⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Uruguay

⁵⁸¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1901_Uruguayan_parliamentary_election

⁵⁸² <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jose-Batlle-y-Ordonez>

11/25/1917 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start (Male) Defective Democracy: On this date, a referendum was held approving the second Constitution of Uruguay, thus, for our regime change events, we code a strategic restructuring for this day.⁵⁸³ On 11/27/1919 the first parliamentary elections with universal male suffrage took place after male suffrage was introduced with the 1918 Uruguayan Constitution. In the same year, the financial requirements for candidacy for the president, the senate, or the chamber of representatives were abolished (Nohlen 2005). On 12/16/1932, female suffrage was introduced.⁵⁸⁴ Gabriel Terra had been elected president in 1930, a position that did not offer much authority. Executive power rested with the nine person Consejo Nacional de Administracion, CNA). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During the entire period the elections were competitive (LIED). Still, V-Dem's CEI indicates somewhat cleanliness from 1919 to 1924, before cleanliness was scored the following year. Since 1919, the country's elections were free and fair according to V-Dem's EF&FI. LIED remained its absent score regarding the political liberties. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI still indicates full political liberties until 1933, when it indicates an ambiguous state.⁵⁸⁵ As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

03/31/1933 End (Male) Defective Democracy/Start Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: On this day, Terra orchestrated an autogolpe with the backing of the National Police, under the leadership of Baldomir Ferrari, and the Armed Forces, leading to the dissolution of the CNA. Terra's regime implemented press censorship and cracked down on opposition factions (Casey et al. 2020: 17, Finch 1991: 197-99).⁵⁸⁶ On 04/19/1934, the third constitution of Uruguay was adopted in a referendum, which abolished the colegiado (nine-member executive), reinstated a presidential system, and introduced universal adult suffrage. In the same year, the Electoral Court gained constitutional status (Nohlen 2005). According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty, which contradicts our observations that they were multiparty. During this time the held elections were not considered as competitive per LIED. However, the elections can be interpreted as somewhat clean from 1934 to 1938 according to V-Dem's CEI. We would argue that in this case the expert judgements by V-Dem are wrong

⁵⁸³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Uruguay_of_1918

⁵⁸⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

⁵⁸⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage_in_Uruguay

⁵⁸⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gabriel_Terra

and we side with LIED and the qualitative judgements in the literature. Regarding the political liberties, LIED underlines they were not present. V-Dem's PCLI considers political liberties to be ambiguous for this regime period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Since 1935, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

06/19/1938 End Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: On 06/19/1938, Terra was defeated in the election and subsequently stepped down (Casey et al. 2020: 17, Finch 1991: 200). This was the first election in which women participated. Terras brother-in-law, General Alfredo Baldomir, was elected to the presidency in these general elections until 03/01/1943.⁵⁸⁷ Pressured by opposition, organized labor and National Party, Baldomir advocated free elections, freedom of the press, and a new constitution.⁵⁸⁸ On 11/29/1942 Baldomir dissolved the General Assembly and established the Council of State (Consejo de Estado), consisting of Batllists and other members of the Colorado Party.⁵⁸⁹ The new constitution of 1942 made it possible for political parties to act freely.⁵⁹⁰ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1938, the elections were competitive again, according to LIED. V-Dem's CEI indicates a somewhat cleanliness. In addition, the overall conditions were still classified as somewhat free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). This regime period is classified as a defective democracy as it marks the end of the autocratic Terra Era and is characterized by enhancements in the guarantee of democratic principles. Political liberties remained absent according to LIED except between 1944 and 1958 they were present. V-Dem's PCLI outcomes switched to somewhat political liberties until 1941. V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present until 1967. V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as somewhat present until 1970, in an ambiguous state for 1971-1972, and not really present for 1973. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. The general elections on 11/29/1942 saw Amézaga from the Colorado Party emerge as winner. He became president on 03/01/1943.⁵⁹¹ He restored civil liberties and promoted economic

⁵⁸⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfredo_Baldomir

⁵⁸⁸ <https://countrystudies.us/uruguay/15.htm>

⁵⁸⁹ <https://countrystudies.us/uruguay/15.htm>

⁵⁹⁰ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Uruguay/The-struggle-for-national-identity>

⁵⁹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1942_Uruguayan_general_election

development and the welfare state.⁵⁹² The slogan “There’s no place like Uruguay” is characteristic for this period.⁵⁹³ In 1946 general elections took place. Tomás Berreta was elected and took office on 03/01/1947.⁵⁹⁴ After his death in August 1947 his vice president Luis Battle Berres took office.⁵⁹⁵ The constitution of 1952 promulgated a system of collective presidency, called National Council of Government.⁵⁹⁶ It remained in place until 1966, when a new constitution reinstated the presidential system.⁵⁹⁷ The National Council of Government (Spanish: Consejo Nacional de Gobierno) was the ruling body in Uruguay between 1952 and 1967. It consisted of nine members, of which six were from the party that received the most votes in general elections, and three from the runner-up party.⁵⁹⁸ However, due to its poor performance the body was abolished through a referendum on 11/27/1966 and Diego Gestido elected president. On 02/15/1967, the presidential system was reestablished through the adoption of a new constitution.⁵⁹⁹ Since the democratic transition the elections score competitiveness for the entire time (LIED). The elections are classified as clean by V-Dem’s CEI, and the overall election conditions are free and fair during this period. Based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power from 1942 to 1951. From 1952 to 1967, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. Until 1942, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Between 1943 and 1949 and from 1968 to 1972, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For the remaining years, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. On 12/06/1967, Vice President Jorge Pacheco Areco succeeded President Diego Gestido, who had passed away six months after taking office. Pacheco implemented repressive measures, including banning the Socialist Party, suppressing leftist organizations, and cracking down on labor unions. His repressive politics and high inflation contributed to the emergence of the left-wing Tupamamros guerrilla group, initiating armed resistance against the political system in Uruguay (Nohlen 2005). Consequently, Pacheco declared a state of

⁵⁹² <https://countrystudies.us/uruguay/16.htm>

⁵⁹³ <https://countrystudies.us/uruguay/16.htm>

⁵⁹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946_Uruguayan_general_election

⁵⁹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tom%C3%A1s_Berreta

⁵⁹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Uruguay_of_1952;

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Council_of_Government_\(Uruguay\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Council_of_Government_(Uruguay))

⁵⁹⁷ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Uruguay/The-military-regime>

⁵⁹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1954_Uruguayan_general_election

⁵⁹⁹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Council_of_Government_\(Uruguay\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Council_of_Government_(Uruguay))

emergency on 06/13/1968, and the armed forces created the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Junta de Comandantes en Jefe y el Estado Mayor Conjunto), who were granted complete independence from the Ministry of Defense.⁶⁰⁰ On 11/28/1971, Juan María Bordaberry Arocena was elected constitutional president.⁶⁰¹ He began his presidency while institutional crisis occurred caused by authoritarian figures and terrorist threats.⁶⁰² Bordaberry augmented the authority structures established by his predecessor, implementing measures such as the suspension of civil liberties, the prohibition of labor unions, and the detention and elimination of opposition figures.⁶⁰³ On 04/15/1972, the legislative body consented to proclaiming a "state of internal war" in reaction to the Tupamaro guerrillas. This declaration curtailed civil liberties, permitted civilians to be judged in military tribunals, and authorized the military to establish detention facilities for individuals charged with political offenses (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 104). Per FH, for 1972, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. LIED considers the elections as competitive. According to V-Dem's CEI, the elections remained clean until 1972. Moreover, the elections were still free and fair up to the year 1970 before they are classified as somewhat free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks from 1967 to 1970. There is no data by Polity5 for the years 1971 and 1972.

06/27/1973 End Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: Upset over the appointment of a civilian defense minister, the investigation of claims of torture against military officers of the legislature, and the course of the war against the leftist insurgency the armed forces threatened a coup. In February 1973, succumbing to military pressure, the elected president acquiesced to establishing a National Security Council (Cosenza). This council comprised the commanders of the three military branches, an extra officer, and the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Economy, and Foreign Affairs, along with the president. Its role was to provide advice on policy, essentially formalizing the informal veto power held by the military (GWF Codebook: 104-105). On 06/27/1973, President Juan María Bordaberry launched with the military a coup against the other civilian power entities including the legislature and the constitution itself. He ruled by decree and by the military-based National Security Council advisory board. The coup was legitimized by the official explanation that it was necessary to crush a Marxist guerrilla group (Tupamaros) (Kaufman 1979: 113-15, Weinstein 1988: 44-50, Jacob/Weinstein 1992, Arceneaux 2001: 185-88). Real power was held by the Junta de Oficiales Generales, made up 18-28 top officers

⁶⁰⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civic-military_dictatorship_of_Uruguay

⁶⁰¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juan_Mar%C3%ADA_Bordaberry

⁶⁰² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juan_Mar%C3%ADA_Bordaberry

⁶⁰³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juan_Mar%C3%ADA_Bordaberry

from the three services, which "dominated critical military and government policy decisions" and the Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, the junta of service commanders (Arceneaux 2001: 190, Weinstein 1988: 50, Gillespie 1984: 99). According to LIED, only executive elections were held until 1975, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No legislative elections were present. On 06/12/1976 Bordaberry, who wanted to reform the government into a corporatist system, was dismissed by the military. On 11/30/1980, the military government held a constitutional referendum to legitimize its power, which was rejected by the population. In 1982, the military government allowed the Colorados, the Blancos, and the Unión Cívica to choose new leaders through primary elections. The result confirmed the decline in the military's support and the strengthening of opposition forces within the traditional parties (Nohlen 2005). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held since 1976. Per FH's evaluation for 1973-1975, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH for 1977-1979, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. According to FH, for the rest of the regime period under consideration, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, from 1973 to 1977, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1978 onward, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

08/03/1984 End Military Autocracy/Start Liberal Democracy: In 1984, the military entered formal negotiations with a coalition of center and left parties, resulting in an agreement to hold competitive elections and return power to civilian government (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 67). The negotiations were formalized in the Naval Club Pact, which was agreed upon on 08/03/1984.⁶⁰⁴ Free and fair general elections on 11/25/1984 led to a democratically elected government. Julio María Sanguinetti from the Colorado Party won the presidency and served as president from 03/01/1985 to 01/03/1990. Luis Alberto Lacalle from the National Party served as president from 03/01/1990 to 03/01/1995. Sanguinetti won another presidential term from 03/01/1995 to 03/01/2000. A constitutional referendum passed on 12/08/1996 now limits each party to a single presidential candidate.⁶⁰⁵ Additionally, reforms

⁶⁰⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Club_Pact

⁶⁰⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Uruguayan_constitutional_referendum

introduced a majoritarian two-round system for the presidential election, with candidates required to reach 50% of the vote to win in the first round, or alternatively win the popular vote in a second round against the second-place candidate.⁶⁰⁶ Under these new conditions, Jorge Luis Batlle Ibanez won the runoff to the presidential elections in 11/1999 and served as president from 03/01/2000 to 03/01/2005. On 10/31/2004 a referendum passed amending the constitution to include a statement that access to water and sanitation were human rights.⁶⁰⁷ José Mujica from the political coalition Broad Front took the presidential office from 03/01/2010 to 03/01/2015. The Broad Front continued to hold the presidential office following the next election cycle, with Tabaré Vázquez in office from 03/01/2015 to 03/01/2020.⁶⁰⁸ Uruguay is, for instance, by the EIU rated as a "full democracy" in 2019. Uruguay operates as a presidential democracy with a bicameral legislature. The political landscape is characterized by a multiparty system.⁶⁰⁹ Uruguay possesses a robust historical framework for democratic governance and has consistently demonstrated a commitment to preserving political freedoms and civil liberties while actively promoting social inclusivity. Despite legal equality for all citizens, discrepancies persist in the treatment and political representation of women and the Indigenous community.⁶¹⁰ According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Therefore, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI acknowledge the presence of political liberties since 1985. On 10/27/2019 general elections took place to elect the President and the General Assembly. Following an absence of a majority winner in the initial voting round, a runoff election was conducted on 11/24/2019. The final vote counts confirmed Lacalle Pou (National Party) as the victor over Martinez (Broad Front). The elections represented the Broad Front's first defeat in a presidential election since 1999.⁶¹¹ General elections were held on 10/27/2024. With incumbent President Luis Lacalle Pou constitutionally barred from seeking immediate re-election, the first round saw the left-wing Broad Front (Frente Amplio) secure the largest share of votes and gain control of the legislature. As no presidential candidate achieved an absolute majority, a runoff was triggered between the Broad Front's Yamandú Orsi and the Republican Coalition's Álvaro Delgado. In the final vote on 11/24/2024, Yamandú Orsi successfully defeated Delgado with 52.00% of the vote. This outcome marked the

⁶⁰⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_Uruguayan_general_election

⁶⁰⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_Uruguayan_constitutional_referendum

⁶⁰⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Uruguay#Recent_history

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Uruguay#:~:text=The%20politics%20of%20Uruguay%20abide,as%20a%20multiform%20party%20system

⁶¹⁰ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/uruguay/freedom-world/2023>

⁶¹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Uruguayan_general_election

return of the Broad Front to the presidency, ending five years of center-right government and signaling a shift in the country's political direction.⁶¹²Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Ever since 1985 elections score competitiveness (LIED). Moreover, V-Dem's CEI indicates electoral cleanliness for the entire time and the elections are free and fair according to V-Dem's EF&FI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. Until 1986, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Fitzgibbon 1948, Collier/Collier 2002, Finch 1989, Fitzgibbon 1954, Gillespie/González 1999, González/Gillespie 1994, Taylor 1951, Taylor 1952, Taylor 1984, Wagner 2006, Weinstein 1975, Weinstein 1993)

Uzbekistan

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Russia, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 06/15/1865]: Tashkent was conquered in 1865 and fell under the control of the Russian Empire.⁶¹³ With the annexation of Kokand in 1876, all of present-day Uzbekistan became part of the Russian Empire.⁶¹⁴ At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Russian Empire exerted full dominion over Central Asia. The region of Uzbekistan was partitioned into three distinct political entities: the khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, and the Governorate General (Guberniya) of Turkestan, with the latter being directly governed by the Russian Ministry of War.⁶¹⁵ In this period V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent.

11/07/1917 Continuation as Part of Other Country [Russia, Communist Ideocracy]: On 11/07/1917, following the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR) was proclaimed, replacing the Russian Empire.⁶¹⁶ Uzbekistan, then a territorial part of the empire,

⁶¹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Uruguayan_general_election

⁶¹³ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Tashkent>

⁶¹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Uzbekistan

⁶¹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Uzbekistan#Entering_the_twentieth_century

⁶¹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Soviet_Federative_Socialist_Republic

remained under the new communist regime structure. This event constitutes a change in reference country rather than an independent regime change within Uzbekistan. The overarching regime type shifted from an autocratic monarchy to a communist ideocracy. The Russian Revolution of 1917 created instability and conflict in Turkistan. In response, Muslims held a National Congress in Kokand and formed an autonomous government led by Mustafa Chokayev. However, in February 1918, Red Army forces from Tashkent dissolved the government, leading to the Basmachi (Qorbashi) Revolt.⁶¹⁷ On 10/08/1920 the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic was proclaimed on, the territory of which was mostly in Uzbekistan with parts in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Also the Turkestan ASSR, an autonomous republic of the RFSR included territories of present-day Uzbekistan (Fedorenko 2015: 3).⁶¹⁸ From 1900 to 1920, PCLI (V-Dem) considers political liberties to be absent. There is no data from 1921 onwards. LIED does not include Uzbekistan in its data before 1989. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

12/28/1922 Continuation Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]: With the establishment of the USSR, Uzbekistan became a part of the Soviet Union.⁶¹⁹ On 10/27/1924 the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic was created, which included present-day Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Fedorenko 2015: 3).⁶²⁰ In 1929, the Tajik and Uzbek Soviet socialist republics underwent a division, becoming distinct entities.⁶²¹ Uzbekistan was governed by the Uzbek branch of the Soviet Communist Party, with the First Secretary of the Central Committee as the head of the party and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet as the head of state. Universal suffrage was introduced in 1938.⁶²² The natural resources of Uzbekistan, such as gas reserves, oil, minerals, and gold, were important to its economy and to the Soviet economy.⁶²³ Extensive Russification accompanied policies of forced cotton monoculture, turning the republic into a main supplier of the USSR's cotton. Soviet authorities exploited regional and clan divisions to prevent the re-emergence of any independent political or ethnic unity.⁶²⁴ Uzbekistan was also affected by the Great Purge, from 08/19/1936 to 11/17/1939, which saw intellectuals,

⁶¹⁷ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Uzbekistan/Russian-and-Soviet-rule>

⁶¹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkestan_Autonomous_Soviet_Socialist_Republic

⁶¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union#Treaty_on_the_Creation_of_the_USSR

⁶²⁰ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uzbekistan#History>

⁶²¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Uzbekistan#The_Stalinist_period

⁶²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

⁶²³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uzbek_Soviet_Socialist_Republic

⁶²⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Uzbekistan

“nationalists”, and Uzbeks in government positions expelled, deported, or executed.⁶²⁵ In an attempt to restrengthen their control over Uzbekistan, Moscow announced in 1986 that the entire party and government leadership had been involved in corruption. This was then followed by another purge. Sentiments of betrayal by the government caused by this affair lead to a resurgence of nationalism among Uzbeks.⁶²⁶

There is no data on political liberties from LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI, except for 1989, when LIED considers them absent, and 1990, when PCLI classifies them as not really present.

06/20/1990 End Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy: The Uzbek SSR adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty within its borders and therefore was a sovereign part of the USSR with its own legislation from 1990-1991, under the control of Karimov, the communist leader during Soviet rule.⁶²⁷ Despite the 1992 constitution's acknowledgment of multiparty democracy, Uzbekistan functioned as a de facto one-party system.⁶²⁸ Opposition parties like the nationalist Unity (Birlik) movement and the more moderate Erk faced continuous persecution, eventually being banned outright. There is a notable absence of genuine organized political opposition, and none of the parties can be seen as actively opposing the president. In fact, all five registered parties express support for the president's policies and, as a whole, do not present alternative plans or actions distinct from his agenda (OSCE 2019). Simultaneously, the government promoted the creation of new parties aligned with its policies. It's worth noting that all pro-government parties and organizations mentioned were established with the president's explicit approval (Lansford 2021). Following President Karimov's demise, the parliament appointed Mirziyoyev as the acting president of Uzbekistan on 09/08/2016. In the – non-competitive – he secured a full five-year term as president representing the Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party (O'zLiDeP).⁶²⁹ Uzbekistan has seen some reforms under the leadership of Mirziyoyev. These reforms include easing some restrictions on media and political expression, improving relations with neighboring countries, and making the political environment slightly more open. Despite these changes, the political landscape remains heavily skewed in favor of the ruling party, with limited space for opposition. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) election observation mission found the 2021 presidential elections to be neither fair nor free, noting a lack of meaningful engagement among candidates and an absence

⁶²⁵ <https://scispace.com/pdf/soviet-use-of-corruption-purges-as-a-control-mechanism-the-13wrcbtidb.pdf>

⁶²⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Uzbekistan#The_Stalinist_period

⁶²⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uzbek_Soviet_Socialist_Republic

⁶²⁸ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Uzbekistan_2011?lang=en

⁶²⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shavkat_Mirziyoyev

of transparent electoral procedures.⁶³⁰ In June 2022 a flurry of constitutional amendments were released to the public which would allow president Mirziyoyev to run an additional two terms, which would be extended to 7 years, and give him a way to circumvent the term-limit all together.⁶³¹ Mass protests against these reforms were met with repression and violence, with nearly two civilians killed. The amendments were passed in a heavily marred referendum in 2023 with an alleged 90.2% positive vote. In May 2023 President Mirziyoyev called for snap elections under the new constitution, in which he was re-elected with reported 87% of the vote, in a non-competitive, free, or fair election.⁶³² Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since the country's independence LIED indicates the elections as not competitive. Furthermore, between 1990 and 1994 the elections score a not really cleanliness. From 1995 to 2016 there was no cleanliness at all. Since 2017 there is a switch back to not really cleanliness outcomes (V-Dem's CEI). For the first four years of independence the elections were not really free and fair. From 1994 to 2008 there was no freedom and fairness at all. Since 2009 the overall conditions returned to not really free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. In addition to that per LIED political liberties were constantly absent. V-Dem's PCLI indicates not really political liberties from 1991 to 1992 and since 2019. For the remaining years no political liberties were achieved. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Grotz 2001b)

Vanuatu

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as joint Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy and France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 10/16/1887]: Vanuatu was ruled by a joined

⁶³⁰ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/uzbekistan/freedom-world/2022>

⁶³¹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/uzbekistan/freedom-world/2023>

⁶³² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/uzbekistan/freedom-world/2024>

Anglo-French naval commission since 10/16/1887.⁶³³ In 1878, a 'mutual exclusiveness' policy led to an 1887 British-French naval commission. The 1906 Convention introduced the Condominium ('The Pandemonium'), revised in 1914, granting equal residency, protection, and trade rights to British and French nationals until independence (Corrin 1985). In 1975 Universal suffrage was introduced.⁶³⁴ LIED confirms that before 1975 no multiparty and legislative elections as well as no universal suffrage were present. According to LIED political liberties were absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as not really present until 1905, ambiguous from 1906 to 1969 and as somewhat present from 1970 onward. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are comprehensive. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. LIED only starts to provide data for Vanuatu in 1906.

11/05/1974 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy and France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy and France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, an agreement between France and Great Britain was reached on the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides. We therefore code this event as a voluntary exit. The Advisory Council was to be replaced by a representative assembly that was to be elected by universal suffrage.⁶³⁵ On 11/10/1975 general elections were held in which 29 of the 41 members were directly elected. The New Hebrides National Party won the elections with 54% of the votes.⁶³⁶ LIED confirms that since 1975 multiparty legislative elections were held. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and somewhat present according to V-Dem's PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive.

07/30/1980 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy and France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Defective Democracy [as independent country]: On this date Vanuatu achieved its planned independence, under the leadership of Prime Minister Walter Lini.⁶³⁷ As part of the transition, the Resident

⁶³³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Vanuatu

⁶³⁵ <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1974-11-12/debates/60b41a92-a997-4a5f-816f-241e7b36a0fd/NewHebrides>

⁶³⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1975_New_Hebridean_general_election

⁶³⁷ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Vanuatu_2013?lang=en

Commissioners were replaced by a ceremonial President. Following the withdrawal of Anglo-French forces in August, Lini requested assistance from troops in Papua New Guinea to address the Vemarana separatists led by Jimmy Stevens, which led to a brief conflict known as the 'Coconut War.' The Papua New Guinea forces swiftly suppressed the Vemarana uprising, and Stevens surrendered on 09/01, resulting in his subsequent imprisonment. Lini continued to serve as Prime Minister until 1991, leading a government predominantly composed of English-speaking individuals and winning both the 1983 and 1987 elections.⁶³⁸ Between 1983 and 1984 there were significant restrictions to the freedom of press, with most of the media being state owned and critical newspaper being shut down (Gastil 1984: 448, Gastil 1989: 478). In the first general elections on 11/02/1983 the Vanua'aku Pati, which was the ruling party, secured 24 seats, while the Union of Moderate Parties won 12 seats. Walter Lini, who belonged to the Vanua'aku Pati, retained his position as Prime Minister.⁶³⁹ Vanuatuan politics have experienced instability since the general election in 1991, characterized by a succession of divisive coalition governments and the frequent use of no confidence votes leading to frequent shifts in prime ministers. Nonetheless, Vanuatu has managed to uphold its democratic system.⁶⁴⁰ Vanuatu holds democratic elections but grapples with recurring unstable coalition governments. The 2025 snap general election was triggered by the dissolution of Parliament amid political instability and was later complicated by a severe earthquake. No single party secured a majority in the 52-seat Parliament, which led to Jotham Napat of the Leaders Party of Vanuatu being elected Prime Minister after forming a multi-party coalition government.⁶⁴¹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. However, the elections are classified as competitive by LIED. V-Dem's CEI declares the election as somewhat clean from 1980 to 1991. Between 1992 and 2008 ambiguous cleanliness is scored. 2009 to 2015 marks the return to somewhat cleanliness outcomes. Since 2016 the elections score cleanliness. Furthermore, between 1983 and 2007 the overall conditions scored somewhat freedom and fairness. Since 2008 the country's elections are free and fair according to V-Dem's EF&FI. Despite significant political corruption, the mostly independent judiciary has effectively held elected officials accountable in notable cases.⁶⁴² In 2023, the country saw three government transitions. As a result, the country reverted to a pattern of governmental instability. Prime Minister Ishmael Kalsakau was removed from office

⁶³⁸ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vanuatu#Independent_Vanuatu_\(1980%E2%80%93present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vanuatu#Independent_Vanuatu_(1980%E2%80%93present))

⁶³⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_Vanuatuan_general_election

⁶⁴⁰ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vanuatu#Independent_Vanuatu_\(1980%E2%80%93present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vanuatu#Independent_Vanuatu_(1980%E2%80%93present))

⁶⁴¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Vanuatuan_general_election

⁶⁴² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/vanuatu/freedom-world/2022>

following a no-confidence vote. Sato Kilman was elected as the new prime minister but was soon replaced by Charlot Salwai after another no-confidence vote.⁶⁴³ Per FH's scoring for 1980, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. While there is no FH data for 1981, 1982 is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. Per FH, for 1983 to 1988, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. As per FH's classification for the years 1989 to 1992, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. According to FH, for the rest of the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Moreover, Vanuatu guarantees full political liberties to its citizens since its independence (LIED, V-Dem's PCLI). For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Stöver 2001)

Venezuela

[officially known as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela]

01/01/1900 Military Autocracy [Start: 10/12/1899]: Venezuela gained its independence from Spain on 07/05/1811.⁶⁴⁴ Male suffrage was introduced in 1858. (PIPE) Venezuela became a military autocracy on 10/12/1899 under Cipriano Castro. Juan Vicente Gómez was vice president in this time. After Castro had to leave Venezuela due to health issues, Gómez became president with US support.⁶⁴⁵ From 12/19/1908 to 08/13/1913 Castros tried to overthrow Juan Vincente Gómez several times after his health had improved.⁶⁴⁶ These coups were not successful and Gómez was able to remain president of Venezuela.⁶⁴⁷ Gomez largely ruled indirectly eliminating free press and opposition until his death on 12/17/1935. Following the death of the president, the Council of Ministers appointed Minister of War Eleazar Lopez Contreras as provisional president, pending confirmation by a compliant Congress on 01/02/1936. His inauguration was met with protests, which were swiftly suppressed, and all forms of "open political activity" were

⁶⁴³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/vanuatu/freedom-world/2024>

⁶⁴⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venezuelan_independence

⁶⁴⁵ <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Juan-Vicente-Gomez>

⁶⁴⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juan_Vicente_G%C3%B3mez

⁶⁴⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cipriano_Castro

outlawed in 1937. In 1941, Minister of War General Isaias Medina Angarita assumed the presidency after Lopez (Deas 1986: 676-78, Ewell 1991: 727, 732-33, Casey et al. 2020: 17). Political liberties were absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI indicates political liberties as absent until 1935, as not really present from 1936 to 1940, in an ambiguous state from 1942 to 1944 and as somewhat present for 1945. According to LIED, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1900. From 1901 to 1913, executive and legislative elections were held, yet they were not classified as multiparty. From 1914 onward, LIED records only legislative elections, which were not multiparty. No executive elections were held during this specified period. From 1922 onward, both executive and legislative elections were conducted, yet they were not classified as multiparty. From 1936 to 1944, LIED records multiparty executive and legislative elections. Until 1935, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. From 1936 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

10/18/1945 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Medina Angarita was deposed and Rómulo Betancourt seized power in a junta (Lachapelle et al. 2020: 17, Ewell 1991: 742). In 1946 Female suffrage was introduced.⁶⁴⁸ Polity5 doesn't provide a classification until 1935. From 1936 onward, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. In the specified timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties are somewhat present.

10/27/1946 End Military Autocracy/Start (Male) Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, Constituent Assembly elections were held in Venezuela, following a coup the year before which launched El Trienio Adeco. The result was a victory for Democratic Action, which won 137 of the 160 seats in the Assembly. Voter turnout was 86.6%.⁶⁴⁹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1947, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The election was considered competitive by LIED. However, no cleanliness was scored according to V-Dem's CEI. Nevertheless, the overall conditions were free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). Besides, LIED classifies the political liberties as absent, but V-Dem's PCLI points out

⁶⁴⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

⁶⁴⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946_Venezuelan_Constituent_Assembly_election

that they are somewhat present. On 07/05/1947 a new constitution was ratified. Regarded as the nation's first genuinely democratic constitution, it introduced direct and universally free elections. Notably, it was the first Venezuelan constitution to grant women's suffrage, along with extending voting rights to illiterate individuals and all citizens aged 18 and above.⁶⁵⁰ For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time.

12/14/1947 Continuation Electoral Hybrid Regime: On 12/14/1947 presidential elections with universal suffrage were held, which were considered free and fair. It was won by Rómulo Gallegos of Democratic Action and therefore saw Democratic Action formally elected to office.⁶⁵¹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1947, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED indicates the elections as competitive. They scored somewhat cleanliness for this year (V-Dem CEI). According to V-Dem's EF&FI the elections were free and fair. Political liberties were absent according to LIED, and V-Dem's PCLI changed to an ambiguous score. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

11/24/1948 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: President Rómulo Gallegos reduced military influence in the government and signed a polarizing land reform. The loss of influence of the military was the motivation behind a military coup led by Leutnant Coloel Delgado Chalbaud and Leutnant Colonel Perez Jimenez⁶⁵², that ousted the elected government of president Gallegos, suspended the constitution and Congress, and installed a military ruling group (Burggraaff 1972: 101-9, 115, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 105).⁶⁵³ From 1948 to 1950 Chalbaud headed the junta. In 1950 Pérez Jiménez achieved de facto control. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI until 1958, when the PCLI switched into a range that, in our interpretation, indicates that political liberties were somewhat present. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. Until 1949, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial

⁶⁵⁰ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Venezuela_\(1947\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Venezuela_(1947))

⁶⁵¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1947_Venezuelan_general_election

⁶⁵² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marcos_P%C3%A9rez_Jim%C3%A9nez

⁶⁵³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Venezuelan_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. From 1950 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held from 1949 to 1951. Thereafter only legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No executive elections were present.

01/23/1958 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Autocratic (Military) Transitional Regime: Marcos Pérez Jiménez resigned and fled the country in response to weeks of massive demonstrations by several sectors of society that caused the military to abandon him (Trinkunas 2000: 89). A military transitional government agreed to include civilian political leaders in an interim government and began plans to restore democracy (Taylor 1968: 52-60, Burggraaff 1972: 154-166, Coronil 1997: 65-66, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 105).⁶⁵⁴

12/07/1958 End Non-Electoral Autocratic (Military) Transitional Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, free and fair general elections were held.⁶⁵⁵ Following the fall of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship in 1958, Venezuela entered a period of electoral democracy underpinned by universal suffrage, elite pacts, and regular elections. Suffrage was inclusive from the outset and remained stable throughout the period. Reforms in 1989 decentralized the system by introducing direct elections of governors and mayors (Ellner 2003), while the 1999 constitution under Chávez expanded participatory mechanisms such as referenda, including the 2004 recall vote. Although these instruments promised deepened democracy, their use remained largely executive-driven. Political competition from 1958 through the 1980s was framed by the Punto Fijo Pact, which ensured power alternation between Acción Democrática (AD) and COPEI while excluding radical actors like the Communist Party (Karl 1987). This system, often termed “partyarchy” (Coppedge 1994), ensured regime stability but constrained pluralism. By the 1990s, economic crisis and corruption scandals discredited the traditional parties, culminating in the collapse of the party system and the rise of Hugo Chávez in 1998 (Morgan 2011). While elections continued under Chávez, the field became increasingly uncompetitive. The opposition’s boycott of the 2005 parliamentary election handed the government full control, effectively ending meaningful institutional contestation. Executive constraints initially relied on a mix of constitutional checks and informal power-sharing within dominant parties. Though the 1961 constitution formalized horizontal accountability, presidential power remained strong. Episodes

⁶⁵⁴ <https://choosedemocracy.us/case-study-venezuela-january-1958/#.Y480uH2ZMuU>

⁶⁵⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1958_Venezuelan_general_election

like Caldera's 1994 suspension of constitutional rights revealed the fragility of institutional checks in times of crisis. Under Chávez, constitutional reform in 1999 centralized authority further, abolishing the bicameral legislature and expanding presidential powers. By 2005, judicial and electoral institutions were effectively subordinated to the executive (Corrales/Penfold 2007). Civil and political rights were comparatively robust during the early democratic period. Venezuela became a haven for exiles, and freedoms of expression, association, and the press were largely respected. However, state repression during guerrilla conflicts in the 1960s and the violent suppression of protests during the 1989 Caracazo revealed the limits of rights protections. Under Chávez, despite formal guarantees, freedoms were curtailed through legalism: the 2004 media law, politicization of the judiciary, and blacklisting of referendum petitioners signaled the shift toward a hybrid regime (Corrales 2015, Hawkins 2016). In sum, Venezuela's post-1958 democracy was initially inclusive and stable but increasingly hollowed out through party system decay and executive overreach, culminating in the erosion of electoral competitiveness and institutional autonomy by 2005. On 04/12/2002 military and businessmen plotted a coup to evict Chavez during ongoing protests against controversial bills concerning oil and land reform. Opposition leader Pedro Carmona seized the interim presidency and declared the constitution and legislature suspended.⁶⁵⁶ On 04/13/2002 a pro-Chavez street movement and sectors of the military peacefully evicted the coup plotters less than 48 hours later from power and restored Chavez to constitutional rule in a counter coup. This is counted as a failed coup and not a regime period. The process of Venezuela's 'authoritarianization' unfolded gradually from August 2004 to December 2005. Even during the recall elections in August 2004, international election observers still regarded them as free and fair (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 105). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this democratic transition the presence of competitive elections is acknowledged following LIED. V-Dem's CEI declares the election with a somewhat cleanliness between 1959 and 1998. In 1999 cleanliness was present. The two following years the scores fell back to somewhat cleanliness before they switched again to ambiguous since 2002. In addition, V-Dem's EF&FI indicates free and fair elections from 1958 to 1962. Afterwards, the overall conditions scored somewhat freedom and fairness for ten years, from 1973 again free and fair elections until 1999 are indicated. Since 2000 the elections slide back to somewhat free and fair conditions. As per FH's classification for the period between 1972 and 1991, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also

⁶⁵⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Venezuelan_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat_attempt

interpret as free in our framework. As classified by FH for 1992 to 1995, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. According to FH, for the years 1996 to 1998, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. Per FH's scoring for 1999-2001, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH for 2002-2004, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. According to FH, for 2005, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. In addition to that political liberties were present from 1970-1997, following LIED, whereas V-Dem's PCLI indicates their presence between 1959 and 1998. Since 1998, LIED identifies political liberties again as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are somewhat present. According to the Polity5 indicator, from 1958 to 1967, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. From 1968 to 1998, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. From 1999 to 2005, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks. Until 1998, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. In 1999, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. From 2000 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

12/04/2005 End Defective Democracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: Geddes, Wright, and Frantz consider the legislative election on this date to be the final gradual move across the delicate boundary separating imperfect democracy from electoral authoritarianism (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 105-106). Following Chavez's success in the recall, the Chavista-dominated Assembly enacted legislation to expand the size of the Supreme Court and enable the dismissal of judges through a simple majority Assembly vote. Ahead of the December 2005 legislative election, OAS election monitors observed that the fingerprint machines utilized for voter identification could potentially be linked to voting machines, raising concerns about identifying opposition voters. Despite the removal of fingerprint machines due to protests before the elections, the five largest opposition parties opted to boycott the election. This stance remained unchanged, resulting in only 25 percent of registered voters participating in the vote. Although the European Union election observers criticized the boycott, they also highlighted government manipulation of the media and an excessive military presence around polling stations

on election day. The Chavistas secured all seats in the Assembly, leading to a five-year period where no opposition voices were represented in any branch of government. Furthermore, opposition voices faced suppression through harassment, intimidation, and occasional arrests, diminishing their public presence (Degutis 2005: 7, Marcano/Barrera 2007, Holland 2008, Corrales 2009). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Different from LIED the regime period in our dataset is not classified as a one-party autocracy since the regime did not opt for a complete exclusion of the main opposition parties but they boycotted the elections. The parties continued to work outside the national parliament. However, the regime is clearly non-democratic. In a 2009 referendum term limits for the offices of President, state governors, mayors and National Assembly deputies were abolished, and Chávez promised to supporters that he would lead Venezuela until 2030.⁶⁵⁷ On 04/19/2013 Nicolás Maduro won the presidential election to formally succeed Chávez. He was re-elected in 2018 in presidential balloting marked by fraud and voter intimidation (Lansford 2021).⁶⁵⁸ A constitutional crisis followed. Opposition leader Guaidó announced, on 01/23/2019, that he was formally assuming the role of interim president under Article 233 of the Constitution of Venezuela, with the backing of the National Assembly, until free elections could be held. He received formal recognition of legitimacy from almost 60 governments worldwide, including the United States, Canada and various Latin American and European countries. However, other nations, including Russia, China, Iran, Syria, Cuba and Turkey continued to recognize Maduro. On 01/06/2021 the European Union stopped recognizing Guaidó as president, without recognizing Maduro as the legitimate president, and threatening further sanctions. As of December 2021, Guaidó was not able to remove Maduro from power.⁶⁵⁹ The Venezuelan presidential election on 07/28/2024, held amid prior disqualification of leading opposition figures, became an international flashpoint. The government-controlled electoral council (CNE) declared incumbent Nicolás Maduro the winner for a third term, but this result was immediately rejected by the unified opposition and much of the international community. Independent analysis and parallel vote tabulations showed strong evidence of a landslide victory for opposition candidate Edmundo González, with the CNE failing to publish supporting vote tallies. The contested outcome triggered a massive crackdown on dissent, culminating in an arrest warrant for González, who was forced to seek asylum in Spain.⁶⁶⁰ This highly polarized event reinforced Venezuela's authoritarian trajectory and

⁶⁵⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Venezuelan_constitutional_referendum

⁶⁵⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juan_Guaid%C3%B3

⁶⁶⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Venezuelan_presidential_election

deepened its political crisis. According to LIED, the elections were still classified as competitive from 2005 to 2007. Since 2008 no competitiveness is scored. Regarding the electoral cleanliness, they score ambiguous outcomes between 2005 and 2012. In 2013, not really cleanliness is acknowledged until 2016. Since 2017 no cleanliness at all is scored, following V-Dem's CEI. The overall election conditions are somewhat free and fair until 2011. The following five years the conditions are classified as ambiguous. Since 2017 no freedom and fairness is given (V-Dem EF&FI). Per FH's scoring for 2005 to 2008, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH for 2009-2015, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. According to FH's classification for the rest of the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Besides, according to LIED political liberties were absent since 2005. V-Dem's PCLI declares somewhat political liberties until 2009, before they switched to ambiguous until 2015. Since 2016, political rights are not really achieved. Venezuela's status by Freedom House declined in 2017 from partly free to not free. According to the Polity5 indicator, in 2005, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. From 2006 to 2008, the executive experienced moderate limitations on authority, placing it in the second intermediate category. From 2009 to 2012, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. From 2013 to 2016, the executive's constraints were categorized as Intermediate Category 2, between slight and substantial limitations. From 2017 to 2018, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Polity5 doesn't include data on the following period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. Except From 2016 to 2017, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Alvarez 2006, Boeckh 2003, Boeckh 2005, Brewer-Carías 2010, Coppedge 1994, Coppedge 2005, Kornblith 2006, Myerson 2008, Welsch 2005, Zimmerling 2005, Peeler 1985, Schultze 2000, Sonntag 2001, Zagorski 2003)

Vietnam

[officially known as Viet Nam]

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 06/06/1862]: With the Treaty of Saigon on 06/05/1862, Saigon and three southern provinces known as Cochinchina were ceded to France.⁶⁶¹ On 06/06/1884 Tonkin and Annam became a French protectorate by the Treaty of Hue.⁶⁶² The three significant regions of Vietnam - Tonkin in the north, Annam in the central area, and Cochinchina in the south - fell under French control between 1862 and 1884. Subsequently, they were amalgamated with Cambodia and Laos to establish the French-ruled Indochinese Union, commonly referred to as French Indochina (Lansford 2021: 1846). The French administration was centralized with a governor-general in Saigon and a “résident supérieur” in each protectorate’s capital. The civil service, overseen by the French, included Vietnamese officials at lower levels, some working in the colonial administration. French Indochina operated through three advisory councils, dealing with governance, economics, and defense. Yet, Cochinchina was governed by a lieutenant governor (and, after 1911, a governor), advised by private and colonial councils. The private council, consisting of ten members appointed by the governor-general, featured two Vietnamese officials. In contrast, the colonial council comprised ten members elected by resident French citizens and ten “native” members chosen by Vietnamese citizens with limited voting rights. While the Vietnamese emperor held nominal authority, actual power resided with the French. Khải Định, seen as a French puppet, was proclaimed emperor on 05/17/1916, succeeded by his son, Bảo Đại, on 01/08/1926. The anti-French Thái Nguyên uprising broke out during the Second World War but was swiftly suppressed (Corfield 2008).

09/22/1940 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Direct Rule Occupation Regime]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy under French administration]: On 09/20/1940, an agreement was signed between the French governor general, Jean Decoux, and Japan, granting Japanese access to Haiphong harbor and permission to station up to 6,000 troops in northern Vietnam. Just two days later, on 09/22/1940, Japanese forces initiated an invasion of Vietnam, swiftly achieving full control within a week. Despite this invasion, the French colonial government had nominal power, albeit significantly weakened, as Vietnam was effectively in Japan’s possession under the French administration. From 1941 to 1945, under the leadership of Decoux, the French colonial authorities adopted a policy of coexistence with the Japanese occupiers.⁶⁶³ LIED does not provide any data for this country

⁶⁶¹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Saigon_\(1862\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Saigon_(1862))

⁶⁶² [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Hu%E1%BA%BF_\(1884\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Hu%E1%BA%BF_(1884))

⁶⁶³ <https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/japanese-occupation-of-vietnam/>

LIED does not provide date for Vietnam before 1945. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as ambiguous in 1945 and does not provide data prior to that year.

03/11/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy under French administration]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]: The Japanese forces ceased their support of the dual imperial regime, leading to the ousting of the French administration through the arrest of all French colonial officials. Consequently, Japan replaced the French colonial administration, and Vietnam became de facto a Japanese colony. Following the disarmament of French soldiers, the emperor Bảo Đại was permitted to declare Vietnamese independence and appoint a Vietnamese national government. Nevertheless, the actual political authority remained firmly under the control of Japanese military commanders. In March 1945, Vietnam became part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.⁶⁶⁴ After the French administration was ousted from the North, Hồ Chí Minh's section of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) joined with non-communist forces, forming the leading political group called the League for the Independence of Vietnam (Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh, or simply Viet Minh) (Hartmann 2001). LIED does not treat Vietnam during its colonial period.

09/02/1945 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Communist Ideocracy: After Japan surrendered on 08/15/1945, a series of events which was later called collectively the "August Revolution", took place and China and France began occupying Vietnam. On 09/02/1945, Hồ Chí Minh took over as president following emperor Bảo Đại's forced resignation and declared the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). On 11/11/1945, the ICP dissolved itself to reassure the Chinese occupation authorities, and the DRV controlled the government and most provinces in the north. However, the communist DRV was "in an uneasy relationship with the Chinese military" which enforced a power-sharing system with China-oriented anti-communist parties, the Viet Nam Nationalist Party (VNQQD) and the Vietnamese Revolutionary League (DMH) (Tønnesson 2010: 16). In the months following independence, the DRV drafted and enacted its first constitution which provided for universal, direct, and secret suffrage and granted women equal rights and full political participation (Lessard 2004). On 01/06/1946, the first general election ever in areas controlled by north Vietnam was held, in which all people 18 years old or older were eligible to vote.⁶⁶⁵ However, in most areas, only the Việt Minh put forth candidates. Voters chose from a list of names, electing those with the most votes. Before the election, Chinese generals brokered an agreement between the Việt Minh and

⁶⁶⁴ <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/vietnam-war> <https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/japanese-occupation-of-vietnam/>

⁶⁶⁵ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_\(Vietnam\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_(Vietnam))

the two China-oriented nationalist parties, VNQQD and DMH. This deal permitted the latter to appoint seventy unelected delegates to the national assembly. This portrayed the Việt Minh as a political party rather than an overarching national consensus organization. However, despite the VNQDD and DMH being granted some ostensibly significant positions in the government, they never wielded genuine control, with the Việt Minh maintaining dominance (Tønnesson 2010: 26). Conducted according to the provisions of the 1946 constitution, the election saw the Communist-led Việt Minh emerge victorious, securing 182 out of 302 seats. However, the allocation of seats among parties had been predetermined prior to the elections. Notably, the voting process lacked secrecy, with ballot papers completed in the presence of aides to assist comrades facing challenges in marking their ballots.⁶⁶⁶ The south of Vietnam was controlled by France, which rejected a communist-led unification and aimed for an Indochinese federation to contain the communist government in the north. On 03/06/1946, an agreement was signed between France and Hồ Chí Minh, leading to nine months of co-existence between the French Fourth Republic and the DRV. On 09/14/1946, the conflicting parties signed a *modus vivendi*, including a ceasefire in southern Vietnam, effective from 10/31/1946. However, on 12/19/1946, an armed struggle broke out in Hanoi, marking the outbreak of the First Indochina War between France and the DRV (Tønnesson 2010). On 07/02/1949, France proclaimed the Associated State of Vietnam, granting it partial autonomy within the French Union under the leadership of Bao Dai. This led to a struggle for legitimacy between Bảo Đại and Hồ Chí Minh during the First Indochina War. However, since 09/02/1945, the DRV had already declared the nation's independence and controlled the majority of Vietnam's territory. Furthermore, its legitimacy was enhanced by the national assembly election of 01/06/1946, which saw an 89 percent participation rate among Vietnamese voters, both in the north and the south.⁶⁶⁷ Consequently, we classify this regime as a communist ideocracy of the DRV, supported by China and challenged by the southern non-communist regime controlled by France. The Geneva Accords temporarily partitioned the nation into northern and southern zones at the 17th parallel, with the provision for general elections set for July 1956, intended to pave the way for the reunification of Vietnam.⁶⁶⁸ Based on our observations, executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held during this period. An exception is the specified period from 1951 to 1953, during which, according to LIED, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Political liberties were absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as ambiguous for

⁶⁶⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946_North_Vietnamese_legislative_election

⁶⁶⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_Vietnam

⁶⁶⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Vietnam

1946, not really present from 1947 to 1950 and as absent from 1951 onward. From 1946 to 1947, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

[For the time between 07/21/1954 until 07/02/1976, see **Vietnam, North** and **Vietnam, South**.]

07/02/1976 Continuation Communist Ideocracy [of Vietnam, North]: On 6/6/1975, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, ostensibly led by Huỳnh Tấn Phát, was established as the government of South Vietnam. However, true power rested in the hands of Phạm Hùng, the fourth-ranked member of the VWP Politburo and secretary of the party's South Vietnamese Committee. Subsequently, on 4/25/1976, a reunified Vietnam conducted elections for an expanded national assembly. On 7/2/1976, the assembly declared the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). On the same day, Tôn Đức Thắng, the incumbent president of North Vietnam, was appointed as the head of state, with Nguyễn Lương Bằng and Nguyễn Hữu Thọ as vice presidents. Phạm Văn Đồng, the former DRV premier, was tasked with leading a cabinet primarily composed of former North Vietnamese ministers, along with six additions from South Vietnam. Further, on 12/20/1976, the VWP concluded a congress in Hanoi, renaming itself the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) and adopting guidelines aimed at realizing the nation's "socialist goals" (Lansford 2021: 1846). On 12/18/1980, the national assembly unanimously passed a new constitution, establishing a state council as a collective presidency and a council of ministers led by a prime minister as head of government. These positions were to be elected by the national assembly. Constitutional changes in 1992 affirmed the central role of the VCP, replaced the state council by a president as head of state who would appoint the prime minister (approved by the national assembly) as head of the council of ministers.⁶⁶⁹ Nonetheless, political dissent remains prohibited (Hartmann 2001). At the 11th National Congress in 2011, Nguyen Phu Trong was elected General Secretary of the VCP. At the same congress, the Central Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption was removed from the control of the Prime Minister and Nguyen Phu Trong was elected as committee head. In 2012, he urged the VCP to adopt a resolution calling for self-criticism, which was aimed at decreasing corruption.

⁶⁶⁹ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Socialist_Republic_of_Vietnam_2013?lang=en

Nguyen Phu Trong was reelected as General Secretary for a second term in 2016 and further pursued his anti-corruption campaign, which led to disciplinary action against 110 senior party members. On 10/03/2018, after the death of Tran Dai Quang, the Central Committee nominated Nguyen Phu Trong for the presidency. He was elected as president on 10/23/2018, consolidating considerable power as he was still holding the office of General Secretary at the same time. He was reelected to this office for a third term on 01/31/2021.⁶⁷⁰ Moreover, elections to the national assembly are controlled by the VCP, which won 485 of 499 seats in an election held on 05/21/2021, even the ostensibly independent candidates were under the VCP's influence. The VCP remains the only legal party, controlling all electoral bodies and disqualifying or arresting genuinely independent candidates.⁶⁷¹ President Nguyen Xuan Phuc was compelled to resign following a sweeping anti-corruption crackdown in January 2023. He was succeeded in March by Vo Van Thuong after being elected by the parliament. On 05/22/2024 To Lam took over as president. On 07/18/2024 General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong died, and president To Lam succeeded him in this role, once again consolidating power by holding both the presidential office and the office of General Secretary.⁶⁷² The VCP still maintains exclusive control over political power, with no other parties permitted to function legally.⁶⁷³ Based on our observations, executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. For the entire period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating also that political liberties are absent. Until 2004 and From 2019 to 2021, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 2005 to 2012, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. From 2013 to 2017, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

⁶⁷⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nguy%E1%BB%85n_Ph%C3%BA_Tr%E1%BB%8Dng

⁶⁷¹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/vietnam/freedom-world/2023>

⁶⁷² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nguy%E1%BB%85n_Ph%C3%BA_Tr%E1%BB%8Dng

⁶⁷³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/vietnam/freedom-world/2024>

Communist Ideocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources Additional sources (Donnell/Joiner 1974, Malesky/Schuler 2008, Saxonberg 2001, Lai/Slater 2006)

Vietnam, North

[officially known as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)]

07/21/1954 Communist Ideocracy: After the French defeat at Điện Biên Phủ, their French forces withdrew, and the Việt Minh government took control of northern Vietnam. North Vietnam was formally established in the Geneva Accords on 07/21/1954, which tentatively delineated the nation into northern and southern zones along the 17th parallel, with general elections slated for July 1956, after which Vietnam was meant to be reunited (LePoer 1989, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 106).⁶⁷⁴ The DRV, led by the communist Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP), accepted the provisions to achieve reunification under their governance. In July 1956, the deadline for the promised elections passed, which was followed by a phase of domestic “détente” in North Vietnam, marked by political and social liberalization and expanded individual rights enforced by the council of ministers and national assembly. The North ostensibly underwent its most “democratic” period even after a Politburo reshuffle (Asselin 2013: 68-72). Realizing that the southern Republic of Vietnam (RVN) would not accept national polls, North Vietnam started forming its own regime. The 1960 Constitution established a semi-presidential government within a communist framework, with president Hồ Chí Minh elected by the national assembly to lead the council of ministers. Although citizens over 21 were formally allowed to run for elections, the communist Vietnamese Fatherland Front (VFF) controlled lists and candidature approvals. However, the DRV retained its claims of a multi-party system, and some Vietnamese Socialist Party (VSP) and Democratic Party (VDP) candidates secured seats in Hanoi (Hartmann 2001). A pivotal moment was communist politician Lê Duẩn’s fourteen-point plan, outlining a strategy of revolutionary militancy for southern political struggle and reunification. Initially rejected, the Central Committee later authorized targeted assassinations of “reactionary traitors” and terror bombings to oppose the Diệm regime and American presence (Asselin 2013: 74). Later on, the People’s Army of North Vietnam (PAVN) and the Việt Cộng guerrillas, based in

South Vietnam, engaged in conflict against the military forces of the Republic of Vietnam, supported by their communist allies, primarily China and the Soviet Union.⁶⁷⁵ Hồ Chí Minh served as president of the DRV until his passing on 09/03/1969. He was then succeeded by his vice president, Tôn Đức Thắng. Phạm Văn Đồng, appointed head of government through the Geneva Conference, held this position until reunification in 1976 (Hartmann 2001). Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 1960. Thereafter, according to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

07/02/1976 End Vietnam, North [Communist Ideocracy]: On 04/30/1975, North Vietnamese forces entered Saigon, and the city fell under their control. After this event, known as the fall of Saigon, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG), formed by Northern Vietnam on 06/08/1969 to oppose the Republic of Vietnam, governed South Vietnam. Initial plans for separate administrations were eventually abandoned and on 07/02/1976, after national assembly elections, the reunification of North and South Vietnam took place and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) was declared (Hartmann 2001).

For the time after 07/02/1976, see **Vietnam**.

Vietnam, South

[officially known as the Republic of Vietnam]

07/21/1954 Start (Monarchical) Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Non-Party) Regime: On this date, the Geneva Accords established South Vietnam as a separate independent state, dividing the nation into northern and southern zones along the 17th parallel, with general elections slated for July 1956, after which Vietnam was meant to be reunited.⁶⁷⁶ At independence Vietnam was led by prime minister Ngô Đình Diệm, appointed by emperor Bảo Đại, who was living in Paris and had little ability to influence events on the ground (LePoer 1989, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 106). Diệm opposed the general elections outlined in the Geneva

⁶⁷⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Vietnam

⁶⁷⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Vietnam

Accords, and, instead, established a republic, formed South Vietnamese republican institutions, and began prosecuting communist insurgents (Hartmann 2001, Davidson 1991). According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. However, according to our observations this was only true for the period after 10/23/1955. No executive elections were present. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI.

10/23/1955 End Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Non-Party) Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, Diệm held a referendum, formally serving as presidential elections between head of state Bảo Đại and head of government Diệm to determine the president of a new, independent Vietnamese state. At the time, Bảo Đại was out of the country and had not been asked to stand as candidate. The referendum introduced universal suffrage with an 18-year voting age and secret voting. However, in practice, voters were given a ballot on which they had to tear off the half featuring the picture of their preferred candidate. The results showed an overwhelming 98.2 percent in favor of Diệm (Hartmann 2001, Asselin 2013). Despite allegations of a manipulated vote, the result reinforced Diệm's legitimacy and effectively supplanted the internationally recognized State of Vietnam with the Republic of Vietnam in the south, which garnered support from the USA, France, Laos, Taiwan (Republic of China) and Thailand.⁶⁷⁷ Diệm emerged as a proponent of Vietnamese nationalism, advocating for both anti-communism, as a counterforce to Hồ Chí Minh, and decolonization, opposing Bảo Đại's influence.⁶⁷⁸ The inaugural Constitution included provisions for establishing the republic and orchestrating the election of its president.⁶⁷⁹ As documented in LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held until 1960. In the years 1961 and 1962, multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted. Subsequently, multiparty executive and legislative elections were once again classified as absent in 1963. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED declares the absence of competitiveness for the entire time. In addition, according to V-Dem's CEI and EF&FI elections have not really been clean, free or fair. As outlined in the 1956 constitution, Diệm, serving as president, wielded a significant concentration of power, and his style of governance gradually veered towards authoritarianism.⁶⁸⁰ Therefore, LIED considers that political liberties were absent for this time. V-Dem's PCLI affirms political liberties were not

⁶⁷⁷ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam>

⁶⁷⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ngo_Dinh_Diem

⁶⁷⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ngo_Dinh_Diem

⁶⁸⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ngo_Dinh_Diem

really given. Moreover, candidates for the national assembly could run as independents or under party affiliations. However, political parties needed authorization from the ministry of interior to attain legal status, which only allowed pro-government political parties and disqualified candidates with links to communism. Once elected, candidates clustered around blocs, such as the People's Bloc, the Unification Bloc, and the Society Bloc, although they were never formalized (Hartmann 2001). Diệm did not control the army, faced administrative deficiencies, and held minimal authority over significant areas of the South controlled by powerful religious sects like the Hòa Hảo and Đạo Cao Đài. Moreover, fearing potential coups, Diệm prioritized personal loyalty in his officers and established fragmented military authority, with no single officer controlling all troops in any given region (Davidson 1991, Asselin 2013). According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

11/01/1963 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, the armed forces led by Lieutenant General Dương Văn Minh ousted president Diệm in a military coup because of their disapproval of his handling of the Buddhist crisis and their fear of the Vietcong threat. Subsequently, Minh assumed the leadership of a twelve-man Military Revolutionary Council (MRC) (Ky 1978: 31, Marshall 2018c, Goodman 1973, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 106). In 1964 and 1965, according to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held. In contrast, multiparty executive and legislative elections were classified as present in 1966 and 1967. However, General Minh was ousted in another coup on 01/30/1964, orchestrated by General Nguyễn Khánh and senior officers due to personal ambition, policy differences, and an ineffectual junta. Following the coup, General Minh remained a figurehead chief of state until 10/26/1964, when General Nguyễn Khánh established himself as the chairman of the new junta.⁶⁸¹ On 09/26/1964, Khánh and the military junta established a semblance of civilian rule by creating the High National Council (HNC), an advisory body with limited legislative authority. The HNC designated Phan Khắc Sửu as chief of state and Hương as prime minister. However, this is not classified as a regime change because the real power remained with the military (Kahin 1986, Moyar 2006, Tucker 2011: 486). On 12/20/1964, General Khánh and other military assets removed the parallel civilian governing council and arrested several of its leaders. This removal can be seen as internal military clashes between the young and old members of the military junta.

⁶⁸¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nguyễn_Khánh

On 01/27/1965, the armed forces removed the last of the civilian elements of the government and imposed direct rule by replacing the MCN with a new Armed Forces Council (AFC), in which younger officers had greater representation (Kahin 1986). This was done with the support of commanders inside and outside of the junta who were concerned about the goings of the war and were opposed to some of the US's demands carried out by the remainder of the civilian administration. On 02/19/1965, the junta infighting and personal ambition led Thảo and Kỳ to attempt to overthrow Khánh. Despite a considerable amount of both fighting and uncertainty regarding junta leadership, the coup ultimately failed, but Khánh was convinced by the US military advisors to flee. A complex series of power shifts allowed new military and civilian leaders to take power. Quát is identified as head of government, appointed by the military junta on 02/16/1965. However, Quát's civilian government was ousted by air marshall Kỳ, General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, and General Hữu Cồ on 06/11/1965. Following this event, the military proclaimed a National Leadership Committee, with Kỳ as prime minister and Thiệu as chief of state (Michaels 2014). Thiệu became the chairman of the National Leadership Committee on 06/14/1965 (Hartmann 2001).⁶⁸² Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For 1963, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. From 1964 onwards, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

04/01/1967 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral (Military) Autocracy: On this date, Thiệu promulgated a new constitution, previously adopted by the constituent assembly on 03/18/1967, which provided for a semi-presidential system with a bicameral parliament (Hartmann 2001, Flanz 1967). Under pressure from the United States to adhere to constitutional governance, elections for both the presidency and the legislature were arranged.⁶⁸³ The elections took place on 09/03/1967. After winning the elections Thiệu became president on 10/31/1967. The last elections in South Vietnam were held on 10/02/1971. In these presidential elections Thiệu ran virtually unopposed after his main opponents, Vice President Nguyễn Cao Kỳ and General Dương Văn Minh, withdrew. The reason was that Thiệu's tainted reputation for corruption led his political adversaries to suspect electoral manipulation and opt out of the race. Running

⁶⁸² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nguy%E1%BB%85n_V%C4%83n_Thi%E1%BB%87u

⁶⁸³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nguy%E1%BB%85n_V%C4%83n_Thi%E1%BB%87u

unopposed, Thiệu secured a straightforward reelection on 10/02, garnering 94% of the vote with an 87% turnout, a statistic widely regarded as fraudulent.⁶⁸⁴ The new regime's stability was challenged by the absence of strong political parties. Deputies were elected as independents who later formed loose parliamentary blocs. Thiệu attempted to create a supportive political movement in parliament and introduced a new party law legalizing 23 parties between 1969 and 1970. However, in 1973, all existing parties were dissolved by decree (Hartmann 2001). He remained in office until 04/21/1975.⁶⁸⁵ The regime relied on the support of the United States, especially during the Vietnam war, which saw heavy involvement of US-troops but also south-Vietnamese interference.⁶⁸⁶ Because of the elections the regime is classified different from other regime data sets as an electoral autocracy and not a military autocracy. However, regarding the subtype it was an electoral military autocracy and largely the continuation of the previous regime. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED affirms that they were not competitive during this period. Furthermore, until 1967 no cleanliness for the elections is scored. Since 1968 V-Dem's CEI indicates ambiguous outcomes. During the entire time the elections were not really free and fair according to V-Dem's EF&FI. Besides, according to LIED political liberties remained absent. V-Dem's PCLI declares them as ambiguous for the entire regime period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. On 01/31/1968, the Tet Offensive commenced. This offensive, by thrusting the war into South Vietnam's urban areas and showcasing the enduring potency of communist forces, signaled a pivotal moment in US backing for the South Vietnamese government. The incoming administration of Richard Nixon initiated a strategy of Vietnamization to diminish US combat engagement and initiated discussions with the North Vietnamese to seek an end to the conflict.⁶⁸⁷ US-military troops withdrew from South Vietnam in March 1972 after the Paris Peace Accords were signed on 01/27/1972.⁶⁸⁸ North Vietnam used the created power vacuum to start another military campaign, the Easter Offensive, between 03/30/1972 and 10/22/1972 against South Vietnam.⁶⁸⁹ 04/21/1975 The communist rebels and the North Vietnamese Army closed in on the capital and Thien resigned and fled. His

⁶⁸⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nguy%E1%BB%85n_V%C4%83n_Thi%E1%BB%87u

⁶⁸⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nguy%E1%BB%85n_V%C4%83n_Thi%E1%BB%87u

⁶⁸⁶ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Vietnam/The-two-Vietnams-1954-65>

⁶⁸⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Vietnam

⁶⁸⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Vietnam

⁶⁸⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Easter_Offensive

Vice President carried on the fight for seven more days. The final ‘Spring Offensive’ between 12/13/1974 and 04/30/1975 marked the concluding North Vietnamese campaign in the Vietnam War.⁶⁹⁰ As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free.

04/30/1975 End Electoral (Military) Autocracy/Start Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by Vietnam, North, (Communist) Ideocracy]: On this date, Communist forces seized Saigon, effectively marking the conclusion of South Vietnam's existence as an independent nation. The formal reunification with the North took place the subsequent year (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 107). On 07/02/1976, the conclusion of the Vietnam War signaled the commencement of the transitional phase leading towards reunification. This culminated in a national election for reunification on the same day, when the Republic of South Vietnam merged with North Vietnam, establishing the modern-day Vietnam.⁶⁹¹ According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem’s PCLI. LIED lists both elections as well as universal suffrage as present during this period.

07/02/1976 End Vietnam, South [Indirect Rule Occupation Regime].

For the time after 07/02/1976, see **Vietnam**.

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Additional sources (Donnell/Joiner 1974, Penniman 1972)

Virgin Islands, British

01/01/1900 Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: xx/xx/1672]: The Dutch established a permanent settlement on the main island (Tortola) by 1648, and by 1672 it was captured by the English and annexed to the British-administered Leeward Islands. The planters were granted civil government in 1773, with an elected House of Assembly, a partly elected Legislative Council, and constitutional courts. The islands prosperity grew until the middle of the nineteenth century, when a combination of the abolition of slavery and agricultural demand in the British Empire changed. In 1867 the constitution was surrendered

⁶⁹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1975_spring_offensive

⁶⁹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reunification_Day

and a legislature was appointed, an arrangement that lasted until 1902, when sole legislative authority was vested in the governor-in-council. In 1950 a partly elected and partly nominated Legislative Council was reinstated. In 1960 the islands gained separate colony status as crown colony. In 1967 the islands became more autonomous and were given a ministerial form of government with H. Lavity Stoutt as first chief minister.

02/26/2002 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Defective Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: The British Overseas Territory Act of 2002 changed the status of the colony to that of overseas territory and granted British citizenship to its people. A new constitution promulgated in 2007 brought greater self-government to the islands. The constitution provides for a unicameral House of Assembly (legislature) based upon representative democracy and a multi-party system. The head of state is the British monarch, who is represented in the territory by the governor. The politics of the British Virgin Islands takes place in the framework of a parliamentary representative democratic dependency with universal suffrage, whereby the Premier is the head of government, and of a multi-party system. FH, LIED and V-Dem do not list the British Virgin Islands. According to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were present during this period. In 2022, an independent investigation into corruption revealed widespread issues within the territory's governance and recommended that London reestablish direct rule over the British Virgin Islands. Andrew Fahie, the Prime Minister and leader of the VIP party, was arrested, charged, and convicted of drug smuggling and money laundering. The UK government decided against this step and instead entrusted the new government with resolving the reported issues. This new government is a government of national unity, involving the two biggest parties VIP and PVIM. It came together following the 2023 general elections which the VIP won and wherein the PIVM came in second. The unity-government's progress in enacting crucial reforms to combat corruption has reportedly been mixed. Due to this, the governor of the BVI announced plans to seek more power over the territory to impose these reforms. This move was decried as an undemocratic power grab by BVI-politicians.

Defective Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Virgin Islands, U.S.

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Denmark, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 05/25/1672]: Denmark-Norway showed interest in the islands, and in 1672, the Danish West India Company established settlements on St. Thomas, followed by St. John in 1694. Subsequently, in 1733, they acquired St. Croix from France. These islands were officially designated as royal Danish colonies in 1754 and collectively named the Danish West Indian Islands. The United States developed an interest in the islands, and in 1867, there was an agreed treaty to sell St. Thomas and St. John to the U.S., although it was never implemented. The outbreak of World War I marked the end of the reform period and once more left the islands in isolation. Concerned about the possibility of the islands being seized by Germany as a submarine base during the submarine warfare phases of the war, the United States once again approached Denmark to discuss the potential purchase of the islands. On 08/04/1916, the Treaty of the Danish West Indies was signed, and a referendum on the sale took place in Denmark in December 1916, gaining approval from voters. The formalization of the agreement occurred on 01/17/1917, as the United States and Denmark exchanged their respective treaty ratifications.⁶⁹² LIED does not provide any data for this period.

03/31/1917 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Denmark, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]: On this date, the United States assumed control of the islands, leading to the renaming of the territory as the Virgin Islands of the United States.⁶⁹³

02/25/1927 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]: In 1927, the Virgin Islands formally attained the status of an unincorporated U.S. territory.⁶⁹⁴ The U.S. Navy managed the islands until 1931, at which point control was transferred to the Department of the Interior. Subsequently, civilian governors, appointed by the president, oversaw the administration of the islands.⁶⁹⁵ Many residents of the islands were conferred U.S. citizenship in 1927 and 1932. The establishment of the local government was formalized through the 1936 Organic Act and the 1954 Revised Organic Act.⁶⁹⁶ In 1968 the Elective Governor Acts were enacted. These acts established the transition from the appointed selection to the popular election of the Governors of the U.S. Virgin

⁶⁹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Virgin_Islands#Danish_period

⁶⁹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Virgin_Islands#American_period

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_United_States_Virgin_Islands#American_period,_1917%E2%80%93present; <https://fam.state.gov/FAM/08FAM/08FAM030808.html>

⁶⁹⁵ <https://www.britannica.com/place/United-States-Virgin-Islands/Government-and-society#ref7726>

⁶⁹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Virgin_Islands#American_period

Islands and Guam, marking a departure from the previous appointment process.⁶⁹⁷ Residents of the Virgin Islands hold U.S. citizenship, yet the territory lacks electoral votes for the presidential or vice-presidential elections. Despite being unable to elect voting members of Congress, the U.S. House of Representatives includes a delegate representing them. While this delegate can vote in congressional committees, they do not have voting privileges in the House itself.⁶⁹⁸ We therefore classify the US Virgin Islands as a de facto colony of the democratic USA. FH, V-Dem and LIED do not list the US Virgin Islands in their datasets.

Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Wallis and Futuna

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 04/05/1887]: The French were the first Europeans to settle in the area, with French missionaries arriving in 1837. On 04/05/1887, the queen of Uvea, from the traditional chiefdom of Wallis, formally signed a treaty, officially establishing a French protectorate. Subsequently, on 02/16/1888, the kings of Sigave and Alo, representing the islands of Futuna and Alofi, also signed a treaty, officially establishing a French protectorate. From that point onward, the islands came under the jurisdiction of the French colony of New Caledonia.⁶⁹⁹ LIED and PCLI (V-Dem) do not list Wallis and Futuna.

10/27/1946 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Part of Other Country [France, Liberal Democracy]: In 1946, New Caledonia and thus Wallis and Futuna attained the status of an overseas territory. By 1953, French citizenship was extended to all residents of New Caledonia, irrespective of their ethnic background.⁷⁰⁰ In 1959, the residents of the islands decided through a vote to attain independent status as a distinct French overseas territory, and this change became effective on 07/29/1961. As a result, their previous affiliation with New Caledonia came to an end.

03/28/2003 End Part of Other Country [France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Defective Democracy [as protectorate-type of France, Liberal Democracy]: With the amendment of the French Constitution in 2003, the legal status of the region of Wallis and Futuna changed from a territoire d'outre-mer to a collectivité d'outre-mer (COM).⁷⁰¹ Wallis and Futuna gained the right to vote

⁶⁹⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elective_Governor_Acts_of_1968

⁶⁹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_the_United_States_Virgin_Islands

⁶⁹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wallis_and_Futuna#History

⁷⁰⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Caledonia#History

⁷⁰¹ <https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/les-revisions-constitutionnelles/revisions-constitutionnelles-de-mars-2003>

for both legislative and executive powers and is represented in the French Senate and Assembly. However, a representative of the French state oversees these institutions and has the authority to postpone legislative decisions, dissolve the parliament or the executive, and establish an interim government. Important policy areas, such as foreign affairs and security policy, are determined by France.⁷⁰² The autonomy rights, representation in the French parliament, and limited sovereignty make it difficult to categorize the regime. Saint Pierre and Miquelon, as well as the other overseas collectivities, represents a special case. Due to its higher degree of autonomy compared to other French administrative zones, such as the départements et régions d'outre-mer, the region cannot be classified as an Indirect Rule Colonial Regime. Instead, it can be categorized as a Defective Democracy with the additional designation of a protectorate-type. It is considered defective because, due to France's position, these territories do not possess full sovereignty.

FH does not provide data for Wallis and Futuna.

Defective Democracy [as protectorate-type of France, Liberal Democracy] continued as of 07/01/2025.

Western Sahara

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of Spain, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 12/26/1884]: During the Berlin Conference held between 1884 and 1885, European nations were defining regulations for creating zones of control in Africa. During this time, Spain declared a 'protectorate over the African coast' from Cape Blanc to Cape Bojador on 12/26/1884. Spain then initiated the establishment of trading posts and a military force in the region. By July 1885, King Alfonso XII of Spain appointed Emilio Bonelli as the commissioner of the Río de Oro, granting him both civil and military authority over the area. In 1924, the territory known as Spanish Sahara came into existence by merging the Spanish regions of Río de Oro and Saguia el-Hamra.⁷⁰³ Following its independence in 1956, Morocco asserted its ownership of Spanish Sahara as a part of its historical pre-colonial land. In 1957, during the Ifni War, the Moroccan Army of Liberation nearly occupied the Ifni territory to the north of Spanish Sahara. Spanish forces stationed in the nearby Canary Islands thwarted the attacks, with French assistance helping Spain regain control. Through the 1960s, Morocco persisted in claiming Spanish Sahara and convinced the United Nations to include it on the list of territories needing decolonization. Spain relinquished control of Ifni to Morocco in 1969 but retained Spanish Sahara. In 1973, the

⁷⁰² https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wallis_und_Futuna

⁷⁰³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_Sahara

Polisario Front emerged, advocating Sahrawi nationalism. The Front rapidly built a guerrilla army, resulting in Spain losing effective control over much of the region by early 1975.⁷⁰⁴ On 02/26/1976, Spain officially informed the United Nations (UN) of its withdrawal from Western Sahara, leaving the area without any governing authority. Neither Morocco nor Mauritania received international recognition for their claims, leading to conflict with the pro-independence Polisario Front.⁷⁰⁵ LIED and V-Dem do not provide any data for Western Sahara.

02/27/1976 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of Spain, Right-Wing (Corporatist) Autocracy]/Start One-Party Autocracy: On this date, the Polisario Front declared the establishment of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in Bir Lehlou, Western Sahara.⁷⁰⁶ In 1979, Mauritania established peace with the Polisario Front and relinquished its territorial demands. Subsequently, Morocco took control of Mauritania's portion and asserted authority over the entire region. A vote was planned for 1992 to decide if the territory would stay under Moroccan rule or achieve independence, but this was delayed multiple times. When Muḥammad VI assumed the Moroccan throne in 1999 after his father Hassan II, the referendum plans came to a halt. Morocco signaled a change in its stance, indicating that it was no longer willing to consider the possibility of a referendum.⁷⁰⁷ The SADR's administration refers to the areas it governs as the Liberated Territories or the Free Zone. Meanwhile, Morocco holds authority over and manages the remaining contested land, which it designates as its Southern Provinces.⁷⁰⁸ As outlined in its constitution, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) functions as a one-party autocracy, a status that persists as long as it lacks authority over its territory.⁷⁰⁹ Starting from August 1982, the highest position within the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) has been the President, held by the secretary-general of the Polisario Front. The President appoints the Prime Minister. The SADR's governmental framework included a Council of Ministers, headed by the prime minister, a judiciary with judges chosen by the president, and the Sahrawi National Council (SNC), a parliamentary body.⁷¹⁰ On 03/08-03/09/2020, the Sahrawi Republic conducted legislative elections to select 52 out of the 53 representatives of the Sahrawi National Council, the singular chamber of the SADR's parliament. Over 100,000 Sahrawis were registered for voting, and a total of 145 candidates competed in the

⁷⁰⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_Sahara

⁷⁰⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahrawi_Arab_Democratic_Republic

⁷⁰⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahrawi_Arab_Democratic_Republic

⁷⁰⁷ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sahrawi-Arab-Democratic-Republic>

⁷⁰⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahrawi_Arab_Democratic_Republic

⁷⁰⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_the_Sahrawi_Arab_Democratic_Republic

⁷¹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahrawi_Arab_Democratic_Republic#Government_structure

elections.⁷¹¹ As of September 2022, a total of 85 nations have extended recognition to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.⁷¹² The one-party regime is justified by the SADR as a necessary measure due to the ongoing conflict and lack of full control over its claimed territory. The situation is complicated by the fact that Morocco controls the majority of Western Sahara and considers it part of its own territory, referring to it as its Southern Provinces. Per FH's evaluation for 1989 and 1990, the territory scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH's classification for the rest of the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the territory not free per FH, which we also place in the not free category. LIED and V-Dem's PCLI do not provide any data for this time.

One-Party Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Western Samoa see Samoa

Yemen

[Abstract before 1900: Between the 12th BC and 6th AD Yemen was considered the center of civilization and wealth in the near east region. In pre-Islamic times, the area that is now known as Republic of Yemen was described as Eudaimon Arabia or Arabia Felix – Happy Arabia – and ruled by several indigenous dynasties in different kingdoms. The coming of Islam around 630 AD changed the country permanently until the 20th century.⁷¹³ Between 1900 and 05/22/1990 have separate histories: see **Yemen, North** and **Yemen, South**.]

05/22/1990 Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: After the unification as Republic of Yemen the former leaders of south and north Yemen were assigned as president and vice-president.⁷¹⁴ Per FH, for 1990 and 1991, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. According to FH, for the years 1992 and 1993, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as not really present in 1990 and as ambiguous from 1991 onward. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited,

⁷¹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Sahrawi_legislative_election

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahrawi_Arab_Democratic_Republic#International_recognition_and_membership

⁷¹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ancient_history_of_Yemen

⁷¹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Yemen

while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

04/27/1993 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date the first parliamentary elections after unification took place. They were classified by election monitors as the first free, multiparty polls in Yemen despite minimal irregularities.⁷¹⁵ In this pivotal electoral event, the General People's Congress (GPC) emerged victorious in 123 constituencies. The Islah Party followed with 62 seats, with its support mainly derived from its tribal rather than its Islamist components. The Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) secured 57 seats, predominantly in the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) territories.⁷¹⁶ Following August 1993, Vice President al Beidh left Sanaa (capital de jure) to Aden (capital de facto), effectively withdrawing from the political process.⁷¹⁷ On 05/04/1994 civil war started between the two Yemeni forces and their supporters. On 05/04/1994, the southern air force bombed Sanaa and other areas in the north, as a response to a major tank battle a few days prior; the northern air force responded by bombing Aden. Vice President al-Beidh was officially dismissed.⁷¹⁸ On 07/07/1994 Northern troops and Jihadist forces led by Tariq al-Fadhli entered Aden on 07/04/1994, factually ending the conflict. As a result, Saleh gained control over all of Yemen.⁷¹⁹ On 10/01/1994 Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected by parliament for a five-year term. On 09/23/1999 Saleh was reelected in the first direct presidential elections.⁷²⁰ He held the position until 2012.⁷²¹ Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi took his position.⁷²² On 02/21/2012 Vice President Hadi won presidential elections with 99.8% of the vote. He was the only candidate and thus uncontested. His candidacy was backed by the ruling party, as well as by the parliamentary opposition.⁷²³ Since 04/27/2003 there have been no parliamentary elections (Macmillan 2022d). This regime change event is coded as a strategic restructuring because the incumbent transitional elite did not exit but actively managed the transition by participating in the elections to legitimize their rule within a new institutional framework. Even though the elections carried the risk that a new elite would come to power, the previous elite remained fundamentally the same. The direction is unclear. Even though the elections were classified by some election monitors as the

⁷¹⁵ <https://merip.org/1993/11/elections-and-mass-politics-in-yemen/>; http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2353_93.htm

⁷¹⁶ <https://merip.org/1993/11/elections-and-mass-politics-in-yemen/>

⁷¹⁷ https://web.archive.org/web/20130616022328/http://www.yca-sandwell.org.uk/history_7.htm

⁷¹⁸ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemeni_Civil_War_\(1994\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemeni_Civil_War_(1994))

⁷¹⁹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemeni_Civil_War_\(1994\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemeni_Civil_War_(1994))

⁷²⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_Yemeni_presidential_election

⁷²¹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemeni_Civil_War_\(1994\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemeni_Civil_War_(1994))

⁷²² https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abd_Rabbo_Mansur_Hadi

⁷²³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi

first free multiparty elections, we have strong doubts about this assessment based on the following data from our comparative sources LIED, V-Dem, and FH. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held, which contradicts the findings of LIED, because it classifies multiparty executive and legislative elections as absent since 2009. Furthermore, according to LIED, only executive elections were held in 2012 and 2013, yet these were not classified as multiparty. During the entire period elections were not competitive according to LIED. In addition, V-Dem's CEI indicates that elections were not really clean from 1993 to 1996. Between 1997 and 2011 the elections scored no cleanliness. Since 2012 a return to not really cleanliness outcomes is acknowledged. The overall conditions were somewhat free and fair until 1996, before they switched to no real freedom and fairness the following six years. Between 2003 and 2011 the scores are classified as ambiguous. Since 2012, not real freedom and fairness is scored again (V-Dem's EF&FI). Per FH's evaluation for this regime period, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH for 1994-2002, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Per FH's evaluation for 2003-2008, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH's classification for the rest of the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Moreover, according to LIED political liberties were not achieved. V-Dem's PCLI indicate an ambiguous presence for the entire time except in 2012 political liberties are classified by us as somewhat present. As per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. Until 1996 and From 2011 to 2014, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. GWF classifies the regime as a personalist autocracy.

09/21/2014 End Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, Houthi Rebels, who are aligned with Iran, occupied Sanaa. A power-sharing agreement between the Yemeni government and the Houthi rebels led to the resignation of Prime Minister Mohammed Basindwa and other cabinet members followed by a temporally cease-fire agreement. A new government was established with Baha as prime minister in December 2014, while Hadi remained president. The Houthis rejected to ratify a draft constitution aimed to end

the civil war and continued with new attacks on the capital.⁷²⁴ The new cabinet under Hadi and Khaled Baha, that existed for less than a month, was forced to resign on 01/22/2015. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present.

02/06/2015 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start No Central Authority: The Houthi rebels established a rival administration in Sanaa on 02/06/2015 that was not recognized internationally. Hadi withdrew his resignation and temporarily governed from exile (Macmillan 2022d, Lansford 2021). Having lost control over large parts of Yemen to the rebels, the Hadi government continued to govern from Aden backed by a Saudi-led military coalition. Since 2016 peace negotiations have made no progress.⁷²⁵ The humanitarian crisis in Yemen is one of the most drastic in the world, famine, diseases like cholera, lack of access to safe water or sanitation are dominating the country.⁷²⁶ Beginning on 01/28/2018, separatists loyal to the Southern Transitional Council seized control of the Yemeni government headquarters in Aden in a coup d'état against the Hadi government. The 26 members of the STC include the governors of five southern governorates and two government ministers. The STC works toward the separation of southern Yemen from the rest of the nation – as it was before 1990. By 07/01/2023 the situation continued to be defined by a political stalemate between the conflict-parties. As the line of control resembles that of the border between the former countries of North and Southern Yemen before their unification, the situation seems to approach a de facto desintegration and reinstatement of the two distinct entities. As both parties to the civil war do, however, still claim to fight for authority over all of Yemen, we will for now continue to list Yemen as one entity with no central authority. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period. This is, however, not final and may change according to the developments on the ground. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI. Since 2022, LIED does not provide any data. Since 2016, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

No Central Authority as of 07/01/2025 continued.

⁷²⁴ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Yemen_2015D?lang=en

⁷²⁵ <https://www.cfr.org/background/yemen-crisis>

⁷²⁶ <https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/yemen-crisis>

Additional sources (Alley 2010, Khalili 2009, Ingrams 1938, Ismael 1981, Robbins 1939)

Yemen, North

[officially known as The Yemen Arab Republic; also known as Yemen (Sana'a)]

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 07/29/1872]: North Yemen, which was known as the Yemen Vilayet, became a part of the Ottoman Empire on 07/29/1872. The formal incorporation of the region into the Ottoman Empire was the result of an agreement between the Ottomans and local Yemeni leaders. However, Ottoman control was largely confined to cities.⁷²⁷ Already before the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Shiite Imam Yahya bin Hamiduddin took power in the Northern Kingdom of Yemen in 1911.⁷²⁸ LIED and V-Dem's PCLI do not provide data on political liberties for this timeframe.

10/30/1918 End Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Autocratic Monarchy]/Start Autocratic Monarchy: After the conclusion of World War I and the subsequent collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the region of northern Yemen gained independence and established itself as the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen.⁷²⁹ Autonomy from the Ottoman Empire during the Hamid al-Din dynasty era marked the establishment of the traditional imamate of the Zaidi people in the region that later became North Yemen (Burrowes 1987, Haddad 1973, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 107).⁷³⁰ On 09/02/1926 The Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen was internationally recognized. This regime change event is coded as a voluntary exit because independence was achieved as a direct consequence of the Ottoman Empire's collapse, formalized by the Armistice of Mudros.⁷³¹ Imam Yahya declared independence in the resulting power vacuum left by the withdrawing imperial elite. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

⁷²⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen_Vilayet

⁷²⁸ <https://insidearabia.com/president-al-hamdi-yemen-collective-memory/>

⁷²⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen_Arab_Republic

⁷³⁰ <https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,844159-1,00.html>

⁷³¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armistice_of_Mudros

02/17/1948 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Autocratic Monarchy: Ruling Imam Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din was killed in the Alwaziri coup attempt.⁷³² The rivalling Sayyid family seized power for three weeks⁷³³ under putschist and family member Abdullah bin Ahmad al-Wazir.⁷³⁴

03/13/1948 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Autocratic Monarchy: The ruling monarchy was restored with Ahmad bin Yahya, Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din's respective son taking over the throne.⁷³⁵ On 03/08/1958 North Yemen joined the federation of Egypt and Syria (UAR) as a confederate partner⁷³⁶, until Syria withdrew in 1961. Thereafter the relations between North Yemen and Egypt declined.⁷³⁷ Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. Until 1952, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

09/27/1962 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) was established when revolutionaries, motivated by the Arab nationalist beliefs of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, deposed Imam Muhammad al-Badr, the son of late Imam Ahmad bin Yahya⁷³⁸, a week after he seized power in Sanaa. The North Yemen civil war started with the aforementioned coup, which saw YAR forces, aided by the United Arab Republic (Egypt), clash with the loyalist troops of King al-Badr, backed by Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The leader of the coup, Abdullah al-Sallal, created the Revolutionary Command Council to rule and thus rose to the presidency of the newly declared republic.⁷³⁹ The Yemeni army was small and weak and could probably have been defeated by tribesmen loyal to the royal family, but the regime was kept in power by Egyptian troops and administrators" (Burrowes 1987, Haddad 1973, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014, Clark 1998). The conflict persisted intermittently until 1967,

⁷³² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yahya_Muhammad_Hamid_ed-Din

⁷³³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alwaziri_coup

⁷³⁴ https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sayf_Abdallah_ibn_Ahmad_al-Wazir

⁷³⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alwaziri_coup

⁷³⁶ https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vereinigte_Arabische_Staaten

⁷³⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutawakkilite_Kingdom_of_Yemen

⁷³⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutawakkilite_Kingdom_of_Yemen

⁷³⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdullah_al-Sallal

when Egyptian forces withdrew from Yemen to participate in the Six-Day War.⁷⁴⁰ Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. According to the Polity5 indicator, until 1965, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. From 1966 onward, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. During this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

11/05/1967 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: A coup ousted al-Sallal and installed a coalition led by the civilian Abdul Rahman al-Eryani, along with military figures (Burrowes 1987: 28, Haddad 1973: 285-88).⁷⁴¹ Rahman al-Eryani was originally a leader of the Free Yemeni Movement (Al-Ahrar), a opposition group during the time of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen.⁷⁴² A compromise on 12/01/1970 resulted in a republican form of government in North Yemen with prominent positions granted to members of the royalist faction, was agreed upon by the leaders of the region with the approval of the major foreign players involved, namely Egypt and Saudi Arabia. A new constitution came into force in 1970 and the first parliamentary elections were held in February and March 1971 (Glosemeyer 2001: 293).⁷⁴³ As political parties were banned, all candidates ran as independents. The indirect election system in rural areas led to a parliament being dominated by tribal elites. Secret elections only took place in urban areas, whilst indirect elections were held in rural areas, effectively barring women from voting (Glosemeyer 2001: 297). Since there were neither elections of the government by the parliament nor the population the preconditions for an electoral autocracy are not fulfilled. By LIED the period is classified as a Non-Electoral autocracy. According to our classification the regime is an electoral oligarchy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections held were not competitive according to LIED. V-Dem's CEI indicates no cleanliness. V-Dem's EF&FI underline not really free and fair election conditions. Per FH's scoring for 1972, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH, for 1973 and 1974, a score between 9 and 10

⁷⁴⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Yemen_Civil_War; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen_Arab_Republic

⁷⁴¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul_Rahman_al-Eryani

⁷⁴² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul_Rahman_al-Eryani

⁷⁴³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Yemen; <https://www.britannica.com/place/Yemen/The-age-of-imperialism#ref964972>

makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. Furthermore, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicates that no political liberties were guaranteed. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Until 1971, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

06/13/1974 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim al-Hamdi orchestrated a military coup that ousted the civilian-led government led by Abdul Rahman al-Eryani. Following the coup, a Military Command Council was established, the sheiks and other civilians. Subsequently, in 1975, the MCC dissolved the partially elected Consultative Council, diminishing the representation of tribal interests and consolidating control within the regime (Clark 2010: 107, Burrowes 1987: 57-60, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 107). The appointed cabinet comprised mostly of technocrats.⁷⁴⁴ While Ibrahim al-Hamdi as well as his successor, Ahmad al Ghasmi were assassinated on 10/11/1977 and 24/06/1978 respectively, it is unclear who exactly was responsible for the assassinations.⁷⁴⁵ Because unlike the personnel, the power structure of the regime did not change significantly, we do not consider the two assassination attempts regime changes. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

07/17/1978 End Military Autocracy/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: The four-member Presidential Council, which briefly governed the regime from 1974 to 1978 following the assassinations of previous leaders, appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Ali Abdullah Saleh as president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Burrowes 1987: 92-93). The post-1978 regime is considered different from the 1974-78 regime because Saleh began almost immediately to change

⁷⁴⁴ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Yemen/The-age-of-imperialism#ref964972>

⁷⁴⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen_Arab_Republic#Republic_after_war,_1970s

the identity of those who could influence policy, reducing the military's role and incorporating sheikhs. Beginning in late 1978, he purged important officers, narrowing the faction of the military included in the inner circle. He brought back to influences sheikhs who had been excluded since 1974 and gave his family and tribe a privileged place in decision making, distribution, and command positions in the military (Burrowes 1987: 94-130, Clark 2010: 122). Starting in 1979, Saleh initiated the establishment of institutions aimed at enabling broader political engagement for ordinary citizens (Burrowes 1987: 112-131, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 107-108). In 1980 Salih created the political party the General People's Congress (GPC). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 1988. Thereafter, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. As classified by FH for 1978-183, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. According to FH, for the rest of the regime period under consideration, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

05/22/1990 End Yemen, North [Military (Personalist) Autocracy]: Unification as Republic of Yemen .

For the time after 05/22/1990, see **Yemen**.

Yemen, South

[officially known as The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen; also known as Yemen and formerly known as Aden]

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 01/19/1839]: South Yemen, formerly known as Aden, was annexed by the British on 01/19/1839 and subsequently partitioned into two distinct administrative regions: the Aden Hinterland and Aden Colony. Both regions fell under British Indian jurisdiction during Yemen's colonial history (Ingrams 1938, Robbins 1939).⁷⁴⁶ The Aden hinterland (the territory north and

⁷⁴⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Yemen#British_rule

northeast of what was later affirmed the Aden Colony) was declared a British Protectorate in 1873, yet its boundaries were not precisely demarcated (Ingrams 1938). The hinterland was not administered directly by Aden but was tied to Britain by treaties of protection with local rulers of traditional polities.⁷⁴⁷ Aden remained under direct British rule and administered by the government of the Bombay Presidency until 1932.⁷⁴⁸ In 1932, Aden was ruled as part of British India officially known as the Chief Commissioner's Province of Aden when its administration was put under the direct control of the Viceroy of India.⁷⁴⁹ Since Aden was directly ruled it is classified as a de facto-colony. In accordance with the Aden Colony Order, 1936, Aden became a Crown Colony under the full responsibility of the Colonial Office, effective 04/01/1937.⁷⁵⁰ The Aden Colony encompassed a limited area of 75-80 square miles, comprising Aden, Little Aden, Shaikh Othman, and Perim (Robbins 1939). When Aden was declared a colony in 1937, its hinterland became subject to distinctive jurisdiction issued by the Aden Protectorate Order of 1937 (Robbins 1939). Hence, more precisely it was partially both, a protectorate and a colony. Political liberties were not present until 1945 and not really present from 1946 onward according to V-Dem's PCLI. Until 1946, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. LIED does not provide any data for this colonial time.

07/20/1955 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date the colony's constitution changed and the seats in the Legislative Council which was created in 1947 increased from 16 to 18 with four seats being elected. In the same year the first legislative elections were held. However, after the elections protests and claims for independence appeared. Elections were also held in 1959 with 12 elected members and in 1964. The elections were held under strong voter restrictions.⁷⁵¹ LIED does not provide any data for this colonial time. In 1959, six states within the Aden protectorate were joined under the Federation of the Arab Emirates of the South. On

⁷⁴⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Yemen#British_rule

⁷⁴⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chief_Commissioner%27s_Province_of_Aden

⁷⁴⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chief_Commissioner%27s_Province_of_Aden

⁷⁵⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chief_Commissioner%27s_Province_of_Aden

⁷⁵¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legislative_Council_of_Aden;

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1955_Aden_Legislative_Council_election

04/04/1962 nine formerly protected states were added and the State of Aden, formerly Aden Colony, joined the Federation on 01/18/1963 establishing the Federation of South Arabia with Aden as its capital city. In June 1963, the National Liberation Front for South Yemen (NLF) was formed in opposition to the British government.⁷⁵² The NLF started an armed struggle with the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) known as the Aden Emergency on 10/14/1963 against British control. Following the Emergency period, the NLF rebranded itself as the National Front and ultimately played a central role in forming the Yemeni Socialist Party, which later governed the nation as a Marxist-Leninist state under a single-party system.⁷⁵³ Political liberties were not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI. Until 1959, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1960 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

11/30/1967 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start One-Party Autocracy [as independent country]: On this date, South Yemen gained independence from the United Kingdom. British troops completed their withdrawal from the territory on 11/29/1967. Following the British departure, the NLF seized power.⁷⁵⁴ Quathan Muhammad al-Shabii became the country's first president leading the NLF. In 1967 Universal suffrage was introduced, but no elections were held.⁷⁵⁵ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

06/22/1969 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Communist Ideocracy: Al-Shabii held the presidency until this date, when a hard-line Marxist group from within his own NLF led by Abdul Fattah Ismail and Salim Rubai Ali seized control in an event known as the Corrective Move.⁷⁵⁶ A new

⁷⁵² <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/middle-eastnorth-africapersian-gulf-region/british-south-arabian-federation-1959-1967/>

⁷⁵³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Yemen#1969_establishment_of_a_Marxist-Leninist_state

⁷⁵⁴ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/middle-eastnorth-africapersian-gulf-region/british-south-arabian-federation-1959-1967/>

⁷⁵⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

⁷⁵⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Yemen; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corrective_Move

constitution was proclaimed on 11/30/1970 which changed the name of the country to People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) (Ismael 1981). PDRY became a Marxist–Leninist one-party state in 1969 and was the only communist state to be established in the Arab world.⁷⁵⁷ On 06/26/1978 Salim Rubai Ali was overthrown and executed allegedly for his role in assassinating the president of North Yemen. Ali Nasir Muhammad became head of the presidential council in the aftermath.⁷⁵⁸ On 12/18/1978 all political parties were amalgamated into the National Liberation Front, renamed the Yemeni Socialist Party in 1978. The first post-independence parliamentary elections were held in South Yemen between 12/16 and 12/18/1978. They saw 175 candidates (all affiliated with the Yemeni Socialist Party, the sole legal party) contest the 111 seats.⁷⁵⁹ On 12/27/1978 Ali Nasir Muhammad was forced to resign by Abdul Fattah Ismail who formed a new military-party based junta. However, this is classified as a continuation of the previous communist regime. On 04/02/1980 Abdul Fattah Ismail was forced to resign after a confrontation with his prime minister. The Soviets wanted him to remain as figure head in the government to starve off a bloody conflict between the two factions.⁷⁶⁰ On 01/13/1986 a violent struggle between supporters of Nasir and opponents became a civil war. In the midst of the fight, a violent coup purged Nasir and others. Haidar Abu Bakr al-Attas claimed executive power in the party and the ruling junta in the aftermath.⁷⁶¹ LIED indicates that no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 1978. Thereafter, both executive and legislative elections were conducted, but they were not classified as multiparty. According to Polity5, until 1977, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1978 to 1985, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. From 1986 onward, the executive faced slight limitations on power. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. In this period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties were absent. From 1969 to 1977 and from 1981 to 1985, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1978 to 1979, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were

⁷⁵⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Yemen

⁷⁵⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Nasir_Muhammad

⁷⁵⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Yemen;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978_South_Yemeni_parliamentary_election

⁷⁶⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Nasir_Muhammad

⁷⁶¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haidar_Abu_Bakr_al-Attas

comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Since 1986, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

05/22/1990 End Yemen, South [Communist Ideocracy]: The Unification of North and South Yemen as Republic of Yemen ended the existence of South Yemen as a separate nation (Clark 2010: 134-40).

For the time after 05/22/1990, see **Yemen**.

Yugoslavia

[the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, which was briefly the new name for rest-Yugoslavia before the state resolved, is handled under the name Yugoslavia]

For the regime period between 01/01/1900 and 12/01/1918 see **Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia**.

12/01/1918 Start Constitutional Monarchy: On this date, Yugoslavia was founded to be a state that unites all South Slavic people. It was also known as Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.⁷⁶² The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was initially governed as a constitutional monarchy with multiparty elections. From the year 1920 onwards, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. No such elections were registered prior to this date. In 1920 male suffrage was introduced (LIED). From 1921 to 1928, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For 1918-1928, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the given period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous since 1919 regarding the status of political liberties.

01/06/1929 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start Autocratic Monarchy: King Aleksandar Karadjordjevic abrogated the constitution on 01/06/1929 and dissolved parliament, declaring a royal dictatorship and engaging in repression of political opposition. Aleksandar reintroduced limited democracy in 1931 and allowed some political parties. However, the regime is still coded as an autocratic monarchy since voters in the elections of 11/08/1931 were presented with a single list of candidates supporting the royal dictatorship of King Alexander. Aleksandar was

⁷⁶² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Yugoslavia

assassinated in 1934, and a three-man regency ruled on behalf of his young son (Sudetic 1994: 28-29, 32-35, Casey et al. 2020: 17). As documented in LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were not held until 1930. Subsequently, both executive and legislative elections were conducted between 1931 and 1934, though they were not classified as multiparty. From 1935 onward, multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted. From 1929 to 1936, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. In 1939 and 1940, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. In 1929, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1930, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1931-1939, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 1940, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present.

03/27/1941 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date young officers overthrew the government and the regency led by Prince Paul of Yugoslavia. They declared a new government under General Dusan Simovic. King Peter II fully assumed his monarchical powers.⁷⁶³ After anti-Axis demonstrations erupted, Germany invaded Yugoslavia.

04/17/1941 End Military Autocracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: On this date, the Yugoslav troops surrendered unconditionally to the German troops after eleven days of fighting. The regime collapsed due to German occupation (Sudetic 1994: 37, Casey et al. 2020: 17). The region that is now Serbia was partitioned among Hungary, Bulgaria, the Independent State of Croatia, Greater Albania, and Montenegro. The remaining area of occupied Serbia was subjected to military control by Nazi Germany, and Serbian puppet governments were established under the leadership of Milan Aćimović and Milan Nedić, with the support of the Yugoslav National Movement (Zbor), a fascist organization

⁷⁶³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yugoslav_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

headed by Dimitrije Ljotić.⁷⁶⁴ For 1941, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For 1942, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1943 and 1944, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. During the German occupation, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent.

10/20/1944 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Communist Ideocracy [as Yugoslavia]: On this date, Belgrade was liberated from German occupation by Soviet and Bulgarian troops, as well as Yugoslav partisans. This marked the end of the occupation for the Serbian territories within Yugoslavia. On 03/07/1945, and during the retreat of the German forces, a government dominated by Tito and the communists was established (Petrovich 1947: 508-9, Van Dyke 1947: 375). With the German surrender on 05/09/1945, the occupation also ended for the remaining territories of Yugoslavia, including Istria and Slovenia. Constituent Assembly elections were held in November 1945 in which only People's Front candidates could run. The non-communist ministers resigned in protest, and several non-communist parties boycotted the election. It resulted in a communist dominated government led by Tito as prime minister. The assembly ended the monarchy (Sudetic 1992, Petrovich 1947: 515-18, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 92). In 1945 female suffrage was introduced, but de facto women first could vote in 1990.⁷⁶⁵ On 11/29/1945 the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with Serbia being one of its six constituent republics was proclaimed. Women were allowed to vote with the Communist constitution of Yugoslavia.⁷⁶⁶ According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held during this period, but they were not categorized as multiparty. From 1945 to 1950, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. In 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from the Soviet-led Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties (Cominform), following disagreements regarding policies between Stalin and Tito. Yugoslavia

⁷⁶⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serbia#The_Balkan_Wars_and_World_War_I;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_Yugoslavia

⁷⁶⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

⁷⁶⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

then adopted a non-aligned stance in the cold war.⁷⁶⁷ On 01/13/1953 the Yugoslav Constitutional Law came into effect, amending the Constitution by further establishing workers' control over enterprises, as well as expanding local governmental power.⁷⁶⁸ Between 1953 and 1979, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. On 04/07/1963 the second constitution of Yugoslavia came into effect, dividing the Federal Assembly into a total of five chambers, making it the only [pentacameral](#) legislature. The constitution also introduced term limits to executive positions and extended human and civil rights.⁷⁶⁹ The fourth and final constitution came into effect 02/21/1974 and introduced extensive protection of the republics' self-management system. It reduced the number of members of the Federal Presidency and ensured equal representation for each republic. Additionally, it proclaimed Josip Broz Tito president for life.⁷⁷⁰ Tito died on 05/04/1980.⁷⁷¹ Since 1980, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. From 1945 to 1962, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 1963-1988, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1989 and 1990, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the communist period, LIED still identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent.

01/20/1990 End Communist Ideocracy [as Yugoslavia]/Start No Central Authority: The Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists ended de facto communist rule in Yugoslavia. While the parts of Yugoslavia did not become independent countries until 1991, since January 1990 there was no de facto rule by a central authority. The commencement of the 14th (extraordinary) Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists marked a significant moment, as the Yugoslav communist party disbanded itself into its constituent republican parties, effectively terminating one-party rule in Yugoslavia. In February 1990, Slovenia and Croatia passed legislation legalizing opposition parties. Subsequently, opposition parties emerged

⁷⁶⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cominform#Expulsion_of_Yugoslavia

⁷⁶⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Yugoslav_constitutional_amendments

⁷⁶⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1963_Yugoslav_Constitution

⁷⁷⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1974_Yugoslav_Constitution

⁷⁷¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Josip_Broz_Tito

victorious in multiparty elections held in Slovenia and Croatia during April-May 1990, leading to the conclusion of communist rule in both regions. Following this, both countries ceased tax contributions to the central government and withdrew their troops from the central government's military operations in Kosovo (Glaurdic 2011: 127-139, Lampe 2000: 325-55). The Slovenian parliament declared full sovereignty in July 1990, and in the same month a constitutional reform in Serbia legalized opposition parties and defined it as *de facto* independent (Glaurdic 2011: 165). While the initial breakaway nations did not achieve formal independence until 1991, the Yugoslav League of Communists and the central government began to lose authority over policymaking in January 1990. By the conclusion of 1990, they had relinquished control over most of the territory that comprised Yugoslavia (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 92). The dominance of Serbia in Yugoslavia began when Slovenia declared its independence in 1991, following the disintegration of the Yugoslav communist party regime (Prunk 2001). According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. For 1991, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

04/27/1992 End No Central Authority/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with only Serbia and Montenegro as part of it, was founded. After the secessions of Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia, the Serbian communist party and its leader Milošević became the dominant force. (Sekelj 2000: 63, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 92, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 57). On 09/24/2000 general elections were held and presidential candidate Vojislav Koštunica defeated Milošević, despite attempted vote rigging. It was the first election of the 40 members of the Chamber of the Republics by direct universal suffrage after the constitution was amended. Koštunica's party Democratic Opposition of Serbia was a wide electoral alliance of political parties in Serbia, intent on ousting the ruling Socialist Party and its leader Milošević.⁷⁷² President Milošević annulled the elections he lost and stayed in power. However, protests spread. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In addition to that, elections were not competitive per LIED. V-Dem's CEI indicates that elections were not

⁷⁷² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Opposition_of_Serbia

really clean since 1993 and that the election in 2000 was of ambiguous cleanliness. According to V-Dem's EF&FI elections have not been really free and fair in this period. Besides, LIED considers the political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI considers them as ambiguous. From 1993 to 1996, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. In 1997 and 1998, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. In 1999, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1992-1999, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

10/05/2000 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: Miners and later other sectors of the populace revolted against Milošević and forced him to resign on this date.⁷⁷³ The Democratic Opposition of Serbia that had won the election took office (Binnendijk/Marovic 2006, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 92).⁷⁷⁴ After the resignation of Milošević, Yugoslavia became part of the UN again in 11/01/2000.⁷⁷⁵ On 07/06/2000, the parliament amended the constitution such that the president would no longer be selected by the parliament but would be directly elected instead. On 02/04/2003 Serbia and Montenegro formed the state union of Serbia and Montenegro (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 57). On 05/21/2006 the people of Montenegro voted for their independence, and on 06/03/2006 it was proclaimed (see Montenegro).⁷⁷⁶ Throughout this era, competitive elections took place under universal suffrage, accompanied by a gradual improvement in press freedom and the protection of civil liberties.⁷⁷⁷ However, according to LIED political liberties were still absent. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI indicates full political liberties since 2001. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In addition to that, LIED confirms the presence of competitive elections since 2000. From 2000 to 2001 ambiguous cleanliness is scored. From 2000 to 2002, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. For the time since 2003 V-Dem' CEI indicates that elections were somewhat clean. Moreover, since 2000 the overall election conditions are classified as somewhat free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. From 2003 to 2006, based on Polity5's evaluation,

⁷⁷³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overthrow_of_Slobodan_Milošević

⁷⁷⁴ <http://tinyurl.com/4y2eg35>; <http://tinyurl.com/8derdce>

⁷⁷⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serbia_and_the_United_Nations

⁷⁷⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serbia_and_Montenegro

⁷⁷⁷ <https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/serbiaandmontenegro/28187.htm>

the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. For the year 2000, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2001 and 2002, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. Nonetheless, reports indicated a lack of independence within the judiciary, which was purportedly influenced by the governing authorities (Piano/Puddington/Rosenberg 2006: 625).

06/03[-05]/2006 End Yugoslavia [Defective Democracy]: The Union of Serbia and Montenegro, formerly known as Yugoslavia, was officially dissolved in 2006.

For the time after 06/03[-05]/2006, see **Montenegro** and **Serbia**.

Zambia

[formerly known as Northern Rhodesia]

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 11/28/1899]: Since around the end of the 19th century, North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia were administered by the charter of the British South Africa Company (BSAC).⁷⁷⁸ On 11/28/1899 North Western Rhodesia with Barotziland officially became a British protectorate by the Barotziland-North Western Rhodesia Order in Council.⁷⁷⁹ On 01/29/1900 North-Eastern Rhodesia officially became a British protectorate by the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council.⁷⁸⁰ On 08/17/1911, they were united as Northern Rhodesia (McCracken 1986, Paxton 1980). While the British legislation “gave it the status of a protectorate” the BSAC charter de facto had features of a charter colony.⁷⁸¹ The colonial economy was based on special treaties concluded with the company in 1898 and 1900, although they were later reduced (McCracken 1986). LIED only provides data from 1911 onwards. Furthermore, it classifies multiparty executive and legislative elections as absent from this point onwards. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem’s PCLI. Both LIED and V-Dem only start to provide data for Zambia since 1911. Since 1911, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted

⁷⁷⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_South_Africa_Company

⁷⁷⁹ <https://bnfa.info/40-2/248-2/>

⁷⁸⁰ <https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/1900-02-15/debates/7361c6a7-ce8b-4433-b398-f85b74fc5824/ForeignJurisdictionAct1890>

⁷⁸¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Rhodesia

by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

04/01/1924 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of British South Africa Company]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Defective Democracy]: On this date, the British South Africa Company was relieved of the administration of the territory by the Crown and Northern Rhodesia was transferred to the control by the Colonial Office (Paxton 1980). Although now officially a British Protectorate, the first years of Colonial Office rule also favored white settlers. Moreover, in 1925, a legislative council was set up. It was presided by the Governor of Northern Rhodesia who was appointed by the British Government.⁷⁸² The electoral franchise system was established in such a way that it almost completely excluded Africans (McCracken 1986). Electors had to be United Kingdom citizens. Additionally, they had to be able to fill out an application form in English and have an annual income of at least £200.⁷⁸³ According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held from 1926 onwards. No executive elections were present. Nor male or female suffrage was introduced as only white settlers were allowed to vote. Therefore, it is only justified to code this period as colonial rule. The protectorate of Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland joined in a Union as part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in August 1953. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was not a sovereign state, and yet it markedly differed from a normal British dependency. It had control over its defense, finance, and trade policies, all areas in which dependent British territories lacked full authority. Although it did not have equal status with the members of the Commonwealth, it enjoyed virtual responsible government. Its affairs were the concern of the Commonwealth Relations Office and its Prime Minister attended the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference (Rosberg 1956: 98-105). According to LIED political liberties were absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as not really present until 1953 and as ambiguous from 1954 onward.

12/31/1963 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved. A nine-month period of internal self-government followed thereafter (Paxton 1980). Nkumbula agreed to work in a coalition with Kaunda as prime minister. The two and their parties worked together until the United National Independence Party (UNIP) gained 55 of the 75 parliamentary seats in a pre-independence election in 1964 with a much wider franchise.⁷⁸⁴ A new UNIP-led

⁷⁸² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governor_of_Northern_Rhodesia

⁷⁸³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Rhodesia#Pre-war

⁷⁸⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Rhodesia#End_of_Federation_and_independence

government was sworn in shortly before the end of January. Governor Evelyn Dennison Hone retained responsibility for foreign affairs, defense and policing.⁷⁸⁵ He fostered a positive working rapport with Kenneth Kaunda, contributing to the groundwork for Northern Rhodesia's independence.⁷⁸⁶ Polity5 doesn't contain a classification for this period. Until 1925, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1926 to 1952, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. The remaining colonial institutions—the functioning judiciary and the governor's reserved powers—paradoxically served as safeguards that bolstered democratic quality during the transition. As long as the British governor retained veto authority over foreign affairs, defense, and policing, and as long as courts operated under an independent common-law framework, UNIP's dominance in the legislative council could not translate immediately into unchecked executive power. Opposition MPs, even if sidelined at the ballot box, still had recourse to the courts if their rights were violated, and the governor retained the theoretical ability to intervene if gross abuses occurred. In other words, these colonial-era checks meant that, despite UNIP's overwhelming majority, there remained at least nominal channels to challenge arbitrary or overtly partisan actions.

10/24/1964 End Electoral Hybrid Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy [as independent country]: On this date Northern Rhodesia was granted independence as the Republic of Zambia (Paxton 1980). Kaunda became the first president of independent Zambia. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the election as not competitive. According to V-Dem's CEI the election was not really clean. V-Dem's EF&FI scores ambiguous overall election conditions. From the beginning autocratic tendencies were evident, especially with regard to the political rights of the opposition.⁷⁸⁷ Therefore, LIED indicates no political liberties for this time. V-Dem's PCLI declares ambiguous political liberties in 1964 and their somewhat presence until 1967. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints

⁷⁸⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1964_Northern_Rhodesian_general_election

⁷⁸⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evelyn_Hone

⁷⁸⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenneth_Kaunda

during this time. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. Between 1964 and 1967, certain V-Dem indicators—particularly measures of electoral competitiveness and executive constraints—could be interpreted as reflecting features of an electoral hybrid regime. Nevertheless, a close reading of the political context and our own observations reveal that these metrics obscure the extent to which the UNIP had already monopolized power from the moment of independence. In practice, opposition parties were systematically marginalized: rival MPs who broke away in early 1965 saw their mandates revoked without due process, and UNIP-affiliated youth militias regularly employed intimidation and violence to prevent meaningful competition. Consequently, the relentless exclusion of dissenting voices and the absence of genuine mechanisms of accountability demonstrate that Zambia functioned as an electoral autocracy from 1964 onward. On 02/28/1967 the by-elections, triggered to replace MPs who had departed from UNIP to establish a new opposition party and subsequently had their mandates revoked, saw widespread intimidation and violence by ruling party (UNIP) activists, resulting in victories for UNIP (Tordoff and Molteno 1974, 23). Further violations of opposition political rights occurred during the following couple of years. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Elections according to LIED were not competitive in the whole regime period. In addition, no real cleanliness scored between 1964 and 1967 following V-Dem's CEI. Furthermore, the overall election conditions are classified as ambiguous during this entire period (V-Dem EF&FI). Per FH's evaluation for 1972, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. LIED states the absence of political liberties, whereas V-Dem's PCLI considers them as ambiguous for the whole time. In the first half of 1968, prior to the December 1968 general election, a number of UP supporters were beaten or stoned by UNIP youths, and some houses were burned (Rasmussen 1969, 414). In August 1968, the UNIP government banned the opposition UP and arrested most of its leaders (Molteno and Scott 1974, 156, Tordoff and Molteno 1974, 27). A number of ANC (the traditional opposition) candidates were prevented from filing their nomination forms prior to the 12/1968 election by UNIP roadblocks and local violence (Molteno/Scott 1974: 164). The 1968 election was thus not free and fair. While GWF identified 02/28/1967 as the point in time when the UNIP-dominated government crossed the fine line between democracy and autocracy, we argue that the UNIP-regime was an electoral autocracy from the start. Based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight

limitations. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

12/08/1972 End Electoral Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: On this date, Zambia became a one-party state led by the United National Independence Party (UNIP). All other political parties were banned. The 1973 constitution, along with the subsequent national elections in December 1973, marked the culmination of the establishment of what was termed a “one-party participatory democracy”.⁷⁸⁸ In July 1990, members of the Kaunda cabinet defected from the regime and entered a coalition with opposition leader Frederick Chiluba, head of the copper workers union. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty until 1990. As classified by FH for 1972-1979, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH, for the years 1980 to 1983, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. According to FH, for 1984-1986, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. Per FH, for the years 1988 to 1990, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties were not really present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. In September 1990, Kaunda agreed to call multiparty elections in October 1991. This move was triggered by immense protest against the government and organization on the side of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD).⁷⁸⁹

10/31/1991 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, the first multi-party elections since 1968 took place. Because the shift to multiparty elections by Kaunda was certainly not voluntary and some accounts stress the size of the protesting events, this regime change event constitutes a borderline case between a popular uprising and an elite concession under mass pressure. Because Kaunda was still in power and could enter the election as an incumbent, we consider the regime change event to be an elite concession under mass pressure. While Kaunda moved to allow multiparty elections, thinking he could win it, the election on 10/30/1991 was won by the opposition and opposition leader Chiluba took power (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 68, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 109, Bjornlund 1992: 405-31,

⁷⁸⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Zambia

⁷⁸⁹ <https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/225530>

Molteno/Scott 1974).⁷⁹⁰ From the start of the new regime there were repeated violations of democratic norms by the MMD, particularly with regard to the opposition. Controversial modifications to the constitution and the imprisonment of political adversaries drew significant criticism, leading some donor nations, such as the United Kingdom and Denmark, to withdraw their financial assistance.⁷⁹¹ Relying on an overwhelming legislative majority, president Chiluba pushed through a series of constitutional amendments on 05/28/1996 that made former president Kenneth Kaunda ineligible to run for office as the new rules required presidential candidates to have two parents holding Zambian citizenship.⁷⁹² On 11/18/1996, general elections were held which were boycotted by the main opposition party, the United National Independence Party, together with five other allied parties.⁷⁹³ President Chiluba easily defeated a weakened and fractured opposition (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 93, Karatnycky 2001). International and domestic observers also noted a number of other irregularities in the conduct of the election. It is generally viewed as not free and fair (Baylies 1997: 113-128, Mbaio 1996: 1-11). General elections were held in December 2001 and even though a variety of parties contested, administrative and credibility problems arose. The newly elected president was Levy Mwanawasa and after a by-election his party got the majority in parliament.⁷⁹⁴ International observers noted “serious irregularities with the campaign and election, including vote rigging, flawed voter registration unequal and biased media coverage and the MMD’s improper use of state resources.”⁷⁹⁵ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections were competitive according to LIED since 1991. V-Dem’s CEI indicates constant ambiguous cleanliness scores since 1991. The overall election conditions are acknowledged as somewhat free and fair until 2014 by V-Dem’s EF&FI. However, LIED indicates no political liberties are present for this time. However, V-Dem’s PCLI indicates somewhat political liberties until 2004. From 2005 to 2008 full political liberties were guaranteed. From 2009 onwards, V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were somewhat present again. On 11/28/2006, Mwanawasa was re-elected as president. According to observers of the Commonwealth, the electors were able to exercise their democratic rights freely and fairly. Although there were some logistical problems and instances of violence of the police towards

⁷⁹⁰https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Zambia#:~:text=The%20politics%20of%20Zambia%20takes,of%20a%20multi%2Dparty%20system.

⁷⁹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Zambia#Frederick_Chiluba_and_the_MMD

⁷⁹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Zambia#Frederick_Chiluba_and_the_MMD

⁷⁹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Zambian_general_election

⁷⁹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Zambia#2001%E2%80%932008

⁷⁹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_Zambian_general_election

the opposition, these can be seen as isolated events. Overall, the results reflected the will of the Zambian people.⁷⁹⁶ In this term, Mwanawasa's politics are seen as more democratic and in accordance with the rule of law, compared to Chiluba. He died after suffering a stroke in 2008, leading to new elections the same year. On 10/30/2008, elections were held after Mwanawasa's death in office. Mwanawasa's vice president Rupiah Banda was elected president. Sata contended that the elections were marred by fraud and lodged a legal challenge seeking a recount. However, in March 2009, his plea was dismissed by the Supreme Court (Puddington 2010). Several instances of violence were recorded and riots broke out after the results were announced.⁷⁹⁷ Irregularities within the electoral process and the failure to reform such have paved the way for vote rigging, unequal access to resources by campaigners, flawed voter registration, unequal and biased media coverage and corruption have defined and led to the constant outbreak of electoral violence during elections over the past decades (Puddington 2015). In 2011 new presidential elections were held which were won by Michael Sata. After Sata's death in 2014, Guy Scott became interim president before new elections were held in 2015.⁷⁹⁸ According to FH, for the years 1991 and 1992, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. As classified by FH for 1993-1995, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. Per FH's evaluation for 1996-2001, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH, for the years 2002 to 2005, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. As classified by FH for the rest of this regime period, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. Until 2000 and from 2013 to 2015, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. From 2001 to 2004, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. In this period Zambia is a borderline case between an electoral hybrid regime and a defective democracy.

01/24/2015 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date Edgar Chagwa Lungu became the new president. In 2016, the new president voted in favor of a long-pending

⁷⁹⁶ <https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/ZM/zambia-final-report-general-elections-commonwealth-1/view>

⁷⁹⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Zambian_presidential_election

⁷⁹⁸ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zambia#Politics>

constitutional amendment, which decides that non-controversial issues are debated in parliament while for controversial issues referendums are held. In 2016 regular elections were held and Edgar Lungu was reelected again despite the opposition's accusations of irregularities, which were rejected by the governing party Patriotic Front.⁷⁹⁹ In the same year legislative elections were held with the PF winning 80 seats and the opposition party UNPD winning 58 seats. The elections were accompanied by violence between the PF and the UPND. According to FH, the opposition faced severe repression during this time, as their freedom of expression and right to protest have been limited. Moreover, the government passed a law to restrict the opposition's activities. The media were also concerned by these repressive measures as the Post and other critical media were cut down.⁸⁰⁰ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 2016 no electoral competitiveness is scored (LIED). In 2017 the opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema was arrested. After several attacks in the country a restrictive 90-day state of emergency was declared, permitting a more severe control over the media.⁸⁰¹ Ever since 2016 not really cleanliness for the elections is scored (V-Dem CEI). Moreover, since 2016 not real freedom and fairness for the elections are stated (V-Dem EF&FI). Per FH, for 2015, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. According to FH, for the rest of the regime period, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. Regarding the political liberties LIED classifies them as absent. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI remained its somewhat present outcomes, except in 2020 they were classified as ambiguous. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. In 2016 and 2019, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. In 2017, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. In 2018, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. In 2020, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. General elections on

⁷⁹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Zambia#2015-present

⁸⁰⁰ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/zambia/freedom-world/2017>

⁸⁰¹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/zambia/freedom-world/2018>

08/12/2021, elections indicated a step towards a more democratic and less autocratic regime.⁸⁰² Hichilema was elected president over the incumbent president Edgar Lungu with a voter turnout of 70% marking the third transition of power since the countries' first multi-party elections in 1991 (Resnick 2022: 70-84, Lansford 2021). Yet, although the outcomes were deemed trustworthy, the competitions were also tainted by violence and the biased application of the law to obstruct the opposition.⁸⁰³ Further, active manipulation of the voters' roll was also reported.⁸⁰⁴

06/14/2022 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, President Hakainde Hichilema signed into law the reform of the Public Order Act, a landmark piece of legislation that dismantled a central instrument of political repression used under previous administrations.⁸⁰⁵ The original act, dating back to colonial rule, had long enabled the police to prohibit opposition gatherings, deny protest permits, and restrict political campaigning. The amended version eliminated prior police approval for public meetings and introduced judicial oversight, thereby enhancing protections for the freedoms of assembly and expression. This legislative change constituted a clear institutional break with the clear autocratic logic of the preceding regime. It marked the first moment since the democratic opening in the early 1990s that opposition forces were guaranteed equal legal access to the public sphere and electoral campaigning. The reform allowed for the unimpeded mobilization of civil society and political parties, significantly improving the de facto competitiveness of the political system. No data has been provided by LIED since the year 2022. According to V-Dem's CEI cleanliness was ambiguous between 2022 and 2023. The overall election conditions are somewhat free and fair since 2021 (V-Dem's EF&FI). As per FH, for this regime period, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. Moreover, according to V-Dem's PCLI full political liberties were achieved since 2022. Polity5 doesn't provide data for this period. In 2022, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. In 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Krennerich 1999)

⁸⁰² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Zambian_general_election

⁸⁰³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/zambia/freedom-world/2022>

⁸⁰⁴ <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-dashboard/ZMB>

⁸⁰⁵ <https://www.zambiamonitor.com/hichilema-urged-to-repeal-replace-public-order-act-as-world-press-freedom-day-draws-near/>

Zanzibar

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start:10/19/1856]: Zanzibar was incorporated into Oman's overseas territory in 1698 after Oman's victory over the Portuguese in Mombasa. Said bin Sultan moved to Zanzibar in the early 1800s and established a ruling Arab elite, promoted clove plantations with slave labor, and attracted Indian traders.⁸⁰⁶ His sons Majid and Thuwaini fought over control, leading to the separation of Oman and Zanzibar. On 10/19/1856 the Sultanate of Zanzibar was created.⁸⁰⁷ Zanzibar then became a British protectorate on 07/01/1890 after the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty between the United Kingdom and Germany.⁸⁰⁸ In 1886, the British government encouraged William Mackinnon to increase British influence in the region, leading to the formation of the British East Africa Association and the Imperial British East Africa Company. However, the company failed, and the British government proclaimed the East Africa Protectorate in 1895. In 1902, the administration was transferred to the Colonial Office, and Uganda was incorporated into the protectorate.⁸⁰⁹ Zanzibar is in this period a borderline case between a de facto colony and a protectorate with a say in its inner affairs. During the British rule, they exercised their power thru an indirect rule. The Sultanate was allowed to continue, however, it had less power.⁸¹⁰ V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as absent until 1952 and as not really present from 1953 onward. In 1963, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, but it does not include Zanzibar in its data before 1963 and between 1965 to 2024. Until 1925, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1926 to 1959, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

12/10/1963 Continuation Autocratic Monarchy [as independent country]: On this date, the United Kingdom terminated the protectorate over Zanzibar, which had been in place since 1890. Although the United Kingdom never had sovereignty over Zanzibar, the Zanzibar Act of 1963

⁸⁰⁶ <https://academic.oup.com/book/33093/chapter-abstract/282271632?redirectedFrom=fulltext>

⁸⁰⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_sultans_of_Zanzibar

⁸⁰⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heligoland%E2%80%93Zanzibar_Treaty

⁸⁰⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultanate_of_Zanzibar

⁸¹⁰ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sultanate-of-Zanzibar>

ended the protectorate status and allowed for Zanzibar to have full self-government as an independent country within the Commonwealth. Zanzibar became an independent monarchy within the Commonwealth under the Sultan.⁸¹¹ According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were absent in 1963.

01/23/1964 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start One-Party Autocracy: On this date, a month after Zanzibar's independence, a rebellion ousted the monarchy and brought a repressive autocratic regime led by the Afro-Shirazi Party to power (Lansford 2012a: 1411, Zolberg 1968: 82). After the Zanzibar Revolution, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP)⁸¹² and Umma parties formed a Revolutionary Council to serve as an interim government, with Abeid Karume as the President and Abdulrahman Mohammad Babu as the Minister of External Affairs. The country was renamed the People's Republic of Zanzibar, and the new government immediately banned the Sultan, as well as the Zanzibar Nationalist Party and Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party.⁸¹³ In this period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties were absent.

04/26/1964 End Zanzibar [One-Party Autocracy]: On this date, Zanzibar merged with mainland Tanganyika. The new country was then named the “United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar”.⁸¹⁴ ASP leaders agreed to union with Tanganyika to buttress their own position in Zanzibar. The union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika consolidated ASP's control over Zanzibar. Irregularities and violence have continued to plague Zanzibari elections.⁸¹⁵ In 1964, Tanu's tolerance of opposition also declined. It began to coerce the civil servants and police to join Tanu, and citizens had to produce a TANU card to get medical care or crop selling privileges (Burton/Charton-Bigot 2010: 208). In 1964, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. FH does not provide data for Zanzibar.

For the time after 04/26/1964, see **Tanzania**.

Zimbabwe

[formerly known as Southern Rhodesia]

⁸¹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultanate_of_Zanzibar

⁸¹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afro-Shirazi_Party

⁸¹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Republic_of_Zanzibar

⁸¹⁴ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tanzania#Modern>

⁸¹⁵ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2843.htm>

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 10/29/1889]: At the beginning of the 20th century, Zimbabwe (Mashonaland and Matabeleland) was administered by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) as Southern Rhodesia as a British colony. This arrangement followed the Rudd Concessions, a treaty signed under pressure by Lobengula, King of Ndebele (Matabele) in 1888, granting Cecil Rhodes, founder of the BSAC, exclusive control over metal and mineral rights, as well as commercial and legal powers in exchange for British protection, payments, and weapons. Based on this treaty, Cecil Rhodes received a charter from the British government on 10/29/1889 allowing him to establish the BSAC, modelled on the British and Dutch East India companies (Roberts 1986).⁸¹⁶ The BSAC had the authority to raise its police force, create settlements, and govern Zimbabwe on behalf of Britain. In 1895, the BSAC officially renamed the region as Southern Rhodesia. The Southern Rhodesian order-in-council of 1898 in the British government established the colony's governance and remained in effect until 1923 when the BSAC's rule ended, and Southern Rhodesia gained self-government. Moreover, it was a compromise between business and imperial interests, resulting in a settler colony characterized by land seizures, segregation in governance, denying African political participation (Mlambo 2014, Raftopoulos/Mlambo 2009). On 10/10/1898, an all-white Southern Rhodesian legislative council was introduced as the governing body of the BSAC. Legislative council elections were held on 04/17/1899, marking the first election in the colony. The council consisted of at least ten voting members: the Southern Rhodesia administrator, five members nominated by the BSAC, and four members elected by registered voters. The right to vote was limited to British subjects, male, aged 21 years or older, literate, and meeting specific financial requirements. No political parties existed at the time, and candidates ran independently.⁸¹⁷ According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. In 1919 restricted suffrage was introduced (for whites only).⁸¹⁸ However, no universal suffrage and voting rights for the native population were present. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

⁸¹⁶ <https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/queen-victoria-britain-approves-charter-rhodes>

10/01/1923 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy]/Start Right-wing (Racial) Autocracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom (Monarchical) Defective Democracy]: On this date, the British government formally assumed control of Southern Rhodesia from the BSAC and integrated it into the British Empire after a referendum on 10/27/1922 (Day 1969). In the referendum, only sixty members of the 900.000 African population were eligible to vote. The 1923 constitution granted significant self-government to the Southern Rhodesian prime minister, but foreign policy and specific legislation affecting Africans to conditions or restrictions not applying to Europeans were subject to British government veto (Martin/Johnson 1981, Day 1969, Mlambo 2014). Moreover, a government was established under a British governor, assisted by an executive council and a legislature (McCracken 1986, Steinberg 1966). First general elections under the new constitution took place on 04/29/1924.⁸¹⁹ However, only white settlers formed the government, excluding any native population from exercising power.⁸²⁰ On 08/01/1953, the British government established the Central African Federation (CAF) comprising Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland. In the preceding Southern Rhodesian federation referendum on 04/09/1953, only 429 Africans were eligible to vote (Martin/Johnson 1981). As it was not a sovereign entity, the constitutional status of Southern Rhodesia as a self-governing entity was not affected.⁸²¹ The federation had a two-tier system of government in which federal administrative posts, such as governor and parliament, were replicated at the territorial level. While the territorial government had autonomy over local matters, including African affairs, the federal government was responsible for defense and foreign policy. African representation in the federal assembly was severely limited, and they were allocated only six representatives, two for each territory, of the 35 seats (Raftopoulos/Mlambo 2009). On 09/12/1957, the Southern Rhodesian National Congress (SRANC), the first nationalist African party, was formed but banned again in 1959. The same year, Prime Minister Edgar Whitehead declared a state of emergency, and 500 leaders and members of the SANC were arrested (Day 1969, Martin/Johnson 1981). The SANC was succeeded by the National Democratic Party (NDP) on 01/01/1960, advocating for African rights, one man, one vote, and a constitutional conference. However, the NDP was banned in 1961 and succeeded by the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) (Raftopoulos/Mlambo 2009). On 07/26/1961, a new constitution was approved in a referendum. It gave Southern Rhodesia almost complete internal autonomy (Crawford 2006). The new electoral system

⁸¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1924_Southern_Rhodesian_general_election

⁸²⁰ <https://www.britannica.com/topic/British-South-Africa-Company#ref29434>

⁸²¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federation_of_Rhodesia_and_Nyasaland

purportedly widened the franchise for Africans by creating a ‘B Roll’ with lower qualifications. It also provided for an enlargement of the Rhodesian parliament from 30 to 65 members, 15 of whom would be elected by B Roll voters (Raftopoulos/Mlambo 2009). General elections under the new constitution were held in 1962. However, they were boycotted by many black Africans many of whom did not qualify to vote under the constitution anyway.⁸²² The federation was dissolved on 12/31/1963 and on 10/24/1964, the country was renamed Rhodesia. From then on, the country was de facto independent (Steinberg 1966). On 11/11/1965 a unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia followed. In 1964, Ian Smith became Prime Minister and led the white minority government, a position he held until 1979. Under him, independence was declared, and the Bush War took place.⁸²³ On 03/02/1970 a new constitution was adopted. General elections were held on 04/10/1970 in which the Rhodesian Front Party won 50 of the 66 seats. On 05/28/1970 the new bicameral Parliament was opened by the president, replacing the unicameral Legislative Assembly.⁸²⁴ Britain, however, declared the regime and independence as illegal (Paxton 1980). In 1978 universal suffrage was introduced.⁸²⁵ A draft constitution was accepted by the white electorate in a referendum in 1979. In April 1979 general elections were held under a restricted ‘whites-only’ franchise for the 72 black seats in the 100-seat Parliament. The United African National Council (UANC) won 51 of the 72 seats and Bishop Abel Muzorewa became prime minister of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe on 06/01/1979. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held, which contradicts the findings of LIED, because it only classifies multiparty legislative elections up to 1965. During the entire time the elections were not competitive following LIED. Between 1923 and 1928, 1933 and 1953, 1958 to 1965 and 1970 to 1979 the elections were somewhat clean. For the remaining years the electoral cleanliness is considered ambiguous. According to V-Dem’s EF&FI the elections were free and fair from 1923 to 1927. For the following five years somewhat freedom and fairness are scored. Between 1933 and 1953 the overall conditions were free and fair back again before they turned back to somewhat free and fair outcomes until 1957. In a period of seven years the country achieved free and fair elections again. Since 1965 the elections have been somewhat free and fair. Nevertheless, no political liberties were achieved during this regime period, therefore the classification as electoral oligarchy can be confirmed (LIED). Per FH, from 1972 to 1977, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. As classified by FH for 1978, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we

⁸²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1962_Southern_Rhodesian_general_election

⁸²³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ian_Smith

⁸²⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliament_of_Zimbabwe

⁸²⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

interpret as rather not free. Per FH's scoring for 1979, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. For 1923 and 1924, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. Between 1925 and 1963, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. For remainder the given timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent. Polity5 doesn't entail data for this period. Until 1963, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

12/21/1979 End Right-wing (Racial) Autocracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date the Lancaster House Agreement was signed.⁸²⁶ This concluded the constitutional conference in Lancaster House between the government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia (led by Bishop Muzowera), the British Government and the Patriotic Front (led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, the leaders of the rebel fractions ZANU and ZAPU) to end the Rhodesian Bush War. The agreement consisted of Zimbabwe's temporary return to colonial status under the British, which were to oversee the next election as well as the ceasefire. As the return to colonialism was considered as purely temporary, we argue that this regime period is better classified as a non-electoral transitional regime, than being a case of indirect colonial rule. As the regime change itself is clearly marked by negotiation between different groups (both internally and internationally), we consider it a negotiated transition and not a foreign intervention. Elections took place on 02/14/1980 and 03/04/1980. The newly formed parliament (House of Assembly) was designed to consist of 100 members. Of these, 80 would be elected proportionally by province, with all adult citizens participating in a common roll. Additionally, 20 members would be elected in single-member constituencies, but only by white voters on a separate roll.⁸²⁷ The result was a victory of Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) won 57 of the 80 black seats (Paxton 1980). Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front won all 20 of the white roll seats, with most of its candidates running unopposed. Increasing tensions between the black majority and the white minority led to civil war. The elections were clearly not fair. The electoral regime still had a bias towards the white minority. Conversely, onlookers noted extensive violence and coercion against non-white voters by ZANU

⁸²⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lancaster_House_Agreement

⁸²⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1980_Southern_Rhodesian_general_election

combatants and supporters. The trend of violence against dissenters has persisted ever since (Kriger 2003: 311, Norman 2004: 84-87, 95-96, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 109). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For these elections universal suffrage was present for the first time per LIED. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for the year 1980 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. For the period under consideration, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

04/18/1980 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy: Zimbabwe became an independent state under the rule of ZANU and Mugabe. Its independence was recognized by the United Kingdom. One of the most contentious issues during this period was land redistribution. Land was a key source of tension, with many white-owned farms still in the hands of a few landowners, while the majority of the population had limited access to arable land. Among the earliest and most egregious displays of the new regime's brutality were the Gukurahundi massacres in Matabeleland, claiming approximately 20,000 lives, predominantly from the Ndebele minority.⁸²⁸ The formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999, by a wide range of civic movements, led to the first opposition party that posed a serious threat to ZANU-PF rule.⁸²⁹ The outcomes of successive elections during the period from 2000 to 2018 were highly contested, while the elections themselves were marked by gross human rights violations (particularly in 2002 and 2008) and election irregularities. The 2013 election was characterized by more subtle forms of intimidation and violence.⁸³⁰ On 11/06/2017, Mugabe dismissed Mnangagwa Emmerson as vice-president, in a move that positioned First Lady Grace Mugabe to succeed the aging president.⁸³¹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED no competitive elections were held during the entire time. Until 1985, not really cleanliness outcomes are scored. Between 1986 and 1989, no cleanliness was given. From 1990 to 1999 the elections changed back to not really cleanliness. Since 2000 the country's elections are classified as not clean (V-Dem's CEI). Regarding the overall elections conditions by V-Dem's EF&FI, they are classified as ambiguous between 1980 and 1999. From 2000 to 2007 no real freedom and fairness is scored. Between 2008 and 2012 the overall conditions are stated as not free and

⁸²⁸ <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/ZWE>

⁸²⁹ <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/ZWE>

⁸³⁰ <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/ZWE>

⁸³¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emmerson_Mnangagwa

fair. Since 2013 the overall conditions are classified as ambiguous. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for the year 1980 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. As per FH, for 1981 and 1982, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. As classified by FH from 1983 to 1998, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. According to FH's classification for the years 1999 to 2014, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Per FH's evaluation for 2015 and 2016, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH for 2017, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Besides, according to LIED political liberties were absent for the entire time. V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as ambiguous until 1999, from 2010 to 2015 and in 2017. For the other years they were not really present. According to Polity5, from 1980 to 1982, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. From 1983 to 1986, the executive's constraints were categorized as Intermediate Category 2, between slight and substantial limitations. From 1987 to 2000, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 2001 to 2008, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. From 2009 to 2012, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. From 2013 to 2018, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. Until 1988, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1988 to 1999, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 2000 to 2002 and from 2009 to 2016, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

11/21/2017 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, following nationwide protests in 2016, a military coup took place. It forced Mugabe to step down after he dismissed his Vice-President, and he was replaced by Mnangagwa. Mnangagwa was also

a leading member of ZANU–PF and a longtime ally of Mugabe.⁸³² However, his appointment was not in accordance with the constitution.⁸³³ Since the military launched a coup but did not take over the new regime is classified as a non-electoral transitional regime and not a military autocracy.⁸³⁴ According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. This, however, is contradicted by our observations. Per FH’s evaluation for 2018, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem’s PCLI is categorized by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties, indicating an intermediate state between present and absent.

07/30/2018 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, general elections were held. The 2018 elections were historic, as they were the first ones in which Mugabe did not participate. It saw the ZANU-PF getting control of the parliament (again), and Emmerson Mnangagwa victorious in the presidential election beating the young MDC-A leader, Nelson Chamisa.⁸³⁵ The elections showed competitive campaigning and peaceful voting but fell short in key areas. There were deficiencies in legal recourse, equal suffrage, and voter registration. The pre-election environment was marred by biased state media, misuse of state resources, and an electoral commission lacking impartiality. Final results lacked transparency and errors were abundant. Post-election, political freedoms were restricted, security forces used excessive force, and human rights abuses occurred. As classified by FH for 2018 and 2019, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. According to FH’s classification for the rest of the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. In addition to that LIED confirms that political liberties were absent. Following V-Dem’s PCLI their presence was ambiguous in 2018, 2019 and 2023 and changed to not really present from 2020 to 2022. From 2019 to 2022, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. In 2023, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. These shortcomings mean the 2018 elections did not meet international standards (Brok 2018). The current government

⁸³² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emmerson_Mnangagwa

⁸³³ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zimbabwe#History>

⁸³⁴ <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/ZWE>

⁸³⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_Zimbabwean_general_election; <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/ZWE>

has predominantly upheld the legal, administrative, and security structures inherited from the Mugabe era. Despite an initial phase of enhancement, it has intensified repression to solidify its control.⁸³⁶ In the general elections on 08/23/2023 Mnangagwa was reelected as president.⁸³⁷ The elections were overshadowed by claims of intimidation, electoral irregularities, and violence. Persistent issues, including the need for electoral reforms and unfair voter registration processes, remained unaddressed.⁸³⁸ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED affirms that no competitiveness for the elections is scored. In addition, no cleanliness is given, according to V-Dem's CEI. Moreover, since 2018 the elections are not really free and fair. Polity5 doesn't entail data for this period.

Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

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⁸³⁶ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/zimbabwe>

⁸³⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Zimbabwean_general_election

⁸³⁸ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/zimbabwe/freedom-world/2024>

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